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ABSTRACT

Land use law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the
world around us. In doing so, it shapes our relationships not only with the people around us,
but with the places we inhabit and encounter. This dissertation examines how land use law
structures the relations between people and the ‘more-than-human world’ to uphold the
ownership model of property relations and to privilege particular forms of land use. Through
documentary and interview-based qualitative research, it presents an eco-relational
examination of one of the most contentious land uses in Ontario – aggregate mineral
extraction.

The primacy of private ownership in land use decision-making has particular spatial,
temporal, social and ecological consequences for the places and communities involved in
land use conflicts. As certain forms of land use are privileged through law and legal process,
other relations with place fall outside the boundaries of the ownership model of property
relations and are deemed less legally significant. Nevertheless, land use conflicts continue to
arise because people routinely assert forms of interest in land and resources they do not own.
These ‘more-than-ownership’ relations challenge the presumptive detachment of people from
the places they live in, work with, and love. By examining how such relations are imagined,
articulated and asserted through a place-based relational framework, this dissertation
demonstrates their potential to disrupt the power of private ownership to determine whether
and how land should be used.

Realizing environmentally just land use decision-making requires a transformative shift in
legal property relations to de-centre private ownership and foreground a much broader range
of people-place relations. This includes reconceptualizing ownership to incorporate notions
of reciprocity and responsibility to the broader set of ecological, physical and material
networks of relation that make up a particular place. By changing the way we think about
ownership we can change the way we make decisions about land use. In doing so, we have
the opportunity to reshape our relations with the places we inhabit, and with each other.
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Chapter One: Introduction – Defining and Mapping the Project
We need to take our traditional concepts like property, and ask
what patterns of relationship among people and the material
world we want, what patterns seem true to both integrity and
integration. Those questions do not necessarily preclude a
concept of property, but they imply a focus not on limits but on
forms of interaction and responsibility for their consequences.1

1. Prelude
On a crisp winter afternoon in 2009, I happened upon an article about a proposal for an open
pit gravel mine in Melancthon Township, Ontario.2 It described growing local opposition to a
proposal to site the largest quarry in Canada in the heart of Ontario’s potato farmland, among
the rolling highlands between Toronto and the Bruce Peninsula extending out into Georgian
Bay and Lake Huron. I read the article at the kitchen table of the farm my in-laws own,
realizing that the proposed site was just down the road.

Before sitting down to read the article, I had never given much thought to where the materials
that build roads and subway tunnels came from. I had noticed quarries along Ontario’s
highways, but rarely made the connection between them and the concrete foundations of
houses, the towers of Toronto’s skyline, or the highways themselves. I had never heard of
aggregate minerals or karst rock and knew little about the nature of water tables or the
different types of soil scattered throughout the province. The article piqued my interest both
as a lawyer interested in land use and environmental issues, and as someone with these local
landscapes imprinted on my heart.

Our family spends a lot of time at that farm. Two years later, my partner and I were married
there on a wild and stormy Labour Day weekend. But the farm was not my first experience
with the highlands of Dufferin and Grey counties. This place found its way into my life much
earlier. As a child I spent summer weekends just across Highway 10 at my great
grandfather’s goat farm, where he and his partner retired after my grandfather took over the
Jennifer Nedelsky, “Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self” (1990) 30 Representations 162 at 184.
Ben Rayner, “Limestone Quarry Threatens Prime Farm Land”, Toronto Star (6 December 2009), online:
<https://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2009/12/06/limestone_quarry_threatens_prime_farm_land.html>.
1
2
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family auto repair shop in downtown Toronto. I learned how to feed baby goats and took
chilly swims in the forest pond. I clearly remember the smell of the porch where everyone
took off their barn clothes and boots, and the view from that old farmhouse kitchen, with the
golden light of late summer evenings spreading across rolling hills.

It is a place I now understand to be subject to ongoing land claims by the Haudenosaunee
Peoples, and connected to the territory of several other Indigenous nations through habitat
and water connectivity. These intersecting and overlapping Indigenous systems of land use
regulation are now overlaid with colonial law as a result of the establishment of settler
farming communities and the colonial division of collective land into freehold parcels. The
area has been a settler agricultural community for several generations, and small scale farm
operations still characterize the Township, which has one of the lowest income levels in the
province. However, growing populations of amenity-seeking exurbanites and recreational
tourists like my in-laws and my family now inhabit the surrounding areas, zoned as protected
Greenbelt and Niagara Escarpment lands under provincial land use plans. More recently the
area has also become the site of a large number of wind turbines, itself a highly contested
land use governed by a statutory regime structured around private land ownership. As I now
know, it is a complex place, constantly being made and remade from messy interconnections
of social and material relations.

After I read that article, I attended a packed meeting at a community hall in Shelburne in
January 2011, organized by the local group opposing the quarry: The North Dufferin
Agricultural and Community Taskforce. The formal application to dig the quarry would not
be filed until April, but the landowner Highlands Corporation had confirmed the plan to
“explore other land uses” with the local council in 2009, including extracting the aggregate
limestone sitting below their fields of potatoes. 3 Confusion, frustration, and outrage were all
on display in the crowd, but a particular narrative caught my attention as a lawyer and an
aspiring academic. Over and over at that meeting, and in later conversations, I heard people
say the company had lied when they purchased the land and that “the law should do
something about it”. What they meant was that years earlier, when representatives of the
Highlands Corporation had approached farmers in the area to purchase their land, the
Corporation told them that they wanted to create the largest potato farm in Ontario. And they

3

Ibid.
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did, for a time. However, the community soon learned that this was only an interim land use
for Highland. Surveyors on the land, tree removal, and the clearance of old farmsteads,
roused suspicion that something else was planned. There were allegations of bullying and
aggressive tactics to pressure farmers to sell neighbouring parcels of land. Landowners
started to decline offers to buy their land, fearful of the consequences for the community and
future generations. Farmer Jim Black told the Toronto Star, "Once he started talking quarry,
there was no way he was gonna get this place. I have six grandchildren – one of them's 19
now, two 15-year-olds – and we've got one here who just can't wait to get farming, so what
are we going to tell them later on, our kids? We made a big hole in the ground?" 4 Another
farmer told me about a Highlands representative who approached them to say he knew they
needed to sell since they only had daughters and therefore no one to farm the land. They
returned the cheque he left on the table.5

When the Highlands Corporation revealed that they planned to extract aggregate minerals
from the land and create a ‘mega-quarry’ that would extend 200 feet below the water table on
2,400 acres of the site where they had been farming potatoes, local landowners were furious
about the proposed transformation of the landscape and their communities. The proposal
began to draw attention from environmentalists, First Nations, and urbanites; from foodies to
weekend and recreational land users. People described the area as the “roof of Ontario”- the
highest point in the Province and home to the headwaters of five major river systems flowing
into two Great Lakes. They drew attention to the highly prized honeywood soil that stays wet
in dry weather and dry when the weather is wet, and to the water table so close to the surface
that springs pop up in many backyards. Indeed, the unique qualities of the soil are due to the
presence of that valuable limestone close to the surface and the ample freshwater that runs
through it. Therefore, as Black told the Toronto Star, extraction would fundamentally
transform this place: "It's one thing to talk about growing potatoes ... and everything, but as
soon as you start to destroy this land there's nothing left. It'll never come back again." 6

I noticed an interesting tension in the narratives. People would often acknowledge that it was
“their land”, referring to the Highland Corporation’s private ownership of the blocks that it
had assembled. Highland could do much of what they had already done to transform the land
4

Ibid.
Interview 9, August 13, 2014.
6
Rayner, supra note 2.
5

3

simply because they owned it. There was no contention that the land was public or that it
should be. This was an area dominated by private land holders and initially many were happy
to see large-scale investment in the area. Yet, people wanted a say in what Highland could do
on that privately-owned land. Despite the legal boundaries of property ownership, they were
asserting relations with the Highland sites and felt they should be able to make claims that
extended past the survey lines and beyond their own personal interest. They felt these claims
should be heard and considered by decision makers, and that they should matter to the
outcome:
It doesn't take much of a hiccup to cause a problem. We're talking about the
generations following. It probably doesn't make much difference to me, but
where's the good food going to come from if you don't have land to grow it
on? What can you leave your grandchildren? Clean air to breathe, pure water
to drink and good quality soil, secure, that you can grow food on. What else
can you leave them that's any more important?7
They looked to the provincial land use planning system to provide a space for their claims.
The law, they told me, should do something about this. Perhaps, but I was not so sure exactly
what it could or should do. What exactly was the role of ‘law’ in all this?

Following the submission of the Highlands application, NDACT mobilized to engage people
in the provincial consultation process and retained experts to respond to the over 3,000 pages
of technical reports prepared by the Corporation’s 17 private consultants. During the spring
of 2011, I assisted with some of this work on submissions as a volunteer and gained some
insight into the complexity of the regulatory and planning processes involved, as well as the
highly technical expertise required to understand the implications and potential consequences
of the proposal. I was lucky enough to work alongside people with this expertise, as well as
rich local knowledge, and heard about many concerns and frustrations with the process. It
was too long, too short, too complex, did not take enough into account, it was weighted
towards development, it was hijacked by “Not In My Backyard” activists, no one was
listening, there were too many meetings, the meetings were in the wrong place and with the
wrong people. But what I kept coming back to was the tension between the private nature of
the proposed quarry site and the range of interests and relations other people had with the
place at stake – social, economic, material, and affective relations that belied the simplicity of
either owning or not-owning the land. Would the planning and legal processes now underway

7
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create space for these claims to be heard and meaningfully considered? Would the
relationships that people had with privately owned land influence the outcome of decisions?
Should such relationships influence the outcome of decisions?

This is where my inquiry began: an unassuming place along Highway 10 in Southern
Ontario, where the complex socio-ecological networks of relation were suddenly made
visible through a planning process, and where the tensions between private property and
public land use planning were laid bare. I have continued to return to the ancient and subtle
landscapes of this part of Southern Ontario throughout the project for guidance, knowledge,
and inspiration. I hope this project is part of my giving back to that place, and so many others
I have lived with and learned from, and contributing what I can to (re)shaping our peopleplace relations.

2. Description of the Research: Placing Private Property
Land use law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the
world around us.8 In doing so, it shapes our relationships not only with the people around us,
but with the places we inhabit and encounter. How we live with these places is a central part
of how we will face the challenges of contemporary environmental crises in just and
sustainable ways – the floods and droughts of climate change, the rapid loss of biodiversity,
as well as increasing shortages of fresh water and arable soil. This dissertation examines how
law does this structural work to shape people-place relations, and how we might transform
land use law to build relations of humility, reciprocity, and respect with each other and the
“more-than-human” world.9

The model of property in which Anglo-Canadian land use law is embedded centres decisionmaking on the private ownership of land. We legally recognize forms of control over and use
I use “land use law” to describe the overlapping and intersection statutory and policy regimes that govern how
land can be owned, used, and managed, including statutory and common law property, land use planning law,
environmental law, water law, mining law and energy law.
9
I adopt the term “more-than-human” from Sarah Whatmore who describes the effect of the “materialist
recuperations” in geography as a “return to the livingness of the world shifts the register of materiality from the
indifferent stuff of the world ‘out there’, articulated through notions of ‘land’, ‘nature’, or ‘environment’, to the
intimate fabric of corporeality that includes and redistributes the ‘in here’ of human being.” See her article,
“Materialist returns: practising cultural geography in and for a more-than-human world” (2006) 13 Cultural
Geographies 4 600 at 602. This approach avoids defining other parts of the material world as non- or other-than
human and reinscribing the enlightenment dichotomy between humans and nature.
8
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rights to land, but we have a much more difficult time recognizing relations with the land
premised on interdependence, reciprocity or responsibility. The primacy of private ownership
in land use decision-making has spatial, temporal, social and ecological consequences for the
places and communities involved in land use conflicts. In particular, legal property relations
play a key role in upholding hierarchical relationships of environmental injustice and
facilitating transformative extractive development. As certain forms of land use are privileged
through law and legal process, other relations with place fall outside the boundaries of the
ownership model of property relations and are deemed less legally significant or simply noncognizable. These relationships between parties who are not legal interest holders and land
that is owned by someone else are often rejected, ignored or invisible in traditional AngloCanadian accounts of property. Nevertheless, land use conflicts continue to arise because
people routinely assert forms of interest in, or a relationship with, land and resources they do
not own. In regulating the use of private land, the law shapes, and is shaped by, these peopleplace relations even where they are severed and obscured for the purpose of legal decisionmaking. These ‘more-than-ownership’ relations challenge the presumptive detachment of
people from the places they live in, work with, and love.10 Their assertion brings the sociomateriality of particular places into view, disrupting the orderly management of productive
land use through law.11 Such relations are complex, and even contradictory, yet in this

Building on Whatmore’s conception of the more-than-human world, I adopt the term ‘more-than-ownership’
to describe the relations to place that fall outside of the boundaries of ownership. As discussed in Chapter
Seven, as this project developed I rejected the negative and residual category of the “non-owner” used to
describe those outside of the private ownership relationship in property theory. Such parties or participants are
most often defined as non-owners, third parties, or objectors, defined by their distance and exclusion from the
primary legal relationship and the lack of enforceable interests at the outset of the analysis. Rather, ‘more-thanowners’ is adopted to describe individuals and groups who assert direct place-relations or those who have
indirect connections but assert related experience or interest in the outcome of a land use decision. Therefore, as
discussed in Chapter 7, the term is not intended to privilege such relations, but rather to foreground them as
expanding the boundaries of property relations beyond private ownership.
11
Following from feminist work on materiality, such as Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Stacey Alaimo, I use
the term socio-materiality to emphasize the relationality and connectivity of the social and the material, neither
of which I understand to exist as fixed or stable categories but rather to be constantly, and co-constitutively,
made and remade. In doing so, I reject a dualistic understanding of human social meaning and experience versus
an inert and objectified physical world that already exists ‘out there’ without reducing the material to purely
social construction. Rather, I emphasize the need to recognize human social experience, including law, as
embedded in and inseparable from the material world – both are performed and produced through the dynamic
relations between people, places, and more-than-humans. In the context of property, the focus of this project,
Margaret Davies argues an emphasis on property’s “emergence from relations between human and non-human
spheres” allows us to see the “thingness” of property without reducing property to the thing itself. See, Karen
Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Jane Bennett, Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2009); Stacey Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Margaret Davies, “Material Subjects and Vital Objects–
Prefiguring Property and Rights for an Entangled World” (2016) 22 Australian Journal of Human Rights.
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messiness they play an under-examined role in challenging the ownership model of property
at the heart of Canadian land use planning. These more-than-ownership relations are the
focus of this dissertation.

In focusing on these relations I aim to move beyond dualistic debates between
“anthropocentric” perspectives in which the “nonhuman world has value only because, and
insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves human interests”12 and “ecocentric” perspectives in
which ecological systems are presumed to have intrinsic value independent of human
interests and are therefore of “direct moral importance.” While these may be radically
different positions in many ways, they are both premised on the assumption that humans can
and do exist outside and apart of ‘nature’. In this project, I reject this binary and instead adopt
the concept of the ‘more-than-human’ in order to reintegrate humans into ecological systems
and the material world. Rather than advocating for novel or parallel rights for ecological
systems or entities, I seek to foreground the relatedness and interdependence of humans and
the more-than-human world and consider how this might shape the way we construct
property relations; and, therefore, how we make decisions about land use.

Strategic challenges to the dominant narrative of property relations can be found throughout
Canadian legal history. Constitutional rights and title claims by First Nations, Inuit and Métis
Peoples, as well as the (re)assertion of Indigenous law in many parts of Canada, directly
challenge colonial legal frameworks governing land use and people-place relations and offer
place-based alternative legal orders.13 Feminist litigation has also successfully challenged
legal and social constructions of ownership and property relations in the context of family
law.14 These challenges have been put forward as part of broader legal strategies to address
Katie McShane, “Anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism: Why should we care?” (2007) 16
Environmental Values 2 169 at 170.
13
See for example, John Borrows, “Living between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning
and Democracy” (1997) 47 U Toronto LJ 417; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2010); Gisday Wa & Delgam Uukw, The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1987-1990 (Gabriola,
BC: Reflections Gabriola, 1992); Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Law and Aboriginal Title” online: (2017) Osgoode
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2 182: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2825097>;
Senwung Luk, “The Law of the Land: New Jurisprudence on Aboriginal Title” (2014) 67 The Supreme Court
Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 289; Karen Drake & Adam James Patrick
Gaudry, “‘The Lands… Belonged to Them, Once by Indian Title, Twice for Having Defended Them…, and
Thrice for Having Built and Lived on Them’: The Law and Politics of Métis Title” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 1 1.
14
Mary Jane Mossman, “Running Hard to Stand Still’: The Paradox of Family Law Reform"(1994) 17 Dal LJ 5;
Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal Framework for Cohabitants
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historic and ongoing injustice. They are, therefore, both partial and vulnerable in the context
of enduring colonization, racism and gender inequality. Nonetheless they illustrate how
dissident voices can and do use legal processes to advocate for, and perform, alternative
visions of property. This project considers whether and how land use conflicts are also
emerging as potential strategic sites for rethinking property relations.

This dissertation examines how land use law structures the relations between people and the
‘more-than-human world’ in ways that uphold the ownership model of property relations and
privilege particular forms of land use. It demonstrates the central roles that law and legal
process play in structuring people-place relations by examining the regulation of aggregate
mineral resource extraction in the province of Ontario. At the same time, this research
demonstrates how the assertion of more-than-ownership relations challenges the dominant
legal structure of people-place relations and strategically disrupts the power of private
ownership to determine whether and how land should be used. In doing so, this project argues
for an eco-relational reorientation to land use law, one which foregrounds a much broader
range of people-place relations and creates space for reciprocity with place.

Aggregate mineral mining is hard rock mining for gravel, sand or limestone. These are used
in a wide range of everyday products, from toothpaste to subway tunnels to condo towers.
Aggregate is everywhere in the cityscape, but also in the roadways connecting rural and
remote communities where extraction is often sited. It is quite literally the foundation of our
built environment. As such it is intimately linked to the narratives of growth and development
in a particular place: what we need, what is inevitable, and what we want. Aggregate mines
are large industrial open pit mines. As such, they have significant and transformative impacts
on the land and the human and more-than-human communities in which they are located.
Even with the best possible rehabilitation, the site of a mine will never return to what it once
was – perhaps a lake, perhaps a recreational area, but also, and more often, a large hole or
even a landfill. Indeed, aggregate mineral mining, or quarrying, has become one of the most
contentious land use issues in Ontario.

and the Family Home in Canada and Britain"(2005) 30 Queen’s LJ 715. See also, Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1
SCR 1980.
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Like other mineral resources, aggregates are fixed resources. Therefore, although it is
regulated as a land use planning issue in Ontario, aggregate extraction has distinct siting
issues from other types of controversial land uses, which are dealt with through public
planning and environmental assessment processes in which a number of alternative sites are
considered. The rock is where it is, and that is where extraction must take place. The fixed
nature of the resource means extraction is concentrated in particular areas, for example, the
area around Orangeville has a high concentration of mine sites. But extraction is not only
fixed by geography. Aggregate mining in Ontario largely occurs on private land, prompted by
an application by an owner to the Ministry of Natural Resources and municipal governments.
Site selection, therefore, is inextricably linked to land ownership as well as the fixed location
of the resource. In this way, who owns the land is central to Ontario’s quarry stories, and the
relationship between private property and public land use planning is uniquely exposed.

Through documentary and interview-based qualitative research, this dissertation examines the
way people imagine, articulate and assert non-ownership relationships with places in the
context of aggregate extraction disputes. In doing so, it demonstrates that realizing
environmentally just land use decision-making requires a transformative shift in legal
property relations to de-centre private ownership and foreground a much broader range of
people-place relations. This includes creating space for the reassertion of Indigenous legal
orders as primary sources of land use law, as well as the recognition of the complex and
interrelated relations within and between the more-than-human world. In this way, I argue,
ownership can be re-conceptualized to incorporate notions of reciprocity and responsibility –
not only with human ‘more-than-owner’ parties with relations to privately owned land, but
with the broader set of ecological, physical and material networks of relation that make up a
particular place.
3. Chapter Outline: Mapping the Project
The dissertation is published as a portfolio that combines traditional chapters with published
articles. It is structured into nine chapters beginning with this Introduction, which provides an
overview. Chapters Two, Three and Four are traditional dissertation chapters, containing the
literature review, methodology, and an overview of the relevant legal and policy framework.
Chapters Two and Three set out the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in
this dissertation. Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the legal and policy frameworks
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applicable to the extraction of aggregate resources in Ontario informed by both the theoretical
framework and the documentary and interview data. Chapters Five to Eight are published
papers. Chapter Nine is a substantive conclusion including final remarks on the ongoing legal
and policy reforms related to aggregate extraction.

A. Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework
Chapter Two provides a review of scholarship relevant to the theoretical strands woven
together in the later chapters: property theory and critiques; legal geography; environmental
governance; planning history and theory; and, environmental justice. It presents the key
debates and concepts which inform my methodological approach to data collection and
analysis in later chapters, and my argument for an eco-relational approach to land use law.

Section One reviews literature on property, beginning with a brief introduction to peopleplace relations in Indigenous legal orders and Indigenous jurisdiction over land use decisions
in Canada. It explains the link between the displacement of Indigenous laws through
historical colonial settlement and contemporary property and planning law in Canada. This
section then traces the dominant ownership model of property relations from its historical
roots in Lockean conceptions of property through to the Hohfeldian dephysicalized model of
property relations and contemporary Law and Economics approaches. Three types of critical
approaches to property are then presented: social critiques such as Jennifer Nedelsky’s
relational framework; environmental critiques such as Nicole Graham’s analysis of abstract
and dephysicalized property and call for reciprocity with place; and, alternative models of
property such as Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resources.

Section Two introduces the legal geography literature and explores key debates in three areas
of critical legal geography: (1) property; (2) place; and (3) nature and rurality. It begins by
tracing the emergence and evolution of scholarship with an interest in the relationship
between law and space. It then notes the attention legal geographers such as Nicholas
Blomley have given to property and the influence of feminist and relational approaches to
property including the work of Doreen Massey and Sarah Keenan. The section reviews
theorization of ‘place’ by legal geographers, particularly those who have built on Massey’s
complex, negotiated and dynamic conception of space. The final strand of legal geography
examined is work on ‘nature’ and rurality. The work of legal geography scholars examining
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the social construction of nature is explored, such as David Delaney’s critical understanding
of nature, building on feminist and science studies scholarship. Finally, the section examines
related scholarship on rurality, such as the work of Lisa Pruitt exposing the distinctive
operation of law in rural space.

Section Three of the literature review brings together literature on environmental governance,
planning, and environmental justice to develop an understanding of law as a key mode
through which land use decisions are governed. It first introduces scholarship on governance
generally, with an emphasis on critical approaches to understanding neoliberal modes of
governance. It goes on to focus specifically on the environmental governance literature,
which theorizes the complex intersection of state power and non-state actors in environmental
decision-making. This section then examines the scholarship on land use planning,
particularly the history of planning in Canada and the limited scholarly treatment of planning
law. Finally this section concludes by introducing environmental justice scholarship with a
particular focus on Canadian environmental justice scholars. It specifically considers calls for
environmental justice scholarship to extend beyond the human world, such as Deborah
McGregor’s vision of environmental justice from an Anishnaabe perspective, as well as
Randolph Haluza-Delay, Michael J. De Moor, and Christopher Peet’s place-pluralism. It
concludes by examining the need for a more attentive and complex treatment of rurality in
environmental justice literature and practice.

B. Chapter Three: Methodology
Chapter Three is a short overview of the methodological approach used in this research
project. It introduces qualitative approaches to research generally and then specifically
examines place-based qualitative approaches. The chapter describes the place-based
qualitative approach to data collection adopted in this research, including both the
documentary analysis and interviews. It provides a detailed account of the research design,
including the interview process and the data analysis method. The chapter notes the
techniques adopted to ensure validity and address concerns about the generalizability of
qualitative research. Finally it sets out the limitations of the research.
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C. Chapter Four: The Law and Policy of Aggregate Mineral Extraction
in Ontario
Chapter Four provides a detailed overview of the legal and policy frameworks applicable to
aggregate licensing in Ontario. It identifies key procedural elements of aggregate extraction
applications and appeals, as well as substantive legal and policy requirements, and places
these in the context of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. The chapter also
includes documentary analysis, in particular legislative history, case law, and non-scholarly
commentary, as well as the perspectives of expert and more-than-owner interview
participants. The chapter begins with a historical overview of the regulation of aggregate
extraction in Ontario, from its treatment as a largely unregulated activity, to one governed by
a complex proponent-driven regime engaging multiple statutes and policies at all levels of
government. A detailed review of the applicable statutory and policy regimes then examines
the following areas of law and policy: the constitutional rights of Indigenous communities
under s 35 of the Constitution Act and the duty to consult those communities about activities
that may affect those rights; the Aggregate Resources Act; the Provincial Policy Statement
that guides all planning decisions in the province; and, the other provincial, federal, and
international regimes that intersect with these primary frameworks.

The chapter then provides an overview of the participation and consultation requirements and
opportunities available in the municipal and provincial planning processes. Key decisionmaking powers of municipal, provincial, and adjudicative actors are then described. Finally,
Chapter Four concludes with a brief overview of two key amendment and review processes:
the 2017 amendment of the Aggregate Resources Act; and, the ongoing coordinated review of
the provincial land use plans, including the Niagara Escarpment Plan.

D. Chapter Five: Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory,
Environmental Rights and Land Use Planning
Chapter Five consists of the paper Putting Property in its Place, which was published in a
special edition of the Revue générale de droit on human rights and the environment.15 The
paper links the legal and policy framework with key theoretical strands from Chapter Two. In

Estair Van Wagner, “Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmental Rights and Land Use
Planning” (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit 275.
15
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particular, it weaves together relational theory with critical property theory and legal
geography to foreground the work that law does in structuring human relations with land and
the more-than-human world.

The paper introduces the legal framework for aggregate licensing decisions, and then
examines three high profile aggregate mine siting decisions in Southwestern Ontario. Jennifer
Nedelsky’s four-step relational approach to dispute resolution and Nicole Graham’s theory of
reciprocal person-place relations are applied to the cases to show how a shift away from the
ownership model of property can lead to better social and ecological outcomes in land use
planning. By centering the structural work that law does to manage people-places relations in
the context of these decisions, the paper demonstrates specific ways in which Ontario’s land
use law attempts to contain people-place relations within the boundaries of private property
ownership. In particular, the article points to the under-examined role that parties who do not
own the land at stake play in land use disputes. It exposes law and legal actors as central to
determinations about what is at stake, which claims are included or excluded from decisionmaking processes, and which relations influence outcomes about the use of private land. At
the same time, this chapter argues that attempts to bound property relations are incomplete
and partial, and points to strategic openings for the assertion of transformative relations with
the more-than-human world in aggregate mine siting decisions.

Applying a relational rights analysis informed by environmental critiques of dominant
property relations, the paper concludes by arguing for a relational reorientation of property
ownership in land use and environmental decision-making. In doing so, it sets the foundation
for an eco-relational approach informed by Indigenous legal orders and critical property
scholarship. This approach, I argue, has the potential to shift people-place relations away
from the bounded and exclusionary nature of private ownership, towards relations of
responsibility and reciprocity between humans and the more-than-human world. By weaving
these foundational theoretical strands together, this paper sets the stage for the analysis of the
interview data in the following three papers.
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E. Chapter Six: The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in
Ontario’s aggregate extraction disputes
Chapter Six consists of the book chapter, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in
Ontario’s aggregate extraction disputes” forthcoming in the edited volume Contested
Property Claims.16 This paper builds on the approach developed in Chapter Five by
identifying specific ways ownership operates to both order actors and events, and to control
the flows of knowledge and information that are included or excluded in the aggregate
extraction licensing process. Ownership, I argue, works through law to assert both the
chronological power to control the sequencing of events, as well as the substantive power to
manage and control the relations engaged by decisions about how land can, and should, be
used.

This paper engages with key legal geography concepts and critical planning theory,
particularly Blomley’s concept of “bracketing” 17 and Valverde’s work on
“spatiotemporalities”.18 By examining both the legal and policy framework and the interview
data, the paper traces the spatiotemporal power of ownership from site selection through to
the control of knowledge and expertise at the adjudication stage. It demonstrates the specific
ways in which the law and policy of aggregate licensing attempt to “bracket” human
relationships with land in order to produce and reinforce extractive forms of land use. By
structuring the sequence of events to privilege and enrol private owners in extractive
development, law creates a hierarchy of interests in relation to land with procedural and
substantive consequences for human and more-than-human relations. Not only are other
actors provided with limited opportunities to engage in and intervene in the process of
decision-making, they are bound by the spatial power of owners to transform their land and to
produce the conceptual boundaries about what is at stake in a particular decision.

By exposing the specific ways this chronological power and hierarchical ordering of actors
and interests is produced, this paper reveals specific strategic opportunities for intervention
and transformation. I conclude that decoupling aggregate planning from private ownership
Estair Van Wagner, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate extraction
disputes” Mikkel Thorup, Maja Hojer Bruun, Bjarke Skærlund Risager & Patrick Cockburn eds. Contested
Property Claims: What disagreement tells us about ownership (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
17
Nicholas Blomley, “Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing” (2014) 10 Ann Rev of L and Soc Sci 1
133.
18
Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (New York: Routledge, 2015).
16
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could be a first step in rebalancing the values and relationships engaged by aggregate
licensing decisions. Through reframing the key issue from how we manage the extraction of
the resource to a broader planning inquiry into whether we should extract this resource in this
place, and in whose interest, this reorientation has the potential not only to influence casespecific outcomes, but to create space for relational frameworks for land use and
environmental decision-making.

F. Chapter Seven: Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of
People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts
Chapter Seven consists of the paper “Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of
People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts”, published in a special
edition of the MIT Planning Journal Projections on the relationship between law and
planning.19 This paper builds on the theoretical approach outlined in Chapter Two to develop
my eco-relational framework for understanding the complex and interconnected sociomateriality of land use disputes. The paper uses the interview data with more-than-owner
parties involved in aggregate mineral siting disputes to foreground people-place relations
falling outside the boundaries of the ownership model of property. In doing so, it accounts for
the spectrum of contested relations with, and within, the places at stake in aggregate
extraction conflicts. In this paper, I conclude that the transformative and democratizing
potential of planning is limited by the day-to-day operation of participation in land use
decisions, in which ownership is upheld as the primary legal relationship to land, and the
public interest is defined narrowly in terms of economic growth and development.

The paper first presents a quantitative overview of the outcomes in aggregate siting decisions
between 2001 and 2014, which demonstrates the overwhelming rate of success for proponent
applications despite substantial contestation from local and other interested parties. This
disproportionate rate of approval, I argue, indicates a structural problem, and the need for
further inquiry into how the decision-making process produces these outcomes. The paper
considers this finding from an eco-relational perspective.

Estair Van Wagner, “Law’s Ecological Relations: The legal structure of people-place relations in Ontario’s
aggregate extraction conflicts.” (2016)12 Projections: The MIT Journal of Planning 35.
19
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Through analysis of the interview data, I critically assess theoretical claims that participatory
elements of planning and environmental law have redefined property relations and
democratized environmental decision-making. I then use the interview data to demonstrate
the complex, and often contradictory, range of ecological relations asserted by more-thanowner parties in land use conflicts about aggregate mineral siting decisions. Through the
experiences and reflections of the interview participants, I specifically examine the space in
the aggregate licensing process for the assertion of environmentally focused people-place
relations. The paper identifies the reductive characterization of participation as ‘objection’ as
a key limitation on the ability of more-than-owner parties to influence outcomes. It points to
the narrow opportunities to disrupt either the proponent’s narrative about what was at stake
and the state’s development-focused view of the public interest. The paper also examines the
limitations of increasing reliance on proponent-led mitigation and adaptive management of
impacts, as opposed to avoidance and prevention. At the same time, it demonstrates how
more-than-owner parties are filling the knowledge and advocacy gaps left by the increasingly
proponent-driven regulatory framework and the ongoing lack of due diligence and
enforcement by governments.

G. Chapter Eight: Law’s Rurality: Land Use and the Shaping of PeoplePlace Relations in Rural Ontario
Chapter Eight consists of the paper “Law’s Rurality: Land Use and the Shaping of PeoplePlace Relations in Rural Ontario,” which was published as part of a special edition on rurality
as a dimension of environmental justice in the journal Rural Studies.20 In this paper I bring an
environmental justice lens to the eco-relational framework developed and applied in the
previous chapters. By incorporating environmental justice perspectives, this paper exposes
the role of law in constructing rurality as residual space, and examines the social and
ecological consequences for particular places. In particular, it presents the case of the Niagara
Escarpment Plan Area through an examination of two aggregate siting decisions and the
interview data.

Estair Van Wagner, “Law’s rurality: Land use law and the shaping of people-place relations in rural Ontario”
(2016) 47(Part A) Journal of Rural Studies 311.
20
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The paper specifically scrutinizes the use of the category ‘rural’ in Ontario’s land use law and
policy, and concludes that rurality serves as a legal category which enables extractive
development within one of the most protected and ‘environmentally-focused’ planning areas
in the province. The experiences and observations of interview participants are analyzed to
examine the consequences of this legal construction of rurality for people-place relations. In
particular, it explores the emphasis on compensation rather than avoidance of transformative
loss or harm, the treatment of experiential knowledge in the licensing process, and the failure
to recognize cumulative impacts. The paper demonstrates that the current legal structure of
relations results in a reductionist account of the embodied and complex relations of rural
places, and reinforces simplistic accounts of rural land use politics. At the same time, the
paper draws attention to the potential for rural land use politics to uphold dominant property
relations and colonial land use patterns. It concludes that applying an environmental justice
lens to rural land use movements is a necessary part of confronting and countering the
parochial, exclusionary, colonial, and racist potential of rural politics of place.

This paper argues that realizing the transformative potential of land use conflicts to change
people-place relations in settler-colonial states requires more than creating space for
environmentally focused relations between people and places. Environmentally just rural
politics and legal strategies must strive to be inclusive and transformative by foregrounding
Indigenous law and land rights alongside acknowledging the range of ecological relations
between people and places which lie beyond private ownership and presumptive
development. It argues that glimpses of this emerge in struggles over aggregate siting;
however, relations of solidarity between rural and indigenous communities must be
developed on the ground in particular places, as challenging and difficult conversations take
place between Indigenous people and settlers involved in land use conflicts.

4. Conclusion: Towards Ecologically Just Relations in Ontario’s Land Use Law
The conclusion in Chapter Nine briefly synthesizes the main research findings and provides
both theoretical conclusions about an eco-relational approach to land use conflicts and
practical recommendations for legal reform of Ontario’s mineral aggregate regime. Returning
to the ecological adaptation of Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis set out in Chapter Five, I
conclude the existing legal structure of relations hierarchically privileges private land owners
and remains closed to the broader range of more-than-owner relations engaged by aggregate
17

mineral disputes. Not only does this facilitate transformative extractive development in
particular cases, I argue, it upholds and reinforces the dominant ownership model of property
in Ontario’s land use law framework. I then provide a final summary discussion of the values
and relationships uncovered through the place-based qualitative research undertaken for this
project. Informed by these values and relationships, the conclusion then recommends both
immediate practical reforms to Ontario’s land use law, as well as future transformative
change to the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the world around
us.

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation critically examines how land use law centres
private ownership and upholds the dominant model of property relations. By uncovering the
complex and messy more-than-owner relations engaged by aggregate mineral extraction
conflicts, I generate an eco-relational approach to land use decision-making through which
we work towards ecologically just people-place relations.
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CHAPTER TWO
Land use and environmental decision-making are the subject of a diverse range of literature
across many disciplines. This chapter specifically reviews the literature in three broad areas
of scholarship: 1) Property theory; 2) legal geography; and, 3) governance, including
planning and environmental justice scholarship. The chapter begins by reviewing property
theory, first situating Anglo-Canadian property law as contextual and constructed by
acknowledging the enduring role of Indigenous laws and legal orders governing land use
throughout Canada. It then reviews the dominant ownership model of property relations as
well as social and environmental critiques, and, finally, alternative constructions of property.
The chapter then reviews the legal geography literature on three themes: 1) property and
property law; 2) conceptions of place and space; and, 3) constructions of nature and rurality.
Finally the chapter concludes with a review of literature on governance in three distinct areas
of scholarship: 1) environmental governance; 2) planning theory, history, and law; and, 4)
environmental justice. This project weaves these strands together to develop the original
methodological approach described in Chapter Three; and, to inform the eco-relational
approach generated in Chapters Three through Eight.

PROPERTY THEORY
A. Indigenous Legal Orders and Land Law

A lifeworld doesn’t reflect the spontaneous ideas of those standing within it.
Our creation stories are of something common: the earth beneath and all around
us. What varies is how we understand it.
That’s what’s at stake. That’s what I need you to understand.
The trouble isn’t simply that we tell different stories which ultimately generate
widely different bodies of law. That’s a wonderful thing. We can learn from one
another to the benefit of us all. The trouble is that some of us don’t just differ
but differ in the kind of stories we tell of creation.1

Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law : On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61 McGill LJ
847 at 863.
1
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Anishinaabe legal scholar Aaron Mills draws our attention to the foundational narratives that
inform different systems of law in order to point to the “earth-alienation” at the heart of
liberal constitutionalism. This “rootless” foundation for law, he argues, is a very different
kind of story than an Anishinaabe legal order “rooted in interdependent conceptions of selfcommunity”:2
Under a rooted vision of freedom, order isn’t secured through rule of law; law
isn’t the formal obligation to respect rules (i.e., rights and correlative duties).
Rather, law consists in the informal responsibility to coordinate mutual aid (i.e.,
gifts and needs) within particular forms of relationship: law is a framework for
proper judgment.3
Understanding particular conceptions of property as specific “narratives” or “artefacts,”
producing and produced by specific historical, spatial and cultural contexts, opens up avenues
to re-imagine, articulate, and recognize the range of existing and possible people-place
relations.4 In other words, despite its dominance in Canada and other settler-colonial states,
the Anglo-Canadian ownership model of property described below in Section B should be
understood as specific and contextually situated – just one way of understanding human
relations with and in relation to the world around us, particularly land and the environment.
In examining the context of contemporary land use disputes in Ontario, my research points to
the link between this model of property and the emergence of land use planning law. I
acknowledge “the colonial genealogy of planning,” 5 noted by Australian planning scholar
Libby Porter and consider its ongoing influence on the people-place relations at issue. In this
context, while Indigenous law is not the focus of this research, it is critical to recognize the
enduring presence and jurisdiction of Indigenous legal and governance systems and the
influence of the relationships between these legal orders and colonial property and planning
regimes in shaping contemporary people-place relations.6 Further, both Indigenous legal
theory and practice as well as Indigenous planning point to existing models of people-place
relations that challenge “maladapted” 7 superimposed Anglo-Canadian property practices and

2

Ibid at 865.
Ibid.
4
See Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (New York: Routledge, 2007); Carol M Rose,
Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 1994).
5
Libby Porter, Unlearning the Colonial Cultures of Planning (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing,
Ltd., 2012) at 151.
6
Shiri Pasternak, “Jurisdiction and settler colonialism: where do laws meet?” (2014) 29 Canadian Journal of
Law and Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 2 145.
7
Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011) at 206.
3
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offer specific examples of place-based knowledge and land use governance in Ontario and
throughout Canada.8

In demonstrating the relevance of Indigenous laws to contemporary land use disputes,
Anishinaabe legal scholar John Borrows points to the “ancient and contemporary stability and
flexibility of First Nations laws.”9 North American Indigenous peoples, he notes, “developed
spiritual, political, and social conventions to guide their relationships with each other, and
with the natural environment. These customs and conventions became the foundation for
many complex systems of government and law.”10 In “Living between Water and Rocks:
First Nations, Environmental Planning and Democracy,” Borrows describes how
Anishinabek law of environmental planning in Ontario derived from specific knowledge and
practices relating to plants, animals, water, fish and history. For example, he reviews laws
that trace the link between the appropriate scale of development and capacity of the land, as
well as the importance of restoring and monitoring after land is used.11 This Anishinabek law
and knowledge, he argues, would have contributed to contemporary disputes about proposed
development on Hay Island, Ontario, not only by bringing ecological considerations into
focus, but because of its potential to “destabilize the boundaries between humans and their
surroundings and deconstruct the seemingly neutral and natural facade of contemporary geolegal ideas.”12 Similarly, in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, Borrows describes
Anishinabek people-place relations as involving a trustee-like relationship of interdependence
and reciprocity in which the Earth has legal personality and agency. 13 Rocks, he notes, have
agency that requires consent and appropriate process before they can be used. 14 In the Hay
Island case, Borrows provides concrete examples of the procedural and substantive barriers to
Anishinabek assertions of people-place relations and their legal recognition within Ontario’s
current land use framework. At the same time, he provides evidence that more ecologically
and socially sustainable decisions about land use and environmental planning would result
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from the inclusion of a broader range of perspectives and knowledge about place. In
particular, he argues legal recognition of the Earth as a living being and the
interconnectedness of human life flow from knowledge and recognition of place.15 This
points to the importance of including a range of perspectives and people-place relations in
decision-making process from both an equity and justice perspective and an instrumental
perspective about reaching the best possible decision and outcome.
Kahnawake Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred’s description of the sharp contrast between
human-nature relationships in Indigenous and Western liberal traditions provides some
insight into the philosophical origins of the destabilizing potential of Indigenous laws. 16 He
describes Indigenous philosophies as based on a stewardship relationship with the earth, with
power derived from respect for, and responsibility to, nature. In contrast, he argues that in
Western liberal traditions power is derived from “alienation from nature.”17 The connection
between social and political power and land is evident in the Gitxsan legal order and
governance system in Northwest British Columbia, described by Gisday Wa and Delgam
Uukw18 and by Richard Overstall19 and considered in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada
ruling in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.20 According to Borrows, imposed colonial land
use law “inadvertently ignored and purposely undermined” Indigenous laws based on this
conflicting worldview.21 In Canada, he argues, colonial law “imposed a conceptual grid over
both space and time which divides, parcels, registers, and bounds peoples and places.”22
Complex Indigenous systems of government and law regulating both person-person and
people-place relationships were ignored and purposefully undermined as settlers undertook
the work of ordering and managing space.23 The resulting legal discourse of property in
which Canadian planning law is embedded has been closed to place-based analysis. Claims
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asserting people-place relationships, such as Alfred’s stewardship, have been understood as
disruptive and subversive.24

Borrows points to the need for more than procedural changes aimed at participatory
inclusivity in planning decisions. In his view, better environmental planning requires the
participation of Indigenous people, but also requires ideological change through “an infusion
of substantive ideas” including Indigenous laws suitable to evaluate and interpret Indigenous
knowledge relevant to specific land use proposals.25 Alfred also argues that Indigenous
traditions offer a way of breaking from destructive patterns of thought.26 This is particularly
relevant to land use practices associated with Anglo-Canadian property law developed in very
different ecological and social conditions. In the land use context, Alfred argues, Indigenous
perspectives provide a model for balancing engagement in broader economic development
with responsibility to respect the “long-term health and stability of people and the land.” 27
This underlying principle of balance, Alfred notes, makes ecological and community health
the goals of economic decision-making which the scale or intensity of a specific land use
must uphold.28 The potential for a range of non-ownership relationships to be articulated and
recognized in land use disputes depends on the potential to open up conceptual space for
alternatives to the ownership model of property. This requires the inclusion of Indigenous
peoples in decision-making, but as Borrows and Alfred argue, it must also go further. It
requires substantive recognition of and respect for Indigenous legal knowledge and the
jurisdiction of Indigenous legal orders that apply place-based knowledge about specific
ecosystems. Rather than treating assertions of Indigenous law over land use decisions as
Aboriginal rights claims to be adjudicated within the state-based Aboriginal law frameworks,
this includes space for the assertion and application of Indigenous laws that challenge
dominant conceptions of the relationship between humans and our environment even when,
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perhaps especially when, they may not be compatible with Canadian law and institutions.29
As Gordon Christie argues, meaningful engagement with Indigenous laws requires us to
critically consider the “the ability of the state (and Canadian society) to accommodate itself to
the emergence of Indigenous legal traditions” and the reassertion of Indigenous control and
jurisdiction as decentring state law rather than the reverse.30 In the context of this research,
Indigenous jurisdiction over land use planning and natural resources poses particular
challenges for Anglo-Canadian planning and property law. According to Canadian legal
scholar Kirsten Anker, this stems from the disjuncture between colonial conceptions of “landas-space” and Indigenous relational conceptions of “land-as-place”, the former excluding
“the possibility of alternative modes of imagining the relationship between people and the
land.”31
B. The Ownership Model of Property Relations
This project examines the impact of dominant property relations in the context of a set of land
use disputes about aggregate mineral extraction in Ontario. Therefore, this section sets out a
brief description and background to this dominant model of property in Canadian law and
Anglo-colonial legal theory and culture more broadly. Australian property scholar Margaret
Davies argues that the dominant Anglo-colonial “ownership model” of property is “just the
here-and-now of a cultural and political history which is still in process.”32 In doing so, she
points to the importance of understanding why and how particular models of property achieve
and sustain dominance, as well as recognizing the possibility of other different models.
Similarly, American property theorist Carol Rose argues that private property regimes “hold
together only on the basis of common beliefs and understandings.”33 This project examines
contemporary English Canadian land use planning and natural resource management
frameworks, which rely on a private property narrative rooted in Anglo-colonial law and
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culture.34 Therefore, it examines how the liberal “ownership model”35 is built on common
beliefs and understandings in cultural and legal discourse about land use: property is about
the exclusive relationship of an individual owner with a particular ‘thing’ and the resulting
control over access to, and use of, that thing - in this case, land. This idea of property is
foundational to the construction of contemporary land use law as a way of organizing the
‘bundle’ of abstract rights of ownership, control and alienation of things as between people:
“[T]he dominant view of property, in both legal and cultural discourses, is one of abstract
entitlements as between persons which are alienable from, rather than proper to, a person.” 36

While the theoretical examination of the roots of this model of property draws on English,
American and Australian scholarship in addition to the work of Canadian scholars, this
research also adopts the need to “locate property law” contextually and in place. 37 This
project does so in the specific social, but also material, context of the province of Ontario and
its predecessor, Upper Canada. Canadian legal scholar Bruce Ziff argues that English
property law was largely adopted in Upper Canada. Noting few exceptions, he links this
adherence to English law to both practical reasons of certainty and convenience, but also to
imperial discourse – the “resolute confidence in the superiority of English political
institutions” and the related “belief in the right-headedness of English justice” which
manifested in the common law.38 This normative justification exposes the deeply held
commitments to foundational elements of property law despite departures and adaptations in
new colonial settlements. As legal historian John McLaren observes: “Land settlement, as a
process within the dominant culture, was closely related to that blend of order, individualism,
and deference that has marked the history of colonialism in Canada”.39 Land, in his view, was
viewed through the lens of “nation building and the progressive development of a
34
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commercial and industrial economy.”40 The departures Ziff does note draw on American and
Australasian reforms to property law – including free-entry mining regimes – pointing to the
influence of other Anglo-settler colonial legal regimes on the ways property law was adapted
to local conditions in English Canada.41 Therefore, while “a variety of local conditions in
Canada, including those related to geography, climate, and culture, required the fine-tuning of
English property laws for the Canadian context,” Valiante and Smit characterize the common
law of property in Canada as remaining “grounded in the English system of property
ownership but has its own peculiarities.”42 This review of property scholarship reflects this
enduring influence, as well as the links with other settler-colonial property law.

This section contends that the dominant Anglo-colonial ownership model shapes the ways
that people imagine, articulate and assert their relationships with place in contemporary
Ontario. This influence is related to three central features of property relations that are of
particular relevance to this project: 1) the dualistic and hierarchical view of nature-culture
relations; 2) the presumption of exclusivity and alienability of private property; and 3) the
construction of dephysicalized property as an abstract person-person relationship.
I. Nature-Culture Dualism
The ownership model of property can be traced to the liberalism of English philosopher John
Locke and his Two Treatises of Government (1689).43 His influential theory of property
emerged in the context of the 17th century scientific revolution and the emergence of
‘modernist’ thinking. Central to ‘modern’ thinking was the dualistic understanding of the
culture-nature relationship associated with Francis Bacon 44 and Rene Descartes.45 Cartesian
dualism separated mind from body and culture from nature. For Descartes, men were not only
separate from nature, but superior ‘masters and possessors’ as cultural creatures with agency
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and the capacity for rational thinking.46 Modernist thinking emphasized reason and scientific
knowledge, moving away from a view of authority as vested in religion and kings. While
Locke clearly applied the subject-object binary in the human-nature relations he constructed,
he rooted his theory of property in natural law. For Locke, Australian property scholar Nicole
Graham argues, God’s nature was both the origin of law and the powerless object of cultural
appropriation.47

For Locke, land as nature was given to Man in common. Appropriation and improvement of
nature by humans for their beneficial use was not only inevitable, it was necessary for the
formation of society.48 According to Locke, appropriation of nature established dominion
over the land and thus created property. In this transformative act, worthless nature was given
value through human use: “[H]ow much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of
things, we enjoy in this World: And the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be
reckon’d in, as any, or at most, but a very small, part of it.”49 Neither consent nor justification
were necessary for Locke because the commons were of no use until they were transformed
into property: “Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in
themselves.”50 Almost a century later William Blackstone defined property in the
Commentaries on the Laws of England Books 1 & 2 (1765-1766) as, “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world.” 51 While
Jeremy Bentham’s “A Theory of Legislation” 52 breaks with Locke and Blackstone in
conceiving law as originating in culture rather than in God, Graham notes that he maintains
the anthropocentric and dualistic view of human-nature relations. 53 For Bentham, property
emerges in the shift from the ‘savage’ circumstances of physical reality in nature where only
“miserable and precarious” possession is possible to civilization and the creation of law. 54
Therefore, for my purposes, whether Western liberal theory accepts that private property is a
God-given natural right according to Locke or functionally necessary according to Bentham,
46
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the ability to hold property rights in the natural world is the basis for legal and political order.
This remains true within the influential contemporary law-and-economics strain of property
theory with economic necessity and transactional efficiency having taken the place of earlier
justifications.55 Even where there are deep divisions within law-and-economics scholarship,56
the disputes about the nature of property relations never question the severability of humans
from the natural world or the ability of humans to own it. Indeed, these remain the
fundamental premises of private property as a social and legal tool.

The centrality of human-nature dualism in conceptions of property can be linked directly to
the historical role of English property law in the politics of both domestic enclosure in Britain
and the dispossession of Indigenous land throughout the British Empire.57 In his history of
early Ontario, David Wood describes the “mindless assault on nature” by early settlers and
the resulting “profound unbalancing of ecological relationships by the Europeanization of the
New World” that was justified by a vision of “progress” entirely defined by “gainful human
activities that would increase materialistic productivity.” 58 As this project argues, the
severability of humans from the more-than-human world remains profoundly influential in
Ontario property relations. Here I examine this both in terms of the way people imagine and
articulate their relationship to land and how such legal and political claims are asserted and
treated in land use disputes. British feminist legal scholar Davina Cooper points out the
subject-object orientation of the ownership model continues to produce and perform
hierarchical relations of control in contemporary property relations.59 She notes the legal,
physical and emotional “severability” of the owner from the owned in instrumental property
relationships where both are replaceable.60 In this way the “propertied subject” is produced61
in relation to the “object” of property and other ways of constructing human relations with
place are obscured or invisible. In this project, I examine how this arises in the context of
55
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conflicts about how private land can and should be used and explore how the dominant
ownership model of property continues to presume and enforce the separation of nature and
culture into two separate and severable spheres. This presumption of a dichotomy between
nature and culture, whereby people (the owners and users) are detached from places (the
owned and used) shapes how people understand their relationship with place and the way that
their relationships with place are interpreted by legal actors. Here, I demonstrate ways in
which this profoundly shapes not only who participates in land use conflicts, but also how
they participate, and how they do not.
II.
Land Use, Exclusivity and Alienability
The ability to appropriate nature as property in the ownership model is linked to specific
notions of legitimate use, productivity and progress. As historians such as J.M. Neeson and
E.P. Thompson have demonstrated, land use was defined as “improvement” towards the
realization and justification of specific political and economic ends, particularly the English
enclosure of the commons, capitalist industrialization of English society and settlement for
colonial expansion of the British Empire.62 Wood notes the integral link between conceptions
of progress and the rhetoric of settlers “confronting and defeating” wilderness in creating the
new property relations of early Ontario.63 Indeed, he argues, “the image of progress as armed
opposition to nature” was not only “deeply embedded” in those early settlers, it “still exerts
considerable influence, despite different conditions and much greater knowledge, in the
current jobs versus environment debate.”64 Lockean property theory provided a key
theoretical foundation for the transformation of a wide range of property relations within
England and then into new settler colonies. Davies argues that Locke’s theory of property is
“first and foremost a theory of and justification for enclosure.”65 In the context of this project,
legal historian John McLaren’s observations about the idea of property in Canada
demonstrates the power of Lockean property in settler colonial contexts: “In the Canadian
mind, the dominant although not exclusive view has been that land is a commodity designed
for the succour of and exploitation by individuals or corporations exercising dominium over
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it.”66 He notes the “selective historical amnesia” demonstrated by those arriving from
jurisdictions with long histories of common land rights and of resistance by those excluded
from privatization of common lands.67

For Locke, the appropriation of nature as property was only achieved through such acts of
transformation, cultivation and industrial use of nonhuman nature for benefit and profit.
Locke constructs property’s acquisitive potential in a particular and deliberate way.
According to Davies, “In Locke’s state of nature the world was, to be blunt, up for grabs – as
long as it was grabbed in the right way.”68 Graham notes that Locke’s labour was explicitly
distinguished from the types of labour engaged in by commoners prior to enclosure.69
Labour, as envisioned by Locke, was cultivation, not mobile or seasonal land uses such as
grazing or harvesting associated with commoners and with Indigenous peoples. In the context
of Ontario, the “laying of lines on the land” through the survey grid was “a prime example of
the attempt to impose human control on the little understood non-human matrix.”70 As noted
above in Section 1, it was also a deliberate effort to impose a new colonial jurisdiction over
land use and natural resources and erase existing Indigenous laws. 71 This “super imposed
geometry,”72 facilitated by colonial authorities, upheld and reinscribed the efforts of
individual settlers to transform their land into usable and productive private property once
they had successfully transformed and recreated it.73 There is significant continuity in this
emphasis on encouraging productive economic development through the stability and
security of private property from Locke to Blackstone to Bentham and forward to law-andeconomics theorists such as Richard Posner.74 As will be discussed in Section 3 and
demonstrated in this project, the link between private property rights and economic growth is
maintained in contemporary land use law in Ontario.
For Locke, the ability to appropriate property results from the ownership of one’s labour:
“every man has a Property in his own Person,” and in the “Labour of the body, and the Work
66
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of his Hands.”75 As a result of this original ownership, Locke’s man is able to remove
something from the common and create property to the exclusion of all others.76 Locke, Rose
observes, “is undoubtedly the most influential of the classical property theorists.” 77 However,
this exclusivity was echoed in that oft-quoted Blackstone passage noted above, where he
went on to note dominium meant that an owner had a right of “total exclusion of the right of
any other individual in the universe.”78 While Rose points out that this “trope” fails to reflect
Blackstone’s in critical ways, in particular the “anxieties” he expresses about existing
distributional arrangements,79 Blackstone’s dominium and Lockean exclusivity have
informed the development of an idea of property that remains both legally and culturally
powerful. In particular, the American discourse on “takings” and an absolutist position on
property rights associated with the Chicago School and law-and-economics theorists. Thomas
Merrill goes so far as to argue that the right to exclude is the sine quo non of property – a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of property. 80 In addition to the narrow
view of the state in relation to private property that results from an emphasis on exclusion,
the Lockean view also relies on a particularly bounded vision of the individual as a “selfinterested rational utility maximizer” severable from broader networks of social relation.81 As
Rose observes, neoclassical economics adopts this presumption of a self-interested and
utility-maximizing individual in order to make predictions about society. 82 The law-andeconomics movement incorporates this presumption in turning to neoclassic economics to
explain and predict how laws work, as well as assessing laws against measures of
efficiency.83 Indeed Merrill and Smith’s critique of the Coasean contractarian bundle of rights
model and their (re)assertion of the absolutist exclusionary model of in rem property rights is
expressly linked to the need for minimal state intervention: “If property has no fixed core of
meaning, but is just a variable collection of interests established by social convention, then
there is no good reason why the state should not freely expand or, better yet, contract the list
75
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of interests in the name of general welfare.” 84 As explored in this project, this ideal of the
individual autonomous property holder severed from social relations and place by the presocial and absolute right to exclude has important implications for the kinds of claims that
can be made, and can be heard, in land use disputes.

Once property is legitimately acquired, Lockean theory continues, it can and should be freely
transferable. Indeed, the law-and-economics strain of property theory builds on basic
Lockean property to argue for a minimal state with narrow scope for regulation that restricts
property rights.85 As Singer points out, this poses particular problems for property in the
North American context since if the initial transaction is unlikely to have created a
“legitimate root of title, then the whole system is placed in doubt.” 86 Thus, as Singer goes on
to argue, the neo-Lockean appeal to a chain of rightful historical transfers appeals to a
“fictitious state of nature” rather than the history of land acquisition in the context of British
colonial settlement and dispossession of Indigenous lands. 87 Not only is the Lockean account
ahistorical, legal geographer and feminist legal scholar Sarah Keenan argues Lockean
property is “pre-social,” originating in the labour of the subject rather than culture and law. 88
Those who take up Lockean property today base their opposition to state regulation of private
property on this argument that private property rights pre-exist the state as natural rights. For
Richard Epstein, “the end of the state is to protect liberty and property, as these conceptions
are understood independent of and prior to the formation of the state.”89 State-based law, in
Epstein’s view, protects these natural rights rather than creates them. For this strand of
property theory, it follows that when law limits property rights, it constitutes a “taking” of
that property and must be compensated. While the concept of “takings” has specific and
particular resonance in the United States as a result of the constitutional protection of
property rights, there is a “healthy (if somewhat less vocal) property rights lobby” in
Canada.90 As discussed in Chapter Four, the lack of constitutional protection for property
rights in Canada results in a distinctive legal landscape in relation to regulatory
84
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expropriation.91 However, a study of attitudes to private property by Canadian law professor
Cherie Metcalf demonstrates that the difference in the public law frameworks in Canada and
the United States is not reflected in a more favourable attitude to government interference
with private property in Canada amongst the members of the public. Indeed, the takings
debate is alive and well in Canadian property scholarship despite relatively little case law.92
As this project demonstrates, naturalization of property rights also manifests in a presumption
of the right to develop privately owned land on the part of both proponents and decision
makers in Ontario’s land use planning framework.

The right to use land for the benefit of the owner despite locally developed property relations
and physical capacity is so integral to Locke’s model of property that it is protected even
when a particular use may harm the land in ways that fundamentally transform or destroy it.
While Locke does recognize “limits” on appropriation, his concern is for uncultivated land,
which he characterizes as wasted or spoiled. He allows for accumulation and surplus value by
conceiving of the alienation of property as productive and legitimate “use.” This, in turn,
leads to his justification of the money economy, through which people can exchange for the
“truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life,”93 and which provides the incentive for growth
and development beyond provision for one’s personal needs. This system of accumulation,
characterized by Locke as consent-based, allows for the unequal distribution of property
without offending his sense of limitation on individual use of property. Canadian feminist
legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky argues that this model of property constructs persons as either
owners or non-owners not only resulting in systemic inequality, but also in fact requiring it. 94
Indeed, the reliance of contemporary Lockean theorists on the free-market to deal with any
distributional issues maintains and deepens this acceptance of inequality. 95
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of use, producing collective benefits, regardless of the material consequences. In early
Ontario, Wood argues the “ecological imperialism” of colonial settlement not only tolerated,
but celebrated the re-recreation of the land from a complex forested landscape to one in
which over 90% of the mature woodland was lost and replaced by “a more controlled,
regimented scene of superimposed geometry that reached its zenith in the gridironed towns
and cities.”96 John Stuart Mill’s 19th century utilitarian theory of property similarly relies on
cultivation as the source of land’s value: “In many cases, even when cleared, its
productiveness is wholly the effect of labour and art.”97 The value of nature is conceived of in
purely instrumental terms, albeit utility not individual profit.98 Obligations to cultivate and
improve land are framed as moral duties to act in accordance with the public good and state
priorities for Mill, not to understand and develop land use in accordance with the capacities
and limits of the land itself.99 This project examines how this emphasis on use value and a
conception of waste that requires development rather than sustainability endures as a core
element of Ontario’s land use planning framework.

In light of distributional and environmental concerns, property scholars from a variety of
perspectives have drawn attention to and debate the meaning of Locke’s provisos,
particularly that the acquisition of private property is justified only where there is “enough
and as good” left for others in the commons.100 While a complete survey of the extensive
literature is beyond the scope of this project, examples include Singer who has argued that the
proviso requires a democratization of property rights to provide for equal opportunity, 101 and,
Canadian environmental philosopher Peter Brown who finds the basis for sustainability and
transformative ecological economics in the provisos. 102 These are important debates with
genuine potential to reorient the way Locke’s property upholds particular arrangements and
distributions of property rights. However, in the context of this project, it is the dominant
interpretation rather than debates about potential to repurpose Lockean property for
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transformative purposes that inform the decisions being made in Ontario’s land use law
framework. In particular, law-and-economics scholars have dismissed the proviso 103 or
limited it to the avoidance of harm, thus avoiding any more radical implications. 104

The result of the emphasis on relations of use, alienation and exclusivity in the theory
underpinning property law, legal scholar Craig Arnold argues, is the promotion of “alienation
of people from the object of their rights and the environments in which those rights arise,
including alienation from self, others, work, faith, and nature.105 In the contemporary context
of Ontario’s planning and resource management regime, particular forms of land use linked
with economic development continue to be prioritized in land use decision-making.106 As
discussed below in Section C, the emphasis on use as development for economic gain and the
justification for private property were central to the ideology of Canadian planning in the
early 20th century. This project demonstrates that it persists in provincial land use policy and
informs the hierarchical ordering of uses. The notion that certain types of use-based
relationships to land are productive or progressive, particularly those linked to contemporary
industrial capitalist development, continues to maintain and enforce the hierarchical ordering
of person-place relations in Ontario; and, therefore, remains relevant to the kinds of claims
about place parties articulate in land use disputes and to the way such claims are treated by
decision makers.

As explored in this research, the overlapping claims in land use disputes are complex and
sometimes contradictory. Nonetheless, legal tools and process shape the way parties frame
their claims, for example emphasizing instrumental relationships and economically
productive activity rather than ancestral connections to, or stewardship responsibilities for,
the land. In this way people-place relations are transformed from complex eco-social
relationships into abstract entitlements recognizable by law.
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III.
Dephysicalisation
Graham points to “dephysicalisation” as a critical conceptual development in AngloAmerican property law and a fundamental part of the paradigm of people-place relations in
Anglocentric culture.107 Dephysicalisation, according to Graham, is “the removal of the
physical ‘thing’ from the property relation and its replacement with an abstract ‘right.’ 108
While it is generally associated with Wesley Hohfeld’s 1913 and 1917 writings on
property,109 Graham traces the conceptual roots of dephysicalized property to Locke’s
connection between the right to property and the improvement of land.110 Laws derived from
this model of severable relations between people and places make certain kinds of land use
possible, she argues, as places are valued only for their productive capacity. Land is no longer
understood as part of a particular place with spatial or temporal limits and embedded in
specific networks of connection and relation between humans and the nonhuman
environment. 111
Jeremy Bentham’s idea of property goes beyond the Lockean subordination of nature
outlined above by removing the physicality of place from view entirely and assuming the
instrumental value of nature. Law, Bentham argued, not nature, has the capacity to create “a
fixed and durable possession which merits the name property.” 112 This, Graham argues,
marks the emergence of dephysicalized property in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Property was now a person-person relationship and not a people-place relationship.113 This is
a critical development, Graham argues, as it results in a transformation of “the locus of social
wealth from land, to law or legal right.”114 Bentham begins his discussion of property with
the pronouncement that “there is no such thing as natural property, and … it is entirely the
work of law”115 and famously continues, “Property and law are born together, and die
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property
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ceases.”116 As Graham notes, Bentham’s theory assumes the instrumental value of nature,
“removing place from the equation altogether.”117 In his words, property “is not material, it is
metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind.”118 The positivist conception of property
reduces property to interpersonal relations mediated by positive law – in other words, neither
places nor people-place relations are relevant to legal property any longer.
American legal scholar, Kenneth J. Vandevelde uses the term “dephysicalized” to describe
the conceptual shift in the idea and practice of property from Blackstone to Wesley Hohfeld
in the late 19th century.119 Hohfeld proposed a “conceptual scheme” that became the
dominant view of property in the 20th century. Conceiving of property as purely a set of legal
relations between persons Hohfeld, according to Vandevelde, “banished the need for things
from property law.”120 His property relations were a complex arrangement of rights,
privileges, powers and immunities that were neither fixed nor absolute and could be
disassembled into “constituent parts.”121 Through this dephysicalisation, Vandevelde argues,
property became “the right to value rather than some thing.” 122
For Vandevelde, Hohfeld’s conceptual scheme meant that property lost its’ meaning as a
legal category. As definitional boundaries about whether something was or was not property
were no longer fixed and absolute protections were no longer tenable, the content of property
as a legal category became purely political. 123 In Vandevelde’s view, Hohfeld’s model
resulted in judicial determinations of what counts as property purely based on public policy
interests and opinions – there was no longer any logic or inevitability to what made property
property. Therefore, since “property was what the law said it was,” for Vandevelde the
resulting relations in a particular case were entirely determined by politics rather than a fixed
legal category.124 This, he argues, fundamentally undermines the rule of law. 125 Merrill and
Smith similarly argue that the move from conceiving of property as fixed in rem to a bundle
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of in personam rights has led to an orthodox “conception of property as an infinitely variable
collection of rights, powers, and duties” in contemporary property theory. 126 The
consequence, in their view, is a shift from the “tried and true method of handling potential
conflicts over resources” through the clarity and “limiting effect” of the absolute right to
exclude towards the discretionary and variable contractual “list of uses” model that inevitably
requires public regulation to resolve conflicts.127 However, modern property law did not
suddenly become political, nor was there a pre-existing logical legal category of property that
upheld the rule of law.128 Rather, property law has developed as a particular way of
conceiving of, and producing, human relations with land, places and the more-than-human
world, which is, and was, always a political project. Following from Graham’s argument
outlined above, decisions about what property is, and whose relations are recognized by law,
can be traced much further than Vandevelde suggests, justifying the political and legal
arguments for both domestic enclosures in England and colonial dispossession of Indigenous
lands. Indeed, the “tried and true” method of resolving conflicts was a method of upholding
dominant property relations not a natural or pre-political distributional arrangement.

Graham points to the importance of an absence of materiality in dephysicalized property,
however, Vandevelde is entirely concerned with the loss of the conceptual fixidity and
predictability of the category of property in the law. For him, Graham argues, it is a
metaphysical loss connected to an ideal of government, society and the role of law. 129
Accepting Graham’s argument about the conceptual development of dephysicalisation and
the anthropocentrism of his critique, Vandevelde’s insights about the political nature of legal
determinations of contemporary property relations, and the role of economic interests, remain
important to my project. What counts as property in a particular dispute, and the reasons
particular relationships are deemed legitimate as a result, are often taken for granted in land
use law.

Vandevelde illustrates his concern by pointing to a series of American cases regarding
trademarks, trade secrets, and oil and gas rights in which courts created limited property
rights. In the oil and gas cases, the courts struggled to match the abstract property interests of
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competing claimants to the nature of the owned thing, which defied ownership boundaries by
its very nature, resulting in increasingly illogical legal outcomes.130 The struggle to apply
property concepts to oil and gas resulted in a strange relationship between landowners
whereby one owner could gain an absolute form of ownership over the minerals in their
possession, but “[a]ny superadjacent landowner was legally entitled to take as much oil and
gas as he could get by any available means.” 131 As this initially lead to a race between
potential owners to extract and exhaust the resource, courts introduced a circumstantial
reasonableness test to be applied on a case-by-case basis. In Vandevelde’s view this
represents a key shift away from legal categories that facilitate the logical deduction of rights
as between parties and towards policy-based decision-making.132

In the context of land use disputes it is important to examine the embedded assumptions, and
the complex connections and relations that are left out, both in the way parties frame legal
claims and in the treatment of those claims. The social and environmental critiques discussed
in the next section provide a number of useful ways to undertake this work. For example,
Davina Cooper exposes work performed by property practices that attempt to transform
complex sets of relationships into simplified or bounded representations, with clear and fixed
boundaries of relation that entitle particular relations while obscuring or rejecting others. 133
However, she also exposes the potential to code, define and recognize different and
overlapping property relations – to attend to an expanded and complex understanding of
property as constitutive relations of “belonging” beyond formal law and rights. 134 Whereas
Cooper brings the social relationship of the individual and the collective into view in the
production of property, Graham’s critique adds the possibility of seeing and exposing the
material, and more-than-human, dimensions of arranging property relations in disputes about
particular places.135 From this view, Vandevelde’s oil and gas disputes are not only about the
economic interests and the maintenance of social order through arranging extraction rights.
Nor can they be fully understood by conceiving of interests as contingent on or responsible to
those of others or the community. 136 They are also about seeing the physical, geologically and
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hydrologically embedded, ecological phenomenon (here oil and gas) as not only at stake, but
as having a stake in the transformation from relating in-place to use as severable and
differentiated resources in zones of extractive use.

C. Property Critiques
A multitude of valuable and diverse critiques of the historical development and contemporary
application of property in legal theory and practice exist within legal scholarship 137 and other
disciplines.138 For the purposes of my project, I am specifically concerned with three types of
property critiques that are relevant to understanding people-place relationships in Ontario and
the way decisions about land and the environment are made: i) Social critiques that point to
the social context of the ownership model and challenge the assumptions and political
implications of dominant property narratives; ii) Environmental critiques that point to the
physical and material consequences of the ownership model; and, iii) Critiques based on
alternative articulations and practices of property that demonstrate both the possibility and the
continued existence of alternative relationships with places and the environment. In my view,
there has been insufficient scholarly effort to bring these three together to develop a hybrid
eco-social critique of property that attends to both the theoretical concerns raised by property
theorists and the existing practices of alternative properties highlighted in the commons
literature. One of my aims is to contribute to this ambitious project by considering peopleplace relations and land use disputes in the context of all three.
I. Social Critiques
The ownership property model has been critiqued by a number of scholars concerned with its
cultural and political consequences. While these critiques often point to conceptual problems
or inconsistencies in dominant property narratives, their focus is on the way property
influences, and is influenced by, social relations.
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Jennifer Nedelsky has long advocated a rethinking of rights, and of property rights in
particular, from a relational perspective. 139 Cooper and fellow feminist legal theorist Sarah
Keenan have built on Nedelsky’s relational reorientation of property. Cooper
reconceptualises property as belonging, replacing the centrality of control with a constitutive
relationship of part and whole.140 Keenan adopts Cooper’s notion of belonging, but
spatializes property by defining it as a “relationship of belonging held up by the surrounding
space.”141 Legal theorist Joseph Singer’s Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property also builds
on Nedelsky’s relational critique to develop a model of property premised on the importance
of obligations and human relationships rather than presumptive exclusion.142 Gregory
Alexander, one of the American ‘progressive property’ scholars, argues that attention to the
communitarian social obligations of private property can in fact foster human flourishing. 143
Alexander, Singer and fellow American scholars Eduardo Penalver and Laura Underkuffler’s
“Statement of Progressive Property” rejects the dominant model and argues for a new model
of property that serves a diverse range of values and social relations.144 Like Nedelsky, the
Progressive Property scholars also reject the atomism and individualistic model of the self
carried forward from Locke to Bentham and the Chicago School property model. These
broadly communitarian approaches inform my work by situating property as enmeshed in a
much more complex, dynamic, and contested set of people-place relations. Radin breaks
property into that which is essential to personhood, and therefore protected and inalienable,
and that which is commodifiable and exchangeable.145 Critical race theorist and legal scholar
Cheryl Harris has interrogated constructions of the self-possessed person as property holder,
pointing to whiteness as a form of property both historically and in contemporary United
States politics.146 Legal scholar James Penner’s The Idea of Property in Law attempts to
reconstitute property as “the right to a thing” focusing on the interest in use protected by the
right to exclusion as the essence of the property relation. 147
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In general these “socially grounded criticisms” 148 maintain and enforce a dephysicalized
conception of property. The nature-culture divide is presumed, as is the objectification of
‘things’ and the severability of people and place.149 The material consequences of using land
as property are rarely directly considered. Therefore, while they point to the critical need to
rethink the complexity of person-person relations involved in land use disputes, these authors
offer limited insight into place-based claims and human-more-than-human relations. As
Penner suggests, “[F]or most philosophers the actual objects of property are uninteresting,
and the real meat of the question about property is how we can justify unequal holdings.” 150
While Penner contends that his model returns the ‘thing’ to property, it is only to serve as the
foundation for a better understanding of relations between persons. He explicitly rejects the
notion of reciprocity with or duties towards the things that are properly deemed property:
“The individual is not on par with the thing… control is absolute in the sense that a person’s
influence over the thing is unbounded in principle. He may destroy, modify, or leave the
thing, to the extent that this is actually possible.”151 Things, including land, have no agency or
rights in property relations: “A thing has nothing to say about the relationships it has.” 152
Perhaps the most revealing of Penner’s anthropocentrism is his incredulity at the idea of an
“unbreakable relation to a thing [that] would condemn the owner to having to deal with it.” 153
This limits the potential for non-ownership relationships to land to be articulated and
recognized. In particular, there is no conceptual space in Penner’s model for non-instrumental
relations linked to ancestral or cultural relationships or concerns about the capacity and limits
of the land itself. Indeed, Penner explicitly excludes the possibility for a range of such
potential interests and relations to be considered. As David Lametti notes, Penner “does not
take the idea of thingness far enough.” 154 Thus while Penner attends to the “thingness” of
property, he does so primarily to argue for the importance of exclusion and the maintenance
of the autonomous bounded self through this exclusion of others from one’s property. For the
purposes of this research, this failure to provide for a much broader range of relations, and to
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explicitly exclude relations with place, limits the potential of Penner’s attention to materiality
and things in property relations.
Canadian scholar David Lametti aims to bring objects “back into the property picture.”155 He
proposes the metaphor of “a relationship between or among individuals through objects of
social wealth” to better reflect the dual relationality of property – to persons and through
things.156 He points to property as involving both control and exclusion and obligation and
responsibility, including duties to the object itself.157 In this sense, Lametti allows for the
thing itself to influence, or “condition” the property relation. 158 Lametti points to the
importance of focusing on non-ownership or lesser entitlements, as well as correlative duties
of property holding, in order to develop a more socially accurate and functional idea of
property and including stewardship or conservation relationships. 159 Indeed, he notes the
conceptual baggage that the term ownership carries, which, he argues, obscures the
complexity of property relations as “contextual, flexible, fragmented and nonhierarchical.”160
As relational approaches, Lametti’s critique and Nedelsky’s relational rights model both have
particular potential to bridge the divide between environmental and social critiques of
property in the context of land use disputes. Nedelsky’s critique of the property-inspired
language of boundaries embedded in contemporary notions of ‘rights’ points to the need to
rethink what property is: “We need to take our traditional concepts like property, and ask
what patterns of relationship among people and the material world we want, what patterns
seem true to both integrity and integration.” 161 In focusing on relationships, she is referring
not only to personal relationships, but also to the interconnected “structural and institutional
relationships” structured by law and rights. This structuring is the work that law and rights
actually do, she argues, and therefore, it should be exposed and placed at the center of our
analysis.162 Like Graham’s places, relationships are central to our material existence, yet are
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obscured by the legal discourse of the autonomous and bounded individual. “A relational
analysis.” Nedelsky argues, “provides a better framework for identifying what is really at
stake in difficult cases and for making judgments about the competing interpretations of
rights involved.”163 This project adopts this reorientation to attend to relationships and
relational claims in order to understand what is at stake for those involved in land use
disputes. While Nedelsky expressly maintains the dephysicalized construction of property as
primarily about relationships between people, she points to the need for further development
of her relational analysis to encompass the relationships between humans and nonhumans. 164
Nedelsky’s reconceptualization of autonomy - from requiring independence from the
collective to being enabled by constructive relationships - opens up conceptual space for
place as more than commodity. 165 Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place
relationship in property relations is a starting point for the future project of using the
relational approach to articulate the responsibility of humans to the more-than-human
world.166 This research builds on both to argue for a reorientation of property from exclusion
and severability towards relational reciprocity in people-place relations.
Nedelsky proposes a four-step approach to resolving a particular dispute.167 Her approach is
based on her distinction between values and rights. Values, she argues, are the big abstract
articulations of what a society sees as essential to humanity. Rights are specific “institutional
and rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing such values.” 168 Rights, in
Nedelsky’s model, are not rigid and universal or timeless. Rather, they are contextual,
negotiated and evolve around the kinds of relationships we need to pursue our values.
Presented with a specific dispute, the inquiry begins by examining how the legal structuring
of the relevant relations is related to the conflict. Having identified the underlying context,
the question becomes, “What values are at stake?” Once the values are articulated, the inquiry
shifts to the kinds of relationships that would foster those values. Finally, with these
relationships in mind, the question becomes, “How would different types of rights structure
relations differently in the relevant context?” 169 This approach to dealing with conflicts has
the potential to radically alter the way that a particular land use dispute may play out,
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particularly when relations between humans and the more-than-human world are explicitly
recognized as part of both the problem and the resolution.
In my view, Nedelsky’s work offers particular conceptual openness to ecological critiques of
property. The eco-relational methodological approach outlined in Chapter Three and applied
in Chapters Five through Eight adapts her relational rights framework in light of ecological
property critiques. Nedelsky’s concrete framework for dispute resolution is adapted and
strengthened by the insights from Graham and others who emphasize human-nonhuman
relationality and mutual dependence and responsibility. Both Nedelsky’s relational approach
and Graham’s environmental critique seek to “open space” to reorient legal discourse towards
already existing relationships and the work they do. Both point to the current inadequacy of
property law to recognize relationships fundamental to the material conditions of life as the
source of dysfunction in the law, resulting in its failure to effectively respond to ongoing and
emergent social and environmental crises and conflicts. And, while both engage at length
with the theoretical aspects of this potential reorientation, they are also deeply concerned with
the practical outcomes of this present dysfunction. In particular, abstract rights limit the
ability of interested parties to meaningfully express their claims and connect their experiences
to the formal decision-making process. As Graham observes in the context of land use
conflicts, “courts swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into disputes
over abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss associated
with transformation of the nonhuman environment become “dissident voices.” 170
II.
Environmental Critiques
Graham argues, “[P]roperty law is an ideology and practice of a relationship between people
and place.”171 In the Hohfeldian concept of property discussed above, property relations are
categorized through ownership and non-ownership. Ownership, he argued, comes with a set
of rights, privileges, powers and immunities. As Arnold notes, duties, responsibilities, and
obligations are largely absent from this concept of ownership.172 Non-ownership, in the
Hohfeldian sense, comes with a set of relations that do not include rights, but do include
duties, disabilities, and liabilities with respect to an owner.173 As Vandevelde and Graham
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both point out, Hohfeld’s property relations are conceived of as entirely between persons.
The consequence of a dominant person-person model, according to Graham, is that peopleplace relationships are deemed insignificant in both law and culture.174 This
decontextualization of property, Arnold argues, results in the failure to give “meaningful
consideration to the ecological characteristics of particular lands or waters in which rights are
claimed.”175 This project examines the effects of this conception of ownership on land use
law and people-place relations in Ontario.

In the US context, environmental law scholar Jeffery Sax argues in Environmental Law Forty
Years Later: Looking Back and Looking Ahead that Anglo-American property’s function as a
structural legal category is to create an “incentive system” for environmental degradation
through the promotion of transformative uses of physical earth systems and resources.176 In
his view, fundamental change to our relationship with the environment requires attention to
this structural element of the legal system and integration of environmental values into basic
legal structures rather than layering-on increasingly complex environmental regulatory
regimes to existing legal categories. Without such structural change, he argues,
environmental law has little effect against the “unrelenting autonomic momentum of the
property system and the rewards it promotes and encourages.”177 In the context of Ontario,
Wood concludes, “[T]he battle mentality of the early days has become deeply ingrained, a
cultural construct expressed in the values of our society; indeed, the natural environment
remains something to be overcome in favour of development”.178

Sax points to several specific concerns with the current dominant model of property.
Individualistic concepts of ownership, he argues, equate the market-driven interests of
property holders with the public interest leading to an “absolutist” conception of rights to use
and exclusion.179 Indeed the “jus abutendi” right of abuse, he argues, means that an owner
can destroy land and resources without consideration of the consequences for society. While
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specific regulatory tools may be layered onto the basic ownership relationship to prohibit
specific activities, there is a presumptive right to use one’s land as one wishes. 180 Indeed, as
Sax argues and as will be discussed below in Section iii, such regulatory limitations on
ownership are increasingly interpreted as expropriation, takings in the US context, and
subject to compensatory orders for the potential profit value of private property regardless of
the public legislative purpose, the demonstrated social or ecological values protected, or even
the actual private use of the land.181 As noted above, the lack of constitutional protection for
private property rights in Canada has resulted in limited judicial uptake of American case law
on regulatory takings and high standard for constructive takings in Canadian law182 as set out
by the Supreme Court in CPR v City of Vancouver.183 Nonetheless, Canadian legal historian
Douglas Harris points out that property rights are protected by statutory regimes at the
provincial level that require market value compensation for expropriation.184 Further, as
noted by Valiante and Smit, Canada has a “healthy” property rights movement 185 supported
by Metcalf’s study that demonstrates strong cultural resistance to state interference with
private land.186 Sax also laments the lack of judicial imagination to conceive of “legally
recognizable interests” in nature beyond its instrumental use value or the potential for
“concrete injury.” 187 Without the conceptual space to conceive of and protect broader
relational interests in, for example, biodiversity conservation, Sax argues that the legal
system functions to deny “the very possibility of environmental law.” 188 As argued in this
project, Ontario’s land use law similarly lacks conceptual space for more-than-human
interests and people-place relations, which has important implications for the transformative
potential of land use planning and environmental law.

Also in the US context, environmental law scholar Eric Freyfogle points to a place-based
reinterpretation of private property as both a legal and cultural institution. He highlights the
particular potency of the dominant construction of property in relation to the power to
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control, transform and even destroy nature.189 Linking its dominance to both the Lockean presocial view of property’s origins and to the individualistic construction of rights, Freyfogle
problematizes the pervasive role of private property in American environmental
governance.190 Based on the history of land use in Illinois, he presents a counter-narrative of
common use of rural land combined with strong prohibitions on harmful land use to balance
out presumptions about the centrality of exclusivity and private property to American
identity.191 Freyfogle notes the particular strength of this property paradigm in rural areas,192
pointing to both the historically urban focus of movements for land-use control and to the
failure of environmental movements to “put forth an alternative vision of private ownership”
characterized by responsibility and grounded in ecological place.193 Wood’s exploration of
“ecological imperialism” in the colonial settlement of Upper Canada situates similar
dynamics in Ontario,194 as do McLaren’s observations about the primacy of private property
in the Canadian colonial settlement mentality.195

Sax and Freyfogle develop alternative approaches to property rights by reorienting existing
American legal concepts. Sax aims to demonstrate the possible elements of an
“environmentally functional” property regime.196 Property ownership relations, he argues,
must include inducements for the maintenance and restoration of land and water, in particular
the “natural services” provided for human and nonhuman communities.197 Sax points to the
decision in a 1972 riparian zoning case, Just v. Marinette County,198 to demonstrate that it is
possible to define private property rights in relation to “the land in its natural condition” and
to view ecological benefits as meaningful public rights. 199

Freyfogle proposes a practical approach to revising ownership based on familiar legal
concepts in the US legal system, the “do-no-harm-principle” already embedded in the

Eric T Freyfogle, “Private Rights in Nature: Two Paradigms” in Peter Burdon, ed, Exploring Wild Law: The
Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 2011) 270 at 272.
190
Ibid at 273.
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid at 272.
193
Ibid at 274.
194
Wood, supra note 58 at 13.
195
McLaren, supra note 39.
196
Sax, supra note 176 at 15.
197
Ibid at 12.
198
Just v Marinette County, 201 NW 2d 761 (Wisc. 1972).
199
Sax, supra note 176 at 16.
189

48

common law of nuisance and the public ownership and trusteeship in water and wild
animals.200 Extending the notion of harm to the land itself, as well as future generations, he
argues, would limit the power of owners to transform and degrade land, as well as call
attention to issues of capacity and scale in determining appropriate land use. 201 This notion of
“carrying-capacity-harms,” in his view, “could provide a strong counterpoint to the prevailing
tendency to define private rights abstractly, as if land parcels were identical.” 202 Similarly, he
argues that focusing on the public interest in, and responsibility for, common resources such
as water and wildlife shifts scale of appropriate decision-making from the individual owner to
“collective governance at the landscape scale.” 203 This project explores the potential to
reorient ownership and property in the Canadian context, specifically in Ontario’s land use
planning framework. Sax and Freyfogle demonstrate the existing concepts can be a source of
transformative potential and this project argues we should expose and engage with such
strategic openings in land use law.
Canadian Peter Brown adopts a “commonwealth of life” perspective to shift from the ‘natural
resources’ framework in which ecosystems, and their constituent parts, are understood to
exist for the use and benefit of humans towards a worldview that understands the mutual
dependency of nonhuman species on natural systems. 204 From this perspective, human use,
such as extraction, “must be supported by reasons” that attend to both human and nonhuman
well-being.205 This perspective, he argues, shifts the basis on which decisions about how land
can and should be used from economic return to the realization and maintenance of “resilient
flourishing of life and the maintenance of capacity for self-renewal.”206
Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place relationship in property relations offers
another starting point for the future project of using the relational approach to articulate the
responsibility of humans to the nonhuman world.207 Graham aims to (re)centre the notion of
relationship - in her case, the people-place relationship that property law has erased and
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excluded. In doing so, Graham rejects the dualism of either anthropocentric or ecocentric
analyses of environmental crises:
The concepts of network and interconnection open a space for the notion of
inalienable relationships between people and place. The idea that relationships
are interdependent and multilinear works against the idea that relationships are
oppositional within the dichotomous nature/culture paradigm of
anthropocentrism.208
In fact, she notes, the etymological origins of the word “property” invoke a “mutually
formative” relationship between property and identity. 209 In the original sense, property was
all about the interconnections between people and things, with land in particular being central
to the formation of identity for individuals and communities.210 Graham and others have
noted echoes of this in the way that lay persons and communities assert interests based on
generational or other forms of connection with a particular place.211 This research examines
such assertions in the context of aggregate mineral extraction disputes and considers whether
and how such articulations are made, but also how they are received and considered by
decision makers. The more-than-owners people-place relations examined here demonstrate
the complex and even conflicting relations that exist between people and particular places,
neither purely ecocentric or simply anthropocentric.
Arnold’s conception of property as a “web of interests,” which he defines as, “a set of
interconnections among persons, groups and entities each with some stake in an identifiable
(whether tangible or intangible) object at the centre of the web,” brings together a number of
elements of the critiques describe above in this section.”212 This approach compliments
Graham’s re-centering of relationship and emphasis on the centrality of people-place
relations. By simultaneously attending to the particular object of the interest in property, he
argues, and to the multiple relationships between the property-holder and the object and the
property-holder and other interest-holders, the web of interests serves as an integrative model
of property. In his view, by opening up space for consideration of the characteristics of the
object of property and its connectedness with a broader ecological, social, and geographic
and temporal context, this model is preferable to the “legally centrist isolated abstraction” of
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traditional models of property. 213 Further, Arnold includes duties, responsibilities and
relationships alongside rights, building in the space for relations such as Graham’s reciprocity
with place.214 In my view, Arnold’s model provides conceptual space for articulation,
assertion and consideration of the multiple, overlapping and diverse forms of people-place
relation that emerge in the context of land use disputes.
III.
Alternative Models
Citing “stewardship” as an emergent concept, Davies notes a shift from property law as the
realm of fixed, presumptively exclusive individual rights, to more discretionary rights, which
she describes as “more fragile, contextual, and limited use.”215 She argues that the
strengthening of environmental and planning law, including the incorporation of stewardship
concepts in jurisdictions like Australia, is evidence of law’s opening to these alternative
visions of property.216 Cooper suggests five intersecting property dimensions of property
practices that can help us uncover the production and performance of property; “belonging”,
“codification,” “definition,” “recognition,” and “power.”217 Belonging, for Cooper, extends
beyond the hierarchical and instrumental subject-object relation normally associated with
property to include “constitutive” relations of connection between a part and whole. 218
Codification is the coding of a particular thing that “locates relations to a thing within wider
regulatory and epistemic structures” such that it represents “a far more complex set of
relationships.”219 While Cooper notes this includes instrumental coding of a thing as a
severable commodity, a more relational coding of a thing as representative of the whole to
which others belong is possible, or both may coexist and overlap. Definition, Cooper argues,
includes attempts to fix boundaries around things and relationships to them but also a process
of “familiarization” in which the thing is brought into focus.220 Recognition is the process of
bestowing authoritative “recognition and entitlement upon particular relations of belonging
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while ignoring, discounting or rejecting others,” which may flow from formal institutional
sources or informal ones.221 Power, she argues, is whether the particular coding of property
has the capacity to “make a difference”, both in relation to collective and individual interests
in the thing itself but also “in promoting personal, civic and boundary norms.” 222 Cooper,
therefore, not only provides tools to examine how the dominant model of property is
produced and sustained, she helps us to see new possibilities to produce and perform
alternative property relations.
While the emergence of ‘new’ models of property and forms of organizing property regimes
is important, and several promising examples have been outlined above from both social and
ecological perspectives, it is important to acknowledge the presence of existing alternatives
and their predecessors. While the importance of understanding, recognizing and respecting
Indigenous laws and land use jurisdiction was noted above in subsection 1.A, and engages a
range of constitutional and social justice related concerns about Indigenous selfdetermination, it is also important not to essentialize or racialize notions of ‘sustainability’ or
perpetuate stereotypical associations of Indigenous People with nature that continue to be
used to justify racist colonial policies both legally and culturally in Canada and elsewhere. 223
One way to guard against this is to consider a range of land use systems that depart from the
ownership model of property across a range of geographical and cultural contexts. Indeed,
from a historical perspective, it is essential to recall that the Lockean model influenced both
colonial dispossession of Indigenous land and the domestic enclosure of common land in
England for private gain of land-holders and the introduction of industrial agriculture. In 17th
century England, the result was the displacement of complex and longstanding land use
governance frameworks developed to both share and sustain land and natural resources. 224
Further, contemporary scholarship on “the commons,” most notably economist Elinor
Ostrom’s Noble Prize winning work in Governing the Commons: The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action,225 unequivocally demonstrates a broad range of existing

221

Ibid at 631.
Ibid at 630–631.
223
Michael Eugene Harkin & David Rich Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: Perspectives on the
ecological Indian (U of Nebraska Press, 2007); Nicole Graham, “Owning the Earth” in Exploring Wild Law:
The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (Kent Town, South Australia: Wakefield Press, 2011) 259 at 267.
224
Neeson, supra note 62.
225
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
222

52

and enduring approaches to defining and practicing property beyond the twin-poles of
command-and-control state-based regulation versus private property regimes.226 Indeed, as
commons scholars Frank van Laerhoven and Erling Berg argue, the focus of this research has
shifted from proving that Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons was wrong, to
demonstrating the conditions under which communities can establish and maintain systems to
govern common pool resources on their own.227

Rose argues that cultural and political recognition of alternative property relations has the
potential to change our definition of property and property practices. In her view, the
ownership model of property has so influenced cultural understandings of what property is
and what it does, other forms of property such as common pool resources, or what she calls
limited common property regimes, “do not look like property at all to us, and we have tended
to ignore them.”228 Further, she argues, such claims are often made by persons or groups
“somehow deemed inappropriate to make claims of entitlement.”229 The result, Rose argues,
is that certain types of claims are recognized and others are not, with potentially violent and
unequal material effects.230

While my project does not study common pool resources, this literature is important as both a
base of sound empirical research about the potential for property and ownership relations to
be conceptualized and practised outside of the ownership model, particularly in connection
with place-based and experiential knowledge. The work of Ostrom and other commons
scholars does the very important work of viewing people-place relations in practice and
questioning the currency and accuracy of the state versus private control dichotomy in
environmental and land use theory practice. As Rose argues, this can have important
implications for opening space for a wider range of claims to land and resources. At the same
time, my work exposes the problems of conceiving of land use disputes as a particular
‘resource,’ rather than about ‘places’ which comprise complex interconnections of ecological
and social networks. If considered in isolation from their relationships with hydrological
systems, soil, farmers, forests, animals, plants, hikers, and other human and nonhuman actors,
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aggregate minerals as a non-renewable subsurface resources may be seen as ideally managed
through a private property regime. However, the multiple and overlapping claims to the
places in which they are situated point to the need for a more nuanced and complex
understanding of what is being ‘managed,’ and for whom.
Legal Geography
Legal geography encompasses a range of interdisciplinary scholarship in which space is the
organizing principle. Melinda Harm Benson points to the early formation of two separate
trajectories of legal geography research, applied legal geography and critical legal
geography.231 Below I focus on the theoretically oriented critical legal geography stream as
an explicitly critical body of scholarship that provides important insights into the production
of law and space.232

According to Benson, the starting point for the theoretical stream of legal geography
scholarship was the emergence of an interest in the relationship between law, space and the
state amongst geographers.233 The work of critical scholars including Henri Lefebvre 234 and
Edward Soja235 pointed to the socially constructed nature of space and the mutually
constitutive relationship between the spatial, the social and the temporal. Legal geography
builds on these key ideas to explore the ways in which space and law are produced through
social relations.236 Irus Braverman et al. describe the focus of legal geography as
“interconnections between law and spatiality, and especially their reciprocal construction.” 237
Sarah Keenan notes that legal geography exposes the political nature of space by examining
spatial connectivity with the legal and social.238 What is critical for legal geography is that
Melinda Harm Benson, “Mining sacred space: law’s enactment of competing ontologies in the American
West” (2012) 44 Environ Plan A 6 1443 at 1145.
232
For examples of applied legal geography see, Darla K Munroe, Cynthia Croissant & Abigail M York, “Land
use policy and landscape fragmentation in an urbanizing region: Assessing the impact of zoning” (2005) 25
Appl Geogr 2 121; Otis W Templer, “Municipal conjunctive water use on the texas high plains” (2002) 38 Soc
Sci J 4 597; Jennifer F Brewer, “Don’t fence me in: boundaries, policy, and deliberation in Maine’s lobster
commons” (2012) 102 Ann Assoc Am Geogr 2 383; Rutherford H Platt, Land Use and Society, Revised Edition:
Geography, Law, and Public Policy (Washington DC: Island Press, 2004).
233
Benson, supra note 231 at 1145.
234
Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (London: Wiley, 1991).
235
Edward Soja, “The Spatiality of Social Life: Towards a Transformative Retheorisation” (1985) Soc Relat
Spat Struct 90.
236
Deborah Martin, Alexander Scherr & Christopher City, “Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the
Production of Space” (2010) 34 Prog Hum Geogr 2 175 at 177–178; Lefebvre, supra note 234.
237
Irus Braverman et al, “Introduction: Expanding the Spaces of Law”, Irus Braverman et al. eds., The
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) 1.
238
Sarah Keenan, “Property as Governance: Time, Space and Belonging in Australia’s Northern Territory
Intervention” (2013) 76:3 Mod Law Rev 464 at 468.
231

54

law and space are not simply brought together; they are understood as “enmeshed” and
mutually constitutive.239 Or, as Keenan notes, “[A]ll of this shows that law operates through
rather than upon space.”240

Nicholas Blomley et al. identify the significance of this convergence of legal and
geographical perspectives as the potential to open up the concepts of ‘space’ and ‘law’ and
‘society’ to new questions and inquiries.241 Sarah Blandy and David Sibley describe the dual
focus of traditional legal geography research as, “a concern with legal actions in public space,
and, the ways in which concepts of property and jurisdiction shape material landscapes
through legal meaning.”242 Legal geography has been the subject of ongoing internal debate
about its limitations, potential and future possibilities. As David Delaney notes, “there is an
increasing sense that this project has gotten stuck in its bridging phase and that inherited
conceptual dualisms are impeding further progress.” 243 He points to the persistence of
conceptions of law as the immaterial realm of language and meaning, and space as the
inactive material setting that “contains” what law produces. 244 However, as Delaney has more
recently argued, the emerging role of legal geography is “to investigate the contingencies and
constraints of spatial justice.”245

Delaney himself proposes a new approach to move from a law and geography binary towards
an examination of the mutually constitutive nature of legal forms and their “lived
geographies.”246 He argues that the focus of the inquiry should shift from what spatial and
legal phenomenon are or their relatedness, to examinations of “how they happen” - what he
calls the “pragmatics of world-making.” Delaney calls for scholarship that both politicizes
and historicizes world-making through attention to performativity and the enactment of
power through space and law. 247 As discussed in more detail below, Blomley takes up this
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approach in his recent re-examination of his critique of property in ways that have particular
relevance for my project.248
Blomley and Mariana Valverde have directed their attention to exposing specific “legal
knowledges” and the work of particular legal actors.249 As Delaney notes, “[l]egal
geographers take us into the workshops where space, law and (in)justice are the means of the
co-production of each other.”250 Braverman et al. also call for more careful and specific
thinking about temporal dimensions and space-time conceptions. 251 Attention to
spatiotemporalities has been taken up directly by Valverde who reminds us to “always ask
about temporalization as well, and indeed about the ways in which spatialization affects
temporalization and vice versa”. As discussed in Section 4 below, this project considers the
interrelations of space and time in the context of land use disputes, in particular how private
ownership of land works through law to assert both spatial and temporal power. Some legal
geographers have also called for a shift away from the human-centered focus of legal
geography to account for the “crucial legal work performed by (and with) things.” 252
Consequently, they note the importance of engaging with previously disregarded fields such
as physical geography and economics, as well as the humanities.253 As will be discussed
below in this section, my project also points to the importance of engagement with the morethan-human world and with the natural sciences, such as ecology, hydrology and geology,
and environmental history, as part of undertaking place-based research.
Irus Braverman’s use of ethnographic methodologies illuminates the spatio-legal dynamics of
“the social life of power” in socio-nature relations.254 In her, “Who’s Afraid of
Methodology?,” Braverman points to the failure of legal geographers to adequately reflect on
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their methods.255 Given the explicitly critical orientation of legal geography, she argued in an
earlier version of the paper, “We should be devoting much more attention to the
methodological question.”256 She reflects on her own experimentation with a “studying-up”,
engaged ethnography approach.257 As outlined in Chapter Three, I take up her call for the
application of specific and transparent methodological approaches and thus apply a hybrid
qualitative placed-based methodology to this project.

As these descriptions make clear, theoretical legal geography is broad in range and diverse in
approach and perspective.258 For the limited purposes of my study, there are three related
themes of particular relevance that emerge in this literature: i) the construction,
materialization, and practice of property and property relations; ii) place-making and the
politics of place in the context of conflicts about land and environment; and, iii) the
convergence of legal and spatial constructions of nature and the consequences for landscapes
and environments.
A. Property
British geographer Sarah Whatmore points to property as, “one of, if not, the primary
currency of ongoing conversations between Law and Geography.” 259 A consistent theme in
Blomley’s well-known work is the need to examine and understand the concept of property
and what it does in law and in society. 260 Blomley pays particular attention to the forms of
spatial organization and representation involved in legal arrangements and the ways in which
these make legal power possible. Much of his research considers the work that property law
does in ordering space in specific contexts, such as the urban sidewalk, gardening or urban
poverty and homelessness. 261 Space, in Blomley’s work, is a key element of the
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materialization of power.262 Law not only produces and is produced by the social, it is
spatialized and as such can reinforce power relations through processes of exclusion, coding
or locating.263 “Law’s geographies,” he states, “materialize and visually communicate legal
rules.” In doing so, he argues, they “produce particular forms of legal subjectivity.” 264 Spatial
boundaries take on the form of legal meanings, ascribing legal categories to both people and
places, such as trespasser versus owner or public versus private space. In his words, “law
does more than act upon the world: to varying degrees, it makes the world, helping to
constitute the understanding and beliefs that make the world unfold this way rather than that
way.”265

Blomley points to the centrality of the public-private divide in liberal conceptions of
property, serving as a “categorical boundary” for spatial ordering. 266 He points out two
fundamental assumptions that speak to the cultural blindness to alternative models of
property noted by Rose. First, property is either private or state-based; and, second, these
presumed domains of property are distinguishable: “On the zero-sum assumption that
property rights cannot easily be unbundled and shared, it is assumed that one owner must be
effectively sovereign within the spatial bounds of property. The idea of multiple owners,
ideologically at least, is anathema.”267 In the context of disputes about the use of land, this
places critical conceptual and practical constraints on the types of claims that parties
articulate, and even further constraint on their recognition. As Blomley notes, the
maintenance of the public-private divide has re-emerged as a critical site for legal
intervention under neo-liberal governments in Canada: “A bright line is drawn between the
owner and the state. Although the state may intervene to limit these rights if they threaten
harm to others, such interventions are seen as secondary to the core rights of the owner.” 268
Much of Blomley’s past work has focused on demonstrating that property is a more
“heterogeneous” and “hybrid” concept than this ownership model allows and exposing how
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people produce “hybrid space” in everyday life despite the power of dominant spatial and
legal categories in informing policy and government decision-making: “People seem to live
in much more complicated, fluid and hybrid worlds when it comes to categories such as
property, which relies upon clarity, order and fixity.” 269 Blomley and others, such as Nick
Jackson and John Wightman,270 and Sarah Whatmore,271 have examined alternative
constructions of property that fall outside the individualized ownership relationship of liberal
property theory and practice. In Flowers in the Bathtub, his study of gardening in a
Vancouver neighbourhood, Blomley explores how acts of “encroachment” serve as a form of
boundary crossing between public and private property. While gardening is traditionally
associated with private activity, he shows that it can spill over into public space and
transgress important legal boundaries. Such “interstitial activities” create an uncertainty that
is uncomfortable for law, which seeks to resolve it and recreate the boundaries of the
public/private divide. As with his recent book on sidewalk regulation,272 Blomley’s study of
gardening is focused on exposing “everyday legal geographies” and the specificity of legal
tools and logics rather than the ideological dimensions of law.273 In a later article based on
the same data, Blomley assesses and complicates Smith and Merrill’s conception of property
boundaries as sending necessarily simplistic messages to those outside, as discussed in
Section 1, against detailed empirical accounts of everyday interactions with property
boundaries: “A property boundary is a legal spatiality that is itself embedded in and
productive of dense relational geographies (normative, practical, visual, complex, social,
political, and so on).”274 In the context of planning and land use law, his work demonstrates
the importance of detailed examination of the specific operation of law in place. My project
takes this up in the context of aggregate extraction regulation.

This research is consistent with the broader body of critical property scholarship outlined
above in Section 1 in adopting the “mismatch critique,” 275 an approach which Blomley has
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himself recently used performativity theory to critique. The mismatch critique is premised on
the failure of the ownership model of property to accurately represent the reality of property
in the world:276 “Put baldly, it argues that our representations of property’s reality are
incorrect, and that these incorrect representations lead us to make bad choices. Better
understandings of the reality of property should lead to better representations, and thus
improved outcomes.”277 Following from Delany, Blomley uses performativity theory to
question the mismatch approach. Treating the ownership model as “unitary” and presuming
its social and legal dominance, he argues, obscures the ways in which it succeeds at
constructing property vis-à-vis other versions of property and why. Rather, he argues, the
ownership model can be more accurately understood as multiple “performances” of property
that successfully shape legal and social relations and practices. Performativity, he argues,
reveals the varied extent to which a model of property relations has “performative effect” or
success in “constituting the reality of property in particular ways.” 278 Further, he argues, from
a performativity perspective, property is not fixed in reality prior to the performances that
constitute it as something to represent (or misrepresent). 279

For Blomley, performativity is a way to trace and understand the success of the ownership
model despite the laudable work that critical property scholars, and indeed he himself, have
engaged in to demonstrate its flaws as well as to pose alternatives. In the context of my
research, this is an important and worthwhile project: why do private property ownership
relations have so much power and influence in land use decision-making despite both such
theoretical critiques and the range of claims and interests that are continually asserted, both
within and outside the boundaries of formal legal processes? Exposing the specific work that
is done to make, remake, and sustain property as “certain and secure,” Blomley argues, is
critical to understanding how the ownership model is maintained and made real in the face of
such critiques and alternatives.280 In Blomley’s view, the critical distinction is between the
“success” of a particular representation and its “truth”. In other words, the “felicity,” or the
degree to which it is successfully actualized in the world is what matters. Its performative
power does not rest on the accuracy of its representations, but its ability to enrol resources
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and arrange other representations.281 Blomley adopts the concept of “bracketing” to
understand the particular ways law works to organize disputes and the consequences: “[A] set
of relations specified as legally consequential are bracketed and detached from entanglements
(ethical, practical, ecological, ontological) that are now placed outside the frame.”282 This
process is always partial, but nonetheless political as the power to frame the boundaries of a
particular dispute successfully is not evenly distributed. 283 Blomley is careful to note that
bracketing does not mean simplification, rather, that it works to draw on specific and often
complex relations while attempting to sever others and therefore to succeed in successfully
producing law in particular ways. 284 Here I adopt the concept of bracketing to examine the
work that private property, particularly the land ownership, does through law to negotiate the
success of specific forms of land use and people-place relations. Following from Blomley, I
expose attempts to foreground particular relations in land use disputes while severing others.
I attempt to expose the role of private ownership in creating a world in which particular
extractive forms of land use succeed while other instrumental and non-instrumental uses do
not.

For Blomley, the failure of critical property scholarship to bring about change demonstrates
that it is not enough to point to alternatives and expose the inadequacies of the dominant
model of property relations.285 For him, scholarship should identify “new spaces of ‘propertypolitics,’ such as those that seek to recover and rework the commons.”286 The question for
Blomley is, “What sort of property do we wish to see performed?”287 My project engages
with this notion of performativity to examine whether the people-place relations emerging in
contemporary land use disputes contribute to broader conversations about how we live
together in networks of human and more-than-human relation.
Notably, despite performativity theory’s focus on representation, Blomley does not
understand the performance of property as a wholly human enterprise. Drawing on Bruno
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Latour, he argues that it encompasses both elaborate human communication, such as “words
and ideas” as well as “relations between bodies and things.” 288 To this end, Blomley points to
the relational nature of performing property through “assemblages”, as well as the “particular
relational arrangements.”289 However, he maintains a conceptual divide between human and
nonhuman “objects” or “things” with humans as the “agents who arrange and assemble” and
“things that have been arranged.”290 In my view, this kind of performative analysis would
benefit from a richer understanding of the role of the nonhuman and the relationality of
people with and as things. The feminist and relational theory approaches presented in Section
2, such as the work of Nedelsky, Cooper and Keenan, have important roles to play in this
reconception and recognition of alternative relational properties. In particular, Keenan has
built on relational approaches and Cooper’s conception of property as belonging, outlined in
Section 1, to argue that “property is a spatial formation that occurs when relations of
belonging are held up by the spaces in and through which these relations exist.” 291 In this way
she seeks to shift the focus from the propertied subject, building on Doreen Massey’s
theorization of space and place discussed in subsection ii,292 towards “the space that
surrounds, includes and constitutes the subject”, which she understands as “multiplicitous and
dynamic”.293 As Keenan notes, space is also produced by property through material effects
that facilitate the continuation of particular relations of belonging. 294 This temporal
dimension, Keenan argues, is significant because property, particularly in land, tends to
produce linear time. This temporal orientation, she argues, is dependent on the past, but also
“tends to shape the future in the same mould as the past.”295 By constructing property as
spatially contingent, Keenan concludes that it has “significant potential” – it can be reshaped
to produce “alternative spaces of belonging.” 296 Like Blomley’s “new spaces of ‘propertypolitics”, Keenan argues that “subversive property” can unsettle and actually reshape the
world around it.297
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The impact of relational approaches to space on legal geography promises to be significant,
shifting from stable conceptions of spaces as objects in themselves, towards understanding
the “dynamic and unfolding processes” continuously shaping both space and specific
places.298 However, as Braverman et al. argue, it is important to recognize the continuing
performative force of static and fixed understandings of space and scale in legal knowledges
and categories.299 Relational perspectives offer an opportunity to “trace the ways in which
scale solidifies and is made real” and to see law’s spaces as “complicated effects” rather than
as objects in the world.300 Work on place as relational as well as on nature, nonhuman actors
and agency discussed below in subsections B and C also contributes to this shift towards
relationality.
B. Place
Building on critical scholarship on space by Henri Lefebvre 301 and David Harvey,302 scholars
including Andrew Merrifield303 and Doreen Massey304 have theorized “place” as a socially
constructed ‘spatialized moment.’305 Deborah Martin summarizes this concept of place as, “a
setting for and situated in the operation of social and economic processes, and it also provides
a “grounding” for everyday life and experience.”306 Massey’s work emphasises the “throwntogetherness” of places, which are made of up social and material dimensions and human and
more-than human encounters.307 Emphasising the uncertain and dynamic nature of place,
Massey situates place as a site of ongoing negotiation.308 For her, “multiplicity, antagonisms
and contrasting temporalities are the stuff of all places.”309 She is careful to reject an
oppositional approach to space and place, arguing that both are “concrete, grounded, real,
lived.”310 Places, she argues, are events in which broader spatial and temporal networks are
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integrated in a particular moment.311 Thus, in Massey’s view, the politics of place is precisely
the challenge of continuing to negotiate how we will live together. They “implicate us,
perforce, in the lives of human others, and in our relations with nonhumans they ask how we
shall respond to our temporary meeting-up with these particular rocks and stones and
trees.”312 Building on Massey’s conception of place, this project adopts the language of place
in the context of land use law in order to avoid the division of networks of ecological and
social relation into separate severable, and therefore alienable, ‘resources’ – in this case, the
rock formations embedded in multiple and overlapping physical, ecological, and social
systems throughout Ontario. As well, Massey’s conception of place includes the affective
dimensions of people-place relations that are necessarily a part of the ongoing encounter and
negotiations that make up the particular spatialized moments examined in this project.
Building on Massey’s conception of place, Martin et al. use the term “place claims” to
discuss the way people represent “attachments to, and identification with, specific places”
and their “ideals about land use and how spatial processes should unfold.”313 The disconnect
between people’s place claims and law, they argue, is “one of the central features of the lawspace nexus.”314 They call for more research to explore this relationship between the actors
and networks that mediate the spatio-legal production involved in struggles over land use.315
My place-based examination of relational claims in disputes about aggregate extraction will
contribute precisely to this type of research. This concept of ‘place claims’ compliments
Blomley’s work on ‘bracketing’ discussion in subsection ii above, as well as research about
‘place meanings’ and ‘place attachment’ discussed in Chapter Three in relation to placebased research methods.
Pierce et al. introduced the concept of “relational place-making” to integrate bodies of
scholarship on place, politics and networks towards a “networked politics of place.”316 They
construct a multi-scalar and relational concept of place as “bundles of space-time
trajectories”. In adopting Massey’s bundle metaphor to argue that “all places are relational
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places,”317 they point to four key elements of place as relational. First, they argue, places are
made up of “raw materials,” including, “physical features, individuals, coalitions,
corporations and groups, as well as myriad parts of the built environment.”318 These raw
materials are diverse and multi-scalar in nature.319 Second, the process of selection amongst
these raw materials makes up the places of “individual human-environment experiences.”320
Third, as these “bundles” are “framed” toward social and political ends, groups form shared
understandings about places and their meaning in pursuit of collective goals. 321 Finally, they
argue, these bundles are dynamic, ongoing and change over time, each place-frame being
only ever a negotiated and strategic “fraction of a place.”322 Critically, Pierce et al. note the
“simultaneously structural and agentic” and “inherently political” nature of place-making:
“common places develop from pervasive structural forces that produce particular built
environments and values.”323 Elsewhere Pierce and Martin note, “[A] relational place
perspective provides a flexible conceptual scaffolding for attention to the political economic
dimensions or bundles of place without insisting on a solitary focus on the (socio)-spatial.”324
As British geographer Jonathon Murdoch notes, spatial relations are “power-filled” and the
spaces and relations that do not emerge are as interesting and important as those that do. 325
He points to the role of both consensual and contested processes in relational space
production and Massey’s attention to the “power-geometry” of specific places.326 This project
specifically interrogates the framing process in producing and upholding land use law by
applying both Pierce et al’s relational place-making framework and Blomley’s concept of
‘bracketing’ to the broad range of interests engaged by aggregate extraction disputes.
As an analytical approach aimed at assisting researchers to, “unpack the multi-scalar,
multifaceted place-frames enacted in contestations over competing place/bundles through
research that focuses on relationalities between diverse people, institutions, materials and
processes that are inscribed in, and engaged through, socio-spatial conflicts” Pierce et al.’s
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framework is highly relevant to my examination of people-place relations in land use
disputes. Pierce et al. argue that the concept of relational-place is “particularly relevant to
conflicts that centre on change in and of places” and call for empirical research about the
production of place through networked politics.327 They propose four “methodological
hooks” for researchers: First, identify a conflict for study; second, identify and examine the
place-frames central to the conflict; third, identify those actors and institutions key to placeframing; and, finally, “unpack and interrogate the place/bundles” that inform the positions of
the actors and institutions.”328 This approach informs the development of the eco-relational
methodology outlined in Chapter Three by grounding it in as place-based inquiry examining
the work that law does in situating actors in land use disputes.

Martin et al. argue that legal geographers have focused on the framing of geographical
concepts in the outcomes of legal process to the neglect of the process through which
individuals and groups make legal claims and use the law: “Much of the existing literature
implies the raising and contesting of claims, but it does not trace this process through in detail
so as to understand the shaping influence of various actors.” 329 Land use disputes, they argue,
expose the “discontinuity between place identity and legal regulation of place.”330 The
relevant legal frameworks, they argue, do not account for the range of concerns and
attachments expressed by parties to such disputes. Claims made by communities, or rooted in
community relations to place, rather than an individual ownership model are rejected as
unrecognizable to the law. While parties seek ways to use the law and legal process to
advance their claims and express their concerns, as they point out, these interests do not
necessarily translate into existing legal narratives. 331

Their work examines the role of lawyers and specific legal practices involved in disputes
about land use and property: “We view lawyers as playing a critical, and largely unexamined,
role in mediating between community concerns about geography, land use, and development
and the legal structures through which these concerns are so often addressed.”332 In that
study, Martin et al. are interested in place claims and place-making in land use disputes and
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offer their case study as one example of how “strategic practices of parties” to land use
disputes create space through law and legal practices.333 They offer questions for future
research that I take up in my study by examining the role of parties with more-thanownership interests, including, “when and why are space claims legalized?” And, “[h]ow are
place-based community-disputes articulated in legal forms, both in public policy arenas such
as hearings, and more formal legal administrative settings such as litigation?”334 As Martin et
al. point out, it is not clear what may be lost, gained or altered in the process of shaping
claims to existing legal concepts and processes.335
C. Law, Nature and Rurality
Delaney argues that the work of human geographers on the social construction of nature has
failed to adequately consider the role of law in this process. At the same time, he argues, the
tendency of legal scholars to deal with nature through the categories of liberal property, in
which it is the other and the object, has left little room for engagement with the insights of
social theory about the concept of nature and its production.336 Delaney’s own work has
sought to expand legal geography scholarship through examination of the role of legal
discourse and practices in the production of nature to understand the “physicality of law”.337
Like Blomley, Delaney points to law’s materialization of power and authority:
What it says about nature is enforced by the organized violence of the centralized
state. This force is frequently realized in the physical world, on landscapes and on
bodies. Although other discourses of nature undoubtedly have material effects, this
more direct relation to physical force makes law rather distinctive.338
In particular, he notes the inherent connection between legal conceptions of property as
the right to use and the material understanding of nature as resource for human
exploitation. 339 Drawing on the vast literature on the social construction of nature,
particularly within geography 340 and feminist theory, 341 Delaney argues that the legal
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categorization of the world through inclusion and exclusion - ‘nature’ as excluded from
‘human’ and vice versa – realizes these metaphysical distinctions on the material world. 342
The concept of nature as “external,” Delaney argues, illustrates the role of notions of “the
social” or “human” as denoting the metaphysical rather than physical exclusion of the
nonhuman world. Conceived of in terms of an externally limiting force, nature presents
obstacles. Delaney notes critiques of notions of development and progress as conceived
in terms of the human potential to overcome natural limits and links these critiques
directly to the role of law and legal practices.343

Poststructuralist thinking in geography has also influenced legal geography as taken up
by human geographers, including Murdoch, Massey, and Whatmore. By looking to the
diversity of human-nonhuman relations that make up spatial formations, these authors
acknowledge the complexity of interactions amongst and between the social and
ecological. 344 In doing so, they have the potential to add to and enrich Blomley’s
performativity framework and Pierce et al.’s relational place approach by accounting for
the connectivity and immanence of ‘more-than-human’345 worlds in which people-place
relations are lived. Whatmore has argued that legal geographers have largely neglected,
and therefore perpetuated, the human/nonhuman and social/material binaries in their
examinations of property.346 Like Blomley and Delaney, Whatmore points to property as
fundamental to the construction and enforcement of persons as distinct from things, and
to law, as obscuring and naturalizing this distinction as self-evident. 347 She turns to
feminist ‘corporeality’ 348 and Latour’s ‘hybridity,’ 349 “[i]n an effort to articulate a
relational understanding of ethical connectivity that does not presume or reinforce the
cartographies of humanism.” 350 In this way, she argues, she is “recuperating” moral
claims of humanity from the universalizing autonomous human self and “redirecting our
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attention to the affective relations between heterogeneous bodies.” 351 Whatmore calls for
research that “gets up close and personal” to the mundane operation of law to “track the
power of law…through the effacement of its own practices.”352 In particular, Whatmore
points to methodological possibilities that complement the approach outlined in Chapter
2, including, examination of “interpretive communities,” the specificity of language, and
“technologies of documentation and record.”353
Lisa Pruitt similarly points to legal geography’s neglect of the “rural lawscape.” In fact, she
argues, the work of both legal scholars and critical geographers is largely “metrocentric” and
“urban-normative.”354 In the context of my project, this urban-focus does limit the application
of the otherwise compelling legal geography literature. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 7,
Canadian legal scholarship has underexplored the concept of rurality and its role in land use
decision-making. Pruitt’s work has important implications for non-urban research contexts
where different spatio-legal relations make legal geography difficult to apply. In particular,
she points to the need for a more complex understanding of how law works in non-urban
places. Rurality, she notes, is often defined in relation to “emptiness” and the absence of the
familiar markers of habitation and the built environment, producing a “perceived lack of
materiality” despite the material presence of both human and nonhuman actors.355 This
project examines the people-place relations of land use disputes in areas both legally
designated as ‘rural’ and constructed as rural by various social actors. This work contributes
to developing a more complex understanding of non-urban places in Canada, particularly the
relationship between law and rural places in Ontario. As discussed in the following Section
and in Chapter Eight, part of this complex understanding is exploring the application of
environmental justice frameworks in the context of rural land use politics and to contribute to
scholarship advocating a shift away from reductavist labelling of rural land use politics as
NIMBY-ism.356 Rather, this project seeks to expose the complexity of place-attachment and
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practices of belonging and exclusion that characterize rural land use while remaining
attentive to the potential for localism and parochial approaches to place to contribute to
depoliticizing land use decision-making.357
Murdoch’s study of the role of environmental movements in constructing the urban-rural
divide in the UK also demonstrates the need for more complex and heterogeneous
understandings of spatial relations than traditional zoning concepts allow for: “Thus, we
discern an ecological politics focused on the consolidation of a dynamic and complex system
of socio-natural relations in which the urban and the rural are combined in some kind of
‘sustainable assemblage.’”358
Like Whatmore, Murdoch relies on Bruno Latour’s understanding of attempts to separate
‘nature’ from ‘society’ as characteristic of modernity. Murdoch points to preservationist
environmentalism as spatializing a specific concept of nature requiring distinct and divided
spatial zones.359 The planning system, he argues, has been particularly important for
environmental movements attempting to maintain this spatial order.360 Murdoch identifies
multiple paradoxes resulting from environmental preservationist efforts to ‘protect’ the pure
nature of rural England from the ‘dangerous’ effects of the dirty city. He points to the growth
of industrialized agricultural and rural gentrification and to the growing realization that
protecting urban nature and sound housing policy is essential to sustaining life in rural
areas.361 In fact, he argues, maintenance of the strict classification of rural and urban zones
facilitates the urban commodification of externalized nature in the rural. The rural, he notes,
becomes a source of outflows of resources and inflows of waste to ensure the urban is kept
free of ‘nature’ and the rural is defined by its presence.362 In Ontario, planning scholar
Jennifer Foster’s study of the Niagara Escarpment demonstrated how environmentalism has
reinforced colonial land use narratives and constructions of landscape, serving to uphold
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“social exclusion and xenophobia” in rural places and obstruct movements for environmental
justice.363 In Murdoch’s view, urban and rural are no longer tenable as separate and
oppositional zones, rather he argues for a set of “circular relations in which the valued natural
assets of the city and the countryside are nurtured and sustained simultaneously.”364 This
rethinking of urban-rural relationality and interdependence in the context of land use disputes
provides a useful framework for thinking through the way aggregate minerals are constructed
as both rural and urban. As I describe in this project, urban-rural relations have implications
for a conception of environmental justice that include rurality while simultaneously rejecting
exclusionary property practices and the preservation versus development binary.

Unlike Whatmore and Murdoch, Pruitt is largely concerned with the person-person relations
in rurality and examines a number of legal contexts in which the relationship between the
individual and the state is displayed, such as legal responses to partner violence or the ability
of ‘outlaw’ actors to hide in rural areas. On this basis she argues that, “rural spatiality
mediates law’s performance such that law is less likely to seep deeply into the nooks and
crannies of rural space – into its hollows, forests, plains.”365 Pruitt argues that there is a
fundamental tension between the material characteristics of rurality, formal law and legal
actors that results in a critical separation of rural residents from the state. In her view, “rural
spatiality disables or impedes formal law and its functioning.” However, it is unclear how
Pruitt’s conclusions about the effect of rural spatiality apply with respect to person-place
relations and the law.
Rural and remote places in Ontario, Pruitt’s “hollows and forests and plains,” are themselves
constructed through ownership claims, legally sanctioned land use practices, and resource
development claims and proposals that are or will transform material places through forms of
harvesting, extraction or preservation. While law may underperform with respect to
environmental enforcement regimes for the reasons Pruitt describes, such as distance and the
failure to report concerns in planning and natural resource management, in some ways it
performs more directly and visibly on rurality as places are removed or transformed through
the mundane legal processes of permit approvals, leases and licenses. In many places, Pruitt’s
‘emptiness’ is carved out of places with complex spatial and temporal person-place relations
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through specific legal manoeuvres aimed at defining those places as sites of exploitation and
extraction for human use. As Rob Nixon notes, the “invention of emptiness” is fundamentally
linked to the imposition of Lockean person-place relations wherein only certain forms of
habitation and land use are deemed legitimate.366 As this project argues, it is important to
recognize the ways the materiality of those places shape and reshape law as it adapts to the
particularities of local ecologies and, eventually, the limits of particular land use practices. 367
At the same time, it also recognizes law’s reach into rural spaces of limited human habitation
as equally productive of people-place relations as the legal forces regulate spaces of dense
human population.

Governance, Planning, and Environmental Justice
Law is one aspect of the broader framework through which land use, natural resources and
people-place relations are governed in Ontario. The use of private land is regulated by
multiple complex regimes, including a range of land use planning statutes and policies,
environmental regulations, and the common law of property, as well as extra-legal norms and
rules through networks of economic and civil society actors. 368 In order to locate land use law
within this broader context of economic, social and ecological relations, this section draws on
governance and planning literatures, as well the environmental justice scholarship. While
these literatures are vast and wide-reaching, this project is specifically concerned with
governance in the context of land use planning and natural resource management. The
discussion below reflects this focus by drawing on environmental governance scholarship,
land use planning scholarship, and the work of environmental justice scholars. As well, while
I engage with a diversity of sources, Canadian scholarship has been the focus on this
examination in order to situate ‘governance’ in the historical, legal and cultural context in
which this research has taken place.
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A. Governance
Governance can be used to refer broadly to the governing of organizations and societies.369 As,
Bridge and Perreault argue, the widespread adoption of ‘governance’ in social science
scholarship demonstrates its explanatory adaptability in a range of contexts.370 Despite the lack
of a fixed definition, as an analytical category it broadly refers to a shift away from “statecentric” understandings of social and economic regulation and the expansion of formal and
informal roles for non-state actors. Further, governance scholarship often problematizes
analytical categories such as public, private, the state and government. 371 As Bridge and
Perreault argue, “[i]n both analytical and policy approaches, the discourse of governance is
strongly associated with social and economic change.”372 As Judy Fudge and Brenda Cossman
argue in the Canadian context, the liberal state is undergoing a process of fundamental
reconfiguration as a neo-liberal state.373 While the challenge of defining what is meant by
neoliberalism, and how to best study it, has been the subject of longstanding debate,374 for my
purposes I adopt the characteristics identified by Peck et al: “deep antipathies to social
collectivities and sociospatial redistribution; and open-ended commitments to market-like
governance systems, non-bureaucratic modes of regulation, privatization, and corporate
expansion.”375 Cossman and Fudge identify ‘privatization’ as central to this reconfiguration,
which they argue, “has come to represent a fundamental shift not only in government policy
but also in the balance of public and private power, both globally and nationally.”376 According
to Fudge and Cossman, in the Canadian context the practices of reconfiguration include, “the
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sale of government assets, the transfer of government functions to the private sector … the
restructuring of government activities to more closely emulate market norms”, and, a
retrenchment of state social welfare programs combined with increased investment in private
sector service delivery and reliance on familial or charitable institutions. 377 They point to the
importance of law in this reconfiguration as providing a “justificatory framework, defining and
redefining values … for the invocation of state power.”378 In particular, they note a crucial
extension of corporate private property rights on a global scale to restrain state-based regulatory
power as well as a shift away from collective, public responsibility for individual welfare
towards private individual responsibility. 379 As discussed below, this understanding of the
reconfiguration of the liberal state has particular resonance for the forms of environmental and
natural resource regulation that are the focus of this project.
i. Environmental Governance
Bridge and Perreault adopt ‘environmental governance’ as an analytical framework “for
examining the complex and multiscalar institutional arrangements, social practices and actors
engaged in environmental decision-making.” 380 In their view, despite its “widespread,
uncritical use,” environmental governance “can enable relatively nuanced analysis of how
power is produced and exercised over and through the nonhuman world, and the ends to which
power is directed.”381 As a concept that Bridge and Perreault identify as extending a “broad
embrace,” environmental governance moves away from the problematic divisions between
land use, natural resource and environmental issues in Ontario’s legal framework. Further, they
argue, by asserting the centrality of political processes of decision-making, the environmental
governance concept can open up space for creative thinking about people-place relations.382
However, I also adopt their caution that it is a concept that can be used to mask power relations
and therefore, “a careful examination of differing epistemological, normative and rights claims
to and about nature should be central to any treatment of environmental governance.”383 As
Bridge and Perreault argue, “[e]nvironmental governance is a concept more popular than
precise.”384 For a review of the treatment of environmental governance generally see Bridge
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and Perreault 385 and Lemos and Agrawal,386 and in geography see Himley. 387Environmental
governance has emerged as an important concept across several disciplines including
geography,388 ecology,389 political science,390 and to a lesser extent, law.391 In their review of
the literature, Maria Camen Lemos and Arun Agrawal define environmental governance as
“the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors
influence environmental actions and outcomes.”392
Geographers have employed environmental governance as a “broad analytical framework for
addressing the institutional arrangements, spatial scales, organizational structures and social
actors” engaged in environmental decision-making.

393

Critical geography scholars of

environmental governance, including Bakker,394 Bridge,395 and Mansfield396, have examined a
range of governance arrangements as constitutive of the nature-society relationship and how
these maintain particular elements of neoliberal capitalism. 397 Ecological perspectives,
particularly studies of collective action and co-management models have focused on the shift
towards decentralized natural resources decision-making in environmental policy since the
1990s. 398 Political scientists have focused on questions of agency and participation in
environmental decision-making.399 Critical accounts, such as Roger Keil and Gene Desfor’s
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examination of environmental policy in Toronto and Los Angeles point to the importance of
processes of decision-making and policy development as sites for contestation rather than
technocratic or expert-driven exercises in consultation.400
Political economy and regulation theory scholars such as Jessop 401 and Gibbs and Jonas402 have
emphasized the “hollowing out” of the state as well as the expanded role of non-state actors in
regulation and rescaling of environmental policy making. In contrast, Australian legal scholar
Neil Gunningham argues that rather than a ‘decentering’ of the state; recent environmental
policy initiatives have remade the “regulatory architecture” of environmental management. 403
“New environmental governance,” he argues, actually demonstrates an enduring and “essential
policy coordination role for government in encouraging, facilitating, rewarding and shaping
outcomes.”

404

While they do not examine environmental regulation, Fudge and Cossman

similarly argue that neoliberal privatization in the Canadian context “involves a reconfiguration
of the form of state regulation rather than deregulation”, what they refer to as “reregulation”.
In particular, they note the importance of the common law, including property law, to the
success of laissez-faire policies and citing Roger Cotterrell argue, [L]aw is being extensively
used to ‘recreate a climate of free enterprise’ and distribution by market forces. 405 This more
nuanced understanding of the changing role of regulation rather than deregulation provides
important background to understand the evolution of aggregate extraction regulation in Ontario,
as discussed in Chapter Four. Detailed and specific attention to the particular role of law in
reconfiguring the state is also consistent with my approach to exposing and critically examining
the role of private property in land use decision-making in Ontario.

Notably, while environmental governance scholars have observed and debated changes to
environmental management, decision-making and dispute resolution in a variety of
jurisdictions since the mid-1980s, there is little agreement about the nature and the depth of
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such changes.406 Indeed, despite the widespread claims about the shift away from state power
under neoliberalism, Gunningham argues that the state is not “simply one amongst a number
of actors” in the context of environmental policy. 407 In his view, the success of emerging
environmental policy initiatives has been reliant on at least three roles for the state in natural
resources management: “definitional guidance” wherein the state “describes and defines” the
governance arrangement; “participatory incentives” whereby the state provides positive or
negative incentives for particular actors; and, “enforcement capability” to ensure that
obligations are fulfilled and evaluate success. 408 He argues that the concept of “regulatory
capitalism” better reflects contemporary environmental governance 409 by reflecting how
regulation has in fact increased as markets are enrolled as regulatory mechanisms.
Simultaneously, non-state actors are increasingly taking on regulatory roles as governance
networks evolve through “hybridity between the privatization of the public and the
publicization of the private.”410 This understanding of hybrid regulatory networks is highly
relevant to increasingly proponent-driven nature of aggregate regulation in Ontario and the role
of aggregate resource owners and developers and aligned technical experts in shaping land use
law and policy.

My project examines whether and how the neoliberal governance features identified by
Cossman and Fudge411 and Peck et al. 412 have emerged in the context of Ontario’s land use
planning system. Gunningham’s framework provides a useful tool for the delineation of the
specific mechanisms at work in Ontario’s land use planning system. In particular, he proposes
a continuum in the role of the state, from law to regulation, to governance.413 In his view, law
refers to specific state-based statutes while regulation encompasses a broader range of flexible
instruments that enrol a range of non-state actors while still operating “in the shadow of the
state.” Governance mechanisms, he argues, do not privilege the state or require formal
authority, as power and responsibility are diffuse.414 This is an important clarification in the
406
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governance debates as the role of law and its relationship to other forms of social and economic
regulation can be obscured, making it difficult to trace the ways in which specific legal tools
influence people-place relations. The overview of relevant law and policy in Chapter Four
provides a detailed description of the range of tools used by various actors in aggregate
extraction decision-making. In particular, I examine how the role of owner and non-owner
parties are fundamentally shaped by the way in which state and non-state actors define, control
and enforce land use law.
ii. Environmental governance and people-place relations
Lemos and Agrawal note that the structure of environmental decision-making and power
relations related to natural resources not only affects the relationships between different levels
of decision makers and between decision makers and constituents, but also critically shapes
“the subjective relationships of people with each other and with the environment.”415 They note
that this aspect of environmental governance has received little attention in the literature. 416
The notable exceptions to this are work on ‘environmentality,’ such as the work of Arun
Agrawal and that of political scientist Timothy Luke, 417 and, examinations of neoliberal modes
of environmental governance discussed above. 418 As Himley notes, these scholars build on
insights from political ecology 419 as well as “theoretical tools” from both urban regime
theory,420 and regulation theory, 421 particularly geographers like Peck and Tickell who have
drawn attention to the role of actors at the subnational scale.422
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Geographers Karen Bakker, 423 Noel Castree 424 and Becky Mansfield 425 and urban studies
scholars David Young, Gene Desfor, and Roger Keil 426 point to neoliberalism as a
transformative force in shaping and reshaping contemporary human relationships with the
more-than-human world. 427 In particular, concerns about privatization, the production and
protection of private property, and the increasingly pervasive use of markets as mechanisms of
environmental governance are central concerns in these accounts of environmental
governance. 428 Planning scholar Tore Sager notes the importance of neoliberalism as “an
essential descriptor of the transformations of regulatory systems and changing urban conditions
throughout the world.”429 As noted above, this project follows from governance scholars in
examining the effect of neoliberal forms of regulation on human relationships with the morethan-human world, particularly drawing on the concerns expressed by environmental
governance scholars about the role of private property in land use governance.

In large part these scholars have focused on case studies of particular resources or systems of
environmental management. This detailed empirical work has exposed how the materiality of
specific places matters to governance as the biophysical properties of land and ecological
systems “impinge on and shape the organizational and institutional systems through which they
are governed.”430 For example, Scott Prudham’s work on forests in the Pacific Northwest as
well as Karen Bakker’s work on water point to nonhuman resistance to specific politicaleconomic forms of control, such as commodification.431 Mansfield focuses on private property
environmental governance mechanisms and argues, “Property has become the central mode of
regulating multiple forms of nature.”432 Mansfield argues that this “re-making of nature-society
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relations,”433 through multiple forms of privatization produces owners and non-owners through
a market-based subjectivity and discipline wherein ‘owners’ are constructed as “efficient,
profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals” without regard to the nature of their relationship with the
owned-place or thing. 434 My project engages with this work by examining the production of
owners and non-owners through land use law and the social and material consequences for
people-place relations in the specific context of aggregate mineral extraction.

Bakker notes how the physicality of the resource being governed strongly influences the
particular forms of resource governance selected by neoliberal governments. 435 For example,
she argues that private property regimes are more easily established for particular types of
resources “because of their biophysical characteristics, behaviours, and articulation (coconstitution) of labour and consumption practices.”436 This work has important implications
for the examination of people-place relations and how they emerge in the context of land use
disputes. Indeed in the context of aggregate extraction, Canadian environmental scholars
Anders Sandberg and Lisa Wallace recently drew attention to the importance of particular
properties of mineral deposits as a factor in decision-making.437 This research argues that the
geologically fixed nature of aggregate mineral resources is compounded by the development
of aggregate resources on privately owned land. As McCarthy argues, this unavoidable
materiality makes environmental issues a unique realm of regulation. This, Bridge and
Perreault argue, makes environmental governance a critical area of research for geographers.
In my view, this is also true of legal scholars. Indeed, as noted above in Section 1, the
materiality and connectivity of the more-than-human world challenge the anthropocentric
premises of property law and the desire to see property as imposing a clear and orderly set of
relations between people and about things.

The complex context of land use disputes problematizes attempts to understand environmental
governance in relation to a particular ‘resource’ in isolation from the broader ecosystem of
which it is an integral part. Indeed, the layers of competing claims in land use disputes are
inextricably linked to the material reality of resources in place and problematize decision433
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making that divides the nonhuman world into distinct and separate pieces. Following from the
discussion of place above in Section 2, this project recognizes that aggregate resources occur
in specific places. These places are constituted through complex networks of human uses and
attachments with soil, wetlands, forest and hydrogeological features, which intersect with the
relations within the more-than-human world. These messy interconnections pose critical
challenges to planning and property law and it is vital that legal scholarship grapple with how
the presence of places as complex interconnected eco-social systems challenges law and legal
decision-making. My project will specifically develop an understanding of how private
property relations work through law to bracket the human and more-than-human relationships
with, and within, the places at stake.
iii. More-than-human environmental governance
While environmental geography scholars do provide for nonhuman agency, Braun argues that
scholarship on neoliberal natures fails to “incorporate the ‘nonhuman…as a constitutive
element of social and economic life.”438 Bridge and Perreault exemplify this when they suggest
interpreting environmental governance as “governance through nature” rather than
“governance of nature”. 439 This maintains the anthropocentric conception of socio-natural
relations and the validity of a hierarchical human-nature divide as a foundation for governance.
As a result of the failure to go beyond a social constructionist critique of socio-nature relations,
Bakker argues, these accounts do not fully address the range of “environmental processes and
socio-natural entities subsumed within processes of neoliberalization.” 440 Instead she calls for
the interrogation of “the status of nonhumans as political subjects,” through the incorporation
of political ecology, emotional geography, and ecological sciences methodologies and a break
from the humanist model of political economy in which ‘neoliberal natures’ scholarship has
been embedded.441 Braun goes further, calling for environmental geographers to combine the
insights of non-representational theory about human-nonhuman relations and the “radical
uncertainty of complex systems and the capacity of bodies for affect”442 with the physical
geographers’ acknowledgement that “a great deal of order nevertheless exists.” 443
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While these critiques are important, particularly with respect to the production of ‘nature,’ land
and resources through property and land use law, and for the potential for relationships of
reciprocity with place and non-instrumental relations with the nonhuman environment, they
also present significant risks. As Lorimer cautions, such “[m]ore than human approaches
deploy political categories alien to the hard-fought taxonomies of modern legislation and
representation – including human rights.”444 Arguably, such perspectives are fundamentally
incompatible with the legal logics of modern property, planning and even environmental law.
As work by both Valverde and Blomley has demonstrated, activist legal strategies that attempt
to introduce legal concepts that are fundamentally incompatible with logics and tools of
planning and land use law risk the possibility of failing to gain entry to the debate. 445 This
project specifically examines the ways in which land use law includes and excludes particular
claims and knowledges about the more-than-human world. With this understanding, it aims to
consider how the logics and tools of land use planning might be reoriented towards just and
reciprocal relations with place.

As outlined above, the critical environmental governance scholarship provides a number of
important and useful analytical tools to account for human-more-than-human relations in the
context of land use planning and property law. However, in my view, the focus on
neoliberalism and relatively recent developments in legal and policy approaches to socio-nature
relations is somewhat limiting. As the discussion of property law and theory above in Section
1 make clear, people-place relations have long been shaped, defined and controlled through the
ideology of private property and the legal and cultural practices of private property relations.
Indeed, the commodification of places and their nonhuman inhabitants was central to the
colonial settlement of Ontario, the dispossession of Indigenous land and the establishment of a
resource-based capitalist economy.
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Therefore, while struggles over enclosure,

commodification and the power to define people-place relations may be a feature of neoliberal
governance,447 they are not uniquely so. In fact, in the context of aggregate extraction, shifts
towards centralization of decision-making and the expanded role of corporate actors in defining
legal and policy strategies pre-dated the rise of neoliberal governments in Canada, Ontario, and
Toronto. Therefore, this project engages primarily with aspects of this scholarship that draw

J Lorimer, “Multinatural Geographies for the Anthropocene” (2012) 36 Prog Hum Geogr 5 593.
Valverde, supra note 249; Nicholas Blomley, supra note 272.
446
Wood, supra note 58.
447
Young & Keil, supra note 426 at 65.
444
445

82

attention to the more-than-human world, the materiality of the environment in decision-making
and governance, and the importance of understanding the specific role of state law in the larger
historical and socio-natural context of liberal property regimes, land use planning and natural
resource management.
B. Planning
Land use planning disputes are classic examples of “wicked problems”.448 Paul Lachapelle
and Stephen McCool define wicked problems as involving “multiple and competing values
and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-effect relationships, limited time and resources,
incomplete information, and structural inequities in access to information and the distribution
of political power.”449 As planning scholar Barry Cullingworth argues, while land use
disputes involve detailed scientific information, they cannot be treated as purely scientific or
technical problems. He argues, “[I]nevitably the outcome is based upon a mixture of
scientific, social, economic and political issues as perceived by the multiplicity of
organizations and individuals involved in the planning process.” 450 Planning, Murdoch
argues, “has considerable difficulty in ‘representing’ the complex and heterogeneous spaces
in which it is inevitably immersed.”451 As a result, he argues, planning produces inclusions
and exclusions, notably the exclusion of non-ownership relations with land and the
nonhuman environment.452 This project examines this process of inclusion and exclusion in
the specific context of aggregate siting disputes.

What is missing from such accounts of the complexity of land use disputes is attention to the
particular role of law as part of land use planning processes through which such wicked
problems are defined and inclusions and exclusions are negotiated and enforced. My research
explores how land use law works in the face of these wicked problems. In particular, I
consider how law accounts for and responds to the complexity of human relationships with
place and the materiality of the nonhuman world that are uniquely exposed in disputes about
land use. This section briefly situates this exploration of Ontario’s land use planning law in
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the historical context of planning in Canada. It will then examine theoretical approaches to
land use planning law and specifically consider research on participation in planning.
i. Planning History and Theory
Canadian planning evolved from both the British town-planning garden city and the
American city efficient planning ideologies. 453 The dual influences on planning in Canada
were summarized by Gerald Hodge: “The broad social view of responsibility for community
health and housing is derived from the British; the functional view of arranging streets,
utilities and the use of zoning is distinctively American.”454 However, planning scholars J.B.
Cullingworth and Stephen V. Ward argue that it is a mistake to see Canadian planning as
simply a variant of either British or American planning.455 In the context of my research, this
caution informs my reading of both American and British planning scholarship and reinforces
the importance of locating my research in the specificity of Southwestern Ontario, as well as
recognizing Indigenous land law and environmental governance jurisdiction. Attending to the
influence of both traditions on Ontario’s land use law, this project understands planning as
having a unique trajectory and development in Canada, influenced by local legal and political
cultures, but also by distinctive institutional structures and responses to economic and social
events.456 As Canadian planning scholar Zack Taylor points out, the British North American
colony that would later become Ontario adopted a rules-based system for municipal
government early on in the history of planning with the Upper Canada Municipal
Corporations Act: “[T]he Baldwin Act was the first legislation in the English-speaking world
to consolidate enabling provisions for all forms of general-purpose municipal governments,
both urban and rural.”457 In this sense, Ontario’s approach to planning law has long been
distinctive despite the range of international influences that have shaped particular elements
and approaches therein.
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Professional planning in Canada was historically linked to the role of technical and scientific
experts in planning processes.458 As Sager argues, this idea of planning as based on
“professionally good solutions” rather than politics or the market is common to a range of
planning traditions.459 Thomas Adams, a key influence on Canadian planning who was
recruited from England to head up the Commission of Conservation in 1914, advocated for a
scientific approach to planning and emphasized objectivity and efficiency:460 “Adams’ focus
on numbers, standards, and statistics clearly promulgated the value that planning could bring
to society.”461 In Canada, the separation of planning and political decision-making is linked
to the establishment of specialist appointed bodies to oversee municipal affairs, such as the
Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, which later became Ontario’s primary adjudicative
planning body, the Ontario Municipal Board.462 Political scientist John Chipman traces the
historical establishment of the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board in 1906 and its
transition to the Ontario Municipal Board in 1932, to the desire of political officials to
remove contentious disputes about urban development and complex ‘technical’ matters
outside of the political realm into the hands of ‘expert’ decision makers.463 Emerging issues
about the ‘public interest’ in infrastructure development, such as municipal railways and
energy utilities, were seen as time consuming and complex. Therefore, the Board was created
to “remove from the shoulders of elected politicians and place on those of a tribunal
composed of non-elected experts the time consuming responsibility for decision-making.”464

As Peter Moore argues, the quasi-independent nature of these decision-making bodies
“ensured that the “politics” was kept out of planning.”465 However, despite the historical
depoliticization of planning as a technical exercise, critics such as Bent Flyvberg have argued

458

Kaplinsky, supra note 34 at 223; Wayne J Caldwell, Rediscovering Thomas Adams: Rural Planning and
Development in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 336; Walter Van Nus, “Towards the City Efficient:
The Theory and Practice of Zoning, 1919-1939” Alan F. J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter, eds., The Usable
Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979) 226 at 226; Peter
W Moore, “Zoning and Planning: The Toronto Experience, 1904-1970” (1979) Alan F. J. Artibise and Gilbert
A. Stelter, eds., The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1979) 320 at 325–326.
459
Sager, supra note 429 at 149.
460
Caldwell, supra note 458 at 336.
461
Ibid at xxi.
462
Taylor, supra note 456 at 64–65.
463
Chipman, supra note 34 at 11.
464
Ibid at 12.
465
Moore, supra note 458 at 326.

85

that it is a thoroughly political exercise that is “always set within relations of power.”466 In
Ontario, early planning was not without politics, but rather a closed and elite system of
governance. As Moore notes, removing planning from the formal political sphere resulted in
a planning system strongly influenced by the interests of the provincial business elite.467
Indeed Taylor has speculated that the “narrow electoral franchise” linking participation to
property ownership at the municipal level is one of the key institutional influences on the
nature of municipal governance and local politics in Canada.468 Chipman notes that the
Ontario Municipal Board’s early oversight power for municipal bylaws was explicitly linked
to property ownership.469 While this language restricting participation in planning decisions
has been removed from provincial law, his study found that the Board’s approach to land use
disputes perpetuates this link between private property rights and planning. 470 In examining
the public interest in contemporary planning law in Ontario, Marcia Valiante concludes that
while the protection of private property rights may not be expressly embedded in
contemporary legislation, it endures as “part of the culture of planning law.” 471
Scholars have paid particular attention to the history of zoning in Canadian planning law.
Zoning, Moore argues in his study of its historic development in Toronto, was a tool that fit
squarely within the “scientific management” approach to city planning that was emerging by
the 1920s.472 Legal scholar Eran Kaplinsky argues that while planning systems in North
America were purportedly intended to shift land use control away from private law notions of
nuisance and restrictive covenants, the imposition of regulatory control over private land
through zoning laws was politically palatable because of its appeal to private property owners
and developers.473 The “practice of zoning,” Kaplinsky argues, has been shaped by a social,
political and economic context, resulting in a focus on “the protection of private property
values.”474 Indeed Cullingworth notes that policymakers explicitly linked zoning to the
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protection of property in early attempts to bring it into law in Ontario.475 Tracing the early
history of zoning, Walter Van Nus argues that early on Canadian planners “exchanged the
goal of an optimally efficient urban organism for that of an optimally profitable one for the
property industry.” 476 With respect to the Ontario Municipal Board, Chipman’s study
concluded that the Board has adopted a private law nuisance framework to deal with land use
disputes and notes the problematic blurring of the public interest with the private interests of
local neighbours.477
Blomley notes that we should be cautious about characterizing the adoption of zoning as
purely in the service of private interests in light of the continuing influence of utilitarian
conceptions of land use employed by early planners.478 Appeals to economic arguments may
have been politically expedient for planners, but they were not necessarily the underlying
motivation.479 The relationship between private property and planning is more nuanced,
Blomley argues, and we need to understand the specific ways in which it works through land
use law to organize space. Blomley traces the historical development of debates about the
role of Canadian planning and draws attention to the utilitarian emphasis on improvement of
land and avoidance of waste by influential thinkers, such as Adams. Because of the emphasis
on achieving a specific vision of the common good through efficient development of land and
resources for human benefit, Blomley argues, these early planners understood private
ownership as a potential source of waste that needed to be controlled and directed towards
proper and productive purposes – namely the development of property for economic
productivity.480 In Blomley’s view, this utilitarian logic continues to shape contemporary land
use planning in consequential ways. 481 This research adopts a nuanced approach to
understanding the role of private property in planning law and explores the particular
consequences of the enduring anthropocentric, development-focused orientation for the
places involved in aggregate mineral extraction.
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Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit note that early zoning decisions in Ontario accepted the
impact on property rights as legitimate in pursuing public benefits. However, they note a
simultaneous effort by courts and tribunals “to ensure that private rights were not lost to
arbitrary municipal decisions.482 This balancing exercise remains central to planning
decisions in Ontario. Yet, as Valiante points out, not only are there always “multiple public
interests at play,” land use conflicts expose tensions between different private interests. 483
This research provides further insight into this relationship by focusing on the more-thanownership interests asserted in aggregate siting disputes. These interests, I argue, are not
easily characterized as purely private or public in nature. Rather, they at times combine
interests in privately owned land neighbouring the proposed site with concerns about
environmental, landscape, social and cultural impacts on a particular place. As this research
demonstrates, claims by parties with private interests as neighbours may also be excluded
where they do not fit into the frame of proper land use considerations. In my view,
Chipman’s finding that direct adverse impacts on neighbouring private property owners
tended to outweigh less tangible claims to collective benefits484 points not only to the
importance of characterizing who is making the claim, but also to the need to trace how
different stories about what is at stake and what is to be gained in a particular dispute
succeed. Indeed, while we should remain cautious about the parochial and exclusionary
politics invoked to maintain conceptions of character or amenity in planning, this research
demonstrates that the role of interests in neighbouring land has a more complex relationship
with private property development than the research might suggest, particularly with respect
to industrial and extractive development and corporate proponents.

While the historical relationship between planning and the protection of private property predates neoliberalism and recent changes to land use planning and environmental governance in
Ontario, commentators on regional and infrastructure planning in Ontario argue that
neoliberalism is an important contextual concept for understanding contemporary planning in
Ontario.485 Indeed Sager argues that the “shift from bureaucratic regulation to public
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entrepreneurialism” in urban planning policy and politics has profoundly impacted planning
in a number of countries.486 He specifically notes that contemporary investment in large-scale
infrastructure is shaped by the competition for global investment capital between urban
regions and serves as a “crucial precondition” for neoliberal policies. This pro-growth agenda
builds on the utilitarian roots of planning in Ontario and directly shapes the demand for
aggregate minerals as “physical products of urban entrepreneurship” with spatial and material
effects in both urban and rural places.487 At the same time, it is important to understand how
neoliberal governance strategies have also maintained and re-enforced the bureaucratic model
of technical expertise and “decide-announce-defend model of planning” that emerged in the
first half of the twentieth century. 488 This link between past and recent strategies and politics
of urban development and rural planning is an important part of understanding the legal
boundaries of people-place relations in Ontario and the ways in which non-ownership
relations challenge assumptions in the provincial planning framework. Therefore, while
neoliberalism is not responsible for planning’s private property and technical orientation, this
research demonstrates that it has facilitated a reinscription and purification of the private
property ideology and scientific managerial approaches in Ontario’s land use law.
ii. Planning Law
Understanding planning in this historical context as political and entangled in power
relations, my project takes up Blomley’s call to explore the relationship between private
property and planning. Planning, he argues, ‘often appears to distance itself from questions
regarding property. Its declared focus is the spatial organization of something called “land
use.”489 Building on Valverde’s unpacking of ‘land use’, Blomley argues, “[L]and use …
does not quite sever planning from its relation to property, but rather hooks the two together
in quite a particular and particularly consequential manner.”490 Private property, he notes, is
enrolled by land use planning “in order to achieve desired ends.”491 This nuanced attention to
the relationship between private property and planning is critical to my project, which

Walkerton, Ontario” (2004) 35 Geoforum 3 343; Neil Brenner & Nikolas Theodore, Spaces of neoliberalism:
urban restructuring in North America and Western Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
486
Sager, supra note 429 at 156.
487
Ibid at 154; Sandberg & Wallace, supra note 437.
488
Christopher Groves, Max Munday & Natalia Yakovleva, “Fighting the Pipe: Neoliberal Governance and
Barriers to Effective Community Participation in Energy Infrastructure Planning” (2013) 31 Environ Plan C
Gov Policy 1 340 at 346.
489
Blomley, supra note 478 at 2.
490
Ibid.
491
Ibid at 3.

89

specifically considers the role that law plays in upholding particular private property relations
and facilitating specific uses of land. Canadian socio-legal scholar Mariana Valverde points
to law “as a mode or a conduit for governance.”492 She argues that in the context of urban
governance, law may be only one aspect of the everyday at the local level, but nonetheless
“law does matter.” 493

Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex web of legislation and policy that is
described in detail in Chapter Four and critically examined throughout this project. In the
context of aggregate extraction, the key legal tools include municipal power over zoning and
official plans and centralized provincial planning policy through the Planning Act494, the
Provincial Policy Statement495 and the Aggregate Resources Act496 and associated Ministry of
Natural Resources guidelines.497 There is an impressive body of scholarship examining
Anglo-American and Canadian planning generally. 498 However, with some notable
exceptions discussed in this section, there is a surprising lack of critical scholarship focused
on Canadian planning law.499 In her book Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an
Age of Diversity, Valverde points out, “the main scholarly literatures on the urban either
492
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ignore law’s power or show it only as an exceptional force or a set of antiquated rules.”500
Where critical scholarship has directly considered Canadian planning law, the focus has often
been explicitly on the ‘urban’ and city planning to the exclusion of rural or peri-urban regions
and their connections to urban regions.501 More particularly, again with a few exceptions
including contributions to the 2015 edited collection Public Interest, Private Property,
Canadian legal scholarship has rarely examined the relationship between private property and
planning law.502 In their introduction to the collection, Editors Marcia Valiante and Anneke
Smit call for “a more active debate in Canada on the appropriate parameters of the public
planning power and role, the acceptable limitations on the enjoyment of private property
rights, and the influence of both on the shape of urban Canada.”503 Similarly, the Ontario
Municipal Board has also received surprisingly little attention from legal scholars, 504 though
it has been the subject of more attention from other disciplines. 505 This lack of attention is
surprising both because it is the oldest existing specialist planning tribunal in the world, as
well as the oldest quasi-judicial body in the province with broad and powerful jurisdiction to
deal with issues and disputes under over 100 statutes.506 However, it is consistent with an
internationally recognized gap in legal and planning scholarship with respect to planning
appeal tribunals.507 In light of these gaps, my project makes an original contribution to both
legal and planning scholarship by providing a detailed and critical examination of Ontario’s
planning framework and the role of the Ontario Municipal Board in the context of aggregate
extraction. Further, because aggregate extraction is both an urban and rural planning issue, it
necessitates exploration of how the law operates along the spectrum of urban, suburban and
rural places and their people-place relations.
500
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Planning conflicts engage specific legal and regulatory frameworks and a detailed
examination of how these “mechanisms” actually operate is an important, but often
neglected, part of understanding land use disputes. Whether the goal is theoretical or political,
Valverde notes the importance of understanding the distinctive “logics that are not unique but
nevertheless characteristic of local governance.”508 Valverde’s work is explicitly focused on
the urban; however, her “law in action” approach509 to making the everyday operation of
local regulatory and legal tools visible can be adapted to the geographic and jurisdictional
contexts of this project. Valverde builds a detailed place-based “legal inventory of laws” as
the starting point of her inquiry. 510 In Chapter Four, I adapt this inventory approach to the
rural land use context in Ontario aiming to provide an overview of the “basic legal
architecture” and spaces of aggregate resource management. Understanding the specific
networks of legal tools involved is equally critical to the organization of everyday life outside
of the ‘urban.’ Indeed, the complexity of planning law is arguably part of what makes land
use disputes wicked problems wherever they take place.
Valverde points to the unique ways in which planning law works through categories of ‘use’:
“Governing people, things and spaces through ‘use’ is a different kind of governmental
operation than the much better known operation of governing through legal categories of
personhood and group identity.” 511 In her view, “use” operates as a distinct legal technology
in the context of municipal and planning law.512 Instead of acting on persons, or even directly
on property, she argues, land use law acts on specific uses, which obscures law’s work of
ordering people and things. 513 For Valverde, this has particular legal and political significance
because she concludes that use logics are “incommensurable” with the logic of rights, and
therefore, the currency of rights-based claims fails to ”translate” into legal success at the local
level.514 This poses important challenges to activist strategies attempting to find adjudicative
solutions to the failure of decision-making processes to account for person-place relations.
While I argue that such logics extend to various scales of planning governance, not just the
local, her focus on the ‘how’ of planning governance is highly relevant to understanding the
508
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success of aggregate development proponents in Ontario. Complimenting Blomley’s
performativity approach and his use of ‘bracketing’, Valverde’s attention to particular legal
mechanisms and relationships informs my detailed consideration of how concepts like
ownership and rurality work through law to shape aggregate siting decisions. Further, as
Blomley notes, “[P]lanning, and its instruments, such as zoning, do not have an essential
politics, and can be deployed for multiple ends.” 515 Therefore, understanding how such
instruments are successfully used towards particular ends can inform activist strategies for
environmentally just planning and land use decisions, and potentially even transformative
legal change.

Valverde has more recently built on this work by attending to the relationship between spatial
and temporal dimensions of law.516 In this more recent work she draws attention to the
depoliticizing effect of jurisdiction, noting, “[I]n general, for law to work smoothly, disputes
about the substance and the qualitative features of governance have to be turned into
seemingly mundane and technical questions about who has control over a particular
spacetime (an inheritance, a quantity of lumber, a murder)”.517 As will be examined in
Chapter Four, the shift of regulatory power from local to provincial authorities was a direct
result of the historically contentious nature of aggregate siting in Ontario. As Valverde notes,
this shift not only changes the actors, but also what can be claimed, debated, and decided:
“[T]he consumers of legal decisions are kept from asking: how should problem X or Y be
governed in the first place.”518 As I argue in Chapter Five, the powerful role of centralized
provincial planning policy in aggregate disputes limits the influence of public planning
instruments at the local level.
Valiante attempts to unpack conceptions of the “public interest” and “the common good” that
have historically justified the limitations on private ownership imposed through land use law
in Ontario.519 As discussed in Chapter Four, the public interest is not defined in Ontario
planning law. Rather, a very broadly defined ‘provincial interest’ guides decision-making and
informs the case-by-case “balancing of competing interests” by local authorities and the
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Ontario Municipal Board.520 Thus, while she characterizes provincial planning policy as
“highly prescriptive”, the concept of ‘public interest’ “at the heart of this direction” remains
highly contested.521 Yet, Valiante argues, as a result of the closed-nature of the approach to
policy making in Ontario’s planning framework and the reliance on site-specific amendments
to plans at the municipal level, “participants at every level are restricted to raising concerns
about a specific proposal and have no forum in which to debate the logic of the prevailing
approach to growth and development and the underlying assumptions about the benefits that
are supposed to flow inevitably.” 522 The result, she concludes, is that “[T]he assumptions and
beliefs that underlie current planning discourse are thus sheltered from public debate.”523
While Valiante calls for more and better opportunities for participation as a result of this
closure, which will be discussed in subsection iii, it also suggests the need to unpack key
legal tools and concepts involved in bracketing conflicts and decisions about land use issues.
Of particular relevance to this project are the relationships between private property
ownership and development siting, the development-focused orientation of provincial
planning, and the tension between expertise, knowledge and experience.

The vast majority of aggregate development occurs on private land. As Blomley notes, rather
than neutralizing it, the fact that provincial planning law brackets “[i]ssues of property
acquisition and distribution” implicates planning in reproducing existing forms of exclusion
and hierarchies of interest, and perhaps even in producing new ones. 524 Indeed, it is argued
here that the relationship of private owners to the land where an aggregate mine is proposed
imports specific forms of spatial, temporal, and interpretive privilege. Therefore, while it is
important to understand how land use governance operates through uses rather than persons
as Valverde suggests,525 and, while “land use planning does not question who owns, or
how”,526 this research demonstrates that ownership and owners matter in aggregate extraction
disputes. What Blomley and Valvarde’s work provide is a nuanced approach to
understanding how and to what ends. In the case of aggregate extraction in Ontario, land use
planning law builds on the foundational privileges that flow through ownership and is used
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use to construct extraction as a proper use of land. This “particular arrangement of
property”527 profoundly shapes people-place relations in the province.
iii. Participation
One of the critical aspects of planning law and policy for understanding land use disputes is
the structure of participation at all decision-making stages, and the legal rights of appeal and
standing in subsequent adjudicative processes. The importance of decision-making structures
and structural opportunities for contestation is emphasized by the environmental governance
literature, such as works by Bakker,528 McCarthy,529 and Perreault.530 These scholars consider
the role of social movements in disputing, shaping and reinforcing governance structures
alongside the specific ways in which injustice and inequality are codified by neoliberal
control of natural resources and environmental decision-making.531 In the UK context, Eloise
Scotford and Rachael Walsh have argued that land use regimes have redefined property
relations away from commodification through private property rights and towards a
democratized form of environmental decision-making.532 However, in the context of
Ontario’s land use law, Valiante concludes that while there are “multiple public interests at
play … procedural opportunities to participate do not fully account for all the multiple
interests, and that private economic and property interests heavily influence the outcomes of
development decisions nominally made in the public interest.” 533 While early twentieth
century Canadian planning “assumed” the public interest based on the collection of
‘objective’ data collection and the influence of elites,534 planners and planning scholars now
recognize the plurality of public interests engaged by land use planning. 535 As a result,
Valiante argues, focus has shifted from defining the public interest to the procedural aspects
of planning decisions.536 My research seeks to look beyond aspirational statutory goals with
respect to environmental outcomes or public participation to examine how Ontario’s land use
planning regime both creates and constrains space for contestation about the use of private

527

Ibid.
Bakker, supra note 394.
529
James McCarthy, “Privatizing conditions of production: trade agreements as neoliberal environmental
governance” 35 Geoforum 3 327; McCarthy, supra note 430.
530
Perreault, supra note 430.
531
Himley, supra note 371 at 444.
532
Eloise Scotford & Rachael Walsh, “The Symbiosis of Property and English Environmental Law – Property
Rights in a Public Law Context” (2013) 76 Mod Law Rev 6 1010.
533
Valiante, supra note 471 at 106.
534
Moore, supra note 458 at 326.
535
Valiante, supra note 471 at 108.
536
Ibid at 109.
528

95

land. Therefore, while planning processes do provide for participation in ways that other
traditional legal forums do not, I seek to understand the specific ways in which law brackets
both the process and the substance of land use disputes. Valiante and Smit note, “the balance
between public and private interests in Canadian planning law must be understood as
evolving and continually in need of negotiation.”537 In this sense, it is critical to understand
who and what is being included in the negotiations and who and what are being excluded,
both in order to understand the consequences, and to find strategic openings to intervene and
transform people-place relations. In this way, the detailed research undertaken in this project
can point to strategic opportunities to rethink and reassert non-ownership relations.
Additionally, it proposes ways to avoid the pitfalls of legal translation between
“incommensurable logics” that Valverde and Blomley discuss.
Murdoch argues that planning should not be understood as a “normative ideal,” but rather as
“immanently enmeshed” in socio-political context.538 As discussed above, despite the
ongoing depoliticization of land use planning, the rationality of technical expertise is
mobilized to justify and enforce prior political decisions about spatial order.539 This is
particularly important when dealing with environmental issues and people-place relations
because, as as legal geographers Carolyn Harrison and Tracey Bedford argue on the basis of
several studies in the United Kingdom, “a planning system underpinned by an ideology of
private property rights and a free market forecloses alternative ways of valuing the natural
world.”540 In the United States, Lachapelle and McCool argue that the “technocentric
utilitarianism” in planning and natural resource governance has led to the “mechanization” of
natural resource decision-making, in which public input is often seen as “little more than
another source of data.”541 This technological “way of seeing,” Murdoch argues, results in the
selective inclusion of actors in planning processes.542 Further, as Harrison and Bedford argue,
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reliance on technical experts and the resulting instrumental rationality can result in
“institutional closure” to the range of value orientations engaged by environmental
decisions.543 In particular, Nash et al. note affective dimensions of place-based relations can
be excluded by the technical orientation of planning decision-making.544 This project
demonstrates that these concerns extend to the Canadian context, in which a range of morethan-owner claims are excluded or fail to be considered, not only as a result of the barriers to
participation, but because of the closure of planning decision makers to non-instrumental,
affective, and relational claims about place.

Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Young and
Keil’s study of regional water planning points to the discourse of “scarcity” that operates to
drive regional development in Southwestern Ontario by casting the vulnerability of the
region’s ecological systems as an investment opportunity through the politics and practice of
planning.545 Groves et al. similarly argue that ‘risk thinking’ “shapes the distribution of
power” in the context of energy infrastructure planning in the United Kingdom.

546

In

particular, they point to the growing role of quasi-state and non-state actors as “centres of
calculation” controlling the production, organization and distribution of information about
risks related to resource demand and supply. 547 In their study of oil and gas-producing
provinces in Canada, Carter et al. identified that not only were there barriers to participation,
access to basic information about extractive impacts was difficult to obtain.548 While Carter et
al. examined decisions falling under the federal environment assessment regime, the
processes share key characteristics with aggregate framework examined in this project,
including proponent control over timing and knowledge production, as well as a trend
towards exemptions for a wide range of activities and an increasing role for private actors
within environmental governance.549 They also note that limitations on participation were
combined with deliberate weakening of regulatory capacity and scientific knowledge,
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increasing reliance on non-state actors for aspects of environmental governance.550 Policy
makers, Carter et al. found, routinely defended oil and gas development with economic
justifications about the need for revenue.551 The resulting “narratives of necessity” 552 place
conceptual limits on the terms of debate about specific land use decisions with important
implications for attempts to assert non-ownership relations with place.

My research builds on insights from planning and urban studies scholars by examining the
context of aggregate extraction as a site where “assumptions and storylines” 553 interact with
land use law to frame environmental governance and people-place relations in Ontario.
Aggregate sites are places with complex material and eco-social relations, but for the
purposes of land use law, they are divided into different kinds of space for particular human
uses: agricultural fields, ‘natural’ sites such as forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as
trails, and subsurface resources such as mineral deposits and groundwater sources. Peopleplace relations are defined and constrained through these categories and associated legal
logics of ‘use’ and ‘need’, as well as through broader discursive frames about development
and human-environment relations. In Ontario, these underlying discourses fundamentally
shape individual planning decisions, and therefore, as discussed in Chapter Four, the closednature of provincial policy making means “many of the most basic assumptions and policy
directions of planning the province are off the table” even during formal consultation
processes about guiding instruments in the planning framework.554 In the case of aggregate
mineral planning, this is compounded by the involvement of technical experts who are
simultaneously engaged to prepare reports that will inform government policy and are
retained by aggregate developers for siting applications.555
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British geographers Richard Cowell and Susan Owens link the integration of environmental
concerns into the land use decision-making framework to the successful use of participatory
opportunities by environmental interests and concerned communities.556 In particular, they
point to the locally based resistance to aggregate extraction in rural England as having
successfully “reframed” both the problems and the solutions related to extraction.557
According to Cowell and Owens, this “subversive” use of the planning system has been
related to particular “opportunity structures” 558 and “theatrical opportunities”559 within the
public-inquiry based system. As they argue,
…the importance of planning lies not simply in its instrumental capacity to deliver
environmental sustainability, but in its relative openness to influence by environmental
interests and concerned communities, which enable connections to be drawn between
projects, plans and wider policies.560
Groves et al. build on Cowell and Owen’s work to argue that in addition to having
instrumental utility in terms of enhancing the evidence base for decision-making,
participatory process may also facilitate “public reflection on substantive issues” and
furthering social justice by providing recognition of inequity and historical injustice. 561 In
particular, they argue, planning forums can provide critical opportunities to examine and
rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy as well as consider larger questions
about social, economic and ecological relations: “If a piece of infrastructure is a kind of
solution to a problem, participatory governance may, by including more perspectives, enable
the problem itself to be examined, along with the ways in which it has been framed as a
problem.” 562 In this sense, planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking
about people-place relations despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or mundane issues
of infrastructure siting or zoning and despite presumptions about ‘need’ and ‘demand.’ As
Gibson notes in the Canadian context, “[P]ublic participants have historically been the actors
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most motivated and often most effective in ensuring careful critical review of project
proposals and associated environmental assessment work.” 563
While planning disputes, particularly disputes about the siting of infrastructure such as
quarries, are often characterized as conflicts between localized ‘not-in-my-backyard’ politics
and broader public interest, this project adopts the perspective that land use disputes are much
more complex and often raise significant substantive issues that are otherwise left out of
public planning processes. In this sense, my research demonstrates that not only does morethan-owner participation serve to legitimize the outcome of planning decisions, 564 it has the
potential to improve substantive outcomes by ensuring that critical issues are raised and
evidence considered. Critics such as Kaplinsky have raised valid concerns about the specific
forms of objection used by private land owners in disputes over new land uses, particularly
the cloaking of concerns in the language of “traffic,” “parking,” “environmental,” or other
concerns about supposed tangible impact.”565 Indeed, Valverde also points to the “hijacking”
of participatory processes by homeowners, particularly in the context of affordable housing
development.566 However, as Groves et al. argue, “siting conflicts over such infrastructure
often act as condensation points for wider concerns, which can ‘cross scale’ from the interests
of a specific community to connect with national and international issues.” 567 Indeed the Stop
the Mega Quarry campaign discussed in Chapter One began as a localized conflict in the
small rural township of Melancthon, Ontario, yet it has evolved into an ambitious and
ongoing “Food and Water First” campaign about environmental and food policy at multiple
scales. In my view, it is possible to acknowledge the unequal distribution of power and access
to participation in planning without reducing the issues raised in such disputes as NIMBYism
‘cloaked’ in environmental or other impact concerns. The more interesting questions are
whether and how legal and policy frameworks may constrain the types of claims made by
parties such that broader questions about social priorities, people-place relations and
alternative conceptions of the public interest are narrowed to fit within the particular logics
familiar to land use planning decision makers. Following from Michael Woods et al., I seek
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to engage with the “complex relations of attachment, belonging, exclusion and otherness that
permeate such conflicts.”568

The failure to meaningfully involve communities in planning policy development prior to the
approval process for site-specific proposals and the framing of participation as ‘objection’
may not only constrain who participates, but also how they articulate and assert claims. 569 In
the context of natural resources planning, Lachapelle and McCool emphasize the importance
of opportunities to redefine problems and solutions in natural resource planning. They point
to the concept of ‘ownership’ in participation as one way to account for a range of forms of
knowledge about a particular place or environment and to facilitate the redistribution of
power in relation to decisions about that place.570 This relational conception of ownership in
participation is characterized by “responsibility, obligation, and caring imbued by citizens
and agencies for both the problem and the process of public resource planning and
management.”571 Lachapelle and McCool argue that transformative potential in natural
resource planning depends on both the willingness of decision makers to share responsibility
and deal with issues of structural inequality, as well as their capacity as decision makers to
develop relationships of trust and cooperation with the public.572 Critically, the authors
referred to in this subsection point to specific conditions under which participation in
planning processes provide the kind of opportunities outlined above. These include the
following: early participation prior to decisions being or the terms of debate being defined; a
rethinking of the role of experts in planning; access to information; meaningful opportunities
to impact and influence the outcome; accounting for a diversity of values and perspectives;
acknowledging the multi-scalar effects of planning decisions; transparency about the process;
and, provision on clear and principled reasons for every decision. 573 While Cowell and
Owens emphasize that good planning decisions are not correlated to a particular scale of
decision-making, the “upscaling” of planning in the UK from local to regional levels
eliminated “a key deliberative forum.”574 They argue that in England the local level forum
568
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served as “a space in which the links between grounded experiences of development become
linked to policy learning and change.”575 This resonates with Valiante’s concerns about the
closure of provincial planning policy processes in Ontario.576 Echoing Fudge and Cossman,
Groves et al. describe how neoliberal decentralization through privatization and the resulting
recentralization of decision-making power577 has resulted in “systemic difficulties” for the
participation of the “wider publics” in planning decisions. 578 This project examines how one
particular land use has been ‘scaled-up’ and despite the role of municipal governance in land
use planning in Ontario, it is hierarchically privileged by this closed policy-led provincial
planning framework. However, I note that scaling-up planning decisions should not be
understood as inherently negative, just as local control does not necessarily further social or
environmental justice. As Valverde has demonstrated, ‘local’ control over certain types of
planning decisions tends to privilege particular notions of morality and social hierarchy, in
particular with respect to the siting of shelter housing and other attempts to shift away from
the dominance of the single-family home in residential areas.579
As Sager notes, the push for “flexible planning” and for faster planning processes is linked to
neoliberal governance and the emphasis on entrepreneurialism in planning policy. 580 What
Owens refers to as the “planning cascade”581 limits participation to objection to specific
development proposals and issues of siting in the context of predetermined ‘need’ and
predefined policy problems. In this way, land use conflicts appear to be the types of localized
NIMBY conflicts in which vested interests clash with the public interest and the need for, or
possibility of, “substantive reflection on strategic problems” is rejected or ignored. 582
According to scholars in both the United Kingdom 583 and Canada,584 it is precisely these
political opportunities for deliberation on substantive issues that have been the target of
575
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government reforms aimed at ‘modernising’ or ‘streamlining’ planning processes.
Constructed as being “obstructive,” these “subversive functions of planning” are replaced
with a “technical-rational” model of land use decision-making that reinforces the scientific
managerial vision of planning.585 Despite the relative historical effectiveness of groups in
shifting planning discourse towards environmental sustainability, these types of deliberative
opportunities are depicted as inappropriate “blockages” and environmentalists are depicted as
anti-growth, anti-progress and even more recently in Canada, dangerous.586
Changes to Canada’s federal environmental assessment in 2012 not only directly limited
participation, but more importantly by dramatically reducing the number of projects that
would be assessed and narrowing the scope of assessment, the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act of 2012 “eliminates many opportunities for public participation and limit[s]
the potential range of public contributions, probably excluding the most significant public
concerns.”587 The changes responded to “unprecedented attempts at public objections to oil
and gas industry expansion.”588 They leave key responsibilities to provincial frameworks,
which in the case of Ontario has also been compromised, according to Gibson. 589 The
subsequent federal Liberal government has undertaken a review of the Act and environmental
assessment processes, which was still underway at the time of writing. 590 In the context of oil
and gas extraction Carter et al. found “ongoing and increased impediments to public
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involvement.”591 Cowell and Owens also point to the ability of policymakers, and developers,
to constrain debate and participation through adopting and defining concepts such as
‘sustainable development’ in ways that may "discipline" alternative conceptions. 592
Examining a federal oil and gas review in Canada, Anna Zalik argues, “[I]t offers a venue
through which competing responses to ecological/economic crises are offered by capital and
its opponents; but it also encloses the affective and most unruly elements of such struggles –
within formal procedures shaped by the interests of extractive capital/state alliances.”593 My
project will specifically examine how Ontario’s land use planning framework constrains
opportunities for debate and limits creative articulations of people-place relations.
iv. Planning, place, and the ‘more-than-human’ world
One of the more challenging elements of focusing my project on people-place relations rather
than on more general aspects of environmental concerns and participation in land use
disputes is the difficulty of the ‘more-than-human’.594 The emphasis on improvement and use
noted by Blomley continues to influence contemporary planning. My detailed examination of
aggregate extraction law and policy demonstrates that the anthropocentric conception of
‘conservation’ as protecting resources for human use promoted by early planners continues to
fundamentally inform contemporary planning in Ontario. As Adams wrote of land use in
early twentieth century Ontario: “To conserve land resources means to prevent deterioration
of the productive uses of the land that has already been equipped and improved, and
simultaneously to develop more intensive use of such land, as well as to open up and improve
new lands.”595 Zalik points to the use of ‘resource sterilization’ by both proponents and the
state in the context of oil and gas development in Alberta to describe both environmental
protection measures and use-based claims by First Nations that were argued should prevent
mining. As discussed in Chapter Four, Ontario’s guiding planning policy provides for
absolute protection of aggregate mineral resources and operations from development and
activities that “hinder expansion or continued use” or would be “incompatible” for public
health, safety or environmental impact related reasons. 596 In the 2010 State of the Aggregate
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Resource Report prepared for government, overlapping “planning, environmental and
agricultural” uses and interests were characterized as “constraints” on resource development,
indicating the pro-development orientation of the analysis. 597 As Harrison and Bedford note,
existing legal frameworks perpetuate an understanding of nature as separate from society and
fail to account for relations of connectivity and dependence between humans and
nonhumans.598 They call for new planning structures and practices that can account for a
diversity of perspectives and values, as well as opening space for ecological systems to join
the debate on their own terms.599 As noted above, recognition and respect for Indigenous
legal orders and jurisdiction over land use decision-making is a particularly promising way to
facilitate such a shift in Canada. For example in Anishinabek law, rocks have legal
personality and interests that must be considered in decision-making: “it would be
inappropriate to use rocks without their acquiescence and participation because such inaction
could oppress their liberty in some circumstances.”600 In Canada’s Indigenous Constitution,
John Borrows describes a legal process in his home community, Neyashiingmiing, to decide
whether an alvar area of the Niagara Escarpment could be used as a new pow-wow site.
Based on “community deliberation, naturalistic observation drawn from scientists and Elders
and sacred teachings” the decision-making process provided for the appropriate “respect and
reverence” towards the alvar and resulted in a decision not to relocate the pow-wow site to
that location.601 As discussed below, Indigenous contributions are leading calls for a
broadened conception of environmental justice in Canada.602 In New Zealand, some Treaty of
Waitangi settlements have resulted in sophisticated and creative engagements with Māori law
to redress historical breaches and grievances. These include the Whanganui River, which is
now a legal person with trustees from the Whanganui iwi and the Crown jointly-appointed to
act in its interest;603 and, Te Urewera, a site of violent suppression of anti-colonial resistance
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and a former national park, which is now vested in its own legal identity, owning itself in
perpetuity, and governed by the laws of the Tūhoe people through the Te Urewera Board.604
Political ecology and place-based perspectives also hold promise for moving this project
forward. Building on the critical geography and political ecology perspectives outlined
above, Murdoch challenges the humanist and anthropocentric foundations of planning by
calling for the ‘ecologizing’ of planning. 605 He argues that the unequal distribution of power
in the inherently political processes of planning has meant that earlier efforts to incorporate
environmental and sustainability concerns failed to fundamentally shift the instrumental
understanding of human-nature relations as powerful interests were able to define notions of
capacity and sustainability in their interests. 606 Following from Latour, Murdoch challenges
scholars of planning theory and practice to “rethink the distinctions between the physical, the
social, the political and the environmental.” 607 The resulting uncertainty and complexity is
profoundly challenging to basic precepts of planning and property law. In particular, his call
to enlarge planning procedures to ‘give voice’ to nonhumans such that all those affected by
planning’s operation can take part in decision-making requires a rethinking of both planning
theory and practice.608 While my project does not take this up directly, by focusing on the
role of human-nonhuman relations as they emerge in the context of land use disputes, my
project will push thinking about planning law and techniques for the inclusion of humanmore-than-human relations forward. This project draws particular attention to the
environmentally-focused narratives of more-than-owner parties in aggregate disputes to
understand whether and how articulations of relationships with the more-than-human world
may serve as a foundation for a environmentally just politics of rural place. As outlined in the
following subsection, this project also supports the call for a shift in environmental justice
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approaches that foregrounds the leadership of Indigenous voices and integrates ecological
integrity with environmental justice to account for the more-than-human world.609
C. Environmental Justice
Environmental justice is both a theoretical approach in academia and a framing tool used by
activists and policy makers. 610 While the literature on environmental justice is broad, this
project engages with environmental justice scholarship in two key ways: i) to support calls
for a shift away from anthropocentric understandings of justice towards more relational
approaches that extend to the more-than-human world; and ii) to understand how rurality can
be understood as a dimension of environmental justice. In doing so, this project primarily
engages with Canadian environmental justice scholars in order to situate the case of
aggregate resource extraction within the specific context of patterns of environmental
inequity in the Canadian state and the particular historical and ongoing processes of
colonialism and resource extractivism contributing to such patterns. By focusing on Canadian
scholarship, I seek to engage with other Canadian research about the distribution of
environmental harms and impacts, entitlement to environmental benefits, as well as access to
and participation in environmental decision-making. While environmental justice approaches
and practices emerged in the context of the United States to contend with the uneven
distribution of environmental harms, particularly the impact of industrial development on
African-American communities and the grassroots responses, 611 Canadian scholarship is
adapting the framework to a range of contexts.612 As Agyeman et al. point out, environmental
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justice movements have been active in Canada “for centuries (if not millennia), just as there
have been struggles over the ownership of land and resources throughout Canadian history –
and before the boats came.”613 In particular, Indigenous struggles to protect territory and
ways of life have long been fighting environmental injustice in many forms. 614

I follow from Agyman et al. in rejecting the need to provide a fixed definition of
environmental justice. Rather than seeking to find “the definitive statement on the
relationships between land, resources, nature, history, power relations, society, peoples,
inequity, and all out (human and other-than-human) relations”,615 they seek to be part of a
larger conversation. This project also aims to contribute to such conversations about how the
relations we produce, uphold, and sustain as part of broader social, ecological and physical
networks can be more equitable. For the purposes of this project, I broadly understand
environmental justice as having both procedural and substantive dimensions which can and
do overlap, as well as being concerned with the distribution of both environmental benefits
and harms.616 In addition, more recent work by “Critical Environmental Justice” scholars
such as David N. Pellow, examines the ways in which “multiple social categories of
difference are entangled in the production of environmental justice, from race, gender,
sexuality, ability, and class to species, which would attend to the ways in which both the
human and more-than-human world are impacted by and respond to environmental
justice.”617 Scholarship in Canada has also pointed to the need to expand not only
definitionally, but also to broaden the voices and worldviews, as well as methodologies
within environmental justice theory and practice.618 Of particular relevance to this project is
the need to shift away from an anthropocentric orientation of environmental justice.619
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i. Extending Environmental Justice: The More-Than-Human-World
As McGregor points out, environmental justice scholarship has been focused on people,
which she argues “assumes a certain ideology about “environment” – with a focus on how
certain groups of people (especially those bearing labels such as “minority,” “poor,”
disadvantaged,” or “Native”) are impacted by environmental destruction, as if the
environment were somehow separate from us.”620 Indeed, environmental justice is now often
linked with human rights frameworks.621 However, McGregor explains how this is a limited
conception of environmental justice from an Anishnaabe perspective, which sees
environmental justice more broadly: “It is about justice for all beings of Creation, not only
because threats to their existence threaten ours but because from an Aboriginal perspective
justice among beings of Creation is life-affirming … While people certainly have a
responsibility for justice, so do other beings”. 622 As Neimanis et al. argue, the human-centred
conception of environmental justice obscures a key link to the relationship between
ecological integrity and the survival and well-being of all forms of life.623 Therefore, they
argue, environmental justice scholarship should work to integrate conceptions of ecological
integrity and social and ecological justice.624 Further, McGregor notes that an Anishnaabe
perspective requires environmental justice to recognize the relationships and corresponding
responsibilities of all beings in ensuring “the processes of Creation will continue.” 625 The
eco-relational approach developed in this project supports this work to foreground peopleplace relations and interdependence in land use decision-making, as well as recognizing the
jurisdiction of Indigenous legal orders that continue to do this work in particular places. In
doing so, this project aims to avoid the binaries of anthropocentric versus ecocentric
approaches to environmental governance.
Haluza-Delay et al. articulate a goal for an action-oriented scholarly agenda in Canada: “That
we may live well together in this land.”626 They propose several dimensions to this: the moral
question of “both how to ‘live’ and how to do it ‘well’”; the implicit shift from the individual
to “togetherness”; and, the place-based nature of this togetherness to include social and
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physical dimensions.627 While they specifically engage with Canadian studies and
environmental studies in advocating for “place pluralism,” in my view, their goal is equally
relevant to legal scholars seeking to address injustices and work towards environmental
justice and decolonization. Further, and of particular relevance to this project, they
specifically align this goal with relational and embodied conceptions of place. 628 Indeed, they
propose a “place pluralism” that accounts for the “variability of place, and the sutures and
fractures in what seems to have material objectivity”, while also making “explicit the
participation of more ecological actors.”629 Building on Gruenewald’s twin bases of
“reinhabitation” and “decolonization” for a pluralistic approach to place, 630 Haluza-Delay et
al. extend conceptions of recognition in environmental justice towards an “ecological politics
of recognition”631 – one that recognizes “ecological others, of contrasting cultural practices of
the land, of our own domination or suppression, and of the past.”632 Indeed they argue that a
conception of “just sustainability” rooted in place pluralism is one of the key Canadian
contributions to broader conversations about environmental justice, which they note, “comes
about primarily with Indigenous peoples as partners in knowledge formation.”633 Just
sustainability requires the duality of reinhabiting place through the development of ways of
living informed by the particularity of place and the unsettling and uncomfortable work of
decolonization.634 Haluza-Delay et al. provide a useful framework for understanding when
and how place-based claims and place-protection are complicit in reinforcing ongoing
colonization, particularly colonial land use patterns linked to exclusion and the distribution of
environmental harms.635 In particular, this project examines the role that law plays in
obscuring the plurality of place and excluding embodied and relational understandings of
place from decision-making processes. Following from Graham’s work, this project argues
that this is one way in which law can limit the potential of land use politics to realize
transformative environmental relations.636
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ii. Rurality and Environmental Justice
This project also considers whether and how rurality emerges as a dimension of
environmental justice. In particular, it examines how the legal construction of the “rural”
contributes to environmental injustice and facilitates extractive development. As Pellow
notes, “the integrity and future of rural spaces has never been at great risk” from
environmental harms associated with resource extraction and development.637 Nonetheless,
the specific role of rurality in vulnerability to the distribution of environmental harms and
access to environmental benefits has been underexplored. As Pellow notes, while many sites
of environmental justice activism and scholarship may have been rural in nature, including in
many rural and remote Indigenous territories and communities in Canada, rurality is “simply
not at the heart of this literature.”638

Building on critical planning scholarship discussed above in Section 2, my research rejects
simplistic accounts of rural land use politics as NIMBYism. 639 In Ontario, engagement in
planning decision-making about peri-urban and rural areas by farmers, ex-urbanites, and
vacation-homeowners have been characterized as largely self-interested.640 Such claims are
often largely understood as linked to amenity values or property values and as “rooted in the
traditional producers’ discourse of individualism and property rights.” 641 As Jennifer Foster’s
important research on environmental planning in the Niagara Escarpment and Oak Ridges
Moraine in Ontario demonstrates, dominant narratives about environmental preservation and
planning have been implicated in “social exclusion and xenophobia”.642 Further, as Foster
argues, they can and do reinforce colonial land use narratives and constructions of place and
landscape that erase and exclude Indigenous histories and contemporary jurisdiction and
ways of life.643 These are critical dangers of parochial politics of place and the
depoliticization of the planning process through land use law that do emerge as part of rural
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land use politics in Ontario. In the Canadian context, this research argues, rural land use
politics must engage with the uncomfortable and difficult work of grappling with settlercolonialism in order to contribute to environmental justice.

At the same time, this project demonstrates that rural people-place relations are complex, and
sometimes, contradictory. As researchers we cannot presume claims in rural land use politics
are one-dimensional. Following from environmental scholars such as Sandberg et al. and
Gilbert et al. who explore the complexity of place-politics in Ontario,644 my project explores
this complexity in order to find strategic opportunities to engage in difficult conversations
about living together and with the land. Nuanced and critical examination of expressions of
ecological relations, respect for Indigenous histories and legal orders, and assertions of
reciprocity with the more-than-human world in the politics of rural places is a crucial part of
building environmental justice movements across the rural-urban interface.645 In this way, as
Alexa Scully argues in discussing reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples in Canada, places
and the embodied and experiential relations of which they are constituted can serve as “the
literal common ground”646 for realizing progressive planning and environmental justice.
Further, in Pellow’s view, work on the intersection of rurality and environmental justice is a
key site to explore questions about human-more-than-human relations: “[H]ow can we work
together with nonhuman natures as our allies and partners to promote and secure
environmental justice and sustainability for all?”647

Emerging scholarship that examines environmental justice claims in rural contexts can
provoke and push scholarship and practice beyond the “mold” of “grassroots, ‘bottom-up’
community reactions by people of colour in low-income neighbourhoods,”648 as the
examination of wind-resistance in Ontario by Dayna N. Scott and Adrian Smith
demonstrates. They ask, “How should we react to movements of white, middle class property
644
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owners articulating claims that resonate with the values and aims that have motivated the
environmental justice movement?” 649 While not all rural land use movements share these
characteristics, indeed rurality can be associated with poverty and economic marginalization
as well as resource dependence, those engaged in the land use politics examined here were
predominately white and property owners. As Scott and Smith argue, this necessarily points
to an important “enduring privilege” that may powerfully inform their capacity to demand
political responses to their resistance and shape their access to decision makers and
processes.650 At the same time, as Pellow argues, explorations of rurality and environmental
justice provide an important caution for scholars and activists to guard against assumptions
that “inclusion might enable justice”, which he defines as one of the “greatest shortcomings”
in environmental justice movements and scholarship.”651 He notes that this emphasis on
procedural inclusion limits the potential to shift away from state-centric frameworks, and
therefore, the transformative potential of environmental justice work.652 Indeed, as this
project demonstrates, it also limits our ability to expose how law works to shape people-place
relations towards particular property relations and forms of land use through the selective
inclusion and exclusion of ‘what is at stake’ in a particular dispute. In this sense, the relative
privilege and institutional access of those resisting particular forms of land use and
development does not necessarily translate into transformative claims about place-based
relations being heard or acknowledged in decision-making processes. Following from
Graham and Nedelsky, this research takes an eco-relational approach to examining land use
disputes in places legally defined as rural in order to understand claims to environmental
justice as more than claims to procedural inclusion. Rather, it interrogates the ways in which
the place-based claims expose concerns about the loss or transformation of place and
severing of relations with the more-than-human world. In doing so, it cautiously and critically
looks for strategic openings to work towards a just and inclusive politics of ‘living well
together’ in rural places.

This chapter has introduced the theoretical strands I have woven together to develop the
place-based methodology discussed in the following chapter, and to generate my ecorelational approach to land use law, discussed in Chapters Five through Nine, from the
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documentary and interview data collected in this project. The following chapters apply the
ideas and concepts outlined above to examine the structure of legal relations in Ontario’s
aggregate mineral planning framework and to uncover the broad more-than-owner relations
engaged by these disputes.
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Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology applied in this project, including the process of
constructing the research questions and research plan, and the approach to data analysis. I
begin by introducing qualitative approaches and the rationale for adopting them. The second
section examines place-based research methods and their application to this study. The third
section describes the documentary review, the participants, the research settings and the
interview process. The approach to data analysis is established in the fourth section. The final
section then examines the validity and generalizability of the research and sets out the
limitations.

For this project I developed a qualitative data-based methodology for documentary analysis
which includes the design, conduct, and analysis of unstructured interviews with participants
in aggregate extraction conflicts. My methodological approach was informed by my desire to
privilege the experiences and perspectives of the participants while also uncovering the range
of socio-material people-place relations engaged by these disputes. In this way, I was able to
develop my original eco-relational framework to foreground the people-place relations
engaged in aggregate extraction conflicts and identify the values at stake while also ensuring
these are set in the context of broader institutional relations.

1. Qualitative Research
The qualitative data-based method adopted in this project is informed by the theoretical
framework set out in Chapter Two and place-based approaches to research about
environmental issues. Qualitative methodologies begin from an understanding of the social
world, including law and regulatory practices, as primarily socially constructed. In doing so,
qualitative approaches explicitly acknowledge the need to situate research within the social
world.1 Like other land use conflicts, aggregate extraction disputes are about specific places
and environments rather than abstract notions of ‘the environment’. Therefore, detailed
examination of the wider context in which these conflicts arise, and conflicting claims are
articulated, is essential to understanding the disputes examined here.

1
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Qualitative research is characterized by reflexivity, detailed contextual analysis and
acknowledgement of the negotiated multiplicity of social life.2 To illustrate this, Clifford
Geertz’s notion of “thick description” points to the need for rich contextual description of the
actions and practices of people with an interest in the problem being examined in order to
identify connections and patterns.3 Forestry scholars Mae Davenport and Dorothy Anderson
argue that research about people-place relations in natural resource scholarship can “extend
our understanding of the human-environment relationship beyond the tangible and
instrumental to include the symbolic and emotional.”4 In particular, they advocate for
qualitative research methodologies in this area of research: “By examining people’s
connections to places as expressed through their own words, these studies capture the
subjective, lived experiences people have with nature.”5 Davenport and Anderson point to
the strength of interpretive research in which theory is generated from the data to provide
much needed guidance for decision makers and regulatory agencies in the complex context of
natural resource and land use conflicts.6 This kind of inductive approach, Lisa Webley notes,
“seeks to derive themes or patterns from the data collected as the research progresses.” 7 This
project adopts an original place-based qualitative methodology for legal research that seeks to
uncover and foreground articulations of relations with place. This methodology is used in
order to theorize the work done through law to shape people-place relations, and explore how
these relations in turn shape law. In the context of environmental decision-making, Neil
Adger et al., note that “thick” analysis also requires interdisciplinary research across the
social sciences and beyond. 8 This project extends beyond legal scholarship to engage with
geography, political science, history, and sociology scholarship and incorporates Elizabeth
Fisher et al.’s call for environmental law scholars to develop “interactional expertise” to
ensure “legal scholarship is based on a sound understanding of environmental problems.” 9
2
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A. Place-Based Qualitative Research: The Researcher as a Participant in Place
Place-based research, Antony S. Cheng et al. argue, has the potential to enhance dialogue and
deliberation by foregrounding the “rich, layered place meanings that are expressed and
valued by people” in natural resource decision-making. For them, one of the central goals of
taking a place-based approach is “to foster more equitable, democratic participation in natural
resource politics by including a broader range of voices and values centering around places
rather than policy positions.”10 Place-based research, they argue, is qualitative research that
seeks to “uncover place-based connections.”11 In this study, place is used to express an
explicit acknowledgement of the relationality of the human and ecological communities.
Ecologists and other scholars interested in areas of natural resource management are using
place-based approaches to explore people-place relations in the context of environmental
decision-making.12 However, with the exception of some legal historians, this place-based
approach to scholarship has rarely been taken up in legal scholarship. As Fisher et al.
observe, non-legal scholarship about environmental law often demonstrates “very little
appreciation of the complexity of legal institutions, ideas and processes involved.” 13 In
actively adopting a place-based approach by “designing and facilitating processes where a
rich diversity of place meanings can be expressed, negotiated, and transformed”, 14 I draw
place-based approaches into legal scholarship. At the same time, I extend the place-based
perspective by taking the complexity of legal practices and processes seriously and focus on
how legal tools and practices are used to include, exclude, and transform people-place
relations.
This research goes beyond uncovering and understanding place connections to examining the
co-constitutive role of legal concepts, tools, and practices in place-making and the production
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of people-place relations. In doing so, I take up Deborah Martin et al.’s call for more research
examining the disconnect between people’s place claims and law and the actors and networks
in land use conflicts.15 Attention to place-based connections, not only more accurately
exposes what is at stake in a particular conflict about land use, it also provides a basis for the
relational reorientation of land use law away from instrumental anthropocentrism by creating
space for a much wider range of relations with place and the values that these relationships
uphold. Attention to the range and complexity of place claims in land use disputes reveals
connections and commonalties between divergent and overlapping people-place relations and
can complicate stereotypes and simplistic characterizations of land use politics. 16 As Cheng et
al. argue, “place-based research should [also] seek to question the status quo and to give real
meaning and substance to public involvement in natural resource politics.” 17 Daniel Williams
and Michael Patterson further acknowledge that understanding people-place relations is
critical to natural resource management as it “embeds resource attributes into the system of
which they are a part”.18 In this way place-based research can expose how decision-making
shapes relations beyond the human world. In doing so, the approach adopted here creates
space for a broader conversation about the role of land use law and whether relevant legal
frameworks have the capacity to account for values and relationships articulated by the
participants.19
In taking up a place-based approach I also note Richard Stedman’s caution about its neglect
of the role of the physical dimensions of the environment in constructing these meanings in
relationship with people.20 Davenport and Anderson also push researchers to develop a
“holistic and integrated understanding” of the place meanings and the specific physical
setting to which they relate.21 Therefore, beyond adopting qualitative interpretivist
approaches, I follow Cheng et al. in acknowledging the need for researchers to experience the
places they research. As described in the Introduction, my own familiarity with some of the
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places and conflicts involved was a motivation for undertaking this research. While as Cheng
et al. note, “[T]here is no objective middle ground” in the context of natural resource
conflicts, it is important to recognize that this familiarity and connection positions me as a
kind of interested party rather than an objective and neutral observer. The advantages and
limitations of this positionality will be discussed in more detail in the next section; however,
from a place-based perspective it has particular advantages. While I did not have in-depth
experiences of all the places involved in this study, I did have the advantage of intimate
knowledge of the geography, as well as general familiarity with the social dynamics of
several places involved. This not only provided a basis on which to build the place-based
approach adopted here, it contributed to a sense of trust with participants in both the initial
stages of recruitment and during the interviews. Put simply, people understood that I saw and
cared about the places involved in the disputes and this helped them feel comfortable sharing
their narratives and experiences with me.
In addition to my personal understanding and experience of the places involved, participants
provided invaluable experiences of place through site visits where possible, and through
photos, maps, and narratives about the places involved. Attention to the visual texts provided
by participants as well as those included in application materials also provides insight into the
ways that these “stand in for the actual site” in planning processes, particularly for decision
makers and other legal actors.22 Environmental history scholarship about Ontario, such as
David Wood’s exploration of settlement in Ontario, Claire Elizabeth Campbell’s study of the
Georgian Bay region, Neil Forkey’s study of the Trent Valley, Kelly and Larson’s forest
history of the Niagara Escarpment and Nick Eyles work on the geological history of the
province also augmented my understanding of the places and people-place relations of
Ontario.23
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2. Data Collection
William Gibson and Andrew Brown point to three ways of thinking about methods in
qualitative data collection: “observing people; asking people questions; and reading.” 24 The
approach I developed largely involves reading and talking to people through documentary
analysis and unstructured key informant interviews. The use of multiple methods provides for
an exploration of the problem being examined from different perspectives than would be
available simply through documentary or interview research alone.
A. Reading: Documentary Analysis
The reading, or documentary analysis, in this research includes the literature review of
relevant secondary material, critical examination of the legal framework for licensing
extraction, review of aggregate extraction licensing applications and appeals between 2001
and 2014 in Ontario, as well as reviewing the written and oral submissions made before a
legislative review committee tasked with a review of the Aggregate Resources Act.25

I begin by developing a map of key issues and actors based on my informal understanding of
the relationships in selected aggregate conflicts, identifying important entities, structures,
viewpoints, processes and the issues, both recognized and emergent or potential. The core of
this mapping exercise includes the development of an “inventory of laws” 26 relevant to
aggregate conflicts, which is adapted from Marianna Valverde and included in Chapter Six.
This mapping process is also informed by Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis which begins
with the question ‘how does law structure relations?’ In developing my eco-relational
framework I extend that inquiry to explicitly include the structuring of relations with the
more-than-human world. This inventory is used to provide a detailed examination of the
everyday operation of land use decisions and to make visible the active role of law in land
use planning. The ‘legal system’ is often treated as background by actors in planning disputes
and is not the object of scrutiny itself. Incremental changes to legislation or policy may be
contemplated, but more fundamental shifts in how the law shapes human relationships with
land and the environment are viewed as impossible or impractical, or simply not imagined at
24
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all. Making law’s work visible exposes the foundational discourses and worldviews
informing legal and cultural notions of ‘use’, ‘value’, ‘ownership’, ‘environment’ and even
the concept of property in land, at the heart of land use law and policy. In doing so,
meaningful critique and creative engagement with the legal system is made possible. The
‘map’ provided by this initial analysis informs both the selection of documentary materials
for content analysis and interview sampling by exposing key moments in the legal process in
land use decision-making requiring further examination and scrutiny. This includes the preapplication land acquisition, research and preparation, the application and public consultation
stage, and finally the hearing where applicable.

The next step is an initial review of the Provincial Environmental Registry, a public online
database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993, SO 199s, c 28), where
Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly
posted. This identified 242 decisions on large-scale industrial aggregate mines, including
approvals, withdrawals, and denials between 2001 and 2014. A database of the decisions
identifies the dates of proposal and decision, location, depth of extraction, volume of
extraction, objections filed, key issues identified, and, the decision maker for each. This
provides the basis for the basic quantitative analysis provided in Chapter Seven and for the
selection of cases for further analysis. This process informed the development and refinement
of the research question by providing a detailed picture of the outcomes and actors in
aggregate extraction conflicts.

The next stage is the selection of cases for more detailed analysis through a review of key
documents, including decisions of the provincial land use tribunal, the Ontario Municipal
Board, and any publically available submission documents from the proponent and other
parties. In particular, the review revealed the level and nature of participation by members of
the public and regulatory and planning bodies. Cases with high levels of more-than-owner
participation were identified and from these I selected proposals or appeals resulting in, or
likely to result in, a hearing before the Board, or high levels of public and media attention.
The cases included applications that were approved, denied, and withdrawn, as well as some
additional cases including both large-scale extensions that were not included in the Provincial
reporting regime. Other cases included were identified by a review of media coverage, the
legislative review submissions, and through interview participants. These cases are the basis
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for the case law analysis in Chapters Five and Eight and inform the participant selection and
interview process described below.
B. Talking to People: Interviews
i. Participants
Based on the documentary analysis, 19 semi-structured in-person key informant interviews
were conducted with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes as either morethan-owner parties or professionals, such as lawyers, planners or scientific technical
consultants in multiple locations throughout Ontario. All the disputes were in places deemed
‘rural’ by local or regional plans with the exception of one case study in Northern Ontario.
The goal of participant selection was not to be representative of the broader provincial
population. Rather, I sought to identify key informants that would “purposefully inform” my
understanding by providing in-depth knowledge about what is at stake in disputes about
aggregate extraction and experiential perspectives on the associated decision-making
processes.27 By selecting informants from a range of geographic locations who were engaged
with distinct conflicts and organizations, I sought to include a range of perspectives and
experiences.28

Participants are primarily activists in local or regionally-based organizations formed to
respond to a specific application or pre-existing organizations who chose to become involved
with a particular quarry application based on a particular set of environmental or social
concerns. These participants included (1) farmers, (2) residents of communities close to
proposed mine sites, (3) non-resident home owners in communities close to proposed mine
sites, and (4) members of locally-based environmental and conservation groups. I chose
participants based on their involvement in one of the cases identified through documentary
analysis or through other participants. Initially I knew the participants personally but I then
identified further participants through the documentary data and by “snowball sampling” by
asking those participants to refer me to others. In particular, I selected participants who had
been involved in cases that were active since 2012 or who were involved in ongoing work
related to aggregate extraction so that their experiences would be relatively recent and easier
to recall. In one case the conflict was dated earlier, however, it was geographically and
legally unique and therefore justified inclusion. Participants in this case remained
27

John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches (London:
SAGE Publications, 2006) at 127.
28
Ibid at 129.
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knowledgeable and engaged despite the passage of time and had retained many of the
documents relevant to the case.

The participants are, or were, all in leadership roles for the groups they were involved with
and listed as organizers or spokespersons on websites, formal submissions, or other legal
documents. In addition to the more-than-owner participants, two lawyers, one scientific
consultant, one policy analyst, one professional naturalist, and two planners were also
interviewed. The lawyers had both worked on aggregate siting cases, one for an
environmental organization supporting one of the more-than-owner parties, and the other for
First Nations facing aggregate extraction proposals. The consultant had worked for multiple
more-than-owner parties as a technical expert and witness. The policy analyst was at an
independent legislative body. The naturalist worked for a conservation organization that
worked with both aggregate developers and more-than-owner parties. One planner was an
independent expert who had worked for more-than-owner parties, the other was a planner for
a provincial planning agency. All the participants were white but for one expert participant.
15 participants were men and 10 were women. Participants were recruited following the
receipt of ethics approval from York University’s Human Participants Review SubCommittee in the Office on Research Ethics.29 Initial contact with participants was by email
with an informed consent letter attached for their review. The letter detailed the project, the
interview process and the issues to be discussed, as well as the use of the data in the research.
The letter was again reviewed at the outset of the in-person interviews.

Interviews took place in both one-on-one and small group settings. The group interviews
were undertaken at the suggestion of the participants. Where possible, interviews with morethan-owner parties took place in the area that was the subject of the conflict. However,
locations were selected for the comfort and convenience of the participants and therefore
some of the interviews took place in the Greater Toronto Area. The professional interviews
took place in the offices of the participants, with the exception of one lawyer whose interview
had to be rescheduled and was therefore completed by phone. General interview locations are
set out in the table below. In some cases subsequent site visits were made by the author in
order to achieve a place-based understanding of the participants’ perspectives. In two cases,
participants provided extensive guided tours of the proposed sites following the formal

29

I received ethics approval on February 06, 2013.
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interview. In two cases I am personally familiar with the area. All participants provided maps
and often photographs of the site during the interview. Table 1 summarizes the participant
affiliations and interview locations.

Interview
Number
1
2
3
4
5

Location

Affiliation

Toronto
Municipality of Hamilton
Renfrew County
Toronto
Toronto

More-than-owner party; Farmer resident
More-than-owner party; Residents (2)
More-than-owner party; Resident
Professional Planner
Policy Analyst – Independent Legislative Office

6
7
8
9
10

Burlington
Wellington County
Orillia
Dufferin County
Collingwood

11

Kingston

12

Oakville

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Toronto
Mississauga
Toronto (by phone)
Wawa
Port Credit
Georgetown (Planner)
Toronto

More-than-owner party; Resident
More-than-owner party; Resident
Professional Naturalist
More-than-owner party; Farmer residents (2)
More-than-owner party; Residents, member of local
environmental organization (3)
More-than-owner party; Former resident, member
of local environmental organization
More-than-owner party; Member of local
environmental organization
Lawyer for Environmental Organization
Scientific Consultant
Lawyer for First Nations parties
Residents (4)
More-than-owner party; Resident
Planner – Government Planning Agency
More-than-owner party; Non-resident home owner,
member of local environmental organization

Table 1: Interviews
A significant limitation of this research is that it does not include the perspectives and
experiences of Indigenous communities facing aggregate development proposals in Ontario.
The project was initially designed to include at least one aggregate development in the
Niagara Escarpment Development Plan Area or Manitoulin Island, areas in which First
Nation parties had been actively involved in the aggregate planning process, in order to
include First Nation perspectives, concerns and experiences. I recognized, and continue to
recognize, the impact of aggregate development on Indigenous land and relationships with
place and community as a pressing concern and an important topic for further research.
Further, while Indigenous organizations and individuals did not actively participate in the
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disputes I examined,30 I understand settler-colonialism to be foundational to the structure of
property and planning relations engaged by these conflicts. I also recognize Indigenous legal
orders and the perspectives of Indigenous people as central to individual land use conflicts, as
well as the broader inquiry about how we use to law to structure people-place relations in
Canada. However, as a white, settler, legal academic trained in western knowledge systems, I
also recognize that this is work that must be done cautiously and with careful negotiation.31
Upon reflection, and through discussion with both Indigenous and non-Indigenous advisors, I
came to the conclusion that a separate research framework and a longer timeline are required
to allow for the “relational work”32 that can inform my understanding of how to do this work
“in a good way”.33 Therefore while my work to develop these relationships with a specific
community is ongoing and will inform future work, it is not included in this project. The goal
of this ongoing work is to develop a distinct research framework that “takes direction” from a
specific community, “connects” with Indigenous knowledge holders and community
members, and engages meaningfully with Indigenous legal principles for land use
governance.34 Therefore, the discussion above in Chapter Two and below in the following
chapters considers questions and implications related to Indigenous land and legal orders as a
critical part of a broader discussion about private property, planning, rurality and
environmental justice in Ontario and Canada. However, Indigenous perspectives are not
reflected in the empirical data discussed below.

ii. The Interview Process
The interviews took place over seven months. They lasted approximately one hour, however,
many participants were eager to share and I accommodated longer interviews where possible.
The group interviews tended to be between one and two hours due to the multiple
participants. The interviews were taped with the consent of participants and transcribed
verbatim. The transcripts and notes were stored electronically on a password-protected

30

This should be qualified by noting Indigenous people did join the broader campaign against the Melancthon
mega-quarry proposal and developed relationships with the lead organization, the North Dufferin Agricultural
Task Force, as noted in Chapter 8, participants in this study reflected on these as positive, important and
ongoing.
31
Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples (New York: Zed books,
1999) at 180.
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Margaret Elizabeth Kovach, Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and contexts
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 172.
33
Jessica Ball & Pauline Janyst, “Enacting research ethics in partnerships with indigenous communities in
Canada:‘Do it in a good way’” (2008) 3 Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 2 33 at 48.
34
Kovach, supra note 32 at 172.
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computer. Anonymized notes from the transcripts were printed during the writing process and
shredded prior to being recycled. I also took detailed notes during the interviews and made
further reflective notes following the interviews to record my thoughts and reactions as the
interviewer as soon as possible thereafter. These were anonymized and kept in a locked filing
cabinet. With travel, advance preparation, as well as subsequent site visits and time for
reflection, the processes generally took between one-half to one-full day.

The interviews were semi-structured and based on an interview guide. One interview guide
was developed for more-than-owner parties and another for professional participants
(Appendices A and B). The more-than-owner guide was designed to draw out narratives
around four themes: (1) what was at stake in the conflict; (2) the relationship with the place(s)
involved; (3) involvement in the decision-making process and relationships with decision
makers; and (4) engagement with the legal and policy framework. The professional guide was
designed around three themes: (1) the types of legal/technical issues raised in aggregate
conflicts; (2) opportunities for and influence of public involvement in the decision-making
processes; (3) views on the legal and policy framework and priorities for reform. The
professional guide was slightly modified in each case to account for the specific expertise,
such as law or planning. The interview guides were informed by the literature review and
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the documentary analysis described above,
and discussions with my supervisor. In particular, the guide was informed by Nedelsky’s
relational approach to legal disputes that foregrounds the work that law does to structure
relations,35 by Joseph Pierce et al’s relational placemaking framework,36 and by the placebased approach to uncovering people-place relations described above.

The guides were revised following the initial interviews with members of each group to
reflect this initial interview experience. The guides provided some structure to keep the
interview on track and maintain a consistent set of themes. However, I took an open-ended
approach and encouraged participants to talk openly about what they considered to be
important about their experience. The more-than-owner guide begins with general questions
that ask the participants to situate themselves in relation to the specific conflict in which they
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
36
Joseph Pierce, Deborah G Martin & James T Murphy, “Relational Place-Making: The Networked Politics of
Place” (2011) 36 Trans Inst Br Geogr 1 54.
35
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become involved. The guide then prompts them to share the story of their involvement. I
approached the interviews as an opportunity for interaction and conversation and to develop
relationships with the participants. This approach is in keeping with feminist approaches to
research that seek to work with participants and respect their knowledge and expertise. 37
Further, the open-ended approach is consistent with a place-based approach that seeks to
understand people’s relationships with place in their own words and based on their own
experiences.38 In many interviews, participants continued to cover the themes in the guide
without further prompting and the guide was not necessarily referred to after the initial
questions. Participants’ were enthusiastic and shared detailed narratives about relationships to
place, experiences of the planning and legal processes, and described what was at stake for
them in the conflict. In many cases participants expressed gratitude for the opportunity to
reflect on their experiences and to tell their story. Some contrasted this with the sense that
they had not been listened to during the planning process. Participants also raised new issues
and topics and I often followed up with more questions and engaged with these topics in
addition to those covered in the interview guide. This is also consistent with an approach that
values the expertise and experience of research participants.

As described in the introduction and noted above, prior to conducting this study I was
engaged in one of the cases selected for examination, which was taking place in an area of
personal significance. My involvement consisted of assisting with the preparation of
submissions for a local activist group and working closely with their expert consultant. In one
sense this locates me as a participant researcher or “insider” conducting research on an issue
in which I have also engaged as an activist.39 Participants often knew this, particularly where
they knew me already or had been referred to me through another interviewee. I was also
open about this positionality prior to the start of the formal interview. I briefly explained my
connection to the Melancthon case and that, while it had been the motivation for me to
undertake this study, I was no longer actively working on the issue outside of my PhD
research. However, as a trained-lawyer, a doctoral student and academic researcher, as well
as an urbanite non-resident in the areas under examination, I was also an outsider. In the

Marjorie L DeVault & Glenda Gross, “Feminist Qualitative Interviewing: Experience, Talk, and Knowledge”
in Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2012)
206.
38
Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 12; Davenport & Anderson, supra note 4.
39
Sonya Corbin Dwyer & Jennifer L Buckle, “The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in Qualitative
Research” (2009) 8 International Journal of Qualitative Methods 1 54.
37
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context of largely rural communities, and of participants without legal training, often actively
engaged in current and ongoing conflicts, I was in a very different position than most of the
interviewees. This dual positionality requires attention to how both of these locations as a
researcher may influence the research. At the same time, I reject the insider/outsider binary
and adopt the view of qualitative researchers as necessarily being “with” and “in ‘relation
to’” the participants in this study: “The intimacy of qualitative research no longer allows us to
remain true outsiders to the experience under study and, because of our role as researchers, it
does not qualify us as complete insiders. We now occupy the space between, with the costs
and benefits this status affords.”40 Indeed, taking a constructivist position, it is clear that there
is no neutral position as a researcher since there is no “pure form” of knowledge that exists
outside the circumstances of the interview and the knowledge it produces.41 Rather, it is the
attention to biases and assumptions and dedication to representing the experiences shared by
participants that matter in ensuring the quality of one’s research: “the core ingredient is not
insider or outsider status but an ability to be open, authentic, honest, deeply interested in the
experience of one's research participants, and committed to accurately and adequately
representing their experience.”42

In general, knowledge of my involvement with the Melancthon quarry case helped to
establish “rapport” between myself and the interviewee and helped them to feel
comfortable.43 In one case a participant involved in active and very adversarial litigation only
agreed to meet with me on the basis of this connection. As noted above, it also enhanced the
place–based approach to the research design and analysis. However, it is possible the
participants who perceived me as an insider made assumptions about my knowledge or
understanding and may not have fully explained aspects of their experience. In addition, it is
possible that this also influenced what aspects they emphasized about their experience by
focusing what they perceived as shared factors versus others that might be divergent. My
partial insider status also raises concern about the potential influence on my interpretation of
the data and, therefore required “disciplined bracketing and detailed reflection on the

40
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subjective nature of the research process, with a close awareness of one’s own personal
biases and perspectives”.44
3. Data Analysis
In this project, the collection of data through interviews aims to draw out stories about
people-place relations that emerge from specific aggregate conflicts.45 I examine individual
everyday experiences of engagement with the aggregate licensing and planning system in
order to situate individual narratives “within a complex institutional field” 46 that serves to
coordinate and organize individual involvement in the everyday world to sustain institutional
processes.47 In this way, I engage with individual narratives and experiences while
understanding these as an “entry point” into understanding the work that law does to structure
and mediate people-place relations and to explore the space for a relational reorientation of
land use planning law and practice.48

Property theorist Carol Rose argues that property law is upheld by stories produced and
circulated in a particular society. 49 Legal geographer Nicholas Blomley has shown how
particular property relations are materialized in part by narratives and representations about
landscape.50 Examining how stories are produced and circulated in the social world, and
exposing the preferred stories of specific environments, holds enormous potential in the study
of law, and property and planning law in particular. As Susan Turner notes, “citizens learn in
their experience in ‘the process’ that how they know the world in their everyday relations is
not how it is put together in the relations of planning.” 51 Attention to narratives about
participation in planning processes can contribute to an understanding of the legal system as
an actor rather than a passive system or background. Law actively participates in the cultural
construction of specific places and their relationships with the people who live with them, use
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them, or feel connected to them spiritually, historically or emotionally. This project
specifically considers whether and how the narratives that dominate in legal processes
transform the land as the outcomes of land use decisions are enacted on real places and the
people connected with them. In particular, I consider the role narratives of ownership play in
shaping the landscape to create and uphold private places, as well as they ways in which
other stories about relations with place are deemed irrelevant, outside the boundaries of the
land use decision-making process.
John Creswell explains the data analysis process of qualitative sources as a “spiral”, with the
researcher engaging “in the process of analytic circles rather than using a fixed linear
approach.”52 His “data analysis spiral” includes the following steps: (1) organizing the data;
(2) reading and memoing; (3) describing, classifying and interpreting data into codes and
themes; (4) interpreting the data; and then (5) presenting the data. In my research, several
themes emerged from the literature review to guide the documentary review: (1) the
relationship between private property and land use planning; (2) the role of place in land use
planning law and land use politics; (3) planning law as environmental governance; and (4)
environmental justice and land use planning. These themes were revised as I undertook the
documentary analysis and then again as I designed the interview guide and read and re-read
the interview transcripts. A revised set of themes informed the development of a coding guide
for the interview data, which is attached as Appendix C. The guide was then used to code the
data from the interviews using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software. The coding was an
iterative process and the themes were subject to ongoing revision, including the identification
of key sub-themes within the major themes and relationships between the themes. As
Creswell recommends, I remained open to the emergence of new codes throughout the
process.53 In the process of interpreting the data, I continually went back to the literature
review to relate the findings from the data analysis to the secondary literature. 54 This process
resulted in the production of new theoretical insights while simultaneously exposing the gaps
and tensions that required returning to the literature or returning to the data, or both.
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A. Validity and Generalisability
Concerns about the validity and generalisability of qualitative research are often raised when
contrasted with quantitative approaches that have results that can be easily replicated and
measured for accuracy.55 While qualitative research is distinct from quantitative research and
the notions of accuracy and reliability cannot necessarily be applied in the same way, it
remains essential that researchers ensure the quality of data collection and analysis when
applying qualitative methods.56 Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln propose “trustworthiness” as
a concept better suited to qualitative approaches that acknowledge social construction and the
multiplicity of perspectives. 57 Gibson and Brown adopt trustworthiness as a useful way to
address concerns about validity in qualitative research.58 Trustworthiness focuses the
examination on the context of data collection and data generation methods involved in the
research process and shifts away from notions of inherent truth in any particular account.
Max Travers puts it this way:
One methodological principle employed in ethnomethodological research
is to focus on concrete examples and to stay close to our practical
experience of doing everyday things and making sense of everyday
cultural objects, documented so that no one can object to the findings,
rather than engaging in loose, wide-ranging and usually value-laden
commentary about the modern world.59
Marie Campbell and Ann Manicom argue, “While Truth may be an illusion, it is nonetheless
possible – and urgent – to investigate and describe the relations that put our lives in place.” 60
Here I am concerned with how and why people articulate claims about particular places,
specifically land that is privately owned by others; and, the capacity of the legal frameworks
and decision makers involved to hear, acknowledge, and meaningfully account for such
claims as part of the decision-making process. Therefore, the research objective is not to
assess or determine the ‘truth’ or ‘validity’ of these articulations, or of the decisions, against
an external standard. Rather, the goal of the data-based component of this study is to first pay
close attention to multiple and varied constructions of relationship with place articulated by a
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variety of actors and structured by various legal and policy instruments; and, as a result, to
provide a detailed account of how these are both included and excluded in the decisionmaking processes about the use of privately-owned land, as well as to examine the
consequences for the people-place relations at stake. The research findings also inform my
conclusions and proposals for both further research and law reform. In particular, the data
provides crucial insights into the potential to restructure land use and natural resource law to
uphold a much wider range of people-place relations and the need to reorient legal
constructions of property away from ownership and towards reciprocal relations with place.

Graham Gibbs summarizes several techniques developed to address concerns about validity
in qualitative research and several are adopted here. Triangulation refers to the need to get
different views on a subject to reveal possible mistakes or limitations, and to expose
inconsistencies and new dimensions of social reality. 61 Here, research participants have been
drawn from different social and economic groups and geographical locations and have been
involved in different disputes. Respondent validation refers to the process of checking
transcription accuracy with the respondents themselves. 62 Respondents were advised of this
process in the letter of request when initial contact was made, which was reviewed and
approved by the Ethics Committee at York University. The presentation of evidence through
the inclusion of concise, contextualized quotations grounds the analysis in the data in order to
ensure accuracy.63
B. Limitations
As noted above, for ethical and methodological reasons, the empirical component of this
study does not include First Nations perspectives nor does it examine any Indigenous legal
orders as sources of law governing aggregate mineral extraction. Given the legal and political
importance of recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction over land use issues and the practical
pressing need to address the impact of aggregate mining on Indigenous land, this is a
significant limitation. My intention to address this through future work designed in order to
do the required relational work is outlined above. In addition, the participants were almost
entirely white, had citizenship status, and, most were property owners. As a result, the
perspectives and experiences of persons from other racial groups are not included here. While
61
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this may accurately represent those engaging in aggregate extraction disputes, it has the
potential to reinforce dominant constructions of environmentalism and rurality that centre
white perspectives. This makes the environmental justice lens applied in Chapter Eight
essential to this study. The limited sample size is also a significant limitation on the
generalizability of the research and I acknowledge that it therefore does not allow for “the
estimation of the distribution of the phenomenon in the population as a whole.” 64 However,
this was not the goal of the interviews conducted in this research. Rather, my intention was to
uncover the wide range of people-place relations engaged by aggregate extraction disputes
and to develop in-depth understanding how these shape and are shaped by the land use
planning processes and legal frameworks. Keeping these limitations in mind, the in-depth
nature of the interviews and enthusiastic participation of the interviewees is a strength of this
study. The rapport between myself and the interviewees resulted in a high quality of data,
including meaningful narratives and reflections about what is at stake and how the legal
process and instruments might better reflect this. Further, the distinct place-based approach to
the research is an original contribution that has led to unique insights and the development of
new theoretical concepts.
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Chapter Four: Legal and Policy Framework for Aggregate Extraction in Ontario

1. Introduction
According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, over 90% of aggregate extraction in
Ontario occurs on private land.1 This makes aggregate mineral resource extraction a
uniquely fitting case study to understand the relationship between private property and
planning. This chapter provides a detailed overview of the relevant legal and policy
framework. In Ontario, the use of private land is regulated by multiple complex and
overlapping regimes, including both statutory2 and common law3 sources of property law,
a range of land use planning statutes and policies, environmental regulation, and extralegal norms and rules that emerge through networks of economic and civil society
actors.4

Aggregate mineral mines are primarily regulated through provincial land use planning
law and policy. However, as noted below, a much broader network of law and policy is
potentially engaged by particular proposals for mineral extraction. Detailed and specific
attention to the role that law plays in the land use processes through which “wicked
problems”, such as aggregate extraction siting, are defined and contested, and inclusions
and exclusions are negotiated, enforced and disrupted, is essential to resolving the
research questions at the heart of this project.5 Part I provides a brief historical overview

1

Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Aggregate Resources Act
Review (7 May 2012) [Aggregate Resources Act Review] at G145.
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The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, RSO 1990, c C.34; Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1990, c
T.21.
3
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Montgomery Publications, 2014).
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Paul R Lachapelle & Stephen F McCool, “Exploring the Concept of ‘Ownership’ in Natural Resource
Planning” (2005) 18:3 Society & Natural Resources 279 at 279. Wicked problems are defined as complex
situations involving “multiple and competing values and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-effect
relationships, limited time and resources, incomplete information, and structural inequities in access to
information and the distribution of political power.”
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of the provincial regulation of aggregate extraction in Ontario. Part II then sets out the
current regulatory framework at the time of writing, including the primary legislation and
policy documents and reviews the role of the Ontario Municipal Board.6 Part III provides
a brief introduction to the aggregate planning reform process started in 2012, as well as
relevant aspects of the coordinated land use plan review currently underway.
In 2012, Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner noted that aggregate extraction has
become one of the most contentious land use issues in the Province.7 While aggregate
mineral resources are widely acknowledged as essential to the built environment and as
the foundation of necessary infrastructure developments from roads to subways to
housing and sewer mains, quarries have long been a source of local conflict about land
use.8 This paradox of a spatially fixed, non-renewable, essential resource and legitimate
community concerns about direct and cumulative social, health, and environmental
impacts exemplifies the ‘wicked’ nature of the problems that land use law and policy aim
to resolve. Multiple and overlapping goals and values in relation to land come into
conflict. Experts, landowners and more-than-owner parties provide vastly different views
on the impacts of extraction. Parties and decision makers all work with limited time and
resources in the context of uncertainty and incomplete information. Perhaps most
importantly for this project, the legal framework plays a key role in producing structural
inequities in access to information and power. Since 2005, conflicts over large-scale
quarry developments in the urban-rural fringe of Southwestern Ontario have resulted in

6
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major community mobilizations,9 complex multi-year litigation,10 a foreign investment
protection claim against the federal and provincial governments,11 a legislative review of
the governing legislation in 2012,12 and a subsequent reform Bill that received Royal
Assent in the final stages of this project.13 Participants in quarry disputes have raised
issues ranging from Indigenous sovereignty, 14 to food security, the right to water and
public health15; and, from regional economic development to international trade.16

As open-pit mines with transformative impacts, quarries have long been a potentially
controversial use of private land in Ontario and other jurisdictions. However, formal
oversight of aggregate extraction in Ontario was limited until the 1970s with landowners
having presumptive power to determine the appropriate use of their land without regard
to surrounding land uses or the environment.17 As the scale of extraction increased and
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growth of suburban development led to increasing demand, aggregate extraction emerged
as a site of conflict about land use in the province. 18 Since that time, aggregate regulation
in Ontario has shifted from a primarily municipally controlled land use to a provincially
led, and an increasingly proponent-driven, activity.19 Like other land use regulation,
aggregate extraction initially occurred under the Planning Act and the Municipal Act
which empowered local governments to use zoning by-laws to control where pits and
quarries could be established and to impose operational requirements through their
Official Plans.20 As will be described below, while the current regime retains this role for
municipal governments, decision-making power has been “upscaled” 21 to the provincial
level, which Valiante notes has a particularly closed policy process.

22

As discussed in

Chapter Six, the result is an inversion of the planning inquiry – the question of how we
will proceed with a particular development precedes or subsumes deliberation about
whether the development should proceed at all. Further, as planning scholars in the UK
have noted, this kind of recentralization of decision-making power can have significant
consequences for participation in planning decisions. 23
A. From Municipal to Provincial Regulation
A key shift occurred during the 1970s when, according to Baker et al., aggregate
developers successfully lobbied the province to centralize control over the process to
avoid a predicted shortage in resources.24 As will be described below, this narrative of
scarcity has continued to inform aggregate policy since that time. The Mineral Resources
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Committee, appointed by the Province, was established with members from both the
provincial government and industry but lacking representation from municipal
government or the emerging environmental movement.25 While a supplementary report
attempted to deal with local concerns, this lack of involvement remained a concern and
was later deemed a “significant and major omission.”26 The resulting Pits and Quarries
Control Act 1971 established a provincial licensing system, primarily controlled by the
Ministry of Natural Resources. The regime applied to a limited area of “major aggregate
production areas” in Southern Ontario, Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie. This limited
geographic application has persisted until very recently. 27 Arguably, the early “proindustry stance” has also persisted despite decades of opposition from local governments,
communities and the environmental movement.28

According to Cullingworth, the limitations of the 1971 Act quickly became clear and
little progress was made with respect to rehabilitation of pit and quarry sites. In 1976, the
government formed the Mineral Aggregate Working Party with members from
government, industry, municipal government and the public.29 They conducted a oneyear study that rejected the regime’s prioritization of “maximum utilization of available
resources” and emphasized the need to prioritize the interests and concerns of local
communities in order to make extraction feasible.30 In fact, they recommended a shared
control system between the province and municipalities. The study also concluded the
government faced a lack of credibility due to a lack of enforcement and the weakness of
the Act as well as limited results of rehabilitation requirements.31
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Notwithstanding the recommendations, the Ministry subsequently adopted the “Mineral
Aggregate Resource Planning Policy” which received cabinet approval in 1982 and was
incorporated into Section 3 of the Planning Act in 1986 as the “Mineral Aggregate
Resources Policy Statement.”32 As a case study on environmental assessment and
aggregate extraction in Ontario notes, of the 64 recommendations of the Working Party
the Policy Statement incorporated just 12.33 It was in this policy statement that aggregate
resources were first declared a ‘matter of provincial interest’ and municipalities were
formally required to preserve as much of the existing aggregate resources as “realistically
possible.” In this way the planning framework was structured to “enrol” private land in
the preservation of aggregate minerals and their production as a resource for a specific
version of the public interest, one emphasizing growth and economically productive uses
of land.34 The Policy Statement included a statement that other land uses may in “specific
instances” take precedence over aggregate extraction. In other words, the norm would be
that aggregate extraction would take precedence over other land uses. As will be outlined
in section 3 below, this prioritization of aggregate resource protection has been
maintained in current planning law and policy in Ontario, particularly the Provincial
Policy Statement.35

The current Aggregate Resources Act came into force in 1990, thus replacing the Pits and
Quarries Act 1971.36 In the interim some land use protection had been imposed, “at least
symbolically,” under the landmark land use plan, Niagara Escarpment Development Plan
Act.37 As Baker et al. note, the aggregate industry lobbied against the passage of the
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current Act, and against the Niagara Escarpment planning protections. Bill 170, The
Aggregate Resources Act was introduced by a Conservative provincial government and
received first and second readings in 1979 but was later withdrawn.38 While it did
respond to some of the concerns raised by the Working Party and brought in a more
detailed set of requirements for site planning and rehabilitation of quarries and pits,
debates in the legislature revealed serious and ongoing concerns. At second reading Jim
Foulds, a New Democratic Party Member of the Provincial Parliament noted his party’s
“serious reservations,” calling the environmental provisions “woefully inadequate,” the
appeal mechanism “lopsided” in favour of aggregate developers, and noting the lack of
protection for municipalities. 39He concluded, “[T]he minister's authority to override the
municipality zoning bylaws is enormous.” 40 Several members expressed concerns about
the centralization of discretionary power in the Minister of Natural Resources and the
lack of local control. Liberal Party member Robert Nixon pointed to the potentially
conflicting roles the minister was assigned, being responsible for both development and
protection of the resource at the same time as controlling the impacts of the industry:
He is seen not to be a controller of the aggregate industry but really the
developer himself. It is his responsibility to search out the resources and
see that the amounts are properly sealed so they are made available to
industry in a fair and equitable way. It almost seems that the Minister of
Natural Resources and his advisers become really the operators of the
overall provincial industry. Of course at the same time they have the
responsibility to control it.41
Mel Swart, another New Democratic member also pointed to the “weak, bare bones”
nature of the bill and criticized the government for placing the substantive policy in a
discretionary policy document approved by Cabinet with no debate in the legislature and
no input from municipalities.42 He pointed to a letter sent from the Ministry to the
Ontario Municipal Board during a hearing on the Durham Official Plan containing an
early iteration of the Policy Statement entitled the “Mineral Aggregate Policy for Official
38
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Plans”: “I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that is the policy of this province, not what's in this
bill… I say it's deliberate that they don't set out the principles in this bill, because they
want to retain unto themselves the principles and the policy. 43 These concerns about the
reliance on ministerial discretion and a closed-policy process to guide aggregate
extraction decisions foreshadow Valiante’s findings about the closed nature of Ontario’s
planning policy process that contains debate within site specific processes and leaves “the
logic of the prevailing approach to growth and development” and “underlying
assumptions about the benefits” unquestioned.44 The development-focused legal and
policy orientation and enrolment of private land in the provincial interest through
planning predates the current neoliberal approach to environmental governance in
Ontario. As described below, the emergence of neoliberal environmental governance in
the late 1980s both upheld and reinforced the role of land owners as planning decision
makers and the managerial emphasis on technical and scientific expertise in aggregate
planning.

The present Act was not introduced until 1988 and was proclaimed in 1990.45 During this
period the extraction rate in the province rose from 131 million tonnes to 197 million
tonnes, resulting in “heightened awareness of the overall costs of the industry and
weaknesses in the policy framework.” 46 A Liberal Party government in 1988
reintroduced Bill 170. On second reading Ruth Grier, a former New Democratic
Environment Minister, noted that while it may be an improvement on the former regime,
the new Act remained unsatisfactory: “We would all like to see the environment
protected and the aggregates industry controlled. Obviously the crux of it is, is the
weapon that is being used adequate to do the job? I regret that it is not.” Pointing to the
inadequate protection of the environment she stated, “Aggregates extraction is not
sustainable. It is a non-renewable resource. Surely, in developing legislation to deal with
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aggregates, if one believes in sustainable development, that legislation ought to put the
environment not just first, but before everything.” 47

With Bill 52, the Aggregate and Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996,
the Conservative government of Mike Harris amended the Act in 1997.48 The
amendments aimed to increase industry accountability through the introduction of
requirements for public notice and circulation of applications and mandatory public
consultation. However, a central objective of the Bill was also to reduce the
government’s role in the regulation of aggregate licensing and operations by shifting
towards a self-monitoring system and the creation of an industry-led Aggregate
Resources Trust that would be responsible for the rehabilitation of abandoned pits and
quarries, research activity and fee collection as well as distribution.49 During legislative
debate upon second reading, Liberal opposition member Jim Bradley succinctly
characterized the effect of the bill: “In this case, we have the industry being put in charge
of itself.”50 At third reading Bradley also noted the privileged position of the aggregate
industry in the legislative development process: “They consulted the industries first, got
their input, drew up their proposals and then consulted somebody else after, which is not
the proper way to go.”51 The New Democratic critic for natural resources and former
Minister of Northern Development and Mines Shelley Martel noted that even other
sectors involved in the government’s own aggregates working group had not been
involved: “Municipalities had no input, environmental groups had no input, consultants
who work with operators around these issues had no input. The only group that the
minister consulted with were the aggregate producers.”52 As described below, this
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industry-led policymaking and proponent-driven approach has persisted, and arguably
increased, to today.

As with Bill 170, the proposed Act was enabling legislation that left much of the
substance to regulation or policy. This lack of substance was criticized by opposition
members who noted that they would not get the chance to debate and influence the
regulations which had yet to be developed and would not come before the Legislature.53
Further, even in this context of deregulation, Bradley and other members raised concerns
about the ability of the Ministry to enforce the amended Act. Liberal member Michael
Brown stated, “[E]ven if we get a set of regulations that look reasonable to us, protect the
environment, are workable by the industry, we have no assurance whatever that this
ministry has any chance of actually administering this piece of legislation.” 54 Both
Bradley and Brown linked their concerns with the Conservative government’s move to
deregulate environmental and natural resource sectors and recent budgetary and staffing
reductions at the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of the Environment and
Energy. Bradley lamented job losses for staff “who used to undertake supervisory
activities, inspection activities and monitoring activities” at the Ministries. He went on,
“[I] think this Bill really is necessitated by the fact that the government is annihilating
those ministries by removing so many of the staff and taking away so many of the
resources.”55 Martel pointed out that 20% of the public service job reductions across
government were slated to be from the Ministry of Natural Resources.56 She linked her
concerns about the Bill with a fundamental shift in the role of government with respect to
natural resource and the environment:
I think what the government forgets at the end of the day -- and this is a
most important point -- is that the resources in the province, be they timber
or wildlife or fish or parks or aggregates, don't just belong to this
government. They don't just belong to the Minister of Natural Resources.
They are not his to give away. The crown acts as the steward and provides
53
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the standards and provides the compliance and monitors that compliance
and provides fines as necessary to ensure that the resources which belong
to all the people are used in an environmentally sound way to benefit the
greatest number of people in the province.57
The current regime, as amended by Bill 42, not only maintains limitations on
public involvement beyond site-specific objections, it is part of a deliberate and
sustained effort across Canada to weaken regulatory capacity, reduce scientific
knowledge within the state, and increase the role of non-state actors in
knowledge production, risk assessment and compliance.58 As the discussion
below and the chapters that follow demonstrate, many of these concerns are
echoed by the experiences of the participants in this project. Whether these will
be resolved by the proposed amendments remains to be seen as the process is
ongoing. The Act continues to be enabling legislation with much of the
substance left to policy and regulation, little of which has been developed or
made available. Historically, planning and aggregate policy and regulations have
not been developed in a transparent or participatory manner. As will be
discussed in Part II and Chapter Nine, in my view, none of the changes represent
a significant shift in aggregate planning policy and nothing in the reforms
provides the basis for the transformative change that would be required to realize
an eco-relational approach to aggregate mineral planning in the province.
B. Research and Commentary
The Ministry of Natural Resources has commissioned two studies on provincial
aggregate resources, one in 1992 and the 2010 State of the Aggregate Resource in
Ontario Study [SAROS]. The 2010 consolidated SAROS report summarized the findings
of six individual reports authored by expert consultants:59 Aggregate Consumption and
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Demand;60 Future Aggregate Availability and Alternatives Analysis; 61 The Value of
Aggregates;62 Reuse and Recycling; 63 Aggregate Reserves in Existing Operations;64 and,
Rehabilitation.65

Following the release of the SAROS report, the provincial Aggregate Resource Advisory
Committee, which includes stakeholder representatives from industry, environmental
interests and municipal governments, released a set of consensus recommendations and
priorities to the Minister.66 There was no public consultation about the review in advance
or subsequently despite the contentious history of aggregate resource development. The
SAROS recommendations included the need for a provincial “Strategic Aggregate
Roadmap” based on a lifecycle management approach and an emphasis on improved
rehabilitation as well as the protection of aggregate resources and simplification of the
approval process. It is critical to assess the recommendations as partial and limited, as
they report only those issues about which there was consensus. Environmental
considerations are absent from the report as no consensus recommendations were reached
regarding the environmental impact of aggregate extraction. While a review of SAROS
technical data is beyond the scope of this project (and my expertise), it is critical to
acknowledge that a range of stakeholders agreed about the importance of knowledge
production and data collection, and that the SAROS process and report have been
criticized as “aggregate-centric” and as emphasizing the benefits of extraction for the
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economy while minimizing social and environmental impacts and the potential to reduce
demand.67

There have been other reports evaluating the aggregate industry in Ontario, such as the
Canadian Urban Institute’s Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Understanding the
Foundations of Ontario’s Built Future, prepared for Dufferin Aggregates prior to the
SAROS report in anticipation of an application for a quarry licence.68 The Report is
presented as an “independent assessment by a neutral party” but acknowledges its
reliance on a combination of publicly available data and industry provided data. In 2005,
the Pembina Institute released a study on Ontario’s aggregate policy. 69 The authors
concluded that the provincial approach did not manage the resource sustainability and did
not promote the appropriate balance between aggregate extraction and other land uses. 70
They called for a comprehensive provincial strategy to manage aggregate resources and
reduce demand.71 The Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy evaluated
the SAROS report in their 2001 report Aggregate Extraction in Ontario: A Strategy for
the Future, which attempts to inform the development of a provincial aggregates strategy
based on stakeholder interviews, publicly available data, Environmental Commissioner
reports and policies and practices from other jurisdictions.72 Aggregate mineral extraction
has also been the subject of commentary in a number of the Environmental
Commissioner’s Annual Reports and Comments since 2000 and a key issue addressed in
the 2012 report Land Use Planning in Ontario: Primer and Summary of
Recommendations of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario.73 The Commissioner
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has pointed to a range of issues, including, the limited capacity of the Ministry to manage
the aggregate licensing program and enforce compliance, the siting of operations near
sensitive land uses and natural areas, problems with industry compliance and
rehabilitation, and the lack of a long-term and comprehensive approach to aggregate
planning.74
4. Part II: The Aggregate Mineral Extraction Legislative and Policy Framework
With this historical context in mind, this section provides an overview of current legal
and policy framework. As mentioned above, the vast majority of aggregate extraction
occurs on private land in Ontario.75 This makes private ownership a key category in the
legal governance of aggregate minerals and a starting point for an inquiry into aggregate
mineral extraction. Under the Canadian constitutional division of powers, planning and
natural resource governance on private and public lands fall within provincial jurisdiction
over municipal institutions and property and civil rights and the management of public
lands.76 Across Canada private land ownership varies in terms of the separation of surface
and sub-surface rights. In Ontario, as in other provinces and territories, private land may
have separate or unified surface and sub-surface rights depending on the terms of the
grant.77 While gold and silver had been reserved to the Crown in English domestic and
colonial territories since the Case of Mines in 1567,78 the common law rule that all other
minerals are part of the land itself was reflected in early fee simple land grants in Ontario,
which included both surface rights and sub-surface rights to non-precious minerals. The
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1869 General Mining Act79 voided the Crown reservation of precious metals and unified
surface and subsurface ownership. The 1913 Public Lands Act80 revoked past mineral
reservations and future reservations had to be expressly set out in the letters patent.81 The
current Public Lands Act carried these provisions forward such that the Crown has no
interest in mineral rights for lands originally granted before 1913 despite reservations. 82
Notable exceptions include Crown land sold for Agricultural purposes as of April 1st,
1957, and sales or dispositions for summer resort locations, both of which include
reservations of all mines and minerals to the Crown.83 Recent statutory reforms to
provincial mining law have further unified land rights, 84 particularly in Southern Ontario
where the majority of aggregate extraction takes place. 85

While statutory and common law property regimes are central to the legal construction
and protection of land ownership, planning law is the primary tool employed to manage
the intersection between private land use and development and the “multiple public
interests at play” in the province.86 Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex
web of legislation and policy. In Ontario, the province provides broad guidance and
maintains considerable power to constrain local government action through both the
Planning Act and the Provincial Policy Statement, a policy document that “sets the policy
foundation for regulating the development and use of land.”87 The bulk of day-to-day
79
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planning powers and responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities. 88 However,
formal public participation requirements for local planning and development decisions,
such as the development, revision or amendment of a municipality’s Official Plan, are
statutory and set out in the Planning Act. These include the provision of information and
material, public open houses where the public can review this material and ask questions,
public meetings, and, rights to make oral or written submissions.89 Similar provisions for
by-laws are also set out in the Planning Act.90

The review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario Municipal
Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, ostensibly dividing “land use” from
“environmental” decisions despite the environmentally-focused nature of many
objections to planning decisions.91 Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies
have recently been formally linked as part of the Environment and Land Tribunals cluster
but it is not yet clear what, if any, substantive outcomes the restructuring has brought
about.92 For certain appeals, particularly where hearings may be required from both
tribunals, a joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act.93 However, one
of the unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the
Ontario Municipal Board, which serves as the primary appeal body for planning and
development decisions, including those with clear environmental implications such as
amendments to Official Plans affecting public space, protected green space and
agricultural lands and the often-contentious applications for aggregate development
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considered here.94 The Board has jurisdiction to deal with issues and disputes under more
than 100 statutes, including the Aggregate Resources Act.95 The role of the Board and its
powers are discussed in more detail below in this Chapter.

In the context of aggregate extraction, the key legal frameworks municipal powers and
centralized provincial planning policy under the Planning Act, the Provincial Policy
Statement, provincial planning regimes, particularly the Niagara Escarpment
Development Plan Act and the Aggregate Resources Act as well as the associated
Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards. The constitutional and/or treaty
rights of First Nations and Metis communities and the applicable Indigenous legal orders
are also part of these key legal frameworks. While this chapter is focused on a detailed
review of these primary legal and policy regimes, quarry disputes can engage a much
broader range of municipal, provincial, federal and international law. The following
overview begins by examining the role of the Crown’s Duty to Consult and
Accommodate Aboriginal rights and title under Section 35 of the Constitution Act.

A. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate – Aboriginal Rights, Title and
Crown Constitutional Obligations
Indigenous legal orders, Aboriginal rights and title, as well as treaty rights and
obligations, have largely been neglected in debates about the regulation of private land
use in Ontario. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the Crown
has a constitutional duty to consult and accommodate in respect of Aboriginal rights,
claims and treaty rights, where “the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the
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potential existence of an Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might
adversely affect it” in accordance with Section 35 of the Constitution Act.96 Following
from Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the landmark cases in Haida Nation v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests), Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of
Canadian Heritage), and Taku River Tlingit First Nations v. British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director), demonstrate that the scope and content of the duty will vary along
a spectrum from a minor “duty to discuss” to “deep consultation,” proportionate to a
preliminary assessment of the claim and the seriousness of the effects.97 Regardless of
where the circumstances of a particular case may fall on the spectrum, the consultation
must always be “meaningful,” undertaken in “good faith” and with the “intention of
substantially addressing the concerns” of the affected community. 98

Much of Ontario is covered by historic treaties rather than subject to Aboriginal title
claims. Therefore, in large parts of the province, the relevant duty to consult analysis is
likely to be the Supreme Court’s decision in the Mikisew, which dealt with the duty to
consult in the context of a historic treaty with a “lands taken up” clause. However, it
should be noted that there are important areas of unceded land subject to current and
ongoing land claims and claims of rights that survived treaty. 99 Indeed, a highly
96
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controversial historic aggregate licence for lands claimed by the Tyendinaga Mohawks
under the federal Specific Claims process for unsettled Indigenous land claims was the
subject of protests, blockades and violent confrontations in 2006-2007 when an assertion
of Indigenous jurisdiction was rejected by the proponent and government agencies.100

In 2014, the Court reaffirmed Ontario’s obligations to Aboriginal parties to historic
treaties, including the duty to consult and accommodate, in the Grassy Narrows First
Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources) case.101 Earlier in the 2006 Mikisew decision, the
Court emphasized the importance of the duty to both First Nations and non-Aboriginal
governments: “[T]he principle of consultation in advance of interference with existing
treaty rights is a matter of broad general importance to the relations between aboriginal
and non-aboriginal peoples.”102 Justice Binnie articulated the appropriate test as the
determination of the “degree to which conduct contemplated by the Crown would
adversely affect those rights so as to trigger the duty to consult,” noting that the trigger is
a low threshold and the variation would be in the content of the duty. 103 He concluded
that the Crown has a positive duty - “an obligation to inform itself of the impact” on
treaty rights and must follow up with a meaningful, “good-faith” process that includes the
possibility of accommodation that “substantially addresses” the impacts. 104 In fact,
Justice Binnie contemplated that finding the process is not compatible with the honour of
the Crown may result in the setting aside of a government order “whether or not the facts
of the case would otherwise support a finding of infringement” of the rights. 105 In that
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case, despite finding that the duty was at the lower end of the spectrum, Binnie found that
it had not been fulfilled and described what ought to have occurred:
This engagement ought to have included the provision of information about the
project addressing what the Crown knew to be Mikisew interests and what the
Crown anticipated might be the potential adverse impact on those interests. The
Crown was required to solicit and to listen carefully to Mikisew concerns, and to
attempt to minimize adverse impacts on the Mikisew hunting, fishing and
trapping rights.106
Should the impact result in “no meaningful right” in relation to the traditional territory
of a Treaty First Nation, both Mikisew and Grassy Narrows impose the treaty
infringement analysis, including the R v Sparrow justification test, recently reaffirmed
in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia.107 The Tsilhqot’in case restated the Sparrow
test for legislative infringement of protected s. 35 rights as follows: 1) the government
must show that it fulfilled the procedural duty to consult and accommodate; 2)
demonstrate a “compelling and substantial” objective for the government actions; and,
3) establish that the government’s actions are consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary
duty to Aboriginal peoples.108

A full examination of the relationship between land use planning, Indigenous land use
laws, and the duty to consult and accommodate is a complex subject and beyond the
scope of this more broadly focused project. It is an area that requires much more detailed
scholarly examination than can be offered in the introductory section below. However,
this overview will provide a general summary of the Canadian legal framework that
should be considered by all parties in dealing with aggregate extraction proposals in
Ontario. Specific Indigenous legal frameworks will be applicable and should be
considered by all parties as appropriate in a particular location.
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i. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Who is Responsible and
for What?
One of the complexities in understanding how the duty to consult and accommodate
operates in the context of land use planning is a lack of clarity about roles of the various
actors, including the proponents and a range of actors that may be created and
empowered by the provincial or federal Crown. These bodies play critical and often
leading roles in land use planning, but are not themselves the Crown. For example,
regional and municipal governments, as well as agencies and administrative bodies, such
as the Niagara Escarpment Commission, the Ontario Municipal Board and the
Environmental Review Tribunal may all play a role in planning decisions.109 In the
context of land use planning and environmental decision-making, including aggregate
extraction licensing, these bodies play very significant roles and cannot be ignored as key
actors in ensuring that legal duties to Indigenous communities are met. In particular,
municipalities are often uniquely positioned to understand the local context of the
impacts of extractive development and may be experienced in conducting certain types of
consultations.

As described below, while the aggregate licensing process is formally regulated by
provincial law and administered by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, conflicts
about aggregate extraction are often rooted in the municipal zoning and official plan
amendments required prior to provincial approval. Indeed, the exclusion of the majority
of private land in Northern Ontario from regulation under the Aggregate Resources Act
licensing process means that municipal Planning Act approvals are the only mechanism
for review in large parts of the province where First Nations lands and rights may be
impacted. Further, public consultation has largely been delegated to the proponent under
the provincial aggregate policies, making the municipality and the proponent the leading
bodies with respect to public consultation in the aggregate context. The Ministry, one or
more municipal and regional governments, and the Ontario Municipal Board often play
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significant roles at various stages of the licensing process. As well, the Ministry of the
Environment, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Niagara Escarpment Commission
and the local conservation authorities may play critical roles in a particular case.

It should be noted that there are real concerns about the consequences of any delegation
of the Crown’s duty to consult that should be considered in the development of the legal
and regulatory framework governing aggregate extraction and land use planning more
generally.110 Kaitlin Ritchie argues that the costs may include the following: 1) the loss of
critical opportunities to advance reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal people
through nation-to-nation negotiations; 2) the potential that the “scope and range of
accommodations” that can result from consultations will be limited by the statutory
powers of non-Crown bodies, such as municipalities and tribunals;111 and, 3) the potential
to create confusion about who has the duty to consult that may result in a failure to fulfill
the duty.112 However, as Imai and Stacey recently pointed out, the failure to engage other
public bodies and private proponents in the fulfillment of the duty may have important
and negative consequences for the protection of Aboriginal interests and for the goal of
reconciliation between the Crown and First Nations.113 In the words of the Court of
Appeal of Yukon, “[T]he Duty to Consult exists to ensure that the Crown does not
manage its resources in a manner that ignores Aboriginal claims.”114
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The Court in Haida found that the Crown cannot delegate the legal responsibility for the
duty to consult and accommodate, a power that flows from the “assumption of
sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group” and the
“honour of the Crown.”115 However, the Court specifically allowed for the Crown to
delegate “procedural aspects” of the consultations, in that case to industry proponents. 116
As Kleer et al. point out, this leaves the complex question of exactly what has been
delegated to a case-specific analysis. In Rio Tinto Alcan v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council,
the Court contemplated delegation to public bodies where their decision-making roles
may affect Aboriginal rights and interests, in that case administrative tribunals. 117 Carrier
Sekani did provide some guidance about how to undertake this inquiry, including the
importance of examining the specific duties and powers conferred on the body by the
legislature, particularly the nature of the delegation expressed or implied in the enabling
legislation.118 Kleer et al. point to the Court’s division of the duty into two separate roles
in the context of delegation: a) the “consulting” role whereby a body is delegated the role
of engaging with an Indigenous community and examining the potential impacts and
possible accommodations and has the “remedial powers” necessary to effect changes and
to accommodate in response to the consultation outcomes; and, b) a “reviewing” role
through which a body is legally empowered to consider whether there is a duty in the
circumstances and if so, if the duty has been met.119

The law on how this specifically impacts municipalities has been limited and the
results of judicial consideration have been mixed. In Ontario, the regulatory
framework has been silent on the duty to consult and accommodate in the land
use planning context until 2014. The Ontario Planning Act, Provincial Policy
Statement and Aggregate Resources Act provided very little guidance in the
context of aggregate extraction. The 2014 revised Provincial Policy Statement
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included, for the first time, explicit acknowledgement of the “rights and
interests” of Aboriginal communities and mandatory language requiring the
Policy Statement “shall be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the
recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.” 120 Given
the powerful role of the Provincial Policy Statement in decision-making by both
municipal governments and the Ontario Municipal Board, this serves as the first
explicit provincial delegation of at least some aspects of the duty to consult and
accommodate municipalities in Canada.121 A 2009 report provides that the
position of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing is that “municipalities
do have a duty to consult in some circumstances” and notes that in practice
many municipalities are already engaged in consultation with neighbouring First
Nations and Metis communities.122 However, the extent of the delegation and the
implications are as of yet unclear. The Aggregate Resources Act has been silent
on the duty to consult on Aboriginal rights until the 2017 amendments. Section
3.1 of the amended Act now provides Ministerial oversight to determine
“whether adequate consultation with Aboriginal communities has been carried
out”.123 Not only does this leave “adequate consultation” as an undefined and
discretionary standard, it presupposes the delegation of the duty to the proponent
in the context of aggregate extraction. Several members raised concerns about
leaving the duty of consult to be defined at the discretion of the minister. New
Democratic Member Gilles Bisson criticized the consultation process on the Bill,
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which amends both the Act and the Mining Act, based on submissions made by
Six Nations Chief Ava Hill:
What they were left with was that somebody came and knocked at the door
of the First Nation and said, “By the way, here’s what we’d like to do,”
and walked away. The next thing they know, they’ve got the legislation.
The Chief is pretty clear. She’s saying, “I cannot support this legislation as
a First Nations leader because it stops well short of what the UN
declaration calls for.”124
Bisson attempted to amend this clause at Committee and raised the issue at second
reading, citing Chief Hill’s concerns about compliance with the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People:
It leaves us with a conundrum in this Legislature: If we truly do believe—
as we said we did when we brought the First Nations leadership to this
Legislature to talk about reconciliation and to reaffirm our intent to work
with First Nations in order to make sure that they are full partners with
Ontario and that we respect their right when it comes to the issues of the
duty to consult and the UN declaration. We at that point voted in an
affirmation of those principles, and we find ourselves with legislation now
that falls short of it.125

While there is minimal case law in Ontario, the question is unresolved with some
decisions assuming a municipal responsibility126 and others determining the opposite,
finding that municipalities are not “the Crown.” Prior to the 2014 revision of the Policy
Statement, the Ontario Municipal Board in Sifton v Brantford found the municipality in
that case did not have “a clear duty to consult resulting from the obligations to consult of
higher levels of government.”127 In 2015, the Board acknowledged the 2014 duty to
consult provision in an appeal of a rezoning application for a redevelopment project on
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unceded Algonquin territory on the Ottawa River or Kichi Zibi. 128 The Board found that a
consultation process incorporating “elements and features within the overall development
that will recognize and celebrate Algonquin history and culture as well as the overall
significance of the islands to the Algonquin in particular” was “in line with” the
consultation contemplated by the Policy Statement and the Official Plan.129 Notably the
Board characterised the City consultation process as “a number of well attended public
meetings occurring, where public input was sought from both the public at large as well
as with the Aboriginal community.” 130 The proponent rather than the city undertook
specific consultation with the Algonquins of Ontario.131 Rather than viewing this as a
failure of the City to fulfill the duty to consult, the Board invoked the private ownership
of the land to shield the City and the developers from further obligations, noting that the
proponent had engaged in consultation “notwithstanding” the private nature of the
development.132 The decision acknowledges the land as unceded Algonquin territory but
then immediately limits the significance of this finding:
“[T]here is no land claim agreement in place and the Board notes that the
negotiations between the Federal Government, Provincial Government and
the Algonquins are focused on lands that are under federal
jurisdiction/ownership and do not include lands that are privately held or
owned at this time. The subject lands have been held in private ownership
for over 100 years with small areas still owned by PWGSC subject to
perpetual lease agreements for perpetual use by private interests.133
The decision was upheld on appeal in 2016.134

Outside of Ontario, further case law has developed. A 2012 decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City)135 accepted
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the “powerful arguments, both legal and practical” against “automatically” imposing the
duty on a municipality, resulting in a confusing situation where the duty to consult
remained, presumably to be fulfilled by the provincial Crown. The project was allowed to
proceed as only municipal approval was required.136 As Imai and Stacey argue, the Court
arrived at this result by asking the wrong question – who has the duty to consult rather
than whether consultation is required before proceeding - resulting in a problematic
result.137 The Court held that without the express delegation of the duty, municipal
authorities do not owe a duty to consult, concluding that “local governments lack the
authority to engage in the nuanced and complex constitutional process involving ‘facts,
law, policy and compromise.”138 While acknowledging, “that First Nations may
experience difficulty in seeking appropriate remedies in the courts in cases like this one,”
the Court concluded that the law from Haida and Carrier Sekani, combined with the
municipal “lack of practical resources to consult and accommodate” countered the
arguments for an implied delegation of the duty put forward by the First Nation. 139

Imai and Stacey critique the result in Neskonlith on both legal and practical grounds,
arguing the constitutional nature of rights recognized and protected by Section 35 does
not allow for a “sphere of activity by non-government actors that is beyond” their reach
and to the problematic “implementation issues” of the result.140 The importance of the
Crown-First Nations relationship and the distinct role of other public or private parties
cannot result in such parties being in a better position than the Crown to pursue activities
that adversely impact Aboriginal rights and interests.141 They note that Haida must be
read alongside R v. Sparrow, in which the Supreme Court set out the test for the Crown to
justify an infringement on s. 35 rights, including the need to demonstrate a proper
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legislative objective, that the action infringed on the right as little as possible, and
engaging in consultation and possibly providing compensation. 142 They argue that the
decision could result in increased conflict, directly counter to the goal of reconciliation
set out in Haida, where a municipality was permitted to proceed with a project prior to
the completion of the separate consultations with the Crown and regardless of the
conclusions about adverse impact, alternatives and accommodation. 143 Similarly, Janna
Promislow argues that the Neskonlith decision may result in less pressure for legislative
clarity about Indigenous rights in the context of land use planning as it “appears to
reverse the direction set in Haida Nation…for a broadly distributed dialogue in relation
to development on lands subject to Aboriginal rights and title claims, leaving it open to
legislatures to provide further structure for this dialogue.”144

Promislow also notes that the Court of Appeal decision fails to address the finality of
some municipal decisions, such as the permit at issue in Neskonlith or the rezoning
application in Jackman, and the possibility to reduce the potential for claims to limit or
stop impactful development where proof of Aboriginal rights is pending that was opened
up by Haida.145 Further, and of particular concern with extractive activities in Ontario,
the decision has problematic implications with respect to the role of private proponents
and landowners in relation to the Crown-First Nation relationship. The Supreme Court in
Tsilhqot’in makes clear that while Ontario can exercise its jurisdiction over land and
natural resources, this Crown power is “burdened by the Crown obligations toward
aboriginal people,” in including respect for harvesting rights of Treaty First Nations. 146
The duty to consult and accommodate and the requirement to justify treaty infringements
cannot be fulfilled by a land use planning system that simply delegates decision-making
powers that trigger the duty to non-Crown bodies. As Promislaw argues, “courts should
avoid interpreting statutory mandates as excluding the duty to consult unless legislation
142
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makes those exclusions express.”147 Despite the finding in Jackman, nothing in the 2014
Policy Statement expressly provides for delegation of the duty to private parties.

Litigation surrounding aggregate extraction has rarely dealt with issues related to the duty
to consult and accommodate. This is likely due, at least in part, to the failure of the
regulatory framework to recognize the role of First Nations and Metis claims in land use
planning in the Province and to institute an appropriate process, which has resulted in
limiting participation by affected First Nations and Metis governments to the general
‘stakeholder’ processes related. Such general processes are not seen by First Nations
governments as fulfilling the duty and some communities have asserted the right to be
consulted independently and directly by the Crown and all decision-making bodies
involved in the licensing process, a position consistent with Mikisew. 148 In submissions
to the legislative review Committee, Saugeen Ojibway Nation representative Veronica
Smith pointed to the “lack of any consultation process on how the establishment of
quarries and pits is affecting our traditional territory, our constitutional rights, and our
Treaty 72 and aboriginal title claims.”149 Chief Hill rejected the 2017 amendment
regarding consultation and instead proposed the following consultation clause:
3.1 Consultation with First Nations communities shall be governed by the
principle of free, prior and informed consent in the extraction of aggregate
resources from any area within Ontario. If it is found that the extraction
will be from the treaty area of a First Nation, then that First Nation should
be entitled to a royalty payment based upon the amount of aggregate
extracted.150
In addition, communities facing complex and sometimes multiple consultations have
pointed to the need for financial support for staffing and technical expertise for
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consultation. Smith noted the “enormous burden on SON, both in terms of staff time,
political representative time, and consultant and technician time, to ensure that SON’s
aboriginal and treaty rights are protected.” 151 The human resource and financial
challenges faced by First Nations in connection with consultation have been recognized
by the courts in a range of contexts; however, there is, as of yet, no legal duty for the
Crown to provide or arrange for such assistance. This remains a significant challenge
facing First Nations involved with quarry licensing processes, which similar to other
types of mining, involve the review and interpretation of complex technical reports
including planning, natural heritage, hydrology, geology, hydrogeology, archeology and
cultural heritage and often air quality, as well as retaining independent expertise to
provide advice and expert evidence in any legal proceedings. 152 It also compounds the
lack of revenue sharing, as noted by Chief Hill.153

While the concerns expressed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Neskonlith
shed some doubt on when an implied delegation would be found, an explicit delegation to
a municipality is a clear possibility following from both Haida and Carrier Sekani and in
light of the 2014 Policy Statement. Indeed, Imai and Stacey argue, “municipalities should
be required to work with the provincial Crown.”154 In Ross River Dena, the Court of
Appeal of Yukon emphasized that the Crown has a proactive responsibility to establish a
consultation regime for activities that may interfere with Aboriginal rights and title, in
that case quartz mineral mining.155 The prospective nature of this obligation, described in
Ross River Dena as requiring accommodation to take place, where required, before
Aboriginal rights, title and interests are affected, is consistent with the nature and process
of land use planning. It should, therefore, be possible to design and establish such a
regime for aggregate licensing (and other land use matters) that compliments, and
improves upon, the established role for consultation and prospective decision-making at
151
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the municipal level. As was emphasized by the decision in Mikisew, a general process of
public consultation does not satisfy this obligation; it is specific to the obligations to, and
impact on, Aboriginal Peoples and their rights. A decision by a First Nation not to engage
in a general public planning process does not relieve the government of its duty to consult
and engage directly with Aboriginal Peoples.156 Further, the extent of delegation to a
private actor in the proponent-led system described below is problematic in the context of
the Crown’s duty, even where some aspects of consultation can be legally delegated.
At the time of writing, it remains to be seen how Ontario, Indigenous communities,
municipalities, proponents and the Ontario Municipal Board will interpret the changes to
the Policy Statement and define “adequate consultation” under the amended Act. For
example, Grey County planning staff noted, “It is unclear what the Province is expecting
of municipalities when making decisions that are consistent” with the new Policy
Statement. Staff advised the County Planning and Community Development Committee
that they are “interpreting these policies to indicate that municipalities are encouraged to
consult Aboriginal communities as part of the planning process and ensuring that the
conservation of cultural heritage and archaeological resources considers the interests of
Aboriginal communities.”157 Arguably this interpretation minimizes the significance of
the mandatory language introduced in the 2014 Policy Statement. More likely, the new
Policy points towards the collaborative approach recommended by Shin and Stacey,
whereby the Crown retains primary responsibility, ensuring the centralization of expertise
and resources, but delegates appropriate parts of the consultation and accommodation to
municipalities, which are likely in better position to assess the effects of a decision in the
local context.158

Concerns about the capacity of municipalities to properly engage in consultation
activities, particularly small and rural communities often involved in aggregate
development and other extractive activities, should not be minimized. However, the
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primary role of the Crown should include support for both municipal governments and
First Nations parties to ensure that consultation proceeds consistent with the dual Haida
goals of “meaningful” consultation and reconciliation. As Justice Binnie concluded in
Mikisew: “The contemplated process is not simply one of giving the Mikisew an
opportunity to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do what she intended to do
all along.” Several Indigenous communities across Ontario have taken steps to assert
jurisdiction over their territory and the right to Free Prior and Informed Consent under the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through the development
of consultation protocols based on Indigenous law to applied to all decisions impacting
their lands and communities.159 Implementing meaningful consultation between
aggregate decision makers and Indigenous nations would require recognition and
implementation of such protocols alongside municipal and provincial practices and
frameworks used to define the content of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate. Indeed,
decision-making would be enhanced by consultation and partnerships informed by these
instruments as they clarify the role Indigenous communities want to play in land use
decisions, the support they require from governments and proponents to make informed
decisions in accordance with their laws and protocols, and the legal principles that will be
applied when making decisions about their territory and rights. The aggregate extraction
decision-making framework should therefore explicitly recognize the UN Declaration as
well as the role of these Indigenous planning instruments and decision makers. Any
delegation to municipal and proponent actors should clearly identify the jurisdiction of
Indigenous decision makers and legal orders and require that aggregate extraction
decisions are made in accordance with these instruments.

Ontario has a duty to ensure any procedural delegation upholds the Crown’s nondelegable obligations to Indigenous communities. However, the 2017 incorporation of
159

See for example, Nishnawbe Aski Nation: A Handbook on Consultation in Natural Resource
Development, 3rd ed. (2007), online: http://www.nan.on.ca/upload/documents/pub---nan-handbook-onconsultation---3rd.pdf; Curve Lake First Nation: Consultation and Accommodation Standards, available
online:
http://www.curvelakefirstnation.ca/documents/CLFN%20Consultation%20and%20Accommodation%20St
andards%202016.pdf; Walpole Island First Nation Consultation and Accommodation Protocol (2009),
available online: <http://www.uoguelph.ca/~ks2015ca/pdfs/2009_Walpole_Island_First_Nation.pdf>.

165

Aboriginal consultation in the amended Act still falls short of this standard by failing to
clearly define adequate consultation or acknowledge the Declaration and the right to Free
Prior and Informed consent, and by upholding the proponent-driven nature of the process.
The amendments do nothing to ameliorate the burden of responding to and engaging in
consultation on Indigenous communities, nor do they support municipalities to build
meaningful relationships with Indigenous partners and to accommodate section 35 rights
in the planning process. Further, they fail to acknowledge the role of Indigenous law,
such as the Indigenous consultation protocols noted above, in defining the Duty to
Consult and Accommodate in Ontario’s land use framework.
B. The Aggregate Resources Act
This section provides a detailed overview of the Act as it existed at the time this research
was undertaken. While amendments following the recent passage of Bill 39 Aggregate
Resources and Mining Modernization Act160 are discussed within this section, Part III
provides a more detailed overview. Notably, the amended Act remains enabling
legislation and many of the changes proposed during the consultation process discussed
in Part III require the development of future regulations and are therefore not discussed
here. Aggregate resources, defined by the Act as, “gravel, sand, clay, earth, shale, stone,
limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, granite, rock or other prescribed material”,161
are regulated separately from other minerals under the Aggregate Resources Act [the
“Act”]. The Act sets out 4 purposes:
(a) to provide for the management of the aggregate resources of Ontario;
(b) to control and regulate aggregate operations on Crown and private lands;
(c) to require the rehabilitation of land from which aggregate has been
excavated; and
(d) to minimize adverse impact on the environment in respect of aggregate
operations.162
“Management” is defined as the “identification, orderly development and protection of
the aggregate resources of Ontario,” clearly establishing the development-focus of the
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Act.163 This emphasis on development is consistent with the historical emphasis in
provincial planning on utilitarian conceptions of improvement and development that
center around human benefits and economic productivity. 164
The Act provides for several categories of aggregate, which are referred to as “pits” or
“quarries”.165 Depending on the amount, depth and nature of the material to be extracted,
a pit or a quarry on private land will require either a “Class A” or “Class B” licence under
S.7(2) of the Aggregate Resources Act. A “pit” refers to the extraction of unconsolidated
bedrock – stone, sand or gravel.166 A “quarry” involves the extraction of consolidated
bedrock, for example, shale, limestone or dolostone.167 Extraction on private land can
also be allowed through a Wayside Permit only for use by a public authority for
temporary road construction or maintenance.168 Extraction on Crown lands or lands under
water requires an Aggregate Permit.169 For the purposes of this study, I am focused on
aggregate licences as outlined above as these have been the focus of recent and ongoing
conflicts in Ontario. As outlined in Table 2 below, licence applications are further
classified into eight categories depending on whether extraction below the water table is
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proposed. The 2017 amendments introduced exceptions to the requirements for licences
and permits for persons meeting “qualifications that may be prescribed” to “operate a pit
or quarry” under certain terms or conditions.170 The Bill provided no justification for this
exemption and provides no detail on the qualifications or terms and conditions. The Act
also provides for the minister to waive fees associated with licences and permits.171
Class ‘A’:
Removal of over 20,000 tonnes/annually
Category 1: Pit Below the Water Table
Category 2: Quarry Below the Water Table
Category 3: Pit Above the Water Table
Category 4: Quarry Above the Water Table

Class ‘B’:
Removal of 20,000 tonnes or less annually
Category 5: Pit Below the Water Table
Category 6: Quarry Below the Water Table
Category 7: Pit Above the Water Table
Category 8: Quarry Above the Water Table

Table 2: Classifications
This project primarily considers large scale, below the water table aggregate quarries,
requiring a Class ‘A’ Quarry Below Water licence.172 However, some Class ‘B’ cases are
considered in both the case law analysis and the empirical case studies where they raise
unique or significant issues. Environmental lawyers David Estrin and John Swaigen have
questioned the distinction, noting that it is based on the “questionable assumption” that
the volume of extraction is determinative of the harm that will be caused by a mine.173 As
noted above, the Act has a limited geographic application that is established by
regulation, which excludes private land in most of northern Ontario and only Planning
Act approvals govern the establishment of aggregate extraction operations on private land
in these areas of the province.174 As discussed in Chapter Eight, the exclusion of the vast
majority of private land in Northern Ontario from the Act reflects a perception of
emptiness that fails to reflect the complexity of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous
people-place relations in the north and presumes that there is nothing and no one to be
harmed by industrial extraction.175 Further, it reinforces the legal construction of the
170
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north as the appropriate place for resource development that has been recently reinscribed
through the Far North Act’s privileging of extractive rights.176
i. Administration of the Act
Under the current process the primary responsibility for an aggregate licensing
application lies with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (the “ministry”) and
a landowner who must make an application directly thereto. Local municipalities,
Conservation Authorities and Regional or County authorities have notice rights under the
Provincial Standards.177 As well, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Energy
and local offices of the Ministry of Natural Resources must be notified. The Ministry of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs must be notified if prime agricultural land is not
being restored to the same average soil quality and the Niagara Escarpment Commission
must be notified if the area is within their jurisdiction.178 As discussed in detail below,
associated Official Plan and zoning amendment applications are primarily the
responsibility of the local municipal authorities; however, the Ministry of Municipal
Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Natural Resources have some statutory notice
and review requirements.

While the Act contemplates statutory guidance for application requirements, guidance is
contained in two Ministry policy documents, the Aggregate Resources Provincial
Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal Procedures Manual.179
Application and operation in accordance with the Standards is required by regulation,
arguably strengthening their enforceability, but the 700-plus-page Manual is not similarly
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incorporated into the regulations.180 Together these documents specify the technical
information and reports required during the application process, including expert
hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s) and cultural heritage report(s),
which must be prepared by a “qualified” professional as defined in the Act. 181 Notably,
the detailed Manual was not initially available to the public except by individual request,
which was the subject of specific criticism by the Environmental Commissioner in his
2006/2007 Annual Report to the Legislature.182 Table 3 outlines the mandatory,
conditional, and routinely prepared documents associated with a Class “A” Below the
Water Table quarry, based on both the Standards and the Manual. The Standards require
the Ministry to provide a determination that an application is complete before the process
proceeds. The Act also provides for additional information to be required by the
Minister.183 The amended Act provides for a new “custom plan” category for which the
Minister can approve custom consultation and notification procedures and requirements
for surveys or studies for a particular application.184 As discussed in Part III, a number of
commentators raise concerns about this highly discretionary power, as well as the lack of
detail about regulatory content in general. A more widely supported amendment provides
for future regulations enabling the Ministry to have “technical or specialized studies or
reports” included in an application undergo external peer review. 185 However, no such
regulation is yet proposed. Similarly, a widely supported proposal to have enhanced
information requirements, including Agricultural Impact Assessments for development
on prime agricultural land and plain language summaries for all application documents,
have been left to future regulatory or policy development.186
180
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Document
Description: Key Content
(Required,
Required in
Some
Circumstances,
Routine)
Site Plan

Primarily a descriptive document,
including drawings:
•
•

•

•

Summary
Statement

•
•

•
•

•
•

Existing site features and
surrounding area
Operations: including shape,
heights, area of excavation,
water diversions, buildings,
set-backs/berms, hours,
equipment, monitoring
Rehabilitation: progressive
and final, including
vegetation, groundwater
elevation, water drainage,
buildings
Cross-sections of existing
conditions, rehabilitation,
final groundwater table,
typical berm, slope gradients
Any planning and land use
considerations (planning
report);
Agricultural classification
per Canada Land Inventory
for current land and postrehabilitation;
Quality and quantity of
aggregate on the site;
Main haulage routes,
proposed truck traffic and
necessary entrance permits
(traffic study);
Municipal traffic
agreements/approvals;
Progressive and final
rehabilitation

Prepared by

A qualified professional:
ARA, s. 8(1), (4). The Site
Plan may be prepared by a
certified professional
engineer, land surveyor,
landscape architect or “any
other qualified person
approved, in writing, by the
Minister.” The policy and
procedure for approval to
prepare a site plan is
contained in the Manual, s.
2.00.01.

Majority can be prepared by
the Applicant. Groundwater
portion must be prepared
by a Professional
Geoscientist or a
Professional Engineer.
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•
•

Hydrogeologic
Report

Natural
Environment
Report

o Details of
agricultural
rehabilitation
o Description of “fill”
Required water approvals
(PTTW or COA)
Suggested by manual:
information on both surface
and groundwater

a. Level 1: preliminary
evaluation to determine final
extraction depth relative to
established groundwater
table(s), and potential for
adverse effects to ground
and surface water;
b. Level 2: impact assessment
required where Level 1
Report identifies potential
adverse effect to determine
significance of effect(s) and
feasibility of mitigation
a. Level 1: determines whether
any of following exist on
and within 120 metres of
site: significant wetland,
habitat of endangered or
threatened species,
woodlands, valley lands,
wildlife habitat, areas of
natural and scientific
interest; or, fish habitat.
b. Level 2: If any features
identified in Level 1 report,
provides impact assessment
for negative impacts on
natural features or
ecological functions and
proposed preventative,
mitigative or remedial
measures.

Professional Geoscientist or
Engineer

Person with appropriate
training and/or experience
in identification of fish
habitat and significant
natural heritage features.
With reference to the
Natural Heritage Reference
Manual for off-site features.

(Terms in bold are defined in the
Policy Statement)
Cultural
Heritage

a. Stage 1: any known
significant archaeological

Stage 1: person with
appropriate training and/or
172

Resource
Report
Purpose: “to
ensure that
archaeological
resources are
identified,
assessed for
their
significance,
and
protected…”

b.

c.

d.

e.

resources on subject
property and potential for
site to have heritage
resources;
Stage 2: If known resources
or medium to high potential,
survey and any
recommended mitigation
Stage 3: where
recommended by stage 2,
detailed site investigation
Stage 4: outlines any
recommended mitigation
through excavation,
documentation, avoidance
Assessment of impacts to
built and cultural heritage
landscapes may be required
separate and independently
carried out

Noise
Assessment
Report

Required if extraction/processing
within 500 metres of sensitive
receptor to determine whether
provincial guidelines can be
satisfied

Blast Design
Report

Required if limits of extraction
within 500 metres of sensitive
receptor to demonstrate provincial
guidelines can be satisfied

Adaptive
Management
Plan

Not required by the Standards or the
Manual; however, increasingly
standard and accepted by the Board.
May be the subject of a stand-alone
report or incorporated into larger
discussion of rehabilitation etc.

licence – may consist of
sign-off letter from Ministry
of Culture, Heritage &
Libraries Branch
Stages 2-4: licensed
Archaeologist

Qualified Heritage
Consultant

Table 3: Required Documents
Until the 2017 amendments, an approved site plan was required for any aggregate licence
and the proponent had to operate in accordance with that plan.187 The Act now provides
for regulatory exemptions from site plan requirements but provides no further guidance
on the circumstances in which such an exemption would be appropriate. The site plan is
187

Ibid, s 8, 15. Under the amended Act the site plan is required under s 8.

173

the primary mechanism for the regulation of any particular operation by the Ministry,
therefore an exemption provides for substantially less oversight and monitoring. The
Minister can attach conditions to the licence and add or vary conditions at any time. 188
The amended Act will also empower the Minister to require amendments to the site plan
or submission of a new site plan at any time.189 The amended Act also provides for the
Minister to require licensees to submit operational information and to conduct
inventories, studies, surveys or tests, though the licensee can request reconsideration. 190
In the case of a failure to comply with a direction to conduct the requested inventory or
study, the Minister will be able to have it conducted at the costs of the licensee.191

The Act provides for enforcement powers to ensure compliance. For example, under
Section 63, which provides for compliance orders, including the power to “order that the
operation of the pit or quarry cease and that the site be rehabilitated to a safe condition in
accordance with the order.”192 Section 48 provides for rehabilitation orders, including
imposing time requirements, where it is found that the operator is “not performing or did
not perform adequate progressive rehabilitation or final rehabilitation on the site in
accordance with subsection.” The amended Act will also require rehabilitation reports;
however the substance and timing of such reports is subject to future regulations.193 The
Act also requires the Minister’s acceptance of licence surrender upon satisfaction of the
rehabilitation requirements under the Act, the licence and the site plan.194 A licence can
also be suspended pending fulfillment of specific requirements under Section 22, or
revoked for contravention of the Act.195 Revocation orders are appealable to the Ontario
188
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Municipal Board and the licensee is entitled to a hearing within 30 days if notice is
served.196 Fines can be imposed for failure to comply with Section 63 compliance
orders.197 The amended Act will provides no minimum fine, but will raise the maximum
to $1,000,000 with an additional $100,000 per day for the continuation of an offence. 198
Notably the amended Act will also specify that the provision of false or misleading
information in any report or in information required is an offence.199

The substantive impact of these enforcement powers depends on the identification of
compliance issues and the capacity to meaningfully enforce them. Until 1997, inspectors
were required to conduct annual inspections. As noted above, the Act has moved to a
system of self-monitoring and reporting with the Ministry serving only an auditing
function. While this project did not include investigation of enforcement decisions,
longstanding concerns about enforcement have been noted by legislators,200
researchers,201 the Environmental Commissioner,202 the Board,203 and by participants in
this project. Estrin and Swaigen noted in 1993, “[B]etween 1973 and 1989, the Ministry
initiated 154 prosecutions and obtained 81 convictions. The total fines levied amounted
to about $72,000.” Comparing this to the enforcement record of the Minister of
Environment and Energy, they point out that the Ministry of Natural Resources had
therefore undertaken “fewer prosecutions over a 17-year period than the Ministry of
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Environment and Energy undertakes in a single year.” They also note that as of 1993 the
Ministry had not revoked any aggregate licences.

Prompted by the Environmental Commissioner, the Ministry reviewed the self-reporting
compliance system in 2002.204 The Commissioner reported the Ministry’s findings that
the quality of the self-compliance reports were “lacking,” both with deficient information
and sometimes incomplete or inaccurate reporting.205 The review had also revealed that
while staff were not always able to meet the 20% field audit target, the visits were
“frequently identifying additional violations” not reported by the proponent.206 In 2004
the Commissioner reported the Ministry’s update on compliance had found that the fieldaudit targets were actually declining. 207 The Commissioner’s annual report did note some
administrative changes had been implemented to improve compliance, including
invoking the suspension and revocation powers for failure to submit compliance
reports.208 However, it concluded, “[T]he Ministry’s continuing inability to fulfill this
obligation is perpetuating conflicts at existing operations, and is also undermining the
public’s confidence in the regulatory system…”209 In 2003, an Application for Review
under s 61 of the Environmental Bill of Rights by Gravel Watch, an NGO dedicated to
aggregate mineral issues, prompted another review of the aggregates program,
particularly regarding the rehabilitation requirements. 210 The Environmental Bill of
Rights provides for discretion for the Minister to turn down applications for review and
the Ministry turned down two other Section 61 applications for review of the aggregate
minerals regime in 2005.211 The Environmental Commissioner reported on the findings of
the resulting 2006 report and notes that it confirmed long term issues of inadequate
204
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staffing, budget and expertise.212 In particular, Ministry findings confirmed a more than
50% reduction of inspectors, with some responsible for as many as 600 operations, who
were therefore unable to meet Ministry targets for audits of self-compliance.213 A sample
compliance survey found that 100 of 121 sites had compliance issues.214 Further, they
noted that they were unable to adequately evaluate rehabilitation of aggregate sites. 215 In
addition to issues with implementation, the Commissioner’s report notes internal
concerns about lacking technical expertise, including the loss of “much of its hydrogeological [sic] knowledge and this in turn makes it difficult to assess potential impacts
extraction operations could have on water resources.”216 The Commissioner’s report does
note some improvements underway, including new power for inspectors and plans to hire
new inspectors and concludes, “much more will be needed to rebuild the Ministry’s
capacity in this area and to restore public confidence.” There is little evidence to
demonstrate that this has occurred. One policy analyst reported that while attempts were
made to follow up on compliance and enforcement issues, “…eventually they just said
we are not checking anymore because the numbers are not so flattering.”217

The capacity issues and lack of enforcement is of particular concern where applications
propose complex and evolving “adaptive management plans” to address uncertainties and
leave significant decisions about how impacts will be monitored and managed to future
arrangements between the proponent and the Ministry. Under cross-examination, a
Ministry Aggregate Technical Specialist who gave evidence in the Rockfort quarry case
discussed in Chapter Five, stated that her District met the Ministry’s 20% “field-checking
target” and that she “tries to visit most active aggregate sites once per year”. 218 In the
context of significant potential effects and a complex and ongoing management plan that
left much to be decided and monitored by the Ministry after approval, the Board
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concluded it would “not approve an aggregate proposal which leaves an issue like the
protection of the natural environment to be dealt with by a third party with demonstrably
inadequate resources, like MNR.”219 One planner I spoke with noted the lack of public
trust in the Ministry’s enforcement role: “There is a sense in the public mind that nobody
is minding the store.”220 The result in her view is an enforcement process driven by
individual complaints: “A retired engineer who lives near the quarry goes out with his
binoculars and looks from the Bruce Trail and says ‘ah ha, what is that being dumped
there on the site?’”221 Not only does this raise environmental justice issues about which
individuals and communities will have the resources and institutional access to raise
concerns that will lead to enforcement, even where concerns are successfully raised it is
difficult to overcome complex causality and evidentiary issues. As one more-than-owner
participant noted, “The onus is on us to prove that it was them and it is impossible. They
will say it was a natural disaster that caused it even after a huge blast that caused our
water not to come clean. It will always come down to you can’t prove it definitively.”222

The Act creates a proponent-driven, self-monitoring system that exemplifies the
neoliberal reconfiguration of the state towards market-based governance mechanisms and
privatised modes of regulation aimed at minimizing bureaucracy. 223 As Gunningham
argues, this does not necessarily reflect a reduced role for the state, but rather a
“hybridity” of governance networks where non-state actors are enrolled in governance
networks and power and responsibility are diffuse.224 Here the Act retains the role of the
state in guiding and coordinating aggregate mineral development while non-state actors
are enrolled to operate “in the shadow of the state.”225 The Provincial Standards and
Manual demonstrate how this shift in the balance between public and private power
219
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operates in practice through the Applicant’s control of the knowledge base upon which
the technical, legal and factual decisions are made.226 The application is based on the
proponent’s site selection, which is usually linked to ownership of the land in question,
reinforcing the power of private owners to determine land use regardless of the impacts.
The production of the owner as “efficient, profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals” is central
to the enrollment of private property mechanisms in the “re-making of nature-society
relations”. 227 As discussed above, this has a long history in Ontario’s mining law and
policy and planning frameworks.228 However, in the context of aggregate mineral
extraction, neoliberal modes of environmental governance have reinscribed and purified
the ownership model of property and linked it with scientific and managerial approaches
to land use conflicts.

As discussed below in Chapters Five through Eight, the licensing process is informed and
driven by the information and expertise provided by the proponent, with the express
purpose of having the application approved. While the role of technical and scientific
expertise in Canadian planning was historically linked to the desire to separate planning
and politics,229 planning scholars have long pointed to the political nature of planning. 230
In Ontario, Moore notes that removing planning from formal politics historically served
the interests of the business elite.231 Any litigation following from an application relies on
the knowledge base provided by the proponent, subject to any independent technical or
legal expertise and documentation that may be provided by Indigenous governments,
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municipal actors or planning authorities, and third party groups or individuals, likely at
their own expense. In the context of aggregate extraction applications, independent expert
evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both logistically and financially
onerous, particularly for Indigenous and small local governments and community groups,
particularly given that they may or may not be accepted by the Board at a hearing and
that access to the proponent’s land may not be granted for direct investigation and data
review.232 Chapters Five, Six and Seven further demonstrate that other sources of
knowledge, including participants’ experiential knowledge, are often deemed irrelevant
or critiqued by proponents and decision makers as lacking objectivity or relevant
expertise. In this way, the aggregate licensing process actively shapes and reshapes the
people-place relations engaged by a particular proposal. 233 The crisis in enforcement
capacity that followed from the 1997 amendments exemplifies the neoliberal technique of
restraining “state-based regulatory power” through the “extension of corporate private
property rights”.234 The complaints-driven enforcement process facilitates a shift from
“collective, public responsibility” for safeguarding the ecosystems and communities
impacted by aggregate extraction to “private individual responsibility” to enforce the
industry-driven compliance regime.235 In these ways, private property is “enrolled”236 by
land use planning in specific ways through the Act and associated policy and regulation
to achieve the desired end of the development and protection of aggregate mineral
resources.
C. The Provincial Policy Statement
As the guiding document for planning in the province of Ontario, the Provincial Policy
Statement requires specific and detailed attention in understanding the legal framework
for aggregate mineral extraction. The Policy Statement is a detailed and prescriptive
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document setting out the provincial vision for “improved land use planning and
management, which contributes to a more effective and efficient land use planning
system.”237 The preamble states, “The Provincial Policy Statement provides for
appropriate development while protecting resources of provincial interest, public health
and safety, and the quality of the natural and built environment.”238 While the Policy is
reviewed every five years, it cannot be challenged in a planning or aggregate licensing
process. Therefore, the assumptions and underlying values remain unchallenged once a
Policy is put in place.239 The Policy is approved by Cabinet and despite significant public
consultation, the policy making process is neither deliberative nor participatory. 240
Aggregate resource policies are set out in s 2.5 a dedicated subsection of the Policy
Statement’s section on the “Wise Use and Management of Resources”.

This section provides a detailed introduction to three key aspects of the policy direction
provided to the Ministry, municipalities and to the Board in decision-making: 1) The
presumptive needs analysis; 2) the close to market requirement; 3) the public interest and
social and environmental impacts. These three areas demonstrate the specific ways in
which “[a]ggregate resources are given a privileged position” in provincial planning
policy and practice.241

i. Presumptive Need and Demand Analysis
Following the report of the Commission on Planning Development Reform in the 1990s,
provincial planning policy evolved into the Provincial Policy Statement. Since the first
version was approved, the Policy Statement has consistently prioritized aggregate
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resource “protection” and development.242 This prioritization has been maintained
through to the recently revised 2014 policy. However, until 2005 it maintained that
“mineral resource needs” should be considered, providing a policy basis for supply and
demand analysis as central to aggregate licensing decisions: “As much of the mineral
aggregate resources as is realistically possible will be made available to supply mineral
resource needs, as close to markets as possible.”243 Opposing parties and governments
used this version of the policy to argue that the material to be extracted was not currently
required and therefore the site should not be approved.244 In 2005, the Provincial Policy
Statement was revised to explicitly eliminate consideration of need in Policy 2.5.2.1:
As much of the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible shall
be made available as close to markets as possible.
Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type
of supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the
availability, designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate
resources locally or elsewhere.
In this way the need for the resource must be presumed in the analysis of any decision
maker regardless of the context of supply or demand, locally or provincially. This
presumptive need analysis remains controversial and stakeholders have argued that
supply/demand analysis should be reintroduced in aggregate licensing decisions during
the most recent five-year-review of the Provincial Policy Statement.245 This was also
raised by a number of deputants at the all-party review of the Act before the Standing
Committee on General Government described below and by commentators during the
Policy Statement review,246 and the consultation on the 2017 amendments.247 While the
Board has concluded that a needs analysis is not required, it has nonetheless also been a
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live issue in several cases.248 As noted by the Board, “[a]ggregate extraction is the only
use in the wide ranging Policy Statement where need is not required.”249 A lawyer who
participated in this study noted, “[t]he underlying rationale for giving aggregates this very
special status within the Provincial Policy Statement has never really been fully explained
or rationalized from the perspective of government.”250

The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known
deposits, and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude
or hinder” extraction.251 In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a
licence “ceases to exist,”252 resulting in a licensing regime with no possibility of
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the
changes to surrounding land and land uses. Thus, consistent with the utilitarian
development focus of planning in Ontario, the resource is severed from its material
relations to be ‘conserved’ only for specific forms of human use.253 Other forms of
relation, and even uses that fall outside of the dominant conception of productivity, are
seen as “constraints”254 or as “resource sterilization”.255

Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano
and Sandberg specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the
aggregate industry to appeal to decision makers, including provincial and local
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governments and adjudicators.256 In the context of energy infrastructure planning in the
United Kingdom, Groves et al. similarly argue that discourses of risk “shape the
distribution of power.”257 In particular, they point to the growing role of quasi-state and
non-state actors as “centres of calculation” controlling the production, organization and
distribution of information about risks related to resource demand and supply. 258 The
resulting “narratives of necessity” place conceptual limits on the terms of debate about
specific land use decisions with important implications for attempts to assert relations
with place. 259 Therefore, while the SAROS report commissioned by the province
confirmed long-term needs identified by the aggregate industry, in weighing the impact
of these findings on planning policy it is important to critically consider the role of
industry in shaping these conclusions. As noted above, the report has been criticized for
both substantive and procedural shortcomings and an overall “industry-centered”
approach. In particular, it has been noted that the planning consultants hired to conduct
the study for the province are closely linked to the aggregate industry. 260 Indeed, a
majority of those involved were simultaneously retained as experts for the controversial
Melancthon Mega Quarry proposal submitted for provincial review in 2011. In addition,
the CIELAP report noted the MNR had themselves identified significant gaps in the
information provided by the SAROS papers, most notably about recycling and
rehabilitation.261
ii. Close to Market Requirement
The Policy Statement also requires that “as much of the mineral aggregate resources as is
realistically possible shall be made available as close to markets as possible.” 262 The
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majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area and the surrounding
Greater Golden Horseshoe region. This implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource
protection and development on a specific geographic area within the province, within and
adjacent to these areas, which is also highly valued for agricultural land, recreational use
and ecological significance. While some concentration of extraction is inevitable with a
fixed resource like aggregate, the clustering of this type of transformative land use makes
a cumulative impact assessment relevant, particularly where exacerbated by policy
requirements.263 A recent Ontario Bar Association presentation by a leading proponent
council summarized the justification for this policy as follows:
Transporting aggregates longer distances increases the cost to the user and
the cost of the final products that use aggregate as inputs, such as public
infrastructure projects and housing. Therefore, there is a public interest in
ensuring that aggregate resources are extracted as close to market as
possible in order to support the Provincial economy.264
The aggregate industry has also emphasized the environmental benefits of this
requirement in reducing production-related emissions and contribution to climate
change.265

Neither the process under the Act, the Policy Statement, nor the municipal amendment
processes, require a cumulative impacts analysis. 266 Arguably, the Ministry Statement of
Environmental Values, which is discussed below, should require at least consideration of
cumulative impacts; however, as noted above, the Ministry does not undertake a distinct
consideration process and the Environmental Commissioner has expressed concern about
the lack of cumulative impact analysis in aggregate applications. 267 The 2014 Policy
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Statement does allow for (but not require) cumulative impact considerations with respect
to impacts on water quality and quantity through the requirement for planning authorities
to use the watershed scale.268 Cumulative impacts are of particular importance for
communities in areas that fall outside of special planning regimes, which are facing
increasing pressure for aggregate development as proponents view the regulatory
requirements of more protected areas as prohibitive, for example, the Carden Plain area
and parts of Dufferin, Grey and Bruce Counties adjacent to, but excluded from the
NEPA, and First Nations territories in Southern Ontario and Manitoulin Island. One
lawyer described the effect as “offloading to adjacent municipalities” through the
protection of the areas that achieve special designations. 269

The close to market requirement is subject to the “realistically possible” limitation and
the Ministry has taken the position that this should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
and include examination of other Policy Statement policies and “other considerations.” 270
There has been limited analysis of the section by the Board; however, one case did point
to social and environmental impacts as part of the “realistically possible test,” finding that
the proposal was, “not realistic given that the possible environmental impacts have not
been minimized.”271 Bull and Estrela point out that this is consistent with the purposes of
the Act to minimize adverse impacts. However, they also note that the close to market
analysis also suggests that some impacts are acceptable.272 Therefore, the analysis has
been focused on which impacts and at what threshold in pursuit of the purported
economic benefits of close to market extraction.273 One planner commented, “To the
aggregate industry that means all else aside, everything else is diminished this is number
one. We are going no, the [Policy Statement] says quite clearly you balance all of the
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policies equally… We argue about that at every single hearing and we are so tired of
it.”274
iii. Environmental Impacts
Natural and cultural heritage, as well as water, agriculture and mineral aggregate
resources are discussed in Section 2 of the Policy Statement, “Wise Use and Management
of Resources.” The “balancing” of social and environmental impacts of extraction must
be considered in light of the Policy Statement’s protective stance for mineral aggregate
resources and operations from “incompatible” development.275 Section 2.5.2.5 requires
municipalities to protect known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits, strictly
limiting development that would “preclude or hinder” access and extraction. Mineral
aggregate operations must be protected from incompatible development, even where they
“cease to exist.”276

As the CIELAP report notes, there has never been an attempt to comprehensively study
the environmental impacts of aggregate extraction in Ontario.277 At first glance, social
and cultural features are given a high level of protection by the Policy Statement, as they
“shall be conserved.”278 However, a close examination reveals that protection of natural
and social-cultural features is largely limited to features formally deemed “significant” by
provincial policy and is subject to important exemptions.279 While the Policy Statement
provides for absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies and existing operations,
social and environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than avoided. 280 This
despite s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected for the long
274
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term,” s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve or restore the
quality and quantity of water,” and s.2.6.1, which states that significant built heritage
resources and significant cultural heritage landscapes shall be conserved. The 2014
Policy Statement now draws attention to and explicitly distinguishes between “positive
directives” such as shall and “limitations or prohibitions” such as shall not which do not
allow for discretion and “enabling or supportive language” such as should, promote,
encourage which, they state, allows for “some discretion,” making the close-examination
of such language essential to decision-making at the application and adjudicative stages.

The 2005 Policy Statement imposed a prohibition on development and site alteration in
significant habitat of endangered species and threatened species, defined as habitat
approved by the Ministry of Natural Resources as “necessary for the maintenance,
survival, and/or recovery of naturally occurring or reintroduced populations of
endangered species or threatened species.”281 The new 2014 Policy Statement eliminated
the prohibition, now allowing for development and site alteration in accordance with
provincial and federal law.282 Lands adjacent to endangered species or threatened species
habitat are now also exempted from the “no negative impacts” test for development and
site alteration.283 This is consistent with, and facilitates, the 2013 amendments to the
Ontario Endangered Species Act noted above, which specifically exempt pits and quarries
from the requirements to obtain a permit for activities that would otherwise be prohibited,
including damaging or destroying species habitat, instead requiring only mitigation
measures and registration of activities with the Ministry without independent monitoring
requirements and enforcement capacity. 284 Exemptions for aggregate extraction, such as
those newly introduced under the ESA, have been the subject of strong criticism from the
provincial Environmental Commissioner.285 Further, the requirement to maintain, restore
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or, where possible, improve “the diversity and connectivity of natural features” and “long
term ecological function and biodiversity” uses the enabling rather than directive
language used to protect aggregate deposits and operations.286 Recent Board
consideration of the Ministry’s Natural Heritage Reference Manual in interpreting the
Policy Statement introduced the consideration of mitigation measures and rehabilitation
plans in determining the impact on natural features, including controversial concepts such
as “replacement and enhancement.”287 The Manual is a Ministry guidance document
providing “recommended technical criteria” for consistency with the Policy Statement. 288

While the precautionary principle is incorporated into the Ministry’s Statement of
Environmental Values, and arguably therefore a required consideration in the licensing
process, the adoption of a precautionary approach to aggregate extraction has been
limited and highly contested by industry. 289 Aggregate industry proponents have instead
focused on the adoption of “adaptive management plans” and this has been endorsed by
the Board, municipal authorities and the Ministry in particular cases. In another context,
the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed the approach as an alternative to the precautionary
principle: “It counters the potentially paralyzing effects of the precautionary principle on
otherwise socially and economically useful projects.”290 However, the adaptive
management approach remains highly controversial; and, as Armitage et al. have noted,
“[e]xamples of the successful application of adaptive management are few, and it remains
more of an idealized concept than an empirically tested strategy”. Australian
commentator Alan Randall has argued, “adaptive management is essentially reactive. It is
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all about waiting until problems reveal themselves and seeking to resolve them by trial
and error – basically, standing aside when the lights go out and then feeling our way in
the dark.”291 In contrast, he describes the precautionary approach as “driven by big risks”
and the prospective prevention of “plausible but uncertain threats of harm.” Rather than
weighing outcomes, the precautionary approach looks to the worst-case and if the harm is
“horrifying, even if unlikely,” prohibition may be the best result.292 Further, there is no
regulatory or policy requirement for such a plan, nor are there standards. Notably,
Westgate et al. have cautioned about over-use of the term and noted that few projects
labelled ‘adaptive management’ are accurately characterized as such.293 Arguably, in the
context of aggregate extraction, this voluntary and industry-led approach to managing
ecological impacts compounds the proponent-driven nature of the licensing process.
While adaptive management plans have been incorporated into site plans and licensing
conditions and proposed as “an additional layer of oversight,”294 their enforceability has
been questioned, as has the potentially improper delegation of the Board’s authority to
the Ministry.295 Indeed, the lack of institutional support for adaptive management has
been found to be a key constraint on the success of adaptive management arrangements.

Aggregate extraction operations are also exempt from other environmental legislation,
including any regulations of a local conservation authority under the Conservation
Authorities Act.296 Such agencies are empowered to regulate development impacts on
wetlands, shorelines and watercourses.297 Conservation authorities are provided with
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notice of Planning Act and Aggregate Resources Act applications.298 They may also play
an advisory role to municipalities on issues related to natural heritage and water.

The 2014 Policy Statement introduced the notion of land use compatibility with respect
to resource extraction by encouraging the separation of major facilities, which would
include aggregate operations, and sensitive land uses, which include features of the
natural or built environment that could be adversely affected by a facility. 299 However,
the wording of the section arguably protects the development of facilities by ensuring
their “long-term viability” despite adverse impacts and risks to public health and safety
which should be prevented or “minimized or mitigated. In the case of aggregate
extraction, this compounds their priority land use status and could serve to limit the
protection of environmentally and culturally significant features to avoid future land use
incompatibility in areas identified as having aggregate mineral resources.

The Policy Statement attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between the protection of
natural features and cultural heritage by classifying aggregate extraction as an “interim”
activity.300 A lawyer recalled a discussion with a Ministry official who explained the
interim nature of extraction, “you peel back the cover and you dig out the aggregate and
then you put it back and it is like doing your bed covers in the morning.” 301 The policy
does require rehabilitation to “accommodate subsequent land use”;302 and the 2014 Policy
Statement now encourages “comprehensive rehabilitation” in areas with a concentration
of mineral aggregate operations, defined as “coordinated and complementary, to the
extent possible, the rehabilitation of other sites in the area.”303 However, the standards for
rehabilitation are limited to the promotion of “land use compatibility” obscuring the
specific and unique relationships that adjacent ecological and human communities may
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have with the land and its current use. The Environmental Commissioner has expressed
serious concerns about the current number of abandoned aggregate pits and quarries and
the slow rate of achieving basic levels of rehabilitation.304 Rehabilitation was the subject
of a successful Environmental Bill of Rights application for review in 2006 that identified
problems with both monitoring and compliance.305 The Canadian Urban Institute Report
documented a number of successful cases of rehabilitation.306 However, monitoring,
enforcement and the pace of rehabilitation remain significant issues. The Canadian
Environmental Law Association has estimated that at the current rate it would take
between 234 and 335 years to rehabilitate the 6,900 abandoned pit and quarry sites in
Ontario.307

Of particular concern to a number of stakeholders involved in recent aggregate disputes,
despite mandatory protection of “prime agricultural land,” aggregate extraction is
permitted as an interim use on all classes of farmland, including specialty crop areas. 308
Enhanced requirements for rehabilitation to an “agricultural condition” on prime
farmland and specialty crop areas explicitly exempt the most potentially harmful class of
below the water table quarry where the applicant can show that much of the resource is
below the water table or where extraction is so deep as to render rehabilitation
“unfeasible.”309 The Policy Statement does require that the applicant also demonstrate
that alternative locations have been considered and found unsuitable and that agricultural
rehabilitation is maximized in remaining areas. 310 While some commentators have
characterized these types of alternative considerations as functioning as an early
screening mechanism,311 it is difficult to see how this occurs in practice given that
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, “Our Cratered Landscape: Can Pits and Quarries be
Rehabilitated?” in Reconciling Our Priorities, ECO Annual Report, 2006-2007 (Toronto: Environmental
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aggregate producers assemble the parcel through gradual purchases of adjacent land and
expensive exploration making the relative suitability of the owned parcel largely
inevitable. The aggregate planning process contrasts with the types of siting decisions
dealt with under the environmental assessment process, through which public entities’
assessment of potential sites prior to selection and the notion of an alternative location,
is, at least arguably, on the table.312 The consideration and assessment of alternatives has
not been the subject of detailed examination before the Board.

While the land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and
potentially as having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities
for food production, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the Policy
Statement. Aggregate sites are material places with complex eco-social relations, but for
the purposes of the licensing decision, they are divided into agricultural fields, ‘natural’
heritage features, recreational sites, and subsurface and groundwater resources. The
policy is currently constructed in such a way that while recognized, other relations to
place are trumped by the protection of the mineral resource value and economic
relations.313 These issues will be discussed in the context of specific conflicts and
decisions below in Chapters Five through Eight.
D. Municipal Plans and Bylaws
While the decision-making process flows from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts
include consideration of the local municipality’s Official Plan and zoning by-laws. These
are the primary tools through which “land use” is governed and organized in Ontario. The
Official Plan is a comprehensive document reflecting a municipality’s distinct collective
vision about how to “manage and direct” the effects of physical change on the “social,
economic, built and natural environment” of a particular area.314 Municipalities also
regulate land use through zoning bylaws, which implement the Plan and control
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individual parcels of land with a great deal of specificity, such as controlling building
height or lot size.315 Planning scholar Eran Kaplinsky points to zoning as one of the most
important tools in the North American planning tradition.316 Zoning has been defined as
“simply the restriction of land use; however, it is important to acknowledge its roots in
the law of nuisance and police power for the protection of property. 317 Other definitions
emphasize that zoning is aimed at the separation of land uses, “to prevent negative
external effects associated with the proximity of incompatible activities.” 318 Indeed, as
Valverde argues, “use” is a distinct legal tool because it achieves its work of ordering
people and things indirectly, by acting on “uses” rather than persons or property directly.
As with the Act described above, municipal planning tools enroll private property “to
achieve desired ends.”319 Valverde points to the notion of “incompatibility” as central to
the logic of zoning and its power as a legal tool.320 The 2014 Policy Statement
emphasizes this notion of (in)compatibility through a revised standalone section entitled
“Land Use Compatibility” dealing with the conflict between “major facilities,” including
resource extraction, and “sensitive land uses,” which include both the ecological and
social features. While the former subsection 1.7.1e) stated that planning should separate
such land uses to “prevent” adverse effects, the new section 1.2.6 states that planning
should “prevent or mitigate” adverse effects and adds consideration for ensuring the
“long-term viability of major facilities.”321

The Policy Statement recognizes the role of the local official plan as “the most important
vehicle for implementation” noting that provincial policies “represent minimum
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standards” that local authorities may go beyond. 322 Indeed, the people I spoke with often
assumed at the outset that the municipality was the primary decision maker about
aggregate extraction and other land use issues.323 However, as Valiante notes, Ontario’s
planning framework has become increasingly prescriptive through the specification of
areas of “provincial interest” and the development of provincial policy, particularly the
Policy Statement.324 As she notes, the planning statutes, provincial plans, and policies,
can collectively “be seen as the Ontario government’s view of the collective interests to
be pursued through the planning system.”325 Technically, in the context of aggregate
extraction, if the land for which a quarry is proposed is not currently designated as a
“mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the
Planning Act.326 Under the Act no licence can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an
applicable zoning by-law.327 However, the Policy Statement serves as the guiding
document for all land use decisions in the province. The Planning Act stipulates that all
policy and decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the
Ontario Municipal Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent
with the Policy Statement.328 The Policy Statement also limits the municipal ability to
impose higher standards where they would conflict with its policies.329

Official plans are required to identify and protect provincial interests in their land use
designations and policies, particularly by directing development to “suitable areas.”330
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This includes the protection of the provincial interest in protection aggregate mineral
resources. Where an Official Plan affects a matter of provincial interest, the Planning Act
provides for residual ministerial power to amend the Plan.331 As discussed in Chapter Six,
despite the Act’s recognition of the role of the Official Plan, the role of the Policy
Statement inverts the inquiry such that development is presumptively allowed and the
question of how to manage extraction replaces the question of whether aggregate
extraction should occur at all. In the context of aggregate minerals, the effect is to limit
the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and operation, including
the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into the assessment
of applications, and to impose protection on features not deemed provincially
significant.332 Therefore, aggregate disputes often turn on whether the decision of a local
authority to amend or not to amend the Official Plan conforms to the Policy Statement. It
is important to note that in areas of the province not regulated by the Aggregate
Resources Act, municipal Planning Act approvals are the only licensing requirements for
private land.

Some applications will also involve special provincial planning regimes, such as the
Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, the Oak Ridges Moraine
Conservation Act333, the Greenbelt Act,334 or the Growth Plan legislation and policy. 335
This may mean approvals for amendments will require additional planning authority
approvals, such as the Niagara Escarpment Commission discussed in Chapter Eight, or
may be subject to additional standards in certain areas. A detailed analysis of each of
these regimes is outside the scope of this project; however, the following subsection
summarizes the key elements of the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act
as the provincial plan most relevant to the conflicts examined in Chapters Five through
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Eight, and most considered in the case law examined therein.336 The Niagara Escarpment
Planning and Development Act represents a key example of legislative action that
attempts to respond to the construction of specific landscapes as ‘valuable’ and worthy of
protection while simultaneously promoting economic growth and development.
Technically provincial development plans take priority over the Policy Statement in the
event of a conflict.337 However, the finding of a conflict is a matter for the Board to
determine in the context of a particular case. 338 In a 2013 case, the Ontario Divisional
Court accepted the Board’s parallel analysis approach and application of the “dual
compliance test,” rejecting the need for the requirements of the Niagara Escarpment Plan
to be considered separately and prior to the Policy Statement analysis. 339

E. Provincial Land Use Plans: The Niagara Escarpment Planning and
Development Act
In 1962, blasting from the Dufferin Aggregates Milton Quarry blew a hole in the Niagara
Escarpment, one of Southern Ontario’s most prominent landscapes. The Escarpment is a
major limestone outcrop running through a large part of southern Ontario from Niagara
Falls to the Bruce Peninsula. It is simultaneously a site with unique ecological systems, 340
prime agricultural lands, high scenic and amenity value,341 proximity to urban centres,
and valuable aggregate mineral deposits, as well as being significant to local Indigenous
communities as traditional territory and for legal, economic, spiritual and historic
reasons.342 The transformation of such a prominent landscape was a catalyst for an
emerging environmental movement in the province and for the social and political
336
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construction of the Escarpment as a specific and valuable landscape. 343 A 1968
government-commissioned expert report mapped and documented the entire Niagara
Escarpment area in response to growing public awareness about the unique features of
the area and concern about the impact of the aggregate mineral industry. 344 In 1990, the
area was designated as a UNESCO World biosphere reserve.345

The landmark Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act (the “Niagara
Escarpment Act”) was passed in 1973 with the express purpose of maintaining the
Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing only for
“compatible” development.346 The Niagara Escarpment Act was significant both as
establishing an environmentally-focused land use plan, but also because of the new
provincial role in planning decisions previously made at the local level, shifting planning
from a local to a regional scale.347 It created the 17-member Niagara Escarpment
Commission (the “Commission”), made up of 8 members from escarpment counties and
regions and 9 members of the public, appointed by Order-in-Council. The Commission is
responsible for the creation of the land use plan, the Niagara Escarpment Plan, and is
now responsible for its implementation.348 There are no appointments designated for
Indigenous governments and representatives. The Commission is an arms-length
regulatory agency, reporting to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry. The
Niagara Escarpment Act provides the scope for the policies in the Niagara Escarpment
Plan (the “Plan”), including but not limited to, management of land and water resources,
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location of industry and commerce, identification of major land use areas, provision of
major parks and open space, control of pollution and the natural environment, and
ensuring compatibility of private sector development.349

While the process through which the original Plan was developed was neither
collaborative nor participatory, environmental groups, community organizations and the
aggregate industry were involved in hearings on the proposed land use plan from 1980 to
1983. According to Whitelaw et al., critics of the new planning regime, including the
aggregate industry, private land owners and residential developers, were successful in
limiting the scope of the plan by over 60% and influencing the planning rules. 350 They
describe the hearing process as “adversarial.”351 The plan is reviewed regularly, and is
now reviewed at the same time as the other provincial land use plans, as described
below.352

The Commission’s responsibilities include assessment of applications for amendments to
the Plan and development permits, including for new aggregate mineral extraction
operations.353 No other permit or licence, including those under the Aggregate Resources
Act, can be approved before a development permit is issued.354 The Plan provides for
seven land use designations: Escarpment Natural, Escarpment Protection, Escarpment
Rural, Escarpment Recreation, Minor Urban, Urban and Mineral Resource Extraction.
Each designation is described in detail in the Plan, including the “Objectives,” “Criterion
for Designation,” and “Permitted Uses” associated with such a designation.355
Escarpment Natural and Escarpment Protection prohibit mineral resource extraction. An
amendment to the Plan is required for extraction over 20,000 tonnes on Escarpment Rural
349
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lands, which are described as “essential” and as providing a “buffer to the more
ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment.”356 Extraction is specifically contemplated
in such areas, although requiring an amendment to be granted, and these are therefore the
subjects of applications before the Board.357
i. Plan Amendments
Section 8 of the Niagara Escarpment Act sets out seven “objectives” that are “to be
sought in the consideration of amendments to the Plan”:
a) to protect unique ecologic and historic areas;
b) to maintain and enhance the quality and character of natural streams and
water supplies;
c) to provide adequate opportunities for outdoor recreation;
d) to maintain and enhance the open landscape character of the Niagara
Escarpment in so far as possible, by such means as compatible farming or
forestry and by preserving the natural scenery;
e) to ensure that all new development is compatible with the purpose of this
Act as expressed in section 2;
f) to provide for adequate public access to the Niagara Escarpment; and
g) to support municipalities within the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area in
their exercise of the planning functions conferred upon them by the
Planning Act.
Amendments must be consistent with these objectives as well as the purpose of the
Niagara Escarpment Act, as outlined above, and must be justified by the Applicant.358
Further, an applicant must demonstrate the purpose and objectives of the Niagara
Escarpment Act will not be adversely affected.359 Amendments to re-designate
Escarpment Rural Areas to Mineral Resource Extraction areas require specific
consideration of the following matters:
a) Protection of the natural and cultural environment, namely:
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i.

Groundwater and surface water systems on a watershed basis;

ii.

Habitat of endangered (regulated), endangered (not regulated),
rare, special concern and threatened species;

iii.

Adjacent Escarpment Protection and Escarpment Natural Areas;

iv.

Adjacent Rural Area natural features;

v.

Existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail;

vi.

Provincially significant wetlands;

vii.

Provincially significant ANSIs; and

viii.

Significant cultural heritage features.

b) Opportunities for achieving the objectives of Section 8 of the Niagara
Escarpment Planning and Development Act through the final
rehabilitation of the site;
c) Maintenance and enhancement of the quality and character of natural
systems, water supplies, including fish habitat; and
d) Capability of the land for agricultural uses and its potential for
rehabilitation for agricultural uses.360

The Niagara Escarpment Act requires the Commission to provide notice and copies of
proposed Amendments to all NEPA municipalities, and any Commission advisory
committees, as well as publishing a notice in local newspapers and provide for a
comment period of a maximum of 60 days, with the possibility for extension when
deemed necessary by the Commission.361 It allows for, but does not require, the
Commission to hold public meetings and it is their regular practice to do so.362 The
Niagara Escarpment Act also provides for the establishment of an “advisory committee”
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to “advise and make recommendations to the Minister, through the Commission, in
respect of the amendment and implementation” of the Plan.363

If the Commission receives written objections they are required to appoint a hearing
officer to conduct a hearing within the designated Niagara Escarpment Planning Area
(the “Area”) “for the purpose of receiving representations respecting the proposed
amendments by any person desiring to make representations.”364 They may also choose
to conduct a hearing where no objections are received. The Niagara Escarpment Act
requires the Applicant to present the proposal and justification at the hearing and to make
the Application materials available to the public. Subject to the hearing officer’s rules of
procedure, “any interested person” may question the Applicant and other presenters. 365
Within 60 days of the hearings, the hearing officer is required to provide the Commission
with a report summarizing the hearing representations and recommending whether the
proposed amendment should be accepted, rejected or modified with reasons. 366 The
Commission is required to consider both the written comments received and the hearing
report and make recommendations to the Minister who can refuse or approve the
amendment and has discretion to make any modifications.367

ii. Development Permits
Section 22 of the Niagara Escarpment Act provides for the designation of areas within
the Niagara Escarpment Act Area as “development control areas”. In such areas,
development must be approved under a development permit or exempted by
regulation.368 The Area has been designated under Regulation 826. However, lands
licensed continuously since 1975 under the Pits and Quarries Control Act, 1971 are
exempted from requirements for a development permit by regulation, which remains
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significant since aggregate licences do not expire.369 As well, exploratory excavation and
testing are exempted, allowing landowners to undertake preliminary studies before
making any applications.370

The Plan sets out both general and specific Development Criteria that must be considered
in the permit application process; however, as the Plan notes, not all criteria are
applicable to all situations.371 The following general criteria under Section 1 are relevant
to aggregate extraction applications:
1.

4.

Permitted uses may be allowed provided that:
a. The long term capacity of the site can support the use without a
substantial negative impact on Escarpment environmental features
such as contours, water quality, water quantity, natural vegetation,
soil, wildlife, population, visual attractiveness and cultural heritage
features.
b. The cumulative impact of development will not have serious
detrimental effects on the Escarpment environment (e.g. water
quality, vegetation, soil, wildlife, and landscape).
…
Any development permitted should be designed and located in such a
manner as to preserve the natural, visual and cultural characteristics of
the area.

5.

Where development involves new roads, road improvements or service
corridors, their designation and alignment should be in harmony with the
Escarpment landscape.

8.

Development permitted should be designed and located in such a
manner as to provide for or protect access to the Niagara Escarpment
including the Bruce Trail Corridor.

Section 2.11 specifically considers mineral resources, with the objective of minimizing
the impact of new mineral extraction and accessory uses. The Plan requires that
operations shall not conflict with the following criteria:
a) The protection of sensitive ecological, geological, historic and archaeological sites
or areas.
b) The protection of surface and groundwater resources.
369
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c) The maintenance of agricultural areas, in accordance with the Agricultural
Policies of the Provincial Policy Statement (PPS).
d) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on
existing agricultural or residential development.
e) The preservation of the natural and cultural landscapes as much as possible during
extraction and after rehabilitation.
f) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on
parks, open space and the existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail.372
“Protection” is defined in the Plan as “ensuring that human activities are not allowed to
occur which will result in the unacceptable degradation of the quality of an
environment.”373 The application process includes circulation of applications for
comments to Ministries, municipal governments and Conservation Authorities, all of
which are considered by a Commission staff planner who writes a report for the
Commission recommending approval or refusal and may include conditions. The
proponent, the consulted agencies and surrounding neighbours can appeal a decision to a
Commission hearing officer within 14 days.374
The Niagara Escarpment Act requires the government to review the Plan regularly and
now requires that it be reviewed at the same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the
Greenbelt Act under s.17 (1). In 2015 the government undertook a coordinated review of
these and other Provincial Plans, including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan
and the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan.375 The review and proposed changes at
the time of writing are discussed in Part III of this chapter.
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Participation: Notice, Consultation, Objections
As noted in Chapter Two, opportunities for participation and contestation are key
structural element of environmental governance regimes.376 Legal scholars Eloise
Scotford and Rachael Walsh argue that land use regimes are redefining property in the
UK context, shifting from an emphasis on private property rights towards more
democratic environmental decision-making. British geographers Richard Cowell and
Susan Owens link the successful use of participatory opportunities by environmental
interests and concerned communities with the integration of environmental concerns into
the formal land use decision-making framework.377 They specifically examined resistance
to aggregate extraction in rural England and argue that it “reframed” both the problems
and the solutions related to extraction by connecting the site specific struggles with
broader issues of planning and environmental relations.378 Not only can participation
enhance the evidence base for decision-making and lead to better decisions and enhance
access to justice, Groves et al. argue that participatory processes may also provide
opportunities to examine and rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy.379
In this sense, planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking about how we
relate to each other and the environment despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or
site-specific issues of infrastructure siting or zoning. However, this potential for
creativity and reflection is largely dependent on the nature of the process – whether the
broad policy goals are realized through genuinely deliberative processes and genuine
opportunities to influence outcomes.380 Put another way, whether participation can
“cross-scales” beyond engagement in site-specific applications to provide for
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opportunities to contest, debate and shape the underlying values and goals about planning
and environmental governance.381
While much of the information about process and participation is in the Standards, prior
to amendment the Act stated in s 11(3): “Any person may, during the prescribed
consultation procedures, give the applicant and the Minister written notice stating that the
person has an objection to the application and specifying the nature of the objection.” The
amended Act repeals this subsection and moves all details of consultation and
participation to future regulations.382 The result is that the right to object is no longer
embedded directly in the statute and is therefore subject to the discretion of Cabinet or
the Minister. Further, the right to object is subtly narrowed by an amended s 11(5) which
now instead of providing for “any objections” to be referred to the Board, provides that
the Minister can refer “any objections arising out of the notification and consultation
procedures that are prescribed or set out in a custom plan.”383 In addition, as noted above,
the amended Act includes a discretionary “custom plan” whereby the Minister can
approve individualized consultation, participation and information requirements for a
specific application.384 In the context of Ontario’s planning system, scholars have noted
the influence of private interests in the planning process and the emphasis on economic
development.385 In the context of aggregate disputes, the participatory potential of the
planning process is particularly limited by the proponent-driven nature of the process
both at the application and consultation stages. In fact, despite the protection of aggregate
resources as a matter of provincial interest, the consultations about aggregate application
are conducted and controlled by the proponent. The Ministry has no role in addressing
objections made by citizens or EBR comments and can therefore issue a licence without
formally addressing concerns expressed in these forums.386 In fact, as will be discussed
below in Chapters Four and Five, the Ministry tends to play a limited role at both the
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consultation and litigation stages, even where Ministry concerns or objections have arisen
at some stage in the process without a clear resolution. One planner commented, “MNR
is a very closed shop. They stick to their obligations under the licensing process and
although they may have staff involved in the JART [a joint-municipal planning process in
the Halton Region], they keep their cards very close to their chest and don’t go to
hearings.”387 The amended Act makes the participation of the Ministry in hearings
expressly optional.388
The Standards require the proponent to provide public notice that triggers a 45-day
“notification” period during which members of the public, local governments, and
provincial ministries and agencies can file objections to the proposal. Once a proponent
has filed an application, public notice is also required under the Provincial Standards. A
copy of the Application must be on file at the local Ministry of Natural Resources
office.389 Under the Act, Site Plans and Reports submitted for licences become the
property of the Crown only when a licence is issued.390 The Ministry has interpreted this
to mean that they cannot “produce” copies for members of the public during the
application process. The policy manual states that interested parties can view these
documents at the local MNR office or the local municipality. 391 Parties can also request
information from the proponent; however, the Ontario Environmental Commissioner has
noted concerns about the effective right of the proponent to withhold information.392 In
practice many proponents provide online access to information, as do municipalities
where they are involved in decision-making. However, the process is complex and
involves a number of different decision makers and actors. As well, the timeline and
process for objections must be seen in light of the volume and density of information
387
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involved in aggregate applications. The application documents may be hundreds or
thousands of pages, including highly technical expert reports. Many of the participants in
this study commented on the “learning curve” involved and the need to find expertise
within the community to assist with understanding the application and the process. One
more-than-owner party reflected,
It was very curious because we just had to go and learn. We knew the
questions that we wanted to ask, but we had to figure out how to ask them,
who to ask, who not to ask and how to become part of what to us became
very quickly a very complicated way to solve local planning issues.
Most aggregate licence applications are also posted to the provincial Environmental
Registry, a public online database for environmental decisions, for a minimum of 30 days
under the Environmental Bill of Rights.393 While the Ministries involved do have some
discretion regarding what is posted, according to Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner
almost all new aggregate licences are posted on the Registry. As noted in Part III below,
the government consultation Blueprint document discussed the possibility for online
information requirements for applications and the need for plain language summaries for
all application materials. However, these are not included in the Act and all proposed
changes to these aspects of the process are subject to future regulations making it
impossible to say whether and how the reforms would impact the consultation process at
the time of writing.

The Provincial Standards require the proponent to host one public presentation in the
local area during the notice period. Neither the technical experts retained by the
proponent nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist the
public in interpreting the reports or to ensure compliance. In fact, the Policy Manual
directs Ministry staff not to attend meetings unless there are “special circumstances.” 394
The Standards suggest a non-exhaustive list of forms such a meeting may take, including
an information session, an open house or a community meeting. The only requirements
393
394
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set out in the Standards are that the meeting must take place at least 20 days after the
Notice is published and 10 days before the closing of the notification period.395 It is the
responsibility of the proponent to notify the Minister when the notification requirements
have been completed.396

The Provincial Standards specify that objections must be served on the applicant and the
District Manager of the Ministry of Natural Resources within the 45-day notification
period.397 This requirement includes objections from any agency. Both the statute and the
Standards require that the objector specify the nature of the objection. Within two years,
the proponent must “attempt to resolve” objections and must submit a list of unresolved
objections and documentation of attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for
resolutions to the Ministry and to remaining objectors.398 Notably the amendments repeal
the section in the Act requiring the applicant to work towards resolution and move these
to regulations.399 A 20-day notice period is then triggered during which remaining
objectors, including government agencies, must submit further “recommendations” or
they are deemed to no longer object.400 Proponents are also required to provide the
Ministry with documentation of landowner, stakeholder and agency circulation.401

Notably, Environmental Registry comments are not considered to be objections under the
Act and therefore do not afford the participant the same procedural rights outlined above.
The proponent is also not required to respond, although some may do so in practice. Nonowner third parties in Ontario cannot appeal land use planning decisions as-of-right.
While the Environmental Bill of Rights provides for parties with a demonstrable interest
to seek leave to appeal certain kinds of provincial decisions, the test for leave is
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“stringent” and the majority of applications have been turned down.402 The most common
and easiest way to satisfy the standing requirement for leave is to have made a
submission on the instrument in question; however, it is possible to establish an interest
without having made a submission, for example through proximity to a proposed
development.403 Generally, a party seeking leave may be required to justify having not
submitted at an earlier stage. In practice, the Board hears aggregate disputes as a result of
a Ministerial referral, an appeal of a municipal decision, or an owner-applicant’s as-ofright appeal from a Ministerial decision. Non-owner parties who object to proposals
during the initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to
hearings ordered under the Act.404 As a result, quarry litigation often formally includes
non-owner parties and/or participants either as individuals or as groups with similar
interests in the proceedings. While opportunities to participate are limited by the ability to
retain legal representation and fund independent technical research, objector participation
does present a procedural opportunity for non-owners. Unlike property disputes in other
forums, these land use conflicts are at least theoretically open to claims from third parties
without ownership interests.

With respect to Official Plan Amendments, the Planning Act requires that the municipal
council hold at least one public meeting. In advance of the meeting the proposed official
plan amendment must be available to the public for a minimum of 20 days before the
meeting. However if they refuse to adopt the amendment, the meeting requirement is
waived. The Planning Act provides that any person or public body may make written
402
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submissions to council during the timeline specified by council.405 It also specifies that
council must inform the public at the meeting about the power of the Board to dismiss an
appeal if the appellant has not provided council with oral submissions at a public meeting
or written submission before an amendment is adopted.406 Similarly, a municipality is
required to hold at least one public meeting before passing a zoning by-law amendment
with a minimum of 20 days’ notice to the public and must ensure “sufficient” information
is provided to the public.407 If changes are made to the proposed amendment the public
has the right to request another meeting.408

Scholars in Canada409 and the United Kingdom410 have noted the important contributions
made by more-than-owner or “public” participants in planning processes. In the context
of aggregate, this contribution was also noted by multiple participants in this research. 411
One more-than-owner party noted it is “citizen’s groups” rather than the Ministries tasked
with evaluating the applications in the public interest that are stopping applications.412
Indeed, in several cases examined for this research, serious and complex mitigation
requirements or site reductions and changes to the application were the result of morethan-owner party interventions rather than government agencies.413 Another more-thanowner party noted, “The technical reviews by the Minister were, shall I say, fallible
because they didn’t seem to give it the kind of scrutiny we have and we are not experts.
We just kept bumping up on little things that we would go, ‘how did they miss this?’”414
Yet structural opportunities for participation and deliberation within the planning system
have been diminished as the target of state reforms aimed at ‘modernizing’ or
405
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‘streamlining’ the processes that control land use and development in Ontario. 415 This is
consistent with trends in other jurisdictions within Canada,416 and internationally, such as
the United Kingdom417 where neoliberal environmental governance promotes
“flexibility” and economic competitiveness and shifts towards market mechanisms in the
planning system.418 As noted in Chapter Two, planning has a long history with efforts to
replace the ‘politics’ of planning with professional expertise through a “technicalrational” model of land use decision-making.419 In the context of neoliberal
environmental governance, deliberative opportunities are deemed “blockages” and morethan-owner parties engaging in the planning process are depicted as anti-growth, antiprogress and even dangerous or criminal.420 As discussed in Chapters Six to Eight, this
research demonstrates that even where parties do continue to engage in the planning
process, the failure to recognize the full range of people-place relations with private land
as relevant to land use decisions results in a more subtle form of exclusion. This
enclosure of “the affective and unruly elements” of planning conflicts upholds the
privileged position of aggregate proponents and limits the transformative and
democratizing potential of planning.421 Thus, the data put forward by more-than-owner
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parties serves as a valuable supplement to state oversight while the challenges they pose
are bracketed to maintain an orderly and efficient process.422 Citing public frustration
with aggregate approvals and other forms of development, the Environmental
Commissioner has recently noted the need for meaningful consultation on land use issues:
First, consultation is not simply telling people what you intend to do and, then,
listening to their comments.
…
To be legitimate, an approval process must be able to reach a decision not
to proceed. I’m not saying that this should be a common outcome. Quite
the contrary, one would expect that the vast majority of proposed
undertakings would be well-designed and well-considered, even before
they reach the public consultation stage, so as to be likely candidates for
approval. But, in a valid and meaningful consultation process, we would
expect that sometimes rational arguments or contrasting societal value
systems would and should lead to a “No”. Without that possibility, there is
no value in consultation.423

Other Approvals and Applicable Laws
The provincial Ministry of the Environment is responsible for three forms of approvals
related to aggregate extraction. The Ministry’s responsibilities are based on both the
Ontario Water Resources Act424 and the Environmental Protection Act425 in the case of a
potential contaminant. These approvals are not required before a licence is granted.
However, it is the Ministry practice not to process the application until other approvals
have been granted, as they are required before operations can begin at an aggregate
extraction site.
Under the Ontario Water Resources Act, the Ministry is responsible for the supervision of
the province’s ground and surface water supply. Permits to Take Water are required when
more than 50,000 litres of water per day will be taken. Since water table and groundwater
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impacts are often a central aspect of public concerns about an application, these
applications can be quite contentious and attempts have been made to appeal
approvals.426 Industrial sewage Certificates of Approval are required when sewage is
discharged into ground or surface water under the Ontario Water Resources Act s. 53. In
the context of aggregate extraction, dewatering systems and wash plants require this form
of approval. The permitting system controls water takings for the purpose of avoiding
adverse impacts on other water users or the environment. The Board has, at least once,
required a permit and certificate as a condition for the issuance of the licence for
aggregate extraction.427 However, this is not standard practice.

Permits have historically been required in connection with endangered and threatened
species and species habitat under the Endangered Species Act.428 In 2013 however,
amendments to that Act introduced a “rules-in-regulation” or “permit-by-rule” system for
a range of industrial development activities, including pits and quarries. 429 The new
system means proponents are simply required to follow the rules as set out in the
regulations and no longer require a permit. In effect, as the Environmental Commissioner
concluded, the Ministry no longer has the power to stop activities based on their impact
on endangered species in the province:
That is where the regulatory changes of 2013 have their most profound
consequences: they do not allow MNR to say “no.” Every place, no matter
how unique or ecologically important, will be open to activities with the
potential to adversely affect species at risk; no place is untouchable or
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special. And that does not appear to be consistent with the purposes of the
Act or the general standards of modern natural resource management.430
The regulations also provide species-specific exemptions for projects that meet certain
conditions, including species such as bobolinks 431and butternut trees,432 which have been
at issue in aggregate extraction proposals. Further, instead of requirements for “overall
benefits” to the affected species that commonly applied to permits, many activities will
only be subject to requirements to “minimize adverse effects.”433 There are however
seven species excluded from exemptions for aggregate operations.434 Notably these
amendments were part of an effort to “streamline” the approvals process and reduce the
cost of maintaining the permit system. Of particular interest in the context of reforms to
the Aggregate Resources Act and the use of discretionary regulatory powers, the
government tabled the Endangered Species Act changes as part of an omnibus budget bill
in 2012.435 These were withdrawn in response to widespread criticism but then later
implemented by regulation, without public consultation or legislative debate.

Aggregate extraction is also excluded from the list of “drinking water threats” under the
Clean Water Act.436 Aggregate licences and permits are now prescribed instruments
under the Clean Water Act, which means that they can be used to implement the
protection and management of water sources.437 The Clean Water Act sets out “source
protection areas”438 within the province and establishes “source protection
committees”439 for each. The committees must develop “source protection plans” with
policies to prevent significant drinking water threats.440 Sections 39 and 43 of the Clean
Water Act now respectively require new and existing instruments to “conform” to
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significant threat policies and designated Great Lakes policies in source protection plans.
However only new instruments are required to “have regard” to other source protection
plan policies.441 Therefore while aggregate operations are not prescribed threats, aspects
of their operation, such as handling and storage of fuel are, and must therefore be
managed in accordance with the source water protection plan. Proposed amendments to
the Act provide the authority to require changes to existing instruments and conditions
for new approvals.442 Municipal Planning Act decisions must also “conform” to
significant threat policies and designated Great Lakes policies in source protection plans
and “have regard” to other source protection plan policies.443

While the provincial Environmental Assessment Act does not apply to aggregate
applications, more-than-owner parties and environmental organizations have raised
concerns about this in the context of large-scale applications, including the Superior
Aggregates proposal in Mitchipicoten Bay on the coast of Lake Superior, 444 and the
Melancthon mega quarry. 445 In the case of the Melancthon quarry, opponents
successfully lobbied the province to order an environmental assessment due to the
unprecedented scale of the proposed development, which would have been one of the
largest in Canada and in North America.446 The proposal was subsequently withdrawn
and the EA was never conducted so it is not clear how this would have operated in
relation to the process under the Act.

Federal Jurisdiction can be engaged by aggregate applications, particularly under the
Fisheries Act447 and protection of waterways. However, as discussed in Chapter Two,
recent changes to those regimes have limited their application.448 Similarly, the
441

Ibid, at s. 39.
Bill 39, supra note 13, ss 13(1), 13(3), 23, 25, 31, 37(1).
443
Ibid, s. 39(1).
444
Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Municipality of Wawa, supra note 413.
445
See the application on the EBR Registry, Number 011-2864.
446
O Reg 444/11.
447
RSC, 1895, c F-14.
448
Gibson, supra note 412.
442

216

application of the federal environmental assessment regime has been narrowed to make it
unlikely to be applied in a provincial aggregate siting situation.449

The North American Free Trade Agreement may be implicated depending on whether the
proponent could qualify as a “foreign investor,” in particular the proponent may invoke
the investor protection mechanism if the application is turned down. 450 A recent NAFTA
case was launched by a foreign-owned proponent in conjunction with a civil suit against
the provincial government following the provincial use of the rarely invoked Ministerial
Zoning Power and was only withdrawn after a $15-million settlement was made by the
province.451 Despite widespread recognition that the NAFTA suit was an inappropriate
mechanism to challenge the government’s decision, the eventual settlement may have a
chilling effect on future decision makers.452 While outside the scope of this project, a
2007 decision of a federal-provincial environmental assessment Joint Review Panel to
reject a proposed quarry in Nova Scotia was successfully challenged under NAFTA. 453
The proponent, Bilcon, is seeking $100,000,000 in compensatory damages. Notably,
there was a strong dissent from one member of the NAFTA panel who warned the
decision could result in a “chill on the operation of environmental review panels”.454 The
member went on to disagree with the majority’s finding that the Joint-Review Panel was
wrong to emphasize the effect of the project on the human environment and to take
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“account of the community’s own expression of its interests and values”.455 He
concluded,
This result may be disturbing to many. In this day and age, the idea of an
environmental review panel putting more weight on the human environment
and on community values than on scientific and technical feasibility, and
concluding that these community values were not outweighed by what the
panel regarded as modest economic benefits over 50 years, does not appear
at all unusual. Neither such a result nor the process by which it was reached
in this case could ever be said to “offend judicial propriety”. Once again, a
chill will be imposed on environmental review panels which will be
concerned not to give too much weight to socio-economic considerations or
other considerations of the human environment in case the result is a claim
for damages under NAFTA Chapter 11. In this respect, the decision of the
majority will be seen as a remarkable step backwards in environmental
protection.456
Canada filed a notice of application for judicial review in Federal Court in June 2015,
arguing that the NAFTA tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and the dispute should have
been taken to a Canadian court.457 While the proponent attempted to stay the proceedings
pending the NAFTA Tribunal’s decision on damages, the Federal Court denied the
motion and will allow the Canadian government’s application to proceed.458 Bilcon is
appealing the decision. The majority’s finding that “community core values” fell outside
the proper scope of the environmental assessment inquiry and preference for technical
and biophysical evidence exemplifies the closure of a decision-making process to the
range of people-place relations engaged by planning decisions. As noted by the
dissenting member, the decision has the potential to reinforce and deepen closure in
planning systems and reinforces the emphasis on expertise and technocratic approaches
to environmental governance. While scientific and technical evidence are key parts of
land use decisions, they are an inherently “complex mix of the scientific, social,
economic, political” and material and decision makers must grapple with all these
dimensions in order to find sustainable solutions.459
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Hearings and Decisions: Aggregate Resources Act and Official Plan and By-Law
Amendments
A. The Ministry of Natural Resources
Under the Aggregate Resources Act process, the Ministry will make a recommendation to
the Minister within 30 days of the proponent submitting all required documentation about
resolved and remaining objections at the end of the two-year period.460 The Minister has
three statutory options: 1) refer the application and any objections to the Ontario
Municipal Board for a hearing, or in the case of a site within the Niagara Escarpment
Plan Area, a joint-board of the Ontario Municipal Board and the Environmental Review
Tribunal under the Consolidated Hearings Act;461 2) issue the licence; 3) refuse to issue
the licence.462 Section 12(1) of the Act sets out the matters that the Minister must
consider in making the decision:
(a) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on the environment;
(b) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on nearby communities;
(c) any comments provided by a municipality in which the site is located;
(d) the suitability of the progressive rehabilitation and final rehabilitation plans for
the site;
(e) any possible effects on ground and surface water resources;
(f) any possible effects of the operation of the pit or quarry on agricultural resources;
(g) any planning and land use considerations;
(h) the main haulage routes and proposed truck traffic to and from the site;
(i) the quality and quantity of the aggregate on the site;
(j) the applicant’s history of compliance with this Act and the regulations, if a licence
or permit has previously been issued to the applicant under this Act or a predecessor
of this Act; and
(k) such other matters as are considered appropriate.463
The amended s 12 (e) includes effects on drinking water sources as a consideration.
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Section 7 of the Environmental Bill of Rights requires the Ministry to have a
Statement of Environmental Values. Section 11 requires that the Minister “take every
reasonable step to ensure that the ministry statement of environmental values is
considered whenever decisions that might significantly affect the environment are made
in the Ministry.” 464 The Statement lists the following principles:

464

•

A sound understanding of natural and ecological systems and how our actions
affect them is key to achieving sustainability

•

As our understanding of the way the natural world works and how our actions
affect it is often incomplete, MNR staff should exercise caution and special
concern for natural values in the face of such uncertainty.

•

The finite capacity of our natural systems should be recognized in planning and
allocation decisions.

•

Natural resources should be properly valued to provide a fair return to Ontarians
and to reflect their ecological, social and economic contributions.

•

Participation in resource management by all those who share an interest is a
necessary ingredient, particularly in support of communities who must balance
economic diversity with other needs. Those affected by proposed changes must
have access to information and opportunities to provide input to decisions that
affect their lives.

•

Applied research and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge and
innovative technologies must be fostered to support the sustainable development
of natural resources.

•

An ecosystem approach to managing our natural resources enables a holistic
perspective of social, economic and ecological aspects and provides the context
for integrated resource management.

•

The planning for and management of natural resources should strive for
continuous improvement and effectiveness through adaptive management of
natural resources.

•

In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection must be an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation.

•

From both a sound business and environmental perspective, it is less costly and
more effective to anticipate and prevent negative environmental impacts before
undertaking new activities than it is to correct environmental problems after the
fact.

•

Rehabilitating degraded environments is an important aspect of resource
stewardship.

Supra, note.
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However, the Ministry has historically interpreted the Statement as relevant only to
decisions related to the development of “Acts, regulations, and policies” and not to
instruments, such as Aggregate Resources Act applications. The Environmental
Commissioner has repeatedly pointed out that the Environmental Bill of Rights does not
exempt instruments and that the Ministry should be considering the Statement in
determining the outcome of aggregate applications. Indeed, this was confirmed by the
Ontario Divisional Court in Lafarge Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Environmental Review
Tribunal): “There is no exclusion for Directors when they are making a decision whether
or not to implement a proposal for a Class I or a Class II instrument.”465 The Ministry of
Natural Resources has taken the position that the Statement is an embedded part of the
existing aggregate licensing process. Upon review, the Commissioner “found no
reference to how specific SEV principles (e.g., cumulative effects, the ecosystem
approach, the precautionary approach) had been considered.”466 The 2011/2012 Annual
Report to the Legislature rejected this approach:
To adequately demonstrate that SEV consideration has occurred, SEV
consideration documentation requires an explicit explanation of which
specific SEV principles were considered, and why and how they were
considered, applied and/or dismissed during the decision-making
process.467
In the 2014 Animal Alliance decision, the Divisional Court accepted the Ministry of
Natural Resources’ process for consideration of the Statement as fulfilling the section 11
requirements, known as the “SEV consideration statement,” a form of checklist with
placeholder notations, such as, “a total of XXXX comments were provided” and “I have
taken into consideration the aforementioned in my decision to approve [proposal title].”
The Court also held that there was no concern with the Ministry’s completion of the
Statement consideration in advance of the closing of the 30 day Environmental Registry
public comment period, concluding that these processes mandated by the Environmental
Bill of Rights are “separate” and it was not necessary to demonstrate that all comments
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were reviewed.468 Further, the Court pointed out that failure to comply with Part II,
including section 11, “does not affect the validity of any policy, Act, regulation or
instrument, except as provided in section 118.” 469 Section 118 limits applications for
judicial review to the grounds that the Minister “failed in a fundamental way to comply
with the requirements of Part II respecting a proposal for an instrument.” However,
according to the Environmental Commissioner’s investigation, even this minimal
formalistic process is not part of the aggregate licensing review process at the Ministry. 470
In light of this, the impact of the Statement on aggregate licensing is arguably quite
limited.

If the Minister refuses the licence, notice must be served on the application with
reasons.471 No reasons are required for approval. The applicant is entitled to a hearing by
the Board if notice is served.472 Therefore the application may end up before the Board by
referral or by appeal of a refusal. The proponent is automatically entitled to a hearing in
the case of a refusal. Notably, unlike in referral hearings, objectors are not included as
mandatory parties to a refusal hearing; only the Minister and the applicant are required,
although the Minister has discretion to include other parties. 473 In practice, most
controversial applications will end up being referred to the Board.
B. Planning Act Approvals
Under the Act no licence can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an applicable zoning
by-law.474 Therefore, the Act requires the proponent to apply to local authorities for
appropriate amendments to the Official Plan or By-Laws under the Planning Act before a
licence can be issued. After the consultation process described above takes place, the
Municipality must make a decision on the application.
468
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As set out in the Planning Act, all policy and decisions of municipal governments
must be consistent with the Policy Statement.475 Therefore, as Valiante notes, the areas of
provincial interest and the Policy Statement are “potentially ambiguous and arguably
contradictory”, leaving “room for interpretation by local councils and the OMB” about
how to achieve the right balance between conflicting priorities.476 The long-standing
provincial interest in aggregate resources and their privileged position in the Policy
Statement mean local decision makers are in fact highly constrained in the context of
these applications. Further, despite the relative openness of municipal planning processes
and the wide ability to make submissions, scholars have noted the potential for such
processes to be dominated by well-resourced business or other private interests such as
property-owners associations and the systemic lack of access for marginalized parties,
such as tenants, low-income, and racialized or Indigenous persons or communities.477
Therefore, it is unclear whether and how Councils will consider and be informed by
views that challenge dominant people-place and socio-economic relations.
If the amendment is refused or if the municipality fails to adopt the amendment
within 180 days for Official Plans, and 120 days for zoning by-law amendments, the
proponent can appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board for a hearing.478 Notably while a
decision to deny an application requires reasons, none are required where an application
is approved.479 In practice, most controversial planning amendments, including those in
relation to aggregate extraction applications, will be subject to an appeal to the Board.480
However, the rarely invoked Minister’s Zoning Order power has also been applied in a
recent quarry dispute.481
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C. The Ontario Municipal Board
The role of the Ontario Municipal Board is a key element in the regulation of aggregate
extraction as the Minister routinely refers applications to the Board where members of
the public and/or ministries, planning authorities and local governments file objections. It
is a uniquely powerful institution, as recently noted by the Ontario Bar Association:
“There is no tribunal in Ontario that has a similarly broad jurisdiction and responsibility
as the OMB and there is no comparable tribunal or agency in any other province.” 482 An
understanding of the Board’s powers and procedures is therefore essential to the context
of aggregate extraction decisions.

A 2009 study on the relationship between the City of Toronto and the Board argued that
the Board shifts responsibility for political planning decisions, particularly contentious
development decisions, away from elected officials.483 The study measured the relative
success of private developers before the Board when compared to both the City and to
community groups. Notably, it found not only that developers were significantly more
successful before the Board, winning 64% of the time when directly opposing developers,
but also demonstrated that the City fared significantly worse when aligned with a
community group participating in the hearing. 484 As will be discussed below in Chapter
Seven, aggregate extraction licence applications are overwhelmingly approved at the
Board, despite a few notable exceptions in recent years. 485 Even in the Niagara
Escarpment Plan Area, created in part in response to concerns about the impact of pits
and quarries, the first application was not rejected until 2012 in the Re Nelson Aggregates
Co. decision.486 Indeed, in Re Walker Aggregates Co., another 2012 case within the
NEPDA, the majority of the panel approved a large quarry adjacent to an existing one,
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despite a strong dissent from the third panel member.487 The Divisional Court denied the
Niagara Escarpment Commission’s application for leave to appeal in Walker.488
Where hearings related to the Official Plan and/or municipal by-law amendments are also
required under the Planning Act, the proceedings will likely be consolidated.489 In most
aggregate conflicts both municipal and licensing issues are considered during a hearing.
Therefore, the municipal decision-making process is relevant to the Board’s decision.
Since 1997 the Planning Act has stated that the Board “shall have regard to” decisions by
municipal council or approval authorities made under the Act and related to the same
matter, including the information and material considered by council. 490 This has been
interpreted by the Board as a lower standard of deference than the “shall be consistent
with” requirement applied to the Provincial Policy Statement, requiring the Board to
“consider them carefully in relation to the circumstances at hand, their objectives and the
statements as a whole, and what they seek to protect.”491 The Board has rejected the
interpretation that this section binds the Board, citing the need to maintain its
“independent decision making authority.” 492

The Board controls its own process as per s 91 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act493 and
s 25.1 of the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act494 and has set out rules related to
standing and the hearing process, including the form of documents and exhibits, filing
and notice requirements, adjournment powers, mediation and the conduct of the
proceedings in the Ontario Municipal Board Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Rules
specify further discretion over their own procedure. For example, Rule 3 states that the

487

Ibid.
Niagara Escarpment Commission v. Joint Board, 2013 ONSC 2497, leave to appeal denied.
489
O Reg 30/02, Section 1 provides authority for the Board to consolidate, hear matters at the same time or
one after another, or to stay or adjourn any matter until others are determined. Rule 58 of the OMB Rules
details the difference between consolidation and being heard together. Consolidation unifies procedure,
parties and evidence, whereas hearing together maintains separate procedures and parties.
490
Supra, note 87
491
Concerned Citizens of King (Township) v King (Township) (2000), 42 OMBR 3 (Div. Ct.) at 9.
492
Re Keswick Sutherland School Inc. and Halton (Region) and Halton Hills (Town), (24 July, 2009)
PL080918, OMB.
493
RSO 1990, c O.28 [“OMB Act”].
494
RSO 1990, c S.22.
488

225

Rules “shall be liberally interpreted to secure the just, most expeditions and cost-effective
determination” and Rule 4 considers matters that are not dealt with in the Rules.
The Board may at any time in a proceeding make orders with respect to the
procedure and practices that apply in the proceeding. If these Rules do not
provide for a matter of procedure, the Board may do whatever is necessary and
permitted by law to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely on any
matter before it. 495
Rule 5 guards against overly technical procedural objections, allowing for
“substantial compliance with the Rules” and Rule 6 provides the Board with powers
of exemption:
“The Board may grant all necessary exceptions from these Rules or from a
procedural order, or grant other relief as it considers appropriate, to ensure
that the real questions in issue are determined in a just, most expeditious and
cost-effective manner.”
The combined effect is to provide the Board with considerable discretion to
seemingly contravene specific rules while adhering to the broader scheme.

The Board retains screening power to dismiss a proceeding prior to the hearing on
jurisdictional grounds and, in a range of municipal matters including official plan
and zoning amendments. This includes where the Board finds no “apparent land
use planning ground,” the failure to make prior submissions on the matter, or that
the appeal was not made in “good faith, is frivolous or vexatious, or is made only
for the purpose of delay.”496 Therefore, as Valiante notes, “many issues, concerns,
and values that might have been considered by council must be either abandoned
or reformulated in a way that will qualify” on these grounds. 497
i. Standing and Participation at the Hearing
Party standing, and full participation, before the Board is determined by the
Planning Act, or the development permit regime applicable to a specific dispute, such as
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the Aggregate Resources Act, and in many cases, linked to participation during the
prescribed consultation period. Parties who object to an aggregate application during the
initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to hearings on
applications referred under the Act,498 though notably not an appeal of a ministerial
refusal of an application.499 The Act specifies that the Minister, the applicant and the
objectors are parties to the hearing,500 though the amendments make it optional for the
Minister to join.501 As noted above, since 2007 the right to appeal a municipal decision
on an official plan amendment or a zoning by-law is restricted to persons who made oral
or written submissions to council during the decision-making process.502 Such persons
can also be added by the Board as Parties to an appeal of a zoning by-law amendment but
do not have a right of appeal for a zoning amendment.503 The Board retains some
discretion to add persons who fail to meet the Planning Act submission requirements if
there are “reasonable grounds” to do so,504 or “other such persons” under the Act.505
Recent decisions indicate the Board has taken a strict approach to the submission
requirements, including that oral submissions must be made at the statutory meeting not
in another forum, and written submissions must describe the objection.506

Under the Board rules, Parties are defined as full participants in the proceedings, with the
full range of rights, including:
a) Serving and filing motions;
b) Receiving copies of all documents exchanged or filed;
498
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c) Making opening and closing submissions;
d) Presenting and cross-examining witnesses;
e) Claiming or being subject to costs;
f) Requesting a review of the Board decision.507
Parties are entitled to make a motion for discovery where another party has refused to
provide information.508 However, opportunities to participate are effectively limited by
the ability to retain legal representation and fund independent technical expertise, as well
as the onerous length and complexity of the hearings. Board rules also provide for
discretionary “participant” status and many individuals and groups opt for this more
limited role because of financial constraints or because the Board can grant “participant”
status without an individual or group having made prior submissions under the Planning
Act procedure.509 Board practice is to grant such standing in most cases. 510 Participant
status affords only the ability make a statement, rather than full participation. One morethan-owner party described the experience of being a participant: “We felt very token
there. If you didn’t have a lawyer and you weren’t an “expert”, you didn’t feel like they
were listening to you.” 511 In particular, participants are not entitled to call or crossexamine witnesses. Whether as parties or participants, individuals and groups involved in
Board hearings face considerable conceptual and practical obstacles to meaningful
participation, from the accepted language and narrative of planning considerations
outlined in the Policy Statement and the relevant local development regime to the
political and financial burden of retaining expertise and representation.

The Board also has a large role in pre-hearing mediation and case management. Board
Associate-Chair S. Wilson Lee described the pre-hearing as follows:
[A] tool to map out, delineate the morphology of the issues. It is a forum to
cull issues, to bring about a more rational organization of how hearings are
to be segmented. Finally, it is the venue where the Board Member can probe
and create a climate whether an alternative adjudicative mechanism can be
507

OMB Rules, supra note 495 r 32.
Ibid, r 33.
509
Ibid, r 2, 32.
510
Bruce Wayne Krushelnicki, A Practical Guide to the Ontario Municipal Board (Toronto: Lexis Nexis,
2007); Moore, supra note 486.
511
Interview, September 9, 2014.
508

228

deployed. For more complex cases, Members will work with the parties to
design facilitation of expert witnesses; and, finally, work schedules for the
hearings.
ii. Witnesses – Experts and Non-Experts
Witnesses, particularly expert witnesses on planning and technical or scientific matters,
play an essential role in many land use hearings, 512 including aggregate extraction
conflicts in which highly technical information is central to decision-making. As one
lawyer told me, “Even with free legal counsel, you can’t do these cases without experts.
It is never a legal issue. It is always the experts that are more important than lawyers in
that setting.”513 An expert working for more-than-owner parties noted while lawyers and
planners “deal with the process”, without technical experts “the guns aren’t loaded” and
parties are unlikely to succeed.514 The Board Rules were amended in 2013 to include an
amended Rule 21 requiring experts appearing on behalf of Parties to a hearing expected
to be 10 days or more, or where requested by a Party, to sign the “Acknowledgment of
Expert’s Duty” form stating the following or provide the same information in the body of
their report:
I acknowledge that it is my duty to provide evidence in relation to this
proceeding as follows:
a) to provide evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within
my area of expertise; and
c) to provide such additional assistance as the Board may reasonably require
to determine a matter in issue.
Clause 4 also requires the expert to acknowledge this duty “prevails over any obligation”
to the party they are engaged by or on behalf of. Rule 21 requires that the form, along
with documentation of the expert’s qualifications, details of the issues he or she will
address, the opinions, reasons and conclusions of the expert, and a list of reports or
documents he or she will refer to, be served on other Parties and filed with the municipal
clerk 30 days in advance of the hearing. The Rule 21.01 now also sets out the “Duty of
the Expert Witness” in the same terms as above and including that these duties prevail.
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These changes brought the Board’s procedure for expert evidence in line with general
civil practice under rule 4.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which was introduced to
respond to concerns about “opinions for sale” and expert reports and evidence being
shaped by clients rather than the expert opinions of the professionals. 515 The changes,
recommended by Justice Osborne in the Report for the Civil Justice Reform Project,
clarified that the duty of the expert is to assist the court, first and foremost. Notably, the
Report acknowledges a lack of enforceability may limit the impact of the rule, but
concludes the change “cannot hurt the process and will hopefully limit the extent of
expert bias.”516
The role of experts and expertise is a particularly contentious issue before the Board 517
and the role of experts as “advocates” or “lobbyists” remains a concern for parties and for
the planning profession.518 Both more-than-owner and professional participants in this
study noted problems with retaining expert witnesses because of the costs, but also
because many experienced professionals were “conflicted out because they have all acted
for the proponent at one time or another” and “few experts want to work for NGOs.” 519
Several participants noted that they had “scoped down” or scaled back the issues they
would challenge at the Board because of the cost of hiring multiple experts rather than
based on the merit of the arguments.520 The Board has the discretion to determine the
weight that both expert and non-expert evidence will be given on any particular matter.
Even where more-than-owner parties were able to retain witnesses, lawyer and expert
participants in this study reported that the Board routinely gave more weight to proponent
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witnesses. One expert noted, “They do whatever they can to discredit you…there is
always this stigma if you work for rate payers. You see it in Board decisions. It will say
‘we preferred the applicant’s witnesses’”.521 Another more-than-owner group advised that
their ecology witness on an endangered plant species was found not to be an “expert,” as
he did not have academic credentials despite years of working in the field.522 As a witness
who regularly works for government and more-than-owner parties told me, because he
grew up in areas near to some of the sites in the applications he appears on, he has been
challenged as lacking objectivity rather than recognized as having relevant local
expertise: “Everything is legal. It is process. Everything is strangers from away. They
didn’t have any idea about the local agriculture.”523

Other witnesses also play a role in proceedings, including formal Participants and may be
required under Rule 21.02 to provide a witness or participant statement, including,
background, experience and interest in the matter, as well as details of the issues to be
addressed, evidence to be presented, and any reports to be relied on. More-than-owner
participants in this study shared experiences of engaging in the hearing process. One
participant shared his sense that the affective dimensions were deemed irrelevant: “You
take it on because you are human, yet you know full well that taking this emotional
impact to the Board has really no factual bearing. [The] Board couldn’t care less if you
cry.”524 Another reflected on the process, “It doesn’t listen to the heart. It listens to
legislation. I would think that rather than looking just at process, they should be looking
at the heart of the matter, the emotions…they shouldn’t be just restricting it to legal
issues and lawyers’ arguments.”525 Thus more-than-owner parties are required to spend
valuable resources on technical evidence, which is used by decision-makers to
supplement the inadequate proponent data and the lack of state-funded assessment, and in
doing so reinforce the exclusion of other issues, experience, knowledge, and values
relevant to the people-place relations at stake.
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iii. Decisions: Powers of the Board
The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and of fact in
matters before it.526 However, under the Aggregate Resources Act, the Minister can
specify the issues that the Board can determine.527 The Board can also refuse to consider
certain objections and continue with a hearing on the basis of remaining objections under
both the Act and its own Rules. As an administrative tribunal the Board does not follow
the stare decisis principle and members may consider, but are not bound by, prior
decisions of the Board.528

Section 12(1) of the Act sets out the matters that the Board, like the Minister, must
consider:
(a) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on the environment;
(b) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on nearby communities;
(c) any comments provided by a municipality in which the site is located;
(d) the suitability of the progressive rehabilitation and final rehabilitation plans for
the site;
(e) any possible effects on ground and surface water resources;
(f) any possible effects of the operation of the pit or quarry on agricultural resources;
(g) any planning and land use considerations;
(h) the main haulage routes and proposed truck traffic to and from the site;
(i) the quality and quantity of the aggregate on the site;
(j) the applicant’s history of compliance with this Act and the regulations, if a licence
or permit has previously been issued to the applicant under this Act or a predecessor
of this Act; and
(k) such other matters as are considered appropriate.529
In 2011, the Board in Jennison Construction, concluded that where a proponent has
satisfied the Policy Statement and municipal land use tests, the tests in section 12 would
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also be satisfied.530 In that case the Board has also determined that the “minimize adverse
interests” test set out in the Purpose of the Act must be addressed but concluded that it is
less onerous than the “no negative impacts test” set out in the Policy Statement. 531
However, it should be noted that section 12 of the Act applies more widely to the
“environment” rather than the specific natural heritage features considered under the
Policy Statement, which are discussed in more detail below.

If the Board directs the Minister to issue a licence, then they can specify conditions. The
Minister is not bound by the Board conditions if she finds they are not consistent with the
Act.532 The Provincial Standards impose a series of “Prescribed Conditions” for each
category of licence, including dust mitigation, blasting standards and hours, maintenance
of monitoring records, requirement to obtain any required Certificate of Approval and/or
Permit to Take Water.533 The standards also impose a set of “Operational Conditions,”
governing basic aspects of extraction, fencing, transport, berms and some aspects of
rehabilitation.534

Decisions by the Board are subject to an internal appeal under section 43 of the Ontario
Municipal Board Act, which allows the Board to “rehear, review, rescind, change, alter or
vary” it. Decisions are otherwise final; however, an application for leave to appeal on a
question of law can be made to the Divisional Court under section 96(1).535 The province
does retain one unique and powerful tool to intervene on planning matters, such as
appeals of official plans and amendments, through the ‘declaration of provincial interest
power’ by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, which renders the Board
decision subject to confirmation, variation or rescindment by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council (in practice Cabinet).536 This tool is rarely used.

530

Construction, supra note 248.
Ibid, at para 139.
532
Ibid, s. 11(8).
533
Supra, note 177, s.3.0.
534
Ibid, s. 5.0.
535
Supra, note 489.
536
Supra note 87, at s 17(51)-(54).
531

233

Part III: A Regulatory Regime in Flux – 2017 Amendments to the Act and the
Niagara Escarpment Plan
A. Aggregate Resources Act Reform
In 2011, during a provincial election campaign in which the proposed Melancthon Mega
Quarry north of Toronto became a surprise campaign issue, the incumbent Liberals
promised a legislative review of the Act.537 In May 2012, they initiated an all-party
review of the Aggregate Resources Act at the Standing Committee on General
Government. The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and
rehabilitation, best practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and,
aggregate resource development and protection, including conservation and recycling. 538
It did not include provincial planning policy or any other municipal or provincial
planning legislation, including consideration of the guiding Provincial Policy Statement
or the role of the Ontario Municipal Board in aggregate resources matters.

On Friday May 4, 2012, the government announced that the review would begin the
following Monday May 7, 2012, with hearings before the Committee on May 7, 9, 12 and
14 for 2 to 3 hours each day.539 The Ontario Environmental Commissioner and several
industry representatives were scheduled to depute during the first week. Similar to the
Bill 52 process described above, no community groups, agricultural groups or
environmental organizations were notified or scheduled to depute. The public, including
such organizations, were invited to provide written comments or submit a request to
depute during the remaining two days. After public outcry about the limited notice, the
location of the hearings in Toronto and not in host-communities, and very limited spaces
for deputation, the Committee held five additional public hearings in Toronto,
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Orangeville, Kitchener, Kanata and Sudbury. 540 The Committee heard 86 deputations
from industry, municipal representatives, the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario,
community groups, environmental organizations, professional organizations and
individuals.541 Further comments could be submitted in writing. In addition, the
Committee spent portions of four days visiting 12 operating, rehabilitated, proposed, or
abandoned pits and quarries across Ontario. These visits were facilitated by, and
accompanied by representatives from the Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, as
well as individual aggregate companies and staff. 542 Members of the public or
community were not invited to participate in site visits. While the Report notes a visit to
the proposed site of the Melancthon Mega Quarry, local residents have noted that the
members simply drove by a portion of the site, having declined an invitation to visit the
adjacent farmland from local community members.543

When the Standing Committee on General Government released its report, the
recommendations focused on nine areas: improving public information; licensing and
fees; review of licences; the use of recycled materials; municipal responsibilities;
agricultural land; water resources; rehabilitation; and alternative modes of transport. 544
Given its narrow mandate, it is not surprising that the recommendations deal exclusively
with the managerial elements of the regulatory regime under the Act. With respect to the
licensing process, a central issue for many submitters, the Committee emphasized the
need for simplification and standardization, and the adoption of efficiency measures, such
as digital data collection for inspections.545 The Committee also focused on the use of
recycled aggregates and the need to standardize and possibly increase fees. 546 The Report
did recommend more scrutiny for significant site plan amendments and an increase in the
540

Report on the Review of the Aggregate Resources Act, supra note 12.
Transcripts of the deputations can be found online, see http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committeeproceedings/committee_transcripts_current.do?ParlCommID=8958&locale=en.
542
Report on the Review of the Aggregate Resources Act, supra note 12, Appendix A, 1.
543
North Dufferin Agricultural and Community Task Force, email dated November 4, 2013, on file with
author.
544
Report on the Review of the Aggregate Resources Act, supra note 12.
545
Ibid at 21–22.
546
Ibid at 21, 23.
541

235

public notification period, as well as identifying the need for stronger requirements for
rehabilitation on agricultural land and the assessment of cumulative impacts on water
resources.547 However, the report failed to address any of the deeper policy questions
about the privileged status of aggregate extraction over other land uses, the limitations on
the planning role of municipal governments, and the lack of acknowledgement of the
rights of Indigenous communities. Indeed, the two recommendations related to municipal
governments emphasize their circumscribed role, requiring them to “apply sound
planning principles” to the separating land uses and minimizing “disruption and tension
with current or future non-aggregate land uses.” Additionally, they recommended
Municipalities work with relevant ministries in the exercise of their responsibilities to
protect aggregate resources, accommodate extraction, and develop “suitable relationships
with neighbouring land uses.”548

In February 2014 the government released its “Comprehensive Government Response to
Standing Committee on General Government’s Report on the Review of the Aggregate
Resources Act” responding to the Report.549 In some respects the government response
went further than the Committee. They explicitly mentioned the need to meet
constitutional and other obligations to Aboriginal peoples, including the distinctive nature
of the Duty to Consult and accommodate.550 They also noted that it might be necessary
go beyond the recommendations made by the Committee with respect to site plan
amendments and agricultural land.551 They promised consultations with stakeholders and
Aboriginal communities on several issues: changes and enhancement to information and
studies required in the application process; changes to notification and consultation
requirements; agricultural impacts; and the site plan amendment process. However, they
also reinforced the limited role for municipal planning, only offering enhanced geological
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information to allow municipalities to implement the Policy Statement – in other words,
preserving and protecting aggregate minerals and extraction sites. 552

A series of sessions were held with key stakeholders, agencies, and First Nation and
Métis communities and a consultation paper was developed to seek feedback on proposed
changes. The “Blueprint for Change: A Proposal to modernize and strengthen the
Aggregate Resources Act policy framework” document was posted to the Environmental
Registry on October 21, 2015 with 55 days for public comment.553 The Ministry received
451 comments.554 The Blueprint was cautiously well received.555 As noted in the EBR
summary, comments strongly support changes to the regime but specific proposals
received mixed reaction. Notably the EBR summary notes that a large number of
submissions called for more transformative change to Ontario’s planning law and policy
than the Blueprint offered with respect to the protection of water and agricultural lands.
Further, several comments emphasized the rights of Indigenous communities as well as
the Duty to Consult. Many supportive commentators did note omissions or concerns
including the failure to require an analysis of need.556 Following the Blueprint
consultation, some further targeted consultation took place. Bill 39, An Act to Amend the
Aggregate Resources Act and the Mining Act, was introduced in October 2016 and
received Royal Assent in May 2017 at the very late stages of this project. Table 4 at the
end of this chapter summarizes the changes proposed in the Blueprint. The bolded text
indicates where a proposal has been incorporated directly in the amendments to the Act,
552
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including the section number in the Bill. Several of the changes have been noted above in
this chapter’s discussion of the legal and policy framework.

Most of the Blueprint proposals were not directly incorporated into the amended Act.
Like its predecessors, the amended Act is enabling legislation and much of the detailed
content is left to future regulations or to the discretion of the Minister. The current
Minister, Kathryn McGarry, noted this in her introduction of the Bill for second reading:
“Should this bill pass, we will continue to move forward with our phased approach, with
changes to regulations and provincial standards, including changes to fees to come soon
after passage.”557 She noted that the government will provide for further consultation in
the development of further regulations. However, with the exception of regulations
related to fees, there is neither a timeline nor any specific proposal for this process at this
time.

As a result, few of the more substantive proposals have been realized at the time of
writing. Indeed, some of these could lead to a range of outcomes depending on what is
actually proposed, which could then exacerbate the challenges faced by more-than-owner
parties and municipalities under the current framework. For example, as one submission
noted, while recycling of aggregate materials is important, the increased emphasis on
recycling at aggregate extraction sites could increase the pressure on rural areas to
accommodate impactful industrial activities largely related to urban growth and
development. In my view, the changes will do little to ensure the complex sociomateriality of the places at stake is foregrounded in future aggregate resource decisions.
The Act continues to be a proponent-driven regime and nothing in the Blueprint suggests
Ontario will move towards a broader publically driven strategic planning process for
aggregate minerals under future regulatory changes. Nor does it suggest any meaningful
increase in the capacity of the Ministry to deal with compliance issues and increase
enforcement activities.
557
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Several members at Committee and stakeholders have expressed concern about the lack
of detail in the Bill and submissions from several parties suggested that it should not go
forward until the proposed regulations are prepared and available for public review.558
New Democratic Member Michael Mantha noted at third reading: “Again, the
government is asking this Legislature to trust. This enabling legislation is vague and
leaves almost all of the crucial details to regulations.”559 Progressive Conservative
member Todd Smith observed, “In the 37 pages of legislation that deal with aggregate
resources, there were 59 references to regulation in the bill as it was before us at second
reading.”560 New Democratic member Jennifer French had specific concerns about the
substantive content that was left to Cabinet at second reading, none of which have been
resolved to date:
There are no interpretive guidelines or tools for approval authorities to
help them balance the need for aggregate operations with other public
interests. There is still no clear obligation to screen out pit or quarry
applications that conflict with the government’s own protections for
natural heritage or source water, as the Environmental Commissioner
recommended a decade ago. If the government is sincere about
modernizing the ARA to provide better environmental safeguards, then it
should demonstrate this in the legislation.561

While the Blueprint and Bill 39 were not the subject of this dissertation, this brief review
informs the recommendations and conclusions found in Chapter 9. It is not intended to be
comprehensive. Indeed, as the Act continues to be enabling legislation and much of the
substantive content is either contained in the Provincial Policy Statement, or is to be
included in future regulations or internal Ministry policy, it is premature to offer a
comprehensive analysis. Many of the government’s own proposals fall outside of the
558
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amendments, making it difficult to assess whether these proposals will be incorporated
and what impact they might have. As well, changes to the Policy Statement were outside
of the review and the amendment process, leaving the fundamental assumptions about
land use, development, and the privileged position of aggregate extraction unchanged,
and even reinforced. Amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Plan described below also
fail to challenge the hierarchical ordering of interests and actors in the context of
aggregate mineral development.
B. The 2015 Co-ordinated Provincial Plan Review: Changes to the Niagara
Escarpment Plan
As noted above, The NEPDA requires the government to review the Plan regularly and
now requires that it be reviewed at the same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the
Greenbelt Act under s.17 (1). A coordinated review of these and other Provincial Plans,
including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and the Greater Golden Horseshoe
Growth Plan began in 2015.562 The coordinated review began in 2015 with an appointed
advisory panel who developed a set of recommendations.563 The Panel members included
former Toronto Mayor David Crombie, a municipal planner, a geologist and former
Ministry of Natural Resources employee, and representatives from the Ontario Federation
of Agriculture, the development industry, and the viticulture industry. The review
included public and stakeholder consultation and the Commission and other arms-length
agencies participated in this process. Initial public consultation took place through online
submissions and a series of public meetings in March, April and May 2015. The
government developed draft plans and released these for a period of public comment until
October 2016.564 More than 1,000 comments were received on the draft plans. Final
revised plans were expected in early 2017, but had only just been released as this project
was completed.565 A detailed analysis is therefore beyond the scope of this project.
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Proposals and revisions directly related to aggregate minerals are briefly reviewed below
but were not the subject of this research. The Minister of Natural Resources makes any
final decisions about changes to the NEP pursuant to the review, as per section 17 (3).

As part of the review, the Commission provides the Ministry with recommendations
related to the NEP. The Commission prepared for the 2015 statutory review of the NEP
and the Provincial Plans with a series of Staff Reports and conversations about key issues
at the Commission. In September 2014, the Commission considered a staff report on
whether, 30 years later, Commission aggregate mineral policies had realized the goals
and intentions of the NEPDA, or whether changes were required to achieve protection of
the Escarpment.566 Many of the groups who participated in the research for this
dissertation made submissions to the Commission on the aggregate policies, calling for
an end to, or moratorium on, aggregate extraction in the NEPA. Despite the modest
recommendation by planning staff to “review and improve existing policies and
development criteria,” in September 2014 the Commission voted 7 to 5 to end aggregate
extraction in the NEPA. Commissioners characterized the staff recommended options as
“business as usual” and concluded, “[I]t is time to get back to first principles. There has
been a long period of accommodating aggregate extraction. It is time to transition and
phase this use out of the NEP.”567 In November 2014 staff presented a follow up memo
detailing how these changes would work in practice.568

The Commission made a submission to the Advisory panel in May 2015 and made final
submissions in December 2016. Their 2015 submissions included the recommendation
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that no new mineral aggregate operations would be permitted in the NEP area.569 The
revised Plan did not adopt this position and maintains that new Mineral Resource
Extraction Areas producing more than 20,000 tonnes can be considered through a plan
change.570 No plan change is required for extraction under 20,000 tonnes.571 It also
expressly incorporates the lack of a needs analysis as set out in the Provincial Policy
Statement directly into the Plan.572 The Commission has historically opposed this
clause,573 and has relied on a 2001 protocol with the Ministry acknowledging the
Commission’s authority to consider need. While applicants were not required to submit
evidence on need under the protocol, MNR would provide expert advice. For a number of
years the protocol informally remained in place and need has been considered in
applications within the NEP.574 In 2010, the protocol was updated to reflect the 2005
Policy Statement, which as described above, expressly excludes needs analysis.
Nonetheless, the Commission has continued to draw attention to the relevance of need in
considering the justification for a particular development since the renegotiation of the
protocol.575

Section 1.2.2 of the new Plan revised the requirements for amendments for Mineral
Resource Extraction Areas. It expressly excludes “demonstration of need” for the
resource, making the Plan consistent with the Policy Statement. It also revises the criteria
to be considered as follows:
a) protection of the Escarpment environment;
b) opportunities for achieving the objectives of the Niagara
Escarpment Planning and Development Act through the final
569
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rehabilitation of the site;
c) the protection of prime agricultural areas, the capability of
the land for agricultural uses, and its potential for rehabilitation
for agricultural uses; and
d) opportunities to include rehabilitated lands in the Niagara
Escarpment Parks and Open Space System.
Notably, the new criteria substitutes the very broadly defined term Escarpment
environment for the much more specifically defined former “natural and cultural
environment” outlined above, which included endangered (both regulated and nonregulated), rare, special concern and threatened species habitat. Escarpment environment
is defined in the new Plan as “the physical and natural heritage features, cultural heritage
resources, and scenic resources associated with the Escarpment landscape.”576 It remains
to be seen how this will be interpreted by the Commission and the Board and whether it
includes the same considerations included in the form criteria. The new criteria does add
express consideration of prime agricultural lands; however, it removes the “maintenance
and enhancement” standard for the “quality and character of natural systems, water
supplies, including fish habitat” from the amendment considerations.577 While the revised
general development criteria does include protection and, “where possible”, enhancement
for “key natural heritage features and functions” and “scenic resources and open
landscape character,” these are considered at the development permit stage rather than
the primary inquiry into whether the plan should be amended.578 Further, the revised
Plan’s development criteria provides an express exception for mineral aggregate
extraction within the habitat of endangered and threatened species in accordance with the
exceptions under the Endangered Species Act described above.579 Many of the “key
natural heritage features” are narrowly defined as those already designated as
“significant”.580 The Commission’s final recommendations opposed the exception for
mineral aggregate extraction and state that this policy is “inconsistent with the NEP
objectives for protection of key natural heritage features” and “would be considered a
lowering of the standard for protection of habitat of species at risk”.581 In my view,
576
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despite the position taken by the Commission in the lead up to the review, the revised
2017 Plan has weakened both the amendment criteria and the development criteria with
respect to aggregate mineral development in the Niagara Escarpment Plan Area.

C. Ontario’s Aggregate Reform: Opportunity Lost
In my view, the recent review and amendment process is a lost opportunity to bring about
transformative change in the provincial land use law framework. Instead, the
amendments reinforce the closure of the planning system to public debate and
contestation by exacerbating the highly discretionary nature of aggregate mineral
regulation and the determinative agency of the aggregate industry. They fail to respond to
the long-standing crisis in enforcement capacity and the lack of consultation and
accommodation for Indigenous rights. Perhaps most importantly, they leave the
hierarchical ordering of land uses in the Policy Statement unchallenged. The changes
uphold and reinforce the primacy of private ownership in a proponent driven framework
and a model of planning foregrounding a development-oriented and narrow view of
people-place relations. Therefore, despite six years of efforts on the part of legislators and
interested parties throughout the province, little has changed for Ontario’s quarry stories.
Individual site-specific land use planning conflicts will continue to provide the limited
but strategic openings for the assertion and articulation of alternative people-place
relations in Ontario’s land use law; however, the planning system remains closed to the
values such as ecological integrity and just sustainability and to relations of the places at
stake. Aggregate proposals will continue to be amongst the most contentious land use
disputes in the province and more-than-owner parties will face the same barriers not only
to participation, but also to the inclusion and meaningful consideration of their
articulations about the people-place relations at stake.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the legal and policy framework through
which aggregate extraction is governed in Ontario. In particular, it considered the
structure of relations established and upheld by the Act and the Policy Statement,
examined the role of decision makers, owners and more-than-owner parties in the formal
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processes engaged by aggregate extraction decisions, and introduced recent and ongoing
amendments to the relevant statutes and instruments. The following chapters build on the
detailed understanding of the legal and policy framework developed here to undertake an
eco-relational assessment of Ontario’s quarry conflicts and the people-place relations at
stake.
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New definition of “established
sites” to allow for
grandfathering in newly
designated areas
Permit by rule for low-risk
activities with rules and
maximums for extraction on
private land for personal use
Conditions and time limits for
primary purpose exemption
orders
Table 4: 2017 Amendments to the Aggregate Resources Act
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Chapter Five – Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmental Rights
and Land Use Planning1

1. Introduction
Conflicts about how land can and should be used engage a complex web of relationships.
These include relationships between people, but also relationships between people and
places. Both these types of relationship are structured by formal law and by cultural
constructions of property, rights, and the non-human environment. In particular, the theory
and practice of “land use law”2 is informed by specific and “locatable” legal and cultural
narratives about what property is, and what it does.3 Anglo-American property law and the
land use planning regimes established in Canada attempt to contain people-place
relationships within the framework of private property ownership. While this ownership
model of property is often taken for granted in decision-making processes, struggles for
environmental rights in land use conflicts require us to “remember property” 4 and to critically
examine the ways in which it shapes our relationships with the non-human environment.
According to American property theorist Carol Rose, private property regimes “hold together
only on the basis of common beliefs and understandings.” 5 These narratives frame the way
human relationships to the non-human environment are regulated through formal land use
planning processes. In the case of Ontario, the ownership model is the dominant narrative in
cultural and legal discourse: property is about the exclusive relationship of an individual
owner with a particular ‘thing’ and the resulting control over access to, and use of, that thing
- in this case, land. However, the diversity of interests and claims engaged by contemporary
land use conflicts demonstrates that these conceptual and narrative frameworks do not

1
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account for the range of human relationships with the non-human environment. Nor do they
adequately provide space for the articulation and assertion of the full range of interests in
how land can and should be used. In particular, such frameworks fail to adequately account
for the non-ownership interests in land privately owned by others. These interests and the
creative ways they are reshaping land use law are the focus of this paper.

Part II of the paper provides a brief background on the ownership model of property and
property rights as it has developed in Anglo-American property law. Building on the work of
Australian property law scholar Nicole Graham, this section explores how contemporary
property law fails to account for people-place relationships. 6 Part III explores how a
relational approach to property law and rights discourse has the potential to open space for a
conceptual shift in human relationships with the non-human environment. The promise of
relational analysis to more accurately identify “what is really at stake” 7 in land use conflicts
is explored by bringing together Graham’s property critique and Jennifer Nedelsky’s
relational analysis. In Part IV, I consider these relational perspectives in the context of recent
aggregate extraction conflicts in Ontario, which have emerged as some of the most
contentious environmental disputes in the province. 8 Three recent decisions are considered
to demonstrate how quarry disputes can serve as strategic opportunities for the assertion of
person-place relationships and non-ownership interests in land. Part V offers concluding
thoughts and considers some implications for further research into the role of non-ownership
claims in land use planning disputes and property law.

2.
Constructing Property: Owners and Non-Owners, Places and Things
A specific vision of what property is, and what it does, underpins the basic legal frameworks
governing how land, water and natural resources are used in English Canada. This vision
exists in the theory and practice of land use law and it fundamentally shapes the
jurisprudence interpreting and applying those frameworks.9 A multitude of valuable and
6
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diverse critiques of the historical development and contemporary application of property in
legal theory and practice exist within legal scholarship and other disciplines. 10 It is beyond
the scope of this paper to review them here. Rather, I am specifically concerned with how the
ownership model of property shapes contemporary people-place relationships and the way we
make decisions about the land and environment.

Property as the foundation of contemporary land use law is constructed as a way of
organizing abstract rights of ownership, control and alienation of things as between people:
“[T]he dominant view of property, in both legal and cultural discourses, is one of abstract
entitlements as between persons which are alienable from, rather than proper to, a person.” 11
Following from John Locke’s property theory as it developed in England, and in Canada
under British colonial expansion, formal title to land is given supremacy over other types of
claims and relationships. Historically, enclosure processes facilitated the privatization of
commonly owned resources in England as they were transformed into individually owned
parcels of land. Indigenous legal scholar John Borrows explains how, in Canada, colonial law
“imposed a conceptual grid over both space and time which divides, parcels, registers, and
bounds peoples and places.”12 Complex Indigenous systems of government and law
regulating person-person and people-place relationships were ignored and purposefully
undermined as settlers undertook the work of ordering and managing space. 13

Central to the ownership model of property, and its role in colonial expansion, is the
presumption of a dichotomy between nature and culture, whereby people (the owners) are
detached from places (the owned).14 Property, under this model, is a person-person and not a
people-place relationship. Commodification through transformation and cultivation of nonhuman nature is not only inevitable, but also, necessary for the common good. 15 The right to
10
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use land is so integral to this model of property that it is protected even when a particular use
may harm the land in ways that fundamentally transform or destroy it.16 As Graham argues,
“[m]odern legal discourse does not countenance the possibility of reciprocity between people
and place, much less obligation or responsibility of people to place.”17 Further, as a personperson relation, property rights construct persons as either owners or non-owners, serving as
boundaries that not only result in systemic inequality, but, require it.18 Property rights are
defined by acts of transformation, cultivation and development of non-human nature for use
and profit, and include both the power to exclude and control in relation to other persons and
the freedom to alienate or dispose of one’s property as one chooses. 19
Graham emphasizes the ‘dephysicalisation’ of property as a key development in modern
western property law. It is through this “contemporary legal expression of the nature/culture
paradigm” that property is defined as a person-person relationship, and place is rendered
meaningless in contemporary legal disputes.20 Dephysicalized property protects value rather
than things.21 The value of land becomes abstracted from its physicality, which is subsumed
in the value created through its use and the corresponding ability to exclude all others from
that use. As American scholar Kenneth Vandevelde notes, the Hohfeldian concept of
dephysicalized property, “banished the need for things from property”. 22
Graham traces dephysicalisation in property law to Locke’s “uncanny rationalisation of the
physical severance of people and place.” Linking this separation of people and place with the
imposition of colonial legal order, Graham argues that laws derived from this model make
certain kinds of land use possible.23 Places are transformed into commodities, valued only for
their use for production and profit. Land is no longer understood as part of a particular place
with spatial or temporal limits.24 However, she argues, people-place relationships are
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nonetheless material: “The trouble with defining property as ‘dephysicalised’ is that it is not
– property relations, by which I mean the relationships between people and place, are
material relations – something the law finds deeply problematic.”25 The result, Graham
argues, is a “maladapted” and dysfunctional system of land use law.26 While legal theory and
practice maintain the irrelevance of the physical, property rights operate to protect these
forms of use regardless of spatial or temporal location with “material consequences” for local
ecosystems and peoples:
Because the places are not seen in their ecological context, but as a source of
commercial profit, the paradigm of modern law does not merely prescribe a
dephysicalised property relation in an abstract sense. The paradigm of modern
law prescribes its materialization through land use practices that have no
necessary response to or correlation with their local ecological contexts.
Dephysicalised property is, therefore, not only abstract, it is real.27
Indeed, the property narrative guiding colonial settlement in Ontario “profoundly and
purposefully changed” the natural environment, according to historian David Wood. He
argues that the transformation of the natural world and “the drive for progress, in itself
became an ideology – indeed, the prevailing, almost universal land ethic of the province.”28

This dominant property narrative shapes whether and how interests in land and the nonhuman environment can be articulated and asserted in legal forums. It shapes the legal and
cultural recognition and treatment of such claims in decision-making processes related to land
use and environmental planning.29 The legal discourse of property in which Canadian
planning law is embedded has traditionally been “closed” to place-based analysis. Claims
asserting people-place relationships in land use decision-making forums have been
understood as disruptive and subversive. 30 However, the limitations of the dominant
framework are increasingly exposed in land use conflicts, as non-owner parties assert
interests in private land and articulate rights that exceed the boundaries of the ownership
model.
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3.

Property and Place: Relational Approaches
The strangeness and crises of people-place relations prescribed by modern
property law are increasingly evident from disputes over property rights where
what has been lost has not been the right, but the place.31

Feminist legal theorist Margaret Davies recently noted an emerging scholarly interest in
alternative articulations of property – “what might be optimistically called the beginnings of a
paradigm shift in the meanings and extent of property and its ties to individualism and
liberalism.”32 She points to feminist critiques of liberal individualism and property rights that
have called for a more relational approach – consideration of the context and relationships
within which property is situated.33 Citing “stewardship” as an emergent concept, Davies
notes a shift from property law as the realm of fixed, exclusive individual rights, to more
discretionary rights, which she describes as “more fragile, contextual, and limited use.” 34 She
argues that the strengthening of environmental and planning law, including the incorporation
of stewardship concepts in jurisdictions like Australia, is evidence of law’s opening to these
alternative visions of property. 35

Canadian feminist legal theorist Jennifer Nedelsky has long advocated a rethinking of rights,
and of property rights in particular, from a relational perspective. 36 In focusing on
relationships, she is referring not only to personal relationships, but also to the “structural and
institutional relationships” structured by law and rights. This structuring is the work that law
and rights actually do, she argues, and therefore, it should be exposed and placed at the center
of our analysis.37 Like Graham’s places, relationships are central to our material existence,
yet are obscured by the legal discourse of the autonomous and bounded individual. “A
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relational analysis,” Nedelsky argues, “provides a better framework for identifying what is
really at stake in difficult cases and for making judgments about the competing
interpretations of rights involved.”38 Further, in Nedeskly’s opinion, a relational reorientation
of rights as more than individual entitlements provides a “welcoming framework” for
concepts that blur the distinction between the individual and the collective.39

While Nedelsky expressly maintains the dephysicalized construction of property as primarily
about relationships between people, she points to the need for further development of her
relational analysis to encompass the relationships between humans and non-humans.40 Her
critique of the property-inspired language of boundaries embedded in contemporary notions
of ‘rights’ points to the need to rethink what property is: “We need to take our traditional
concepts like property, and ask what patterns of relationship among people and the material
world we want, what patterns seem true to both integrity and integration.”41 Nedelsky’s
reconceptualization of autonomy - from requiring independence from the collective to being
enabled by constructive relationships - opens up conceptual space for place as more than
commodity.42 Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place relationship in property
relations is a starting point for the future project of using the relational approach to articulate
the responsibility of humans to the non-human world.43

Graham also aims to (re)centre the notion of relationship - in her case, the people-place
relationship that property law has erased and excluded. In doing so, Graham rejects the
dualism of either anthropocentric or ecocentric analyses of environmental crises:
The concepts of network and interconnection open a space for the notion of
inalienable relationships between people and place. The idea that relationships are
interdependent and multilinear works against the idea that relationships are
oppositional within the dichotomous nature/culture paradigm of anthropocentrism. 44
In fact, she notes, the etymological origins of the word “property” invokes a “mutually
formative” relationship between property and identity.45 In the original sense, property was
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all about the interconnections between people and things, with land in particular being central
to the formation of identity for individuals and communities. 46 Graham and others have noted
echoes of this in the way that lay persons and communities assert interests based on
generational or other forms of connection with a particular place.47
Both Nedelsky and Graham seek to “open space” to reorient legal discourse towards already
existing relationships and the work they do. Both point to the failure of property law to
recognize relationships fundamental to the material conditions of life as the source of
dysfunction in the law, resulting in its failure to adequately respond to ongoing and emergent
social and environmental crises and conflicts. And, while both engage at length with the
theoretical aspects of this potential reorientation, they are also deeply concerned with the
practical outcomes of this present dysfunction. In particular, abstract rights limit the ability of
interested parties to meaningful express their claims and connect their experience to the
formal decision-making process. As Graham observes in the context of land use conflicts,
“courts swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into disputes over
abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss associated with
transformation of the non-human environment become “dissident voices.”48
Nedelsky proposes a four-step approach to resolving a particular dispute.49 Her approach is
based on her distinction between values and rights. Values, she argues, are the big abstract
articulations of what a society sees as essential to humanity. Rights are specific “institutional
and rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing such values.”50 Rights, in
Nedelsky’s model, are not rigid and universal or timeless, they are contextual, negotiated and
evolve around the kinds of relationships we need to pursue our values. Presented with a
specific dispute, the inquiry begins by examining how the legal structuring of the relevant
relations is related to the conflict. Having identified the underlying context, the question
becomes, “What values are at stake?” Once the values are articulated, the inquiry shifts to the
kinds of relationships that would foster those values. Finally, with these relationships in

Ibid; David Seipp, “The Concept of property in the early common law” 1994 12 Law and History Review, 29
at 49.
47
Ibid at 27; Davies, supra note 10 at 27; David Lametti, “The concept of property: relations through objects of
social wealth” 2003 325 UTLR 325 at 354.
48
Graham, supra note 7, at 163.
49
“Law’s Relations”, supra note 7 at 236.
50
Ibid, at 241.
46

258

mind, the question becomes how would different types of rights structure relations differently
in the relevant context?51
Creating space for articulations and assertions of the people-place relationship in Ontario’s
land use law framework requires the kind of creative reorientation suggested by Graham and
Nedelsky. Contemporary land use and property law are fundamentally structured to maintain
and enforce the ownership property narrative and abstract property rights. However,
Canadian law does provide some examples of strategic challenges to this vision of property
relations. Constitutional rights and title claims by First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples, as
well as the (re)assertion of Indigenous law in many parts of Canada, fundamentally challenge
colonial legal frameworks governing land use and people-place relations.52 Feminist family
property litigation has also successfully challenged law’s construction of ownership and
property relationships.53 While these are the result of legal strategies as part of broader
political projects that found strategic ways to push legal boundaries, and should be
understood as partial and vulnerable in the context of ongoing colonization, racism and
gender inequality, they demonstrate that dissident voices can use legal processes to advocate
for alternative visions of property. As I will outline below, recent land use conflicts about
aggregate extraction in Ontario demonstrate potential strategic cracks in the land use planning
framework. Rethinking rights through the assertion of place and the expression of our relation
with places, has the potential to help us find and use them to reorient property and rights
towards environmental justice.

4.

In Context: Aggregate Extraction, Place and Property54
Except at the front where the Great Lake pounds and the beach stones form everchanging terraces – solid waves of their own in response – Loughbreeze Beach
Farm spreads in ruin around Esther. The parts of it that are not being claimed by
that which is unclaimable are being excavated by industry: the growing quarry,
the impossible earth-wound made by the cement company. Meadows she played
in as a child, woodlots, cornfields, and pastures have disappeared into this gaping
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absence. Past midnight, when the lake is calm, Esther has for the last ten years,
been able to hear huge machines grinding closer and closer to the finish of her
world.55
Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner recently noted that aggregate extraction, more often
referred to as quarrying, has become one of the most contentious land use issues in the
Province.56 Since 2005, conflicts over large-scale quarry developments in the urban-rural
fringe of Southwestern Ontario have resulted in major community mobilizations,57 complex
multi-year litigation,58 a foreign investment protection claim against the federal and
provincial governments,59 and an election promise of legislative review.60 Non-owner parties
to quarry disputes have raised issues ranging from Indigenous sovereignty to food security
and public health; and, from regional economic development and water rights to
international trade.61 The range and diversity of claims raised by these parties through
formal objections processes, political campaigns, the media and litigation, make it clear that
current legal and policy frameworks are unable to account for the complexity of property
relations engaged by these land use conflicts.
Ontario’s quarry conflicts offer an opportunity to examine the complexity of contemporary
property relations as non-owner actors - First Nations, local ratepayer and community groups,
farmers, environmentalists, and municipal governments - attempt to assert a variety of claims
to privately-owned property. These claims do engage the person-person relationships
between owners and non-owners at the center of traditional property law. 62 However, this
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paper is concerned with these conflicts because they also engage the much less visible, and
much less examined, people-place relationship between non-owners and the land itself.

Because quarry disputes in Ontario are regulated through land use planning law, they serve as
a possible strategic entry point from which to shift the legal discourse about our relationships
to land and the environment. As administrative processes, land use decisions present unique
opportunities for non-owner persons and groups to assert claims within a legal process.
Otherwise legally obscured people-place relationships can emerge as troublesome and
subversive actors in these conflicts. As well, despite the abstract model of property rights
informing the land use planning system, the physical reality of the land in question is
uniquely exposed in land use planning disputes, as principles of property law and
environmental law are simultaneously invoked. In this context, quarry conflicts offer a
strategic opportunity to reinsert the people-place relationship into both legal theory and
practice.

A. Legislation and Policy – The Aggregate Licensing Process63
A detailed overview of the complex regulatory regime applicable to aggregate extraction in
Ontario is beyond the scope of this paper. A brief overview is provided below, with particular
attention to the way the applicable law and policy constructs the boundaries of the legal
process and the relevance of the places in question. Aggregate licensing applications also
incorporate aspects of other regimes, in many cases the environmental regulation of water
and air, but potentially also regulatory regimes at different scales of governance, such as the
constitutional and treaty rights of Indigenous peoples, as well as Indigenous legal orders,
and increasingly, investor protection mechanisms in international trade agreements such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement.64
The Aggregate Resources Act65 provides for several categories of aggregate mine.66 This
paper, like the majority of high profile aggregate conflicts, is concerned with large scale,
below the water table aggregate quarries, requiring a Class “A” Quarry Below Water
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license under the Act.67 For this type of licence, a landowner must make an application to the
Ministry of Natural Resources (the “Ministry”). A site plan and technical reports prepared
by a “qualified” professional must be included in the application.68 While the Act
contemplates statutory guidance for application requirements, no such regulations have been
enacted. Guidance is contained only in two Ministry policy documents, the Aggregate
Resources Provincial Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal
Procedures Manual.69 Together these documents specify the technical information and
reports required, including expert hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s)
and cultural heritage report(s). Based on this information and the objections received from
members of the public and other government agencies through the processes outlined below,
the Minister of Natural resources can issue the licence, refuse to issue the licence, or refer
the matter to the Ontario Municipal Board (the “Board”) for a hearing.70

While these policy requirements flow from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts are
focused on the local municipality’s Official Plan. If the land is not currently designated as a
“mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the
Planning Act.71 Under the Act no license can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an
applicable zoning by-law.72 Therefore, most aggregate disputes turn on whether the decision
of a local authority to amend, or not to amend, the Official Plan conforms to the Provincial
Policy Statement (the “Policy Statement”).73 Under the Planning Act, the Policy Statement
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serves as the guiding document for all land use decisions in the province. It stipulates that all
policy and decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the Ontario
Municipal Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent with the Policy
Statement.74

Since the first version was approved in the 1990s, the Policy Statement has consistently
prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and development. Prior to the first PPS,
aggregate resources were declared a “matter of provincial interest” in 1986, effectively
requiring municipalities to prioritize the protection of aggregate resources above other land
uses.75 This prioritization has been maintained through to the present. In 2005, the Policy
Statementwas revised to eliminate any consideration of provincial mineral resource needs in
licensing decisions. The current version states,

Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type of
supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability,
designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or
elsewhere.76

The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits,
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude or hinder”
extraction.77 In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a license “ceases
to exist”,78 resulting in the strange phenomenon of a licensing regime with no possibility of
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the
changes to surrounding land and land uses.

The Policy Statement also implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource protection and
development on a specific geographic area within the province by requiring that “as much of
the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as close
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to markets as possible.”79 The majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area
and the surrounding Greater Golden Horseshoe region.

While the Policy Statement provides for absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies
and existing operations, social and environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than
avoided.80 This despite s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected
for the long term”, and s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve
or restore the quality and quantity of water.” The Policy Statement sets up a clear conflict
between these requirements and its prioritization of mineral aggregate extraction. At first
glance social and cultural features are given greater protection as they “shall be
conserved.”81 However, a close examination of the Policy Statement reveals that protection
of natural and social-cultural features is largely limited to features formally deemed
“significant” by provincial policy.82

The Policy Statement attempts to resolve this apparent conflict by classifying aggregate
extraction as an “interim” activity.83 “Rehabilitation” to “accommodate subsequent land
use” is explicitly required.84 However, the lack of any standards for rehabilitation beyond the
promotion of “land use compatibility” demonstrates the failure to understand the site of
extraction as a place with value beyond commodification or acknowledge its relationships to
the adjacent environment and communities. Land identified as containing valuable aggregate
deposits is treated, in Heidegger’s words, as “one vast gasoline station for human
exploitation.”85 Beyond the absurdity of a potentially infinite licence for an “interim”
activity, and concerns about the nature and quality of rehabilitation, the Environmental
Commissioner has expressed serious concerns about the current number of abandoned
aggregate pits and quarries and the slow rate of achieving basic levels of rehabilitation. 86 At
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the current rate, the Canadian Environmental Law Association recently estimated it would
take between 234 and 335 years to rehabilitate the 6,900 abandoned pit and quarry sites in
Ontario.87

The disconnect between the purported protection of natural, social and cultural features and
the prioritization of aggregate extraction in the Policy Statement is most evident in relation to
the treatment of agricultural lands.88 Despite mandatory protection of “prime agricultural
land,” aggregate extraction is permitted as an interim use on farmland. Requirements for
rehabilitation to “substantially the same areas and same average soil quality” explicitly
exempt the most potentially harmful class of below the water table quarry. The exemption
applies where the applicant can show that much of the resource is below the water table or
where extraction is so deep as to render rehabilitation “unfeasible”. The current Policy
Statement requires that the applicant also demonstrate that alternative locations have been
considered and that agricultural rehabilitation is maximized in remaining areas. 89 While the
land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and potentially as
having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities for food
production, its value as a commodity is ultimately what matters. The Policy Statement is
constructed in such a way that other claims are trumped by the protection of the resource
value.

B. Legislation and Policy – Notice and Participation90
While there are no statutory public consultation standards in the Act, Ministry policy
requires the proponent to provide public notice. This triggers a 45-day “notification” period
during which members of the public, local governments, and provincial ministries and
agencies can file objections to the proposal.91 Within two years, the proponent must “attempt
to resolve” objections and must submit a list of unresolved objections and documentation of
attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for resolutions to the Ministry and to
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remaining objectors.92 A 20-day notice period is then triggered during which remaining
objectors, including government agencies, must submit further “recommendations” or they
are deemed to no longer object.93

Non-owner third parties in Ontario cannot appeal land use planning decisions as-of-right.
While the provincial Environmental Bill of Rights provides for parties with a demonstrable
interest to seek leave to appeal certain kinds of decisions,94 the test for leave is “stringent”
and the majority of applications have been turned down.95 In practice, the Board hears
aggregate disputes as a result of a Ministerial referral, or an owner-applicant’s as-of-right
appeal from a Ministerial decision. Non-owner parties who object to proposals during the
initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to hearings ordered
under the Act.96 As a result, quarry litigation often formally includes non-owner parties
either as individuals or as groups with similar interests in the proceedings. While
opportunities to participate are limited by the ability to retain legal representation and fund
independent technical research, objector participation does present a procedural opportunity
for non-owners. Unlike property disputes in other forums, these land use conflicts are at least
theoretically open to claims from third parties without ownership interests.

In addition to public notice, the proponent is required to host one public presentation in the
local area during the notice period. Neither the technical experts retained by the proponent
nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist the public in
interpreting the reports. Most aggregate licence applications are also posted to the
provincial Environmental Registry, a public online database for environmental decisions, for
a minimum of 30 days under the Environmental Bill of Rights. However, these comments are
not considered to be objections under the Act and therefore do not afford the objector the
same procedural rights outlined above. The proponent is also not required to respond.
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C. Quarry Places: Current and Recent Cases
While the legal and policy framework outlined above demonstrates how the ownership model
of property fundamentally shapes Ontario’s land use regime, recent quarry decisions
demonstrate that land use conflicts provide a strategic opportunity to reorient law towards
people-place relationships and relational analysis. In particular, several themes emerge from
three recent and highly contested quarry cases: James Dick Construction Ltd. v. Caledon
(Town),97 Nelson Aggregate Co., Re98 and Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re).99 The first part of
the analysis is organized around four themes identified in the decisions: 1) onus; 2)
precaution, 3) reinserting need, and, 4) place and ecological context.100 The decisions are then
considered through Nedelsky’s four-step relational approach. While none of the parties
advanced a relational analysis, nor did the Board in any of these cases adopt one, the reasons
in these decisions demonstrate openness to the centrality of relationships and the significance
of place in decisions about land use. Applying Nedelsky’s approach to these decisions
demonstrates how a relational perspective could help to clarify what is stake and identify a
path to resolution in future land use disputes.

i. Onus
The issue of onus is significant in land use decisions because in many ways, the hearing process
operates on the terms of the applicant landowner. The licensing process is set in motion by the
owner’s proposal to use private land for extractive purposes. As a result of the applicant-driven
nature of the process, the vast majority of the evidence that comes before the Board is prepared
and presented by experts employed by the applicant for the purpose of having the licence
approved.
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In practice, objectors are often burdened with proving that extraction will cause negative
impacts, and expert evidence to demonstrate this is expensive and logistically difficult to obtain.
The majority decision in Walker is an excellent example:
There is no compelling evidence before the Joint Board that the proposed
application would offend the first Purpose of the NEP, as in this area the Niagara
Escarpment and lands in its vicinity will be maintained as a substantially natural
environment and there will be no break in the continuous natural environment
resulting from this application. This is clearly shown on Exhibits 314 and 315.
Nor is there any compelling evidence that a quarry use cannot be compatible with
the natural environment.101
In weighing the evidence before the Board, the majority largely accepts the evidence put
forward by applicant. A close reading of their decision reveals an implicit link between the
owner-applicant’s economically-oriented relationship to the land and the majority’s
preference for their evidence. At the outset, the majority characterizes evidence about the
benefits of the proposed quarry as definitive: “it is clear that the proposed quarry is a highly
significant project for the local community which will create jobs and contribute millions of
dollars to the local economy.”102 In contrast, the majority appears to treat the non-owner
objections as suspect, requiring them to provide “compelling evidence” to overcome the
presumption that the applicant has the right to determine what is best for their property. They
characterize the issues raised by non-owners as “legitimate concerns,” subtly contrasting their
indeterminate nature to the definite economic benefits established by the applicant. 103
As noted by the dissenting member, the majority overwhelmingly “prefers” the evidence and
the witnesses put forward by the applicant, or concludes that the opposing parties “have not
put forward any compelling evidence.”104 He notes that the majority does not provide reasons
or make findings of credibility to explain these preferences or conclusions.105 The majority
explicitly acknowledges being “significantly influenced” by the applicant’s status as the
owner-operator of an existing quarry on adjacent lands. On this basis they describe aggregate
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extraction as a “long-established land use” and note the “positive history” and “lack of
negative impact” of the applicant’s existing quarry. 106
The majority notes that they considered the applicant’s “many years of data.” 107 However,
they fail to acknowledge the argument put forward by one of the non-owner parties that the
existing quarry is a poor case study as it was established in 1964, long before the existing
approvals process and regulatory monitoring regimes were established.108 As there is no preextraction baseline for the existing quarry lands, any conclusions about its impact are of
limited use at best, and potentially misleading at worst. In contrast, the dissenting member
notes that monitoring data has only been collected from 1996 on the existing quarry lands and
concludes that it is of limited use without baseline data about the hydrological or natural
systems prior to extraction.109

In contrast, the dissenting member in Walker emphasizes the onus on the proponent, finding
that the majority in had in fact reversed it.110 He goes on to note that under the majority’s test
few proposals could fail.111 The dissenting member also took care to note that amendments
and development permits “are not granted as of right”. 112 While aggregate development may
be a contemplated use within the applicable land use framework, in that case the Niagara
Escarpment Planning and Development Act, it is “only such development…as is compatible
with that natural environment”.113 While the majority concluded that their role was to
“determine the appropriate balance” between the environmental, social and economic
benefits,114 the dissenting member explicitly rejected this “rebalancing” approach. 115 He
found that the Niagara Escarpment Plan was an “environmentally focused plan” and other
contemplated activities, regardless of their purported social and economic benefits, are
secondary, and in the case of aggregate mining, restricted.116
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In Rockfort, the Board found that the Policy Statement clearly placed the onus on the
proponent, and not on the objectors, despite the lack of a statutory burden in the ARA:
The Board finds that this means that a proponent of development has the onus
of demonstrating no negative impact. Objectors to a development need not
demonstrate that there will be negative impact.117
While technically this burden under the Policy Statement applies to the Board’s
determination regarding the Planning Act approvals, the Board found this to be highly
relevant to the ultimate ARA determination.118 Further, while the Board in Rockfort noted that
the Policy Statement “acknowledges the importance” of aggregate extraction, it found that
mineral aggregate policies do not take priority over any other policy. 119

In Rockfort and the Walker dissent, the presumption of the hierarchy of ownership is limited
by the requirement that owners acknowledge other ecological and people-place relationships
with land. While the ARA framework and the process are structured around the ownership
relationship of the applicant to the land, these decision makers emphasize the onus on the
proponent to draw attention to a broader range of relations involved in land use and its
consequences. In doing so they expose opportunities for the structural relations imposed by
law to be reoriented.

ii. Precaution
In his review of judicial treatment of the precautionary principle, Chris Tollefson points to
the approach adopted in recent Australian decisions that put it to work where it can “add
analytic value.”120 In Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Hornsby Shire Council,121 the Land and
Environment Court of New South Wales found that the principle can be applied where two
conditions can be established; (1) a threat of serious irreversible environmental damage, and
(2) scientific uncertainty as to the environmental damage. 122 While the Rockfort and Nelson
decisions do not explicitly reference the precautionary principle, their analysis appears to put

117

Rockfort, supra note 97 at 271.
Ibid, at 271.
119
Ibid at 276.
120
Chris Tollefson. “A Precautionary Tale: Trials and Tribulations of the Precautionary Principle”, 2012,
Symposium on Environment in the Courtroom: Key Environmental Concepts and the Unique Nature of
Environmental Damage, University of Calgary, March 23-24 at 13.
121
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council, [2006] NSWLEC 133 [Telstra].
122
Ibid, at para. 128.
118

270

variations of the principle to work in circumstances fitting the Telstra conditions. Moreover,
the dissenting member in Walker expressly adopts the precautionary principle.

In Rockfort, the Board based the analysis of potential negative impacts on an unmitigated or
inadequately mitigated quarry, effectively a worst-case scenario approach, despite the
detailed and expert-prepared mitigation plan put forward by the applicant:
The Board finds that an unmitigated or an inadequately mitigated quarry could
have a disastrous effect on the natural features and functions on the lands
surrounding the subject property. Therefore a high degree of certainty, which
would be attendant upon demonstration by JDCL, is required before the Board
approves the applications. Such demonstration has not taken place.123
They did not accept the applicant’s argument that the analysis should proceed on the basis of
the impact of the mitigation plan working as proposed. Therefore, even while accepting the
conclusions of the applicant’s experts as “supportable,” the Board found that the applicable
Policy Statement and the Official Plan tests required more: “…demonstration of no
unacceptable impact on the natural environment is the test established by the Policy
Statement and OP, and that test goes beyond supportable conclusions.”124 The Board
explicitly rejected the Proponent’s argument that they could meet the standard because the
mitigation plan demonstrated a “strongly diminished risk of undesirable outcomes”.125 This
analysis is consistent with a precautionary approach, which Alan Randall describes as “driven
by big risks” and the prospective prevention of “plausible but uncertain threats of harm.” 126
Rather than weighing outcomes, the precautionary approach looks to the worst-case and if the
harm is “horrifying, even if unlikely,” prohibition may be the best result.127
In Walker, the dissenting member cautioned, “[e]ven if a proposed development may be
technically feasible, that does not mean it should proceed.”128 He noted that the applicable
Plan’s language, requiring that the amendment would ensure only compatible development,
sets a very high standard: “In other words, ‘possibly’, or ‘likely’, is not good enough.” 129 He
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adopts the precautionary principle as a minimum standard and finds the applicable regulatory
regime, the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, sets an even higher
standard of ensuring only compatible development.130
In Nelson, the Board’s rejection of the application was largely based on concerns about the
impact on one endangered species, the Jefferson Salamander. The Board took note of the
“knowledge gaps” about the species and its habitat, including the effectiveness of mitigation
efforts to address threats.131 Concluding that there is “still a great deal unknown,” the Board
found that “particular care must be taken when assessing impacts” on the species and its
habitat.132 The standard applicable in that case was to establish with “a substantial degree of
certainty that implementation of the proposed development will ensure that the Jefferson
Salamander and its habitat will be protected.” 133

In all three cases, the decision makers are indicating a shift from an adaptive management
approach, as proposed by the applicant and accepted by the Ministry, to a precautionary
approach. As Randall argues, “adaptive management is essentially reactive. It is all about
waiting until problems reveal themselves and seeking to resolve them by trial and error –
basically, standing aside when the lights go out and then feeling our way in the dark.”134
Applicant proposals to mitigate rather than prevent potentially catastrophic harm to land and
non-human species exemplify they type of maladapted land use practices and material
consequences that Graham’s argument result from law’s dephysicalized model of property. 135

iii. Reinserting Need
Despite the explicit rejection of need-based analysis in the PPS, the Board in Rockfort found
the issue of need to be relevant and explicitly re-inserted it into the analysis:
The language of the policy documents speaking to making as much of the
mineral aggregate as realistically possible, to the market as possible, implies a
Provincial, Regional and Town recognition of the need for the resource.
However that does not make the issue of need irrelevant to these proceedings.
James Parkin, qualified by the Board to provide expert land use planning
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evidence on behalf of JDCL opined that need is a relevant planning
consideration, as it goes to balance. The Board finds that this is the case. It
cannot engage properly in the mandated balancing exercise without
understanding whether there is a need for the aggregate resource. If there were
no demonstrable need for the resource in this Province the Board would be
unlikely to countenance the changes and impact that a stone quarry would have
on the Town and the Region.136
In that case, the applicant had adduced evidence to establish the need and the objectors did
not dispute it. Therefore, the Board accepted that need was established. However, the
decision clearly indicates a willingness to consider such evidence should it be put forward.

The Walker dissent goes further to conclude that justification of the amendment required
consideration of need and alternate sites in the context of that case.137 As in Rockfort, it was
the proponent in Walker who adduced evidence regarding need, which the dissenting member
interpreted as a waiver of the Policy Statement “need shield” and therefore accepted the
objectors’ evidence regarding need and alternate sites.138

iv. Place and Ecological Context
While all three decisions are largely expressed in terms of the technical evidence presented
by the parties, in some of the Board’s conclusions other voices are heard. In Rockfort and
Walker, the physical reality of the land in question emerges as a significant factor in the
decision, as do the material relationships asserted by objectors, both ecological and cultural.

The dissent in Walker expressly acknowledges the profound difference between land uses
that have the potential to be sustainable, such as farming or forestry, and the “radical and
complete” transformation of aggregate extraction: “In my view, a quarry operation is not in
the same category of features as farming and forestry. While they are all “human-made”, the
latter are sustainable uses of the land. A quarry is not sustainable - it removes land and
changes the landscape forever.”139 This recognition of the threat of the loss of place not only
acknowledges the physicality of the land, it recognizes the human relationships with that
specific place as relevant to the decision. In Graham’s terms, the legal decision is “grounded”
136
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in the material reality of the land.140 Citing Nelson, the dissent rejects the proposal to
“protect” significant natural features, including endangered species, by fragmenting the
landscape and leaving isolated islands of habitat in the midst of a large-scale aggregate
mining operation. The member goes on to reject the majority’s conclusion that rehabilitation
to a large human-made lake, fragmenting the existing natural features, would “maintain the
natural environment” based on the site-specific natural and cultural features of the landscape:

The footprint of the proposed quarry and the unnatural end-lake at the site will
drastically, and permanently, alter this unique ecologic area. It will result in the
destruction of most of the significant woodland that is its core. This will
diminish the remaining natural features, functions, and systems in the area,
including linkages, and surface and groundwater flow and recharge, and leave
isolated and oddly shaped landforms of uncertain long-term ecological value.141
The dissenting member further rejected a series of findings by the majority that would allow
destruction of significant natural features, concluding that it is impossible to maintain and
enhance the natural environment by removing features and functions.142 He rejected what he
called the “more elsewhere” approach, finding that a significant woodland on the site cannot
be destroyed because it is part of a larger woodland beyond the site. 143 He also roundly
rejected the proponent’s “Net Gain” proposal whereby woodland and wildlife habitat
permanently destroyed by the quarry would be replaced by “recreating them” in another
location:
If a feature is removed, or otherwise destroyed, in one area, and a similar feature
created in another location within the NEP Area, then an existing feature will be
destroyed within the NEP Area in the new location as well. The end result is that
there will be two areas where features have been destroyed. 144
Finally, the member explicitly rejects the characterization of the quarry as an “interim use” of
the subject land, finding that the total time period of activity until complete rehabilitation was
between 58 and 80 years.145

This analysis applies knowledge about the particular ecological and social systems of the
place in question to conclude that there are material physical limits to how the land should be
140
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used. The member concludes that these limits should be determinative of the appropriate use
for that place and explicitly distinguishes between forms of use that harm and destroy the
land and those that have the potential to be sustainable. In doing so, the member shifts away
from a fixed concept of ownership towards a contextualized understanding of property rights.
In Rockfort, the Board rejected the proponent’s arguments about the inevitability or
progressive nature of “change” and situates the subject lands as a place with a particular
environmental and social context with relationships to the land and people around it:
The Policy Statement directs conservation of significant cultural heritage
landscapes. The subject property is part of such a landscape and the eradication
of the agricultural context does not constitute conservation; it constitutes
destruction. Such destruction is an unacceptable impact.146
The Board’s conclusions point to the relationship between the land as a specific ‘natural’
place and the human community connected to it:
In addition, the fundamental change to the character of the area attendant upon
the proposed quarry would not be acceptable. The loss of views of rural lands,
the loss of a cultural heritage landscape and cultural heritage resources and the
conversion of a rural area into an urban area centred on a heavy industrial
operation cannot be permitted in the interest of the production of more aggregate
for infrastructure development. It is time for alternatives to aggregate for
infrastructure construction to be found. Too much of what is essential to the
character of this Province would be lost if aggregate extraction were to be
permitted on lands like the subject property. Lands situated in a significant
cultural landscape, surrounded by significant natural heritage features and
functions, are not lands on which extraction should be permitted in the absence
of demonstration of no negative impacts.147
All the parties agreed that there were “no significant natural heritage features” on the
property to be excavated or subject to activities associated with excavation. Nonetheless, the
Board found that the impact on groundwater systems and therefore on the surrounding area
dependent on the groundwater features would be negative.148 In Rockfort the Board is shifting
away from a presumptive use model to contingent ownership rights limited by the character
and integrity of a place. Based on an acknowledgment of the land as situated within social
and natural systems, the features and functions that make up a particular place are valued
above the abstracted resource.
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D. Applying a Relational Approach
The themes emerging from these cases reveal a potential shift in the responsiveness of land
use decision makers to assertions of non-ownership interests in private land. These cracks in
the property narrative at the foundation of land use law should be exploited both theoretically
and in practice. Creative thinking about relationships and rights has the potential to reorient
debates about land use and the structure of environmental decision-making. Nedelsky’s fourstep relational approach offers one way to begin this work. A full relational analysis of the
cases discussed above would require further research into the complex relations and the
diverse perspectives of the many parties involved in each case. What follows is a brief
theoretical application of the four-step approach to Ontario’s quarry conflicts based on the
information available in the quarry decisions and the themes discussed above.

i. How Does Law Structure the Relevant Relations?
The first step of Nedelsky’s approach is to consider the way that law structures the relevant
relations. At the outset of the ARA process, the owner as applicant is the primary actor and
their ownership of the land as private property is the core relation. While the establishment of
a regulatory regime like the ARA does provide for public interest limitations on the ownership
relationship, the relations it establishes are centered on the presumptive ability of an owner to
use the land as a “source of commercial profit.”149 The exclusive legal relationship to the land
and the resulting right to use it, even in ways that will fundamentally transform or destroy it,
fundamentally shapes the relationship of the owner to all other parties, human and nonhuman.

Non-owner parties are recognized within the legal framework of the ARA and the PPS.
However, the ARA positions non-owners as third-party objectors to a quarry decision with
limited standing and contingent relations. Third party relations are with the decision maker
and the decision-making process - they are set apart from the primary ownership relationship.
They are neither rights to the land nor a formal acknowledgement of a relationship with the
land owned by the applicant.150
149
150
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ii. What Values are at Stake?
A number of values may be at stake for the parties involved in quarry conflicts and each of
these could take various forms for each party. For the applicant, one of these values might be
expressed as the freedom to use property for private benefit and profit. For a non-owner
party, one value might be expressed as the need to understand and respect the capacities and
limits of land and ecological systems.

The process outlined in the Act shapes the space for these conflicting values to be heard and
accounted for by the decision makers in each case. In the cases discussed above, the
precautionary principle provided non-owners with an analytical tool to encourage the
decision makers to consider specific and place-based knowledge about the land and
environment in question. In this way, the reality of “physical limits to the status quo” became
a legitimate factor for consideration.151 Further, the precautionary principle opened up space
for the decision makers to prefer a prospective approach to managing risk, based on
knowledge of the relevant ecological systems, including the temporal and spatial connectivity
of particular places.152 The insertion of a needs-based analysis also provided an opportunity
for the decision makers to raise questions about whether a specific place can, or should, be
used in the manner and for the purpose proposed. Continued assertion of the need analysis in
quarry cases could be used to raise critical questions about commodification of land and the
interests served by a particular proposal: Is this specific aggregate needed? By whom? Where
is it needed? For what purpose is it needed?

iii. What Relationships Might Foster These Values
Nedelsky’s framework now turns our attention to the types of relationships that might foster
the values at stake. For the owner-applicant, the status quo ARA framework recognizes
ownership as the primary relationship in the approvals process. While the regulatory
approvals process ostensibly limits ownership rights, its applicant-driven nature privileges the
ownership relationship vis-à-vis non-owner parties. The applicant is free to propose a
fundamentally transformative use by virtue of owning the land, a relationship that is
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understood to include both the freedom to commodify the owned land and to exclude nonowner parties from using it. The discussion of onus above demonstrates how the applicantdriven process results in the owner’s information setting the terms of the debate. It becomes
the knowledge base for the decision-making process and all other actors articulate their
objections based on the information contained in the application as prepared by and for the
owner.

The cases reveal that the precautionary principle assists in conceptualizing relationships that
foster respect for the capacities and limits of land and ecological systems. Reorienting
people-place relations away from ownership as exclusion and commodification, and towards
responsibility, requires an acknowledgement of the human dependence on, and role in,
ecological systems. 153 As Graham argues, it is not a matter of replacing anthropocentric
relations with ecocentric relations that maintain the nature/culture dualism at the heart of
modern property law.154 Taking a precautionary, “slow-down and learn”155 approach to land
use decisions provides the necessary opportunity to understand complex ecological systems,
consider cumulative effects, and build responsibility for consequences into property relations.
Such an approach would necessarily include a contextualized needs-based analysis that
would consider the human need for extracted aggregate alongside other social and ecological
needs in the context of specific person-place relations. For example, a decision maker might
consider whether the aggregate to be extracted is part of a natural system that fulfills social
and ecological needs for the surrounding species and human communities. In this way, the
resource is understood to have functions and relationships as it exists in an ecological system
and not only as an abstract extracted commodity. Similarly, owners and non-owners are
understood as part of an interconnected ecological system that constitutes a specific place. An
owner’s relationships of dependence and responsibility to other people, other species, and the
land itself are acknowledged and made visible through a shift away from fixed exclusive
rights to the more limited and contextual forms of property relations noted by Davies. 156

153

Ibid, at 267; Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 18.
Ibid, at 18.
155
Randall, supra note 126 at 161.
156
Davies, supra note 32.
154

278

These types of relationships with land might be described as ‘stewardship’157 or
‘custodianship.’158 As Graham argues, they should be characterized by reciprocity with the
land and acknowledgment of interdependence and responsibility. 159 In Ontario, as in many
other places, examples can be found in the systems of law or jurisprudence of Indigenous
peoples, such as the Anishinabek form of ownership described by Borrows in which “land is
provisionally held for (con)temporary sustenance and for those unborn.”160 As Graham notes,
the point of looking to Indigenous legal practices and property relations is not to “essentialise
and racialise law but to identify and respect the intellectual integrity and practical success of
laws that have been and remain locally viable and authoritative.” 161 The key is that the land is
brought back in to property relations and the material consequences of destructive and
harmful uses are exposed and considered in the decision-making process.

In the cases discussed above, the conflict is not about the use versus non-use of the land. Nor
is it about changing ownership from private to public. Rather, quarry disputes are often about
conflicting forms of land use, such as extraction versus agriculture. The cases discussed
above demonstrate that use-based relationships articulated by non-owners can be understood
as potentially compatible or sustainable in a specific place, and therefore, preferable to the
transformative extraction proposed by the owner.162 At the same time, the cases reveal
openness to the less instrumental relationships articulated by non-owners, such as the
importance of maintaining the integrity of a landscape or the character of place for both
human and non-human needs. The point is not to erase human activity from the landscape,
but to expose our connections to land and consider the material consequences of a range of
human activities, including but not limited to those proposed by the owner.

iv. What Kinds of Rights Can Foster These Relationships?
Nedelsky’s final step brings us to the practical question of the rights that can foster these
relationships. In her words, what are the “institutional and rhetorical means of expressing,
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contesting and implementing such values?” 163 As this analysis has considered the role of nonowners in quarry conflicts, one possibility would be to consider new or improved rights for
third parties in the current decision-making process. Examples of such rights are discussed
elsewhere, such as proposals for a “right to a healthy environment.”164 Proposals for rights or
standing for the land or non-human species have also been proposed and might be
appropriately considered.165 However, by clarifying what is at stake, a relational analysis of
Ontario’s quarry disputes points to third possible approach – redefining what ownership and
its associated rights mean in land and property law.

Starting with a redefined ownership relationship has the potential to reorient the land use
planning process away from a contest of rights and interests. If ownership were understood as
affording limited and contextual rights of private use and benefit but to exclude rights to
fundamentally transform ecological systems and/or cause substantial harm or destruction of
the land, decisions about such uses would need to be made very differently. 166 There may still
be resources that we decide we need to use despite the potential to destroy or transform
places. However, such decisions would no longer be driven by an owner’s private decision to
profit from doing so. The material consequences could be exposed and examined through
independently obtained knowledge about the social and ecological systems of the specific
place. Reorienting land use law away from the ownership model of property could make
proposals for new forms of environmental rights for a range of parties, including non-human
species, less difficult to conceptualize and implement in practice. Rather than adding more
rights to the already complex existing conflict of claims and interests, these types of novel
rights would have the space to reshape law’s relations.
What would this look like in practice? In the context of Ontario’s quarry disputes this might
mean replacing the current licensing process with a publically-driven aggregate development
strategy informed by independent and specific place-based knowledge about the land and
social and ecological systems that aggregate minerals are a part of. In the short term, changes
could build on the opportunities revealed in the cases discussed above. For example, a
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statutory onus on the proponent to demonstrate that no negative impact will result from the
proposed quarry could be added to the Act. Requirements for both a needs-based analysis and
a precautionary approach could be included in the Act and the Policy Statement. Support for
non-owner parties to bring forward a range of concerns at all stages of the decision-making
process, including expensive expert scientific and technical evidence, could also significantly
improve the quality of the knowledge base for decision makers. But the focus of creative
legal interventions and law reform efforts should be clear – to transform the way law
structures our people-place relations from ownership to responsibility.
5. Conclusions
Examining land use law through a relational analysis opens up space for the creative
articulation and assertion of people-place relations in land use decision-making. As
Nedelsky’s work makes clear, law structures the relationships in quarry disputes – both those
between people and those between people and places. And as Graham argues, land use law
structures property relationships to obscure both the physical nature of property and the
relationships between people and places. In Ontario, the law and policy of land use
transforms places identified as sources of aggregate minerals into commodities – all other
natural, social and cultural features of the land are superseded by the use-value of the
aggregate. Claims based on non-ownership relations with other aspects of the land are
transformed into Graham’s dissident voices. The resulting legal “maladaption” has material
consequences as land use practices that disregard the ecological capacities and limits of
particular places continue to be not only permitted, but deemed appropriate and desirable. 167
Land use conflicts like Ontario’s quarry disputes arise as a result of law’s failure to account
for relationships with places outside of the ownership model, based on connections with the
social, cultural and ecological features of a specific place.

Future research is necessary to identify the range of values at stake in these disputes, as
diverse parties will experience and articulate the central concerns differently, perhaps
emphasizing ecological sustainability, environmental health, food security, or Indigenous
rights. Similarly, future research is needed to explore the diversity of relationships these
parties envision to protect these values – perhaps stewardship, custodianship, perhaps local
self-government or Indigenous sovereignty. The recent quarry cases outlined above reveal a

167

Graham, supra note 6 at 175, 206.

281

strategic opening for people-place relationships to be asserted by the non-owner parties with
an interest in how privately-owned land can and should be used. By articulating
connectedness with, and responsibility to, specific places in these forums, we can do at least
some of the work to move land use law beyond a model of property as a contest of abstract
rights to exclude and control. Creative re-thinking of what ownership means, what property
is, and the potential for reciprocal relationships between people and places, will be required if
we are to create rights that realize and institutionalize these relationships and protect these
values. Perhaps we can start, as Graham suggests, by looking outside of ourselves and take
direction from the very places at the heart of these debates:
If we want to know how to reshape our property law, we have to look no further
than the landscape because it is the landscape that reveals our place in the world
and the opportunities and limits of our connection with it.168
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Chapter Six – The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate
extraction disputes1
Introduction
Disagreements about property – what, where, and whose it is - take place in a range of
forums and can take many different forms. Such contestation often engages with formal law
at various stages. Therefore, while formal law may only be one aspect of contested property
claims, ‘law does matter’ to property relations and to the ways in which they can be contested
and transformed (Valverde, 2012, p. 6). This chapter examines the land use planning dispute
as one particular space in which disagreements about property occur. While land use has
been, and continues to be, treated as a presumptively neutral technical concept (Blomley,
2016), this chapter critically examines the role of legal ownership in land use law. It explores
the ways in which law ‘brackets’ human relationships with land to produce and (re)enforce
particular forms of land use (Blomley, 2014) by examining the specific work that legal
concepts of ownership are used to perform in disputes about how private land can be used (C.
A. Arnold, 2002; Blomley, 2016; Porter, 2012; Smit & Valiante, 2015; Valverde, 2012). The
discussion below, like O’Donnell’s work in this volume, explores the way that ownership is
used to shape the relationship between private property and planning in order to expose
opportunities for the creative rethinking of property relations. This chapter contributes to a
small body of scholarship exploring this relationship in the Canadian context (Blomley, 2016;
Smit & Valiante, 2015) through an examination of disputes about aggregate mineral mining
in the province of Ontario.

Land use disputes about particular places and developments are often embedded in broader
tensions about how private land can and should be used, and in whose interest such decisions
are made. Inherently involving a negotiation about the power of the state to place restrictions
on private property rights in order to benefit particular conceptions of the ‘public interest’

Forthcoming as, Estair Van Wagner, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate
extraction disputes” Mikkel Thorup, Maja Hojer Bruun, Bjarke Skærlund Risager & Patrick Cockburn eds.
Contested Property Claims: What disagreement tells us about ownership (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
Portions of this Chapter are the same or similar to portions of Chapters 2 and 4. These portions are italicized to
alert the reader what is repeated and allow them to skip these portions as desired, a note at the start of the section
points the reader to the relevant portions of earlier chapters. Citation style has been maintained as in the
publication, as has grammatical.
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(Smit & Valiante, 2015, p. 7), land use conflicts uniquely expose the relationship between
private property and planning. Groves et al. argue that planning forums can provide critical
opportunities to examine and rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy and to
consider larger questions about social, economic and ecological relations: ‘If a piece of
infrastructure is a kind of solution to a problem, participatory governance may, by including
more perspectives, enable the problem itself to be examined, along with the ways in which it
has been framed as a problem.’ (Groves, Munday, & Yakovleva, 2013, p. 342) In this sense,
planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking about how we relate to each
other and our environment despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or site-specific issues
of infrastructure siting or zoning. Yet, a resource-oriented and instrumental planning
perspective can obscure non-instrumental relations with land while foregrounding
instrumental relationships to land (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2001; Nash, Lewis, & Griffin,
2010). The ideological flexibility of planning makes it essential to identify how specific
concepts and tools shape the boundaries of conversations we have in land use processes, and
therefore, the outcomes.

British geographers Richard Cowell and Susan Owens point to the locally based resistance to
aggregate extraction in rural England as having successfully ‘reframed’ both the problems
and the solutions related to extraction.(Cowell & Owens, 2006, pp. 405–406). As they argue,
…the importance of planning lies not simply in its instrumental capacity to deliver
environmental sustainability, but in its relative openness to influence by
environmental interests and concerned communities, which enable connections to be
drawn between projects, plans and wider policies. (Cowell & Owens, 2006, p. 417)
They point to a key link between the successful use of participatory opportunities by
environmental interests and concerned communities and the integration of environmental
concerns into the formal land use decision-making framework (Cowell & Owens, 2006, p.
406; Owens & Cowell, 2002). This potential for creativity and reflection is largely dependent
on the process – whether the broad policy goals are realized through genuinely deliberative
processes and genuine opportunities to influence outcomes (Scotford & Walsh, 2013). One of
the central functions of law in land use disputes is to structure the relations between the
parties at all stages of the process. Law orders and manages relations between the parties and
the decision makers, but also, the less visible relations between all of these actors and the
land itself (Blomley, 2014; Nedelsky, 2012; Van Wagner, 2013, 2016a). As noted by both
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O’Donnell and Pasternak in this volume, the interests and agency of more-than-human actors
are obscured by colonial property relations in settler states; however, this structure of legal
relations attempts to shape the extent to which, and the ways in which, all actors, human and
more-than-human, engage with the particular decision-making processes. In doing this work,
law is used to bound and define the nature of the contestation in procedural and substantive
terms. In one sense this is a necessary exercise in organizing and scoping a particular dispute
in order to find realistic and timely ways to resolve it. Nonetheless, the specific ways in
which law is used to achieve this work have consequences that extend beyond the outcome of
a particular dispute as ‘a set of relations specified as legally consequential are bracketed and
detached from entanglements (ethical, practical, ecological, ontological) that are now placed
outside the frame’ (Blomley, 2014, p. 136). As noted by American environmental law scholar
Joseph Sax, layering-on increasingly complex environmental regulatory regimes has done
little to limit environmental degradation without attention to structural elements of the legal
system that create rewards and incentives for particular forms of land use and ecological
transformation (Sax, 2008, pp. 9–10).

While the success of bracketing may be limited and partial, Blomley notes that the work of
producing and upholding brackets is nonetheless deeply political: ‘When and how they are
constructed and who gets to bracket are deeply consequential questions. For not everyone has
the opportunity or the power to successfully frame law in ways that stick.’ It is, therefore,
important to understand precisely how this work is done through law and to trace its
successes and failures (Blomley, 2014, p. 139). As Valverde’s provocative work on
spatiotemporalities in law suggests, we must do so in terms of the interrelations between
space and time at work in particular contexts. She notes, ‘…for law to work smoothly,
disputes about the substance and qualitative features of governance have to be turned into
seemingly mundane and technical questions about who has control over a particular
spacetime’ (Valverde, 2015, p. 84). Both directly and indirectly, Valverde argues, the ‘how of
governance’ is sidestepped by transforming political questions into purportedly technical
questions about legal jurisdiction and ‘consumers of legal decisions are kept from asking:
how should problem X or Y be governed in the first place’ (Valverde, 2015, p. 86).
Ownership, it is argued here, is one key category through which land use law is used to
manage both the ordering of actors and events and to control the flows of knowledge and
information that are included or excluded in the process. As such, ownership works through
land use law in two key ways: It asserts the chronological power to control the sequencing of
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events; and, it simultaneously upholds the substantive power to manage and control the
messy complexity of relations engaged by decisions about how land can, and should, be used.

The disputes about aggregate mineral mining examined below provide one example of how
private ownership plays a critical role in bracketing the relationships between landowners,
other parties, and the land itself through land use law. These conflicts demonstrate that
despite explicit environmentally-focused policy goals and opportunities for participation in
planning law and policy, the enduring legal conception of property ownership as a
‘thingless,’ abstract bundle of rights brackets the procedural and substantive nature of land
use decision-making in significant ways. The ‘dephysicalized’ formal legal concept of
property deems human relationships with places legally irrelevant and therefore serves to
assert limits on development or use while other forms of relations with place are often not
cognizable (Graham, 2010; Hohfeld, 1913; Vandevelde, 1980). Dominant property relations
successfully foreground the role of land as commodity – an object that can, and indeed
should, be alienated and used for production and profit without regard to the specificity of
location and relational spatial or temporal effects (C. A. Arnold, 2013; Freyfogle, 2011; Sax,
2008). Other messy affective, social, and ecological relations with particular places are
severed for the purposes of legal decision-making, even where they have been invited (or
perhaps tolerated) at consultative stages in the planning process or are acknowledged features
of the natural systems at stake. As Blomley explains, this bracketing performs an ‘attempt to
stabilize and fix a boundary within which interactions take place more or less independently
of their surrounding context’ (Blomley, 2014, p. 135).

The centrality of the owner in aggregate extraction decisions is obscured by formal state
control of the licensing process and structural opportunities for participation. However, the
role of ownership in determining the sequence of events in the decision-making process
results not only in the power to determine when a decision-making process is initiated, it
situates the private owner at the peak of a hierarchy of land use planning actors. As such, the
owner is imbued with substantial power to shape spatial and temporal dimensions of how
land use governance is enacted and who can meaningfully participate and influence the
outcome. In Valverde’s terms, ownership answers preliminary questions about the who of
governance over the timespace of the application and the site; and, in doing so, ‘implicitly
determines how’ land use disputes should be governed (Valverde, 2015, p. 84, 86). This ‘remaking of nature-society relations’ through private property environmental governance
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mechanisms produces owners as ‘efficient, profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals’ without
regard to the nature of their relationship with the particular place at stake (Mansfield, 2007, p.
393) and without acknowledgment of the wider affective and more-than-human relations
engaged (Murdoch, 2005; Whatmore, 2002, 2006).

As the discussion below will demonstrate, these conflicts demonstrate that legal ownership
remains a powerful determinant of when and how land is used. Ontario’s public land use
planning framework formally upholds the public power to restrict private property rights
(Smit & Valiante, 2015), yet private ownership remains a key category in shaping particular
relationships to land as legally significant while others are deemed extra-legal or irrelevant.
At the same time, these legal spaces of contestation about land use can provide important
insights about challenging the boundaries set by dominant property relations. According to
property theorist Carol Rose, moments of cultural and political recognition of alternative
property relations have the potential to change our definition of property and property
practices (Rose, 1998, p. 141). O’Donnell argues in this volume that land use contestation
about the impacts of climate change can expose openings for alternative approaches to
property relations. The Algonquin tenure system described by Pasternak, also in this volume,
demonstrates how one place-based Indigenous legal order asserts enduring jurisdiction over
land use governance through relations of responsibility and care. As I have argued elsewhere,
rural land use movements can play a role in redefining people-place relations if they resist a
parochial politics of place and take on the difficult and unsettling work of meaningful
engagement with Indigenous legal orders (Bartel & Graham, 2016; Van Wagner, 2016b, p.
323). The disputes about aggregate mineral mining examined below reveal strategic
opportunities to rethink property through land use planning law and to transform the ways in
which law shapes, and is shaped by, people-place relations. In particular, this chapter argues
that decentering ownership in land use disputes has the potential to transform power
imbalances upheld by the hierarchical ordering of authority and the chronological ordering of
key steps in planning processes.
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Aggregate Extraction: The construction of a unique land use 2
Aggregate mineral resources – sand, gravel, rock, and stone - are widely acknowledged to be
essential to the built environment as the foundation of infrastructure developments from roads
to subways to housing and sewer mains. They are valuable natural resources with the
potential to produce economic value when extracted and transformed into marketable
commodities through industrial mining and production. At the same time, aggregate minerals
are functioning and integrated parts of the physical environment in which they are embedded,
with material, ecological and social relations (Eyles & Eyles, 2002). These landscapes are
often layered with other, potentially conflicting interests, such as agricultural production,
housing development, recreational use, Indigenous land rights and jurisdiction, and
ecological and amenity values (Van Wagner, 2013, 2016a).

While quarrying for aggregate minerals has long been practiced by many societies and in
diverse locations, contemporary aggregate mines are large, industrial, open pit mines. As
such, they have significant, transformative, and enduring impacts on the land and the human
and more than human communities in which they are located (Sandberg & Wallace, 2013;
Sandberg, Wekerle, & Gilbert, 2013; Van Wagner, 2016a, 2016b). It is therefore not
surprising that, quarries have also long been a source of legal and political conflict about
appropriate land use in the province (Binnstock & Carter-Whitney, 2011, p. 1; Miller et al.,
2009; Policy Division, Ministry of Natural Resources, 2010). Indeed, since 2005 aggregate
extraction has become one of the most contentious land use issues in the province (Sandberg
& Wallace, 2013; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2012; Patano & Sandberg,
2005). Disputes, including those examined for this research, often arise from disagreement
about the nature and extent of these impacts on the local environment, human health, and
social factors, such as traffic, noise, and employment. Aggregate extraction disputes
therefore provide an important example of the material consequences of framing land use
decisions through dominant property relations and instrumental relationships to land. In
particular, aggregate extraction in Ontario primarily occurs on privately owned land.
Therefore, the disputes that arise provide a unique case through which to explore how
private ownership operates through law to shape procedural and substantive elements of
disagreements about land use.

2

This section provides a summary of the material in Chapter Four, pages 132-142. Repeated content is
italicized.
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Land use is regulated by multiple complex and overlapping legal regimes in Ontario,
including a range of land use planning statutes and policies, environmental regulation, as
well as both the statutory registration framework and common law of property. While the
development and oversight of aggregate mines have some similarities with other extractive
activities and certain types of infrastructure, the majority of aggregate extraction is regulated
through a distinctive interaction between the provincial planning policy, municipal plans and
bylaws, and the Aggregate Resources Act (1990) [the ‘Act’], a standalone statutory
framework governing the process for aggregate licence and permit applications.3 In this way,
aggregate mines are structured as a legally unique land use, with decisions informed by
general planning policy, but set apart through distinct procedural and substantive
considerations.

Within a broad and complex network of land use law and policy potentially engaged by
proposals for aggregate mineral extraction, this chapter is focused on a subset of primary
legal frameworks that have been the subject of disagreement and contestation through
ongoing law reform and legislative review processes, the Act and the Provincial Policy
Statement. 4 Formal oversight of aggregate extraction in Ontario was limited until the 1950s
when the scale of extraction and growth of suburban development led to increasing conflict
(Sandberg & Wallace, 2013; Baker, Slam, & Summerville, 2001, p. 468; Cullingworth, 1987,
p. 229). Since that time, aggregate regulation in Ontario has shifted to a provincially led, and
increasingly proponent-driven, activity (Baker et al., 2001, p. 466) in which non-state actors
are enrolled in flexible forms of regulation that neither privilege nor require formal authority
(Gunningham, 2009, p. 181; Gunningham & Holley, 2010). This shift is consistent with the
broader international ‘shift from bureaucratic regulation to public entrepreneurialism’ in

3

While the majority of production is covered by the Act, it should be noted that it has a limited geographic
application, which excludes private land in most of northern Ontario. In these areas Planning Act approvals
govern the establishment of aggregate extraction operations on private land in these areas of the province.
However, portions of the north have been progressively added as disputes arise with respect to specific
applications, see the Ontario Municipal Board decision on the Superior Aggregates proposal on the shores of
Lake Superior: Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Municipality of Wawa (2009), PL040025.
4
In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1 st session, 40th Parliament,
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection,
including conservation and recycling.
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planning regimes, driven and shaped by inter-urban competition for global investment
capital (Sager, 2011, p. 156).

Conflicts over large-scale quarry developments in the urban-rural fringe of Southwestern
Ontario have resulted in major community mobilizations,(“Mega quarry defeat is a lesson in
activism,” 2012) complex multi-year litigation (Bull, 2010), a foreign investment protection
claim against the federal and provincial governments, (Halton Region, 2013; St. Mary’s
VCNA, LLC v. Government of Canada, 2013) and a legislative review of the governing
legislation (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government &
Standing Committee on General Government, 2013).5 With a fixed, non-renewable ‘essential’
resource situated in areas of overlapping and conflicting relationships with land and the
potential for direct and cumulative social, health, and environmental impacts of extraction,
aggregate mining exemplifies the ‘wicked problems’ that land use law and policy aim to
resolve (Rittel & Webber, 1974). In this context, law works through ownership to simplify
and sever this complexity and to uphold relations with land that support particular land uses
and conceptions of economic development.6
Extracting Private Profit in the Public Interest: The centrality of ownership in the
aggregate licensing process7

A. The Legal Structure of Aggregate Disputes
In Canada, planning falls within provincial jurisdiction over municipal institutions and
property and civil rights (The Constitution Act, 1867). In Ontario, the province provides
broad guidance and maintains considerable power to constrain local government action

5

At the time of writing a Bill to amend the Aggregate Resources Act had been introduced to the provincial
legislature as a result of the legislative review process: Bill 39 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization
Act 2017, available online: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=4213. The Bill
retains key features of the existing regime discussed in this chapter.
6
This chapter is based on a larger qualitative research project examining a series of aggregate mineral mining
disputes in Ontario, Canada between 2001 and 2014. Specific cases for detailed documentary analysis and indepth interviews were selected through a review of key documents to identify the level of participation by
members of the public and governmental and non-governmental organizations in the regulatory process and the
types of issues and concerns about the impact of extraction raised by such parties. 18 unstructured in-person
interviews were conducted with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes. Participants were
largely activists in local or regionally-based organizations formed to respond to a specific application or preexisting organizations who chose to become involved with a particular quarry application based on a particular
set of environmental or social concerns.
7
This section provides a summary of the material in Chapter Four, pages 150-201 and 219-227. Repeated
content is italicized.
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through both the Planning Act (1990) and the Provincial Policy Statement (Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2014), a policy document that ‘sets the policy foundation for
regulating the development and use of land.’8 The bulk of day-to-day planning powers and
responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities who regulate land use through zoning in
Official Plans and by-laws (Kong, 2010; Makuch, Craik, & Leisk Signe, 2004), though
provincial planning regimes, such as the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development
Act (1990), retain significant centralized planning powers in particular parts of the province.
While it is not the focus of this chapter it is important to note that aggregate decisions
directly engage the constitutional and/or treaty rights of First Nations and Metis communities
and the applicable Indigenous legal orders in their territories. Indigenous communities in
Ontario have long been asserting their right to consultation and accommodation and
demanding more control over aggregate resource decisions (Ritchie, 2013); however, the
Duty to Consult and accommodate such rights and interests was only formally acknowledged
in the revised 2014 Policy Statement and is still absent in formal aggregate extraction law
and policy.

Adjudicative review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario
Municipal Board (the ‘Board’), which serves as the primary appeal body for planning and
development decisions, and the Environmental Review Tribunal, ostensibly dividing ‘land
use’ from ‘environmental’ decisions despite the environmentally-focused nature of many
objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al., 2013; Van Wagner, 2013). One of the
unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the Board in
decisions with clear environmental implications such as amendments to Official Plans
affecting public space, protected green space, and agricultural lands, as well as the oftencontentious applications for aggregate development considered here. It has jurisdiction to
deal with issues and disputes under more than 100 statutes, including the Aggregate
Resources Act.9

8

In April 2014 the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took
effect on April 30, 2014 [the ‘2014 PPS], however, the cases discussed in this chapter were considered under
the former 2005 Provincial Policy Statement, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx [the ‘2005 PPS’]. The
key aggregate mineral provisions discussed below remain largely unchanged in the new version.
9
For certain appeals, including some aggregate disputes where hearings may be required from both tribunals, a
joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act (1990). See for example, Nelson Aggregate Co., Re,
2012 CLB 29642, [Nelson], Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012 CLB 16274 [Walker].
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As noted above, aggregate decisions engage a dual set of processes; the general land
use planning process through municipal zoning and land use governance, and, the specific
licensing process managed by the Ministry of Natural Resources (the ‘Ministry’). The current
Aggregate Resources Act is an operational statute for the management of aggregate mining
proposals. It is not a framework for broader planning inquiries that are dealt with under the
Planning Act process and the resulting Official Plans. Section 2 sets out 4 purposes:

(a) to provide for the management of the aggregate resources of Ontario;
(b) to control and regulate aggregate operations on Crown and private lands;
(c) to require the rehabilitation of land from which aggregate has been excavated; and
(d) to minimize adverse impact on the environment in respect of aggregate operations.
‘Management’ is defined in the Act as the ‘identification, orderly development and protection
of the aggregate resources of Ontario,’ clearly establishing the development-focus of the Act
(s 1(1)). No license can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an applicable zoning by-law (s
12.1.(1); therefore, if the land for which a quarry is proposed is not currently designated as a
‘mineral aggregate extraction area’ under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the
Planning Act (s 22). Some applications will also involve special provincial planning regimes,
such as the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, or urban growth plans
(Places to Grow Act, 2005) and associated policy (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal,
2006). This may mean additional planning authority approvals or the application of additional
standards in certain areas. Therefore, the general planning question of whether extraction is
an appropriate land use in a particular place should be the initial inquiry in siting aggregate
development in accordance with planning documents of the local authority. However, this
order of decisions and jurisdiction is restructured by law in two key ways. First, s 66(1) of the
Act expressly limits municipal powers to regulate aggregate extraction:
This Act, the regulations and the provisions of licences and site plans apply despite
any municipal by-law, official plan or development agreement and, to the extent that a
municipal by-law, official plan or development agreement deals with the same
subject-matter as this Act, the regulations or the provisions of a license or site plan,
the by-law, official plan or development agreement is inoperative.
Second, the Planning Act stipulates that all policy and decisions of municipal governments
and land use tribunals, shall be consistent with the Policy Statement (s 3). The hierarchical
structure of interests in land set out in the Policy Statement expressly prioritizes aggregate
development, restricts the power of local land use decision makers, and shifts the focus to the
mechanics of operation to be presumptively approved. Indeed, it limits the municipal ability
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to impose higher standards where they would conflict with any of its policies (s 4.7). Official
plans are required to identify and protect provincial interests in their land use designations
and policies, particularly by directing development to ‘suitable areas’ (s 4.7).

The effect is to limit the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and
operation, including the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into
the assessment of applications, or to impose protection on features not deemed provincially
‘significant’ (M. Bull & Estrela, 2012). The jurisdiction of local authorities over extraction is
rendered hollow by this shift from an inquiry about land use governance throughout the area
to one about the protection and development of one resource, and the management of one
site. This inversion of the land use versus operational decisions is compounded by the
procedural practice of having the planning and licensing inquiries run parallel or even jointly
once it reaches an appeal or adjudicative stage. While this may have important efficiency and
clarity implications for all parties in an already complex and time-consuming process, the
effect of compressing these distinct inquiries is that land use questions often end up
secondary to the technical and managerial licensing inquiry about a specific site (Re Walker
Aggregates Inc., 2012). In this way, the messier and more difficult aspects of decisions about
extractive and transformative land uses are severed and shifted outside of the legal decisionmaking space.

Within this spatial and temporal frame created by the intersection of general planning law and
the aggregate extraction regime, private land ownership plays a particular role in upholding
the ordering of interests in Ontario’s aggregate mineral law and policy. Legal ownership is
used to perform two key boundary-setting functions in this process, which have both spatial
and temporal dimensions. First, the owner becomes the planner by proposing a specific land
use in a particular location and initiating a decision-making process. This may be
accompanied by physical changes to the landscape that shape the material conditions of the
site in advance of a decision or even an application, thus changing the baseline for social,
physical, and ecological impacts. Second, in a proponent-driven process, ownership includes
the power to shape the story and establish the factual record on which decisions are made.
This exclusive spatial access and chronological power has consequences for the procedural
and substantive outcomes of aggregate applications. Ownership, as a legal category, both
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shapes the sequencing of events and decisions within the process and centres the landowner
as the decision maker within a hierarchy of actors and interests. In doing so, it powerfully
influences the outcomes for a complex network of social, material, and ecological interests
and actors.

The Owner as Planner: Site selection and the (re)shaping of the landscapes of
extraction
Aggregate minerals are fixed resources. As with other minerals, the rock is where it is and
that is where extraction must take place. As one large aggregate producer, noted in their
submissions to the 2012 legislative review, ‘[a]ggregate are fixed location non-renewable
natural resources which can only be mined where Mother Nature deposited them.’ The fixed
nature of aggregate minerals also means that extraction is concentrated in particular areas, for
example, the area around Orangeville, north of Toronto has a high concentration of mine
sites. This raises the potential for effects to be cumulative, both geospatially and temporally,
rather than simply site and project-specific and for contestation to cross jurisdictional, legal,
temporal, and ownership boundaries.

But extraction is not only fixed by geological formations. According to the submissions of
the Ministry of Natural Resources to the Legislative Review, over 90% of aggregate
production in Ontario is on private land (Aggregate Resources Act Review, 2012, p. G145).
In Ontario, surface and sub-surface rights may be unified or separated depending on the terms
of the original grant and whether mineral rights were reserved to the Crown. However, the
majority of private land includes both mineral and surface rights and recent amendments to
mining legislation have further unified land rights, particularly in Southern Ontario where the
majority of aggregate extraction disputes take place (Pardy & Stoehr, 2011, p. 6). Site
selection is therefore inextricably linked to land ownership as it layers onto the fixed location
of the resource. The rock is where it is, but it must be extracted where it is owned. In this
way, land ownership and the rights associated with private ownership are central to the nature
of the disagreements and contestations that arise in relation to aggregate disputes. Therefore,
while contestation about the siting of aggregate quarries may have similarities with disputes
about ‘locally unwanted land uses’ (LULUs) such as landfills or power stations and may
similarly expose ‘not in my backyard attitudes’ within and between communities, the
proponent-led process presents a distinctive context in which to explore the relationship
between private land ownership and public land use planning.
Site Selection and Private Planning
An aggregate licence application is based on the proponent’s site selection. While some
proponents lease private land for aggregate development from other landholders, selection is
largely grounded on their own ownership of the land in question. In noting the preponderance
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of private land in aggregate resource development the Ministry of Natural Resources
representative at the 2012 legislative review hearing observed, ‘[O]wnership of the land is
very important’ (Aggregate Resources Act Review, 2012). The link between private
ownership and site selection raises concerns about whose interests are being served in the
siting of transformative extractive development.

Because of the dual physical fix of an in situ resource extracted from privately-owned land
aggregate mineral extraction is not dealt with through public planning or environmental
assessment processes. As noted above, this distinguishes them from applications that go
through processes such as environmental assessment and ‘willing host’ searches in which a
number of alternative sites are considered. While these are subject to criticism in their own
right, they do theoretically involve a broader type of deliberative public planning exercise
than a process driven by private land ownership.10 In the aggregate context, it is unlikely that
a proponent would seriously consider alternative sites that they do not own and do not have
access to for required testing and preparation when putting an expensive and time-consuming
application together. Without such consideration of alternatives, there is a danger that site
selection will be linked to an owner’s ability to assemble land and to their economic
assumptions and interests than to specific knowledge about local social and ecological
relations of a particular place or to a notion of the ‘public interest’ in extractive land uses.

Some participants in the study expressed concerns about aggregate developers targeting areas
with small populations and struggling economies with promises of jobs and economic
development for land acquisition and future development (Participant 1, 2014; Participants
16-20, 2014). In the case of one large-scale proposal, an internal company communication
obtained by a group opposing the quarry revealed that the site location had been selected
because the area has one of the smallest populations in the province and the land had the least
regulatory governance controlling extraction in North America (Participant 1, 2014). The
aggregate industry and government decision makers routinely characterize overlapping
interests in land recognized in law and policy, such as the environmental protections in the
Niagara Escarpment, as ‘constraints’ on the development of the resource. Extraction is both
10

The provincial and federal environmental assessment regimes applicable in Ontario have both been subject to
critique, particularly after amendments that narrowed opportunities for public participation (Auditor General,
2016; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2008; Lindgren & Dunn, 2010). Notably, the regimes are also
proponent-driven and therefore share some of the issues outlined below with respect to spatial and temporal
control.
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legally and politically constructed as a presumptively appropriate land use, but for the
intrusion of other values and relations on the land that limit or restrict development.

Other participants noted concerns about the transparency of a process driven by private land
acquisition. The selection and assembly of land can potentially start years or decades in
advance of an application. In this sense, the sequence of events is initiated long before the
formal statutory process begins. One participant described the process: ‘We found out later
that they had been acquiring lands for 20 years, additional to what they already had. But
under a numbered company, so it was not apparent that they were buying it. Some people
sold it under a different understanding’ (Participant 4, 2014). Another described the impact
on sellers who sold under the pretence that the land would continue to be used for agricultural
purposes (Participant 1, 2014): …[F]or some of the farmers who sold to see those houses be
burned and lost was like us going to a year-long funeral…

Another participant recalled that the site owner went back to neighbouring land owners who
had not sold prior to the Application and said, ‘you can't sell your house now because there is
going to be a quarry on it, nobody is going to buy it, we will take it off your hands’
(Participants 13-14, 2014). This chronological power not only advantages the land owner by
providing a head start in the process, but also through the potential to affect the property
relations of neighbouring lands in ways that facilitate particular forms of future land use.

A number of participants reflected on the need for a broader public form of aggregate
resource planning between local and provincial governments that could separate the private
ownership of lands from decisions about where extractive land uses are appropriate within
the province (Participant 15, 2014; Participant 1, 2014; Participants 2,3, 2014; Participant 4,
2014; Participants 13-14, 2014). Indeed, some groups intentionally shifted from site-specific
opposition to demanding broader changes in the land use planning process in Ontario, calling
for a different balance between different values and interests in land to be embedded within
the legal and policy frameworks. Implicit within these reflections was a desire to engage
directly with the ‘how’ of land use governance, the messy political elements of planning that
were excluded as irrelevant in deliberations about specific applications (Valverde, 2015, p.
86).
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Making spaces of extraction: The transformation of private land
In a proponent-driven system, land ownership determines the physical location of the site and
initiates the process of development. However, it also provides the owner with a more subtle
chronological privilege: the power to determine the condition of the site at the time of
application. Anglo-Canadian property conceptualizes ownership as a bundle of rights with
respect to a particular piece of land or resource (Blomley, 2005; Davies, 2007; Mossman &
Girard, 2014). This includes extensive rights to alter and transform the physical and material
environment, and therefore, the material and temporal networks of relation embedded within
or connected to that particular place – social, political, economic, ecological, geological,
hydrological and other forms of relation. Thus ownership can be used to bracket what can be
considered by decision makers by determining what exists at the critical moment in which the
licensing process applies to the site. Through an owner’s right to transform their land and to
exclude the relevant features of the site, such as endangered species, forests, or wetlands,
from consideration they can determine what exists for the purposes of the law. This preapplication control has important consequences for the ability of parties seeking to assert
competing values and overlapping interests in the land and for the potential for decision
makers to assess such claims. Heritage and environmental features that could potentially
‘constrain’ development can legally be destroyed, removed, minimized, or transformed long
before an application is made by virtue of the extensive rights to transform private property
as of right. As a result, relevant features, relations and interests are excluded from
consideration in any subsequent planning process. In particular, and as noted by Pasternak in
this volume, more-than-human beings and systems may be most profoundly impacted by
these purportedly private decisions. Indeed, entire ecosystems and populations may be
managed out of existence prior to the legal process being triggered. One participant expressed
concerns about the impact of such transformation on the planning process (Participant 4,
2014): ‘That is what is happening now with some developments. Yes, some developers buy
the property, they clear it out, destroys its ecological value and then what is your argument?
You have a woodland? I don't see a woodland.’

One dispute over a large-scale quarry began with concerns about violations of the local tree
cutting by-law. A participant in that process observed that the by-law had been put in place in
the context of agricultural land use to facilitate farming activities and large-scale woodlot
removal would never have been contemplated (Participant 1, 2014). They later became
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concerned that the removal of hectares of trees was motivated by the desire to ‘lessen the
chances of wild life conduits and other conservation thought to stand in the way of their
coming application’ (Participant 1, 2014). Another participant involved in the same quarry
dispute described the subsequent destruction of the homes and farm buildings on the land
acquired for the proposed quarry site (Participants 13-14, 2014):
There is a big house down the road… It is a huge, big house and they took all the
windows out of the top part about November, December, let the wind and the snow
and everything blow through and then they finally took it down. When that house
went down, people started to believe that something was wrong.

These unanticipated changes impacted not only the physical landscape, but also initiated a
sequence of events that transformed the social networks within the local community
(Participant 13-14, 2014):

Nobody really blamed the sale but it left such a hole of connections. It is like [you]
lay out a thousand piece puzzle and take 30-pieces out. It is not the same. As much as
your people might suggest that losing a couple hundred or 300 people out of the
community, people come and go, this wasn't it. This was forced, violent, burned,
blown up, dug under. Farmsteads that had been cared for 100 years by people
disappeared from the landscape … dark and not a light of life anywhere at night. It
left a profound emotional drain on the people.

In another case within the provincially protected Niagara Escarpment Plan Area, participants
described the owner’s attempt to destroy wetlands after the endangered Jefferson salamander
was discovered on neighbouring property and the group opposing applied for provincial
wetland designation over the area (Participant 15, 2014; Participant 4, 2014). The owner in
that case was ultimately charged at the urging of local residents and opponents of the quarry
and pled guilty. However, the success of this enforcement was due to the informal research
and access of a neighbouring land owner to the habitat sites rather than any systemic legal
safeguard.

Beyond the physical and ecological changes in advance of applications, participants reflected
on the ways aggregate mining approvals in a particular place can facilitate a long-term and
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wider transformation of the landscape by fixing industrial extraction as an appropriate land
use for future applications for expansion or new mines in the local area (Participant 22, 2014;
Participants 2, 3, 2014; Participant 7, 2014; Participants 16-20, 2014; Participant 21, 2014).
The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits,
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would ‘preclude or hinder’
extraction (ss. 2.5.2.4, 2.5.2.5). In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a
license ‘ceases to exist,’ (s. 2.5.2.4) resulting in a licensing regime with no possibility of
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the changes
to surrounding land and land uses.

Several participants expressed concerns that once approved, expansion in size or below the
water table was much easier to attain, or that other proposals would be more likely to be
approved once the area was seen as an extractive zone by decision makers (Participant 22,
2014; Participants 2,3, 2014; Participant 7, 2014; Participant 16-20, 2014; Participant 21,
2014). In the words of one participant: ‘[T]he only way to control it is to stop it’ (Participant
16-20, 2014). However, as described below, ownership also plays a strong role in shaping the
process and substance of attempts to control or stop a particular application at both the
planning and adjudicative stages. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the overwhelming
majority of applications are approved, either by the Minister or the Board, pointing to a
structural imbalance in the process (Van Wagner, 2016a, pp. 45–46).

Controlling the facts, controlling the space: Knowledge and power in land use decisions

Citing public frustration with aggregate approvals and other types of land use decisions, the
Environmental Commissioner has noted the importance of meaningful consultation:

First, consultation is not simply telling people what you intend to do and, then,
listening to their comments.
…
To be legitimate, an approval process must be able to reach a decision not to proceed.
I’m not saying that this should be a common outcome… But, in a valid and
meaningful consultation process, we would expect that sometimes rational arguments
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or contrasting societal value systems would and should lead to a “No”. Without that
possibility, there is no value in consultation (Environmental Commissioner of
Ontario, 2008, p. 5).

Participants in this study expressed concerns that despite opportunities for public
participation, the process was structured to presumptively support development. Indeed,
several noted that land owners proposing aggregate mines assumed that proposals would go
forward despite the need for consultation and Ministerial or Board approval. One participant
paraphrased a representative of the company at a community meeting, ‘It doesn’t matter what
you people do, we are going to go forward with this’ (Participant 16-20, 2014). Another
described the ‘arrogance’ of the proponent, ‘They had done the political legwork and under
the Aggregate Resources Act and knew they could muscle this thing through. Couldn't care
less what the community wanted’ (Participant 1, 2014). A planner from one provincial
planning agency reflected on the political pressure to move applications forward to approval
(Planner 2, 2014, p. 2):
If, say, the municipality or the agencies has made a decision and it is not a favourable
one, the operator may express its concern to Queen's Park. In response, we have had
calls from the MPP and the Minister’s office requesting to understand what is going
on and why it is taking so long to bring the application to a final decision. Then we
need a briefing note explaining the process, the stakeholders involved, and what are
the key issues?
For many participants, this ‘entitlement to approval’ was fuelled by a process driven by the
proponent, who provides the majority of the information and expertise to decision makers for
the express purpose of having the application approved. The Aggregate Resources
Provincial Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal Procedures Manual
specify the technical information and reports the applicant is required to provide, including
expert hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s) and cultural heritage report(s),
which must be prepared by a ‘qualified’ professional as defined in the Act (s 8). Licensing
and planning approval processes and any subsequent litigation are based on this factual and
technical record, subject to any independent technical or legal expertise and documentation
that may be provided by Indigenous governments, municipal actors or planning authorities,
and other groups or individuals at their own expense. The chronological power of site
selection and modification, as well as initiation of the process, is thus compounded by the
power to frame the questions and issues to be considered. By controlling the knowledge base
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on which the decision will be made, owners powerfully shape the narrative of what is at
stake.
Independent expert evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both logistically
and financially onerous for Indigenous and small local governments and community groups,
particularly given that they may or may not be accepted by the Board at a hearing and that
access to the proponent’s land may not be granted for direct investigation and data review (Re
Town of Richmond Hill, PL990303, r’vd by Ontario (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing) v Ontario (Municipal Board) 2001). As one lawyer noted, ‘It is phenomenally
expensive to really mount a legal challenge to an application for aggregate licence’ (Lawyer,
2014). Many participants explained that they had scoped down their appeal to one or two
issues because of the cost or the accessibility of experts (Participant 22, 2014; Participants 812, 2014; Participant 16-20, 2014; Participant 21, 2014). Two experts who have worked with
parties opposing quarries noted that the Board tends to accept proponent expert opinions and
shared experiences of being challenged as ‘advocates,’ unable to be objective (Consultant,
2014; Planner, 2014). Further, proponents are under no obligation to allow other parties and
their experts onto the site, making review of the data limited and potentially impossible,
particularly with complex hydrological or ecological data that require in-season and regular
onsite observation. Even government agencies have limited access to verify data and collect
independent data to challenge proponent claims.

This evidentiary and narrative power is compounded by what an applicant is not required to
establish. Until 2005 the Policy Statement maintained that ‘mineral resource needs’ should be
considered, providing a policy basis for supply and demand analysis as central to aggregate
licensing decisions (2.2.3.1, 1996). Opposing parties and governments used this version of
the policy to argue that the material to be extracted was not currently required and therefore
that sites should not be approved (M. Bull & Estrela, 2012, p. 24). In 2005, the Provincial
Policy Statement was revised to explicitly eliminate consideration of need in Policy 2.5.2.1:
Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type of
supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability,
designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or
elsewhere.
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One environmental lawyer characterized this lack of a needs analysis as the ‘biggest
stumbling block’ in the aggregate planning decision framework (Lawyer, 2014). This was
also raised by a number of deputants at the all-party review of the Act before the Standing
Committee on General Government described below and by commentators during the Policy
Statement review (“Review of the Aggregate Resources Act,” 2013.).11 While the Board has
concluded that a needs analysis is not required, it has nonetheless also been a live issue in
several cases as parties continue to press for the opportunity to contest the underlying
assumptions in the framework (Jennison Construction Ltd. V Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
(Town), 2011; James Dick Construction, 2010; Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012). In
one case the Board itself noted, ‘[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging
Policy Statement where need is not required’ (Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County),
2010, 16)

Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano and
Sandberg specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the aggregate
industry to appeal to decision makers, including provincial and local governments and
adjudicators (Patano & Sandberg, 2005; Young & Keil, 2005). Such ‘narratives of necessity’
place conceptual limits on the terms of debate about specific land use decisions (Cowell &
Owens, 2006). Here the presumption of need embedded in the statute fixes the conception of
the public interest as one of perpetual economic growth and expanding (sub)urbanism
directly in law, foreclosing debate about the shape of the present and future built environment
and the urban-rural relationship.
Defining the Landscape: The role of ownership in land use decision making
Ontario’s planning law and policy does not expressly protect private property ownership. Nor
does it expressly situate private owners as planners. Indeed, aggregate decisions engage many
of the forward-looking, participatory and consultative aspects of the province’s public
planning regime. Nonetheless, this chapter demonstrates how ownership endures as key legal
category in land use law. Ownership is used to order actors in a hierarchy of interests in
which aggregate development is prioritized over other relations with land and simultaneously
structures the sequence of events to produce specific spatiotemporal relations. The successful

11

111 of 166 comments on the Provincial Policy Statement Review can be accessed on the Environmental
Registry, Registry Number 011-7070.
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bracketing work done through ownership is reflected in the overwhelming success of
aggregate applications in the province (Van Wagner, 2016a). However, the ongoing
contestation about extraction points to the unsettled nature of the spatiotemporal boundaries
law attempts to uphold. Understanding the specific work that ownership does through site
selection, modification, and control of the factual record can serve to reveal strategic
opportunities for intervention and the transformation of property relations into more just and
complex people-place relations.

Transforming the aggregate planning process requires the decoupling of site selection from
private ownership and the implementation of meaningful and inclusive consultation from preapplication throughout the life of a project. Decentrering ownership, both temporally and
spatially, could create opportunities for parties to introduce the material and spatial
particularity of the human and ecological communities at stake and to expose the wider
substantive and political aspects of the decisions. A better balance of power in the decisionmaking process would make visible what is really at stake (Nedelsky, 2012): how we make
decisions about the extraction of important resources from their material and social context
while attending to the transformative impacts of doing so for the human and ecological
communities and networks of social and material relations. For example, aggregate
development sites could be determined through a broad, policy-driven public planning
process rather than purely site-specific private applications. Such a shift raises other
concerns, particularly about the nature of participation in such a process, the power of private
interests to determine ‘the public interest’, and the relationships between municipal and
provincial actors and Indigenous governments; however, these are issues that land use
governance must urgently and meaningfully address in planning more broadly. Perhaps
transforming the way we make aggregate extraction decisions could be a starting point for
this important work, including the recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction (Pasternak, this
volume).

Would the legal decision-making process be transformed if the technical data was provided
through an independent third party rather than by the proponent? Public funding for
independent technical expertise and legal advice required by participating parties would be a
first step towards a more balanced evidentiary record. However, to be meaningful this must
include access to privately owned sites and oversight of pre-application site changes and this
requires a shift from property as the realm of fixed, exclusive individual rights towards what
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Margaret Davies has described as ‘more fragile, contextual, and limited use (Davies, 2012,
pp. 15–16).’ Certainly a first step in rebalancing the power between the parties would be to
re-establish the requirement that the proponent demonstrate need such that the costs and
benefits of the proposal can be explicitly weighed by decision makers and openly contested
by participants. Decentering ownership could affect these sequencing and evidentiary
transformations in aggregate licensing decision and effectively reframe the question from
how we will manage the extraction of this resource to whether we should be extracting this
rock here, in this place, and in whose interests. Such a reorientation of decision-making away
from ownership as the chronological and spatial starting point for land use decision certainly
has the potential to change the outcome in individual disputes; but, perhaps more importantly
it could strategically create space within the process of land use governance for urgentlyneeded meaningful dialogue about how we should govern the complexity of our
environmental relations.
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Chapter Seven – Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of People-Place
Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts1

Introduction
What is the role of law in structuring human relationships to the more-than-human world in
which our lives are embedded? I consider this question by examining Anglo-Canadian land
use law – which I define broadly to include property, environmental, and planning law – in
the province of Ontario, Canada. Through land use law we recognize and uphold various
forms of control over and particular types of use rights to land (Lametti 2003; Mossman &
Girard 2014; Penner 1997); however, we have a much more difficult time recognizing
relationships with land and ecological systems themselves, in particular relations of
responsibility, or even reciprocity, with place (Graham 2010; Mossman & Girard 2014).2
These conceptual boundaries have important consequences for the people-place relations that
are acknowledged and upheld by law.

While some argue that land use regimes have fundamentally redefined property relations
from a commodified conception of private property rights towards democratized
environmental decision-making (Scotford & Walsh 2013), I will argue that we must critically
consider the people-place relationships that are structured through the everyday practice of
law in specific places. I seek to look beyond the broad and aspirational goals of
“sustainability” and “balance” embedded in legislation and policy documents, to ask whether
and how planning regimes construct or constrain the space for contestation in order to secure
recognition for relations between land and the more-than-human world (Harrison & Bedford
2003:443).

Land use conflicts can provide strategic opportunities for interventions in the way we
organize our ecological relationships. As outlined below, land use planning law and policy in
Ontario provide important procedural rights to participation and consultation in decisionOriginally published as, Van Wagner, E. Law’s Ecological Relations: The legal structure of people-place
relations in Ontario’s aggregate extraction conflicts. Projections 12, 35. Portions of this Chapter are the same or
similar to portions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. These portions are italicized to alert the reader what is repeated and
allow them to skip these portions as desired. Citation style has been maintained as in the publication.
2
I am indebted to the work of Nicole Graham (2010) for this concept of reciprocity with place. For a discussion
of ownership and responsibility, see the work of Joseph Singer (Singer 2001).
1
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making about the uses of privately owned land. While disputes about the siting of
infrastructure and industrial development, such as the conflicts about aggregate mineral
mines, or quarries discussed in this article are sometimes characterized as purely about
localized and narrow ‘not-in-my-backyard’ (“NIMBY”) politics in conflict with the broader
public interest, land use disputes often raise a complex combination of issues and can become
forums for attempts to disrupt traditional property relations. As Groves et al. argue, “siting
conflicts over such infrastructure often act as condensation points for wider concerns, which
can ‘cross scale’ from the interests of a specific community to connect with national and
international issues” (Groves et al. 2013:340). Valvarde’s research on the urban planning
context in the city of Toronto demonstrates how conflicts about a wide range of sociopolitical issues are ‘funneled’ into the forums created by planning law’s public and
consultative structure in Ontario (Valverde 2012:12).

In this context, I argue that critical examination of the day-to-day operation of participatory
planning rights is required to understand how the values and relationships at stake are
asserted and defined by parties and decision makers. Do the legal rights to be informed about,
and to appeal and contest land use decisions offer more than a forum for competing claims of
property to be efficiently channeled? Do they offer more than a way for opposition to private
development to be managed in the interests of public interest narrowly defined as economic
growth? Do they create space for rethinking of property relations? Or do they serve as an
exclusive channel for privileged groups to perpetuate environmental injustice and spatial
inequities?

This paper is an initial attempt to take up these questions through a study of a series of
regional planning conflicts over the siting of aggregate mineral mines in Ontario. Below I set
out a relational approach to land use conflicts and propose an eco-relational analysis of land
use planning law. I then consider the current legislative framework for siting aggregate
mineral extraction in the Province to examine law’s work in structuring people-place
relations. As part of a larger empirical study, this paper specifically applies the relational
approach to consider the ways in which Ontario’s planning law and policy organize and
control the types of claims asserted in relation to land and ecological systems. The complex,
and sometimes contradictory, values and relationships articulated by a range of parties in
aggregate conflicts will be examined in greater depth as part of the larger project.
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Relational Theory and Land Use Disputes: Why a Relational Framework?
What does it mean to be constituted by relationships rather than just living
among others? (Nedelsky 2012:19)
The relational work that law does in land use planning disputes has specific and material
consequences for land and human and ‘more-than-human’ communities (Graham 2010).
Understanding how law structures people-place relations in specific places is essential to our
capacity to respond to the current ecological crisis. In particular, the legal construction of the
relationships between landowners, other parties, and the land itself, shapes and constrains
what is at stake in the land use decision-making process, and consequently impacts the
ecological and material outcomes. As I have argued elsewhere, a relational legal analysis is
ideally suited to exposing and examining law’s role in shaping people-place relations (Van
Wagner 2013).

By offering an ecological adaptation of the relational rights theory of Canadian legal scholar
Jennifer Nedelsky, my aim is to foreground the specific way in which land use law operates
to constitute our relationships with the wider ecological communities in which our are lives
are enmeshed. Nedelsky’s work has influenced a growing body of feminist and critical
property scholarship whose work reimagines property as responsibility, connection, and
belonging rather than as exclusion and protection from the collective (Cooper 2007; Keenan
2010; Nedelsky 1990; Singer 2001; 2009). In Law’s Relations, Nedelsky proposes a
relational rights framework with both methodological and normative dimensions. It is this
formulation of her relational analysis that I engage with below.

For Nedelsky, an essential element of understanding the world relationally is seeing the
interconnection between personal and institutional relationships: “each set of relations is
nested in the next, and all interact with each other” (Nedelsky 2012:31). From this
perspective, we can understand people-place relations as nested in broader relationships with
family and human community, as well as the hydrological, geological, and ecological
relations of the more-than-human world in a specific place, which are themselves shaped by
societal structures of property ownership, land use regulation, and informal attitudes to the
environment. In turn, broader economic forces, as well as global climate trends and
environmental conditions, natural disasters, and human-induced ecological crises, shape these
structures. In her view, through exposing the way that law structures key relationships we can
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better understand what kinds of decisions are being made (Nedelsky 2012:65). Nedelsky
offers her relational rights approach as both an evaluative and transformative framework
through which to resolve disputes (Nedelsky 2012:32). Once this underlying context has been
identified, the inquiry shifts to examine the values at stake, which she describes as the broad
articulations of what is essential in a particular society. She then asks us to consider the kinds
of relationships that would foster those values, leading to a consideration of what particular
forms of ‘rights’ would structure relations differently – rights being the “institutional and
rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing values” (Nedelsky 2012:236).
Because the abstraction of the dominant ‘bundle of rights’ model of property reduces the rich
multi-faceted relationship between people and places to the ownership relation (Graham
2010; Gray & Gray 1998; Penner 1995), it is necessary to first make people-place relations
visible in the decision-making process before we can evaluate and potentially transform
them. In particular it is essential to understand whether there are some people-place relations
that are cognizable and others that remain outside the legally recognized rights and interests
to land. If so, we must consider how this distinction is made and upheld.

Relational Theory and Planning: Seeing People-Place Relations in Law
Noting the limits of her own analysis to human relations, Nedelsky invites her readers to
extend her relational rights framework to ecological relations:
Once attention is drawn to what kinds of relationships generate a given problem
and what is shaping those relationships, it will become clear that the human
institutions and norms I offer as examples above are themselves conditioned by
the availability of natural resources as well as the way humans have constructed
control over those resources and the way humans understand their entitlement to
them (Nedelsky 2012:22).
In my view, land use planning disputes offer a compelling context in which to take up this
invitation. Indeed, they often serve as one of the few legal forums in which these questions of
control and entitlement are openly contested and alternative relations with land are, to some
extent, “performed” (Blomley 2013).
Land use planning disputes are examples of “wicked problems,” (Rittel & Webber 1973)
involving “multiple and competing values and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-
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effect relationships, limited time and resources, incomplete information, and structural
inequities in access to information and the distribution of political power” (Lachapelle &
McCool 2005:279). As such, they are contentious and notoriously difficult to resolve. Land
use planning, and planning law, are also inherently relational in their concern with how we
live together (Massey 2005). They are about relationships: relationships between neighbours,
both near and far; relationships between those who own land and those who do not;
relationships between those who make decisions about land and those who live with these
decisions; relationships between humans and the animate and inanimate more-than-human
agents we share space with; and, relationships between the present generation and past and
future generations. While Valverde’s detailed study of Toronto’s planning regime points to
the fundamentally “social” nature of all planning, she points to the integration of the
governance of human and more-than-human as one of the unique elements of planning in
need of much more scholarly attention (Valverde 2012:217). Planning processes provide for a
wide range of parties to participate in legal decision-making processes (Arnold 2002).
Further, the physical world is uniquely exposed in land use decision-making through photos,
maps, technical data, but also stories and site visits (Van Wagner 2013). Land use planning
is also prospective in nature (Arnold 2002:47; Van Wagner 2013). Unlike environmental and
property law that intervene in people-place relations to remediate after harm has been done,
planning law has the potential for proactive restructuring of relations to avoid ecological
harms.

However, the important relational work that planning law does is under-examined by legal
scholars and often overlooked by others concerned with environmental disputes. 3 Valverde
notes how the logic of zoning and land use law, focused on ‘uses’ rather than people,
obscures law’s ordering of people and things (Valverde 2005:40–41). She has noted the
incommensurability of the use logic of planning law and constitutional rights-based
arguments relied on in many high profile land use cases (Valverde 2005, 2012).4 As Nicole
Graham observes, law “swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into
disputes over abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss
3

Indeed, Valverde (2012, 7) argues, the day-to-day operation of law has been neglected in scholarship about
planning and urban studies. Tony Arnold similarly points to a neglect of land use regulation by both scholars
and activists working on environmental justice issues (Arnold 2002). A 2014 Land Use Prof blog post by
Canadian law professor Deborah Curran specifically noted the limited scholarly work on Canadian land use law,
with Valvarde’s work as a notable exception: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/destined-tobe-classic-land-use-books-from-canada.html.
4
See for example Batty v. Toronto (City), 2011 ONSC 6862, 108 OR (3d) 571.

309

associated with transformation of the nonhuman environment become “dissident voices”
(Graham 2010:163). In the context of land use disputes, a resource-oriented and instrumental
planning perspective can serve to obscure a range of relations that may be put forward by
intervening parties (Henwood & Pidgeon 2001; Nash et al. 2010). In this context a relational
analysis aimed at examining “the way law participates in a problem” is particularly relevant
to understanding the relationship between law and planning (Nedelsky 2012).

My point is that while environmentally-motivated participants in land use disputes may find
themselves frustrated with the process and the outcomes, land use planning is not inherently
problematic from an environmental perspective. In fact, as noted above, it has some particular
strategic potential for the transformation of ecological relations. Through careful and detailed
attention to the legal structuring of relations through deeply embedded constructions of land
as property and more-than-human others as objects, proprietary rights of control, exclusion,
use, and destruction, facilitate power over the more-than-human world rather than
responsibility to, and even reciprocity with, our ecological communities. As Harrison and
Bedford argue, “a planning system underpinned by an ideology of private property rights and
a free market forecloses alternative ways of valuing the natural world” (Boucher &
Whatmore 1993; Cowell & Murdoch 1999; Foster 2002; Harrison & Bedford 2003:352).
Therefore, while land use planning can be understood as creating space for alternatives to
traditional property relations and may facilitate “public reflection on substantive issues”
(Groves et al. 2013:342), we need to understand whether, and how, such opportunities are
being realized on the ground in particular places. In my view, the promise of an ecologicalrelational analysis is the opportunity to link the broad participatory opportunities of planning
contexts with the unique visibility and presence of place in land use disputes. In doing so, it
opens up space for transformative performances of ecological relations and the treatment of
people-place relationships as socially and legally significant.

From Relational Rights to Eco-Relational Rights: Place in Land Use Law
In shifting the relational rights analysis towards an ecological-relational framework,
this paper adopts the language of ‘place’ and ‘people-place relations’ to understand the
overlapping and nested relationships within the ecology of specific landscapes inhabited by
communities of human relation alongside complex and layered networks of materials and
entities. Place is used to express an explicit acknowledgement of the relationality of the
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human and more-than-human: the negotiated “thrown-togetherness” of relation that make up
the social and material dimensions of particular places (Massey 2004:140–141). In this way,
the language of place replaces the division imposed when we talk about ‘resources’ – rocks
or trees, plants or animals, lakes and rivers removed from their networks of ecological
interdependence to enable use and profit. At the same time, the affective elements of peopleplace relations that are often excluded from technical resource-based planning are also made
visible in this conception of place (Nash et al. 2010), and acknowledging the political nature
of claims about, and to, place therefore reveals place-making as a site of power relations
(Murdoch 2005:23; Pierce et al. 2011). This paper builds on Martin et al.’s conception of
place as, “a setting for and situated in the operation of social and economic processes,” and
“place claims” as “attachments to, and identification with, specific places” and their “ideals
about land use and how spatial processes should unfold” (Martin et al. 2010:732, 182) to
understand the political nature of particular places.
Martin et al. note how land use disputes expose the “discontinuity between place identity and
legal regulation of place,” as relevant legal frameworks fail to account for the range of
concerns and attachments expressed by participants. Pierce et al. (2011:61) argue that the
concept of relational-place is “particularly relevant to conflicts that centre on change in and
of places.” Building on Massey’s concept of places as “bundles of space-time trajectories” to
construct a multi-scalar and relational concept of place, they conclude that “all places are
relational places” (Pierce et al. 2011:60). Relational places are made up of “raw materials,”
including, “physical features, individuals, coalitions, corporations and groups, as well as
myriad parts of the built environment” (Pierce et al. 2011:59). Selection amongst these raw
materials shapes both “individual human-environment experiences,” the formation of shared
understandings about places and their meaning in pursuit of collective goals. These “bundles”
are dynamic, ongoing and change over time, each place-frame being only ever a negotiated
and strategic “fraction of a place” (Pierce et al. 2011:61). The disconnect between people’s
place claims and law is “one of the central features of the law-space nexus” (Martin et al.
2010:182).

This paper contributes to the need for further research exploring the actors and networks that
mediate spatio-legal production in struggles over land use (Martin et al. 2010) by examining
law’s role in structuring the people-place relations at the heart of a specific set of conflicts.
As will be discussed below, the persistent centrality of private property ownership in
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substantive decisions about how private land can and should be used is concealed by the
procedural emphasis on participation and consultation in Ontario’s provincial land use
governance. This privileging of the ownership relationship is further obscured by an
emphasis on measurable and purportedly rational and objective criteria in the adjudication of
land use disputes despite the affective and embodied nature of the ecological relationships at
stake.

By focusing on parties who do not have ownership rights to the land involved, I centre the
broad ‘more-than-ownership’ interests engaged by such disputes. In doing so, I examine the
ways in which law creates, responds to, and resolves the discontinuities between place claims
and legally recognized relations to place. Such parties or participants are most often defined
as non-owners, third parties, or objectors, defined by their distance and exclusion from the
primary legal relationship of, and the lack of enforceable interests at the outset of the
analysis. Here, I reject a negative or residual definition and adopt the language of more-thanownership to describe these parties and interests. My intention is to capture both the
individuals and groups whose direct place-relations will be impacted by land use decisions
and those who may be more indirectly connected to specific places but have related expertise
and/or interest in the outcome. While not taken up directly in this paper, my intention is also
to create space for the more-than-human entities with impacted relationships and interests,
such as animals, plants, rivers, rocks or forests. These categories are not intended to simplify
or romanticize local or “community” opposition – which can combine potentially
exclusionary or parochial site-specific concerns with the assertion or development of more
transformative socio-ecological relations. In this sense, ‘more’ is used to acknowledge those
interests that fall outside of property-relations defined by the ownership model and not to
grant any particular relation greater or privileged status. This shift in language is an initial
attempt to account for the wide spectrum of contested relations with, and within, places that
are shaped, obscured, and potentially disciplined by law.
Methodology5
This paper is part of a larger research project involving documentary analysis of the law and
policy governing aggregate siting, which includes applications and appeals between 2001
and 2014 in Ontario, as well as the written and oral submissions made before a legislative
5

This section summarizes the methodological approach outlined in Chapter Three, at pages 119-128.
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review committee.6 An initial review of the Provincial Environmental Registry, a public
online database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993, SO 1993, c 28), where
all Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly
posted identified 242 decisions on large-scale industrial aggregate mines, including
approvals, withdrawals, and denials. A database of the decisions was constructed identifying
the dates of proposal and decision, location, depth of extraction, volume of extraction,
objections filed, key issues identified, and, decision makers for each.

I selected cases for more detailed analysis through a review of key documents to identify the
level and nature of participation by members of the public and regulatory and planning
bodies. Cases with high levels of more-than-owner participation were identified and from
these I selected proposals or appeals resulting in, or likely to result in, a hearing before the
provincial land use tribunal. Selection was informed by the relational-place “methodological
hooks” proposed by Pierce et al. (2011:61), in particular to “identify and examine the placeframes central to the conflict” and to “identify those actors and institutions key to placeframing” (Pierce et al. 2011:61) with a specific focus on more-than-owner parties. The cases
included applications that were approved, denied, and withdrawn, as well as some additional
cases including both large-scale extensions not included in the Provincial reporting regime
and ongoing cases identified by a review of media coverage and through interview
participants. Unstructured in-person interviews were held with over 25 participants in
aggregate extraction disputes. Participants were largely activists in locally organized
interest groups who had asserted, or continue to assert, more-than-ownership interests in
relation to the land at stake in a particular proposal. In addition, two lawyers, one technical
consultant, one policy analyst, and two planners were also interviewed. Interviews took place
in both one-on-one and small group settings. Where possible, interviews took place in the
area that was the subject of the conflict or I made subsequent site visits. All participants
provided maps and often photographs of the sites. In two cases, participants took me on a
tour of the larger area of the proposed development.

6

In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1 st session, 40th Parliament,
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection,
including conservation and recycling.
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Legal and Policy Context: The Law of Aggregate Extraction in Ontario

Like many jurisdictions, Ontario has developed a complex system of land use planning (Blais
2011; Cullingworth 1987; Kaplinsky 2012; Sandberg et al. 2013), including the overlapping
network of laws that govern the use of private land (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario
2012). The ‘public interest orientation’ and consultative nature of the provincial planning
regime suggests the existence of legitimate interests in land beyond private ownership. In
fact, one of the key promises of planning is to reduce conflict where the ‘private’ and ‘public’
interests in the use of private land clash (Blais 2011:52).7 Key aspects of provincial land use
planning law and policy, such as zoning law, are premised on the acceptance of public
limitations on the right of an owner to use their property in any way they wish (Kaplinsky
2012; Valverde 2012:139). Unlike the United States and Australia, Canada does not have
constitutional protection for property rights and Canadian courts have traditionally taken a
highly deferential stance on the power of the state to regulate the uses of private property
(Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 1999; Canadian Pacific Railway
v Vancouver (City) 2006).

In Ontario and other jurisdictions, participation in planning processes has realized some
“subversive” potential.8 However, Anglo-Canadian planning remains rooted in the liberal
individualism of colonial property law and continues to enforce abstract, hierarchical, and
anthropocentric conceptions of human-environment relations that limit the potential to
reimagine people-place relations (Borrows 1997; Mossman & Girard 2014; Van Wagner
2013). In particular, despite the lack of constitutional protection for private property, the
practice of land use law in Ontario reinforces the role of the owner in determining the use of
private land.9 The case of aggregate mineral extraction in Ontario provides a useful
7

For an example of efforts to empirically measure the benefits of planning, see Cheshire & Sheppard (2002). As
Blais (2011) points out in the context of Ontario, we know very little about the actual costs and benefits of
planning.
8
A review of wider land use debates is beyond the scope of this paper, but see examples such as strengthened
environmental protections (Patano & Sandberg 2005; Sandberg et al. 2013; Whitelaw et al. 2008), human rights
protection in zoning decisions (Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario v. Kitchener (City) (2010), O.M.B.D. Case
No. PL050611; Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] M.J. No 212 (C.A.)), and has
resulted in unlikely alliances for social and political change (Cowell & Owens 2006; Sandberg et al. 2013;
Sandercock & Lyssiotis 2003; Scotford & Walsh 2013)
9
While there is little scholarly commentary on land use law in Canada, see Curran’s 2014 blog post comparing
the US and Canada and concluding that protections for property owners are similar in the two countries:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/land-use-in-canada-where-extensive-and-restrictive-landuse-regulation-is-the-norm-by-deborah-curran.html. For a discussion of the private owner as the “primary land
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illustration of the private landowner, and particularly, as the “primary land use decision
maker” in the Canadian context.10
Situating Aggregate Mineral Extraction in the Provincial Land Use Regime 11
While aggregate mineral extraction developments are open-pit mines, in Ontario they are
regulated under land use planning law and policy. Unlike other large-scale industrial mining
developments in the Province, they are also largely located on privately owned land. And,
unlike other ‘locally unwanted land uses (“LULUs”), the siting of aggregate mineral mines
is driven by private-owner proponents rather than public siting processes, such as
environmental assessment.

Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex web of legislation and policy. Figure 1
illustrates the detailed “inventory of the laws” potentially applicable to any given aggregate
extraction dispute in the Province.12 Land use planning falls within provincial jurisdiction
over municipal institutions and property and civil rights.13 In the context of aggregate
extraction, the legal framework includes, the constitutional and/or treaty rights of First
Nations and Metis communities and the applicable Indigenous legal orders,14 municipal
powers and centralized provincial planning policy under the Planning Act, the Provincial
Policy Statement (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2014), [“PPS”], provincial
planning regimes, particularly the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, and

use decision maker,” see (Platt 2014). At the time of writing a new volume on Canadian planning law was in
press, Anneke Smit and Marcia Valiante. Public Interest, Private Property (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2015)
10
It is important to note that the privileging of ownership rights is not the only explanation for outcomes
described in the case study below. Land use planning decisions are complex and the siting of extractive activity
is situated within larger dynamics of extractivism as well as rapid sub/urbanization. While I would argue that
these are related to the structure of land ownership through private property and an owner-driven planning
system, they also present distinct issues and considerations that are not taken up here. However, I see examining
law’s role in privileging a specific form of relationship to land as critical to understanding how law upholds
particular values about the more-than-human world in order to transform people-place relations in land use law.
11
This section summarizes the material from Chapter Four, on pages 145-149, 162-192, and 219-227. Repeated
text is indicated in italics.
12
This visual representation is an adaptation of Valverde’s (2012, p. 21-28) “legal inventory of laws”, which
aims to provide an overview of the “basic legal architecture” engaged by particular disputes.
13
Canadian Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, s 92 (13).
14
While the application of Indigenous law and the constitutional duty to consult First Nations and Metis
governments is not discussed in this paper, they are considered in the larger project. Indigenous and Aboriginal
law present some unique legal challenges to the existing aggregate extraction regime that are worthy of
extensive and specific consideration beyond the scope of this paper.
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the ARA and associated Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards. 15 While the
decision- making process flows from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts include, and
many are focused on, consideration of amendments to the local municipality’s Official Plan
and zoning by-laws required. The Province provides broad guidance and maintains
considerable power to constrain local government action through both the Planning Act and
the PPS, which “sets the policy foundation for regulating the development and use of land.” 16

15

Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, s.22; Provincial Policy Statement (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and
Housing 2014); Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards (Ministry of Natural Resources, Land
and Water Branch, Aggregate and Petroleum Resources Section 1996; Ministry of Natural Resources, Natural
Resources Management Division 1997)
16
The majority of cases discussed here were decided under the 2005 Provincial Policy Statement, Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx [the “2005 PPS”]. In April 2014 the
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took effect on April 30,
2014. Applications filed subsequently will be determined under the 2014 PPS.
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Figure 1: Inventory of Laws for Aggregate Extraction Siting
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Figure 1: Inventory of Laws for Aggregate Extraction Siting
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Within this provincially led planning regime, the bulk of day-to-day planning powers and
responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities. However, formal public participation
requirements for local planning and development decisions are set out in the Planning Act (s.
17, 22, 26.2, 34). Review of planning decisions is divided between the Ontario Municipal
Board (OMB) and the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT), ostensibly dividing “land use”
from “environmental” decisions, despite the environmentally-focused nature of many
objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al. 2013; Van Wagner 2013).17 However, one
of the unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the OMB, a
quasi-judicial administrative body, which serves as the primary appeal body for planning
and development decisions, including ARA licensing and associated planning approvals.

The data collected from the Environmental Registry revealed that applications for large-scale
industrial aggregate mineral mines under the ARA are overwhelmingly approved, both by the
Ministry that oversees licensing, and by the quasi-judicial appeal body that contested
applications are reviewed by in Ontario. Table 5 shows that between 2001 and 2014, 86% of
large-scale ARA applications listed on the Registry were approved with only 2% having been
denied. While close to 12% are withdrawn, in at least two cases, the applications were
resubmitted with modifications. In another case, the application was withdrawn after a
multimillion dollar settlement with the Province and an unsuccessful claim against the
Federal government under the investor protection clause of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).18 While another high profile withdrawal by the Highlands Company in
2011 is widely seen as a victory for the well-organized opposition, which brought together
farmers, urban food movement activists, second home owners, environmentalists and
indigenous groups, a revised Ontario geological survey now indicates that the applicant’s
technical assessment of the quality the rock was incorrect and the value was overestimated. 19

17

Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies have recently been formally linked as part of the
Environment and Land Tribunals cluster but it is too early to determine any substantive outcomes of the
restructuring (Sossin & Baxter 2012). For certain appeals, particularly where hearings may be required from
both tribunals, a joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act (RSO 1990. c C.29), such as the
high profile Nelson Aggregate Co., Re, (2012 CLB 29642), and, Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re) (2012 CLB
16274) cases.
18
St. Mary’s Cement proposed a large quarry below the water table, located near Hamilton, Ontario. It was
opposed by multiple agencies and local governments and a community group and eventually resulted in a rare
Ministerial Zoning Order under section 77 of the Planning Act prohibiting aggregate development. Members of
the community group were interviewed for this project.
19
Consultant, interview, June 2014.
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Decisions

#

%

Approved

208

86

Withdrawn

28

12

Denied

6

2

Total

242

100

Table 5: Decisions on Class A Licences 2001-2014 as reported on the provincial
Environmental Registry
An overwhelming majority of the applications are approved. In many cases, this is despite
substantial public participation in planning processes and tribunal hearings and strong
objections by the community and sometimes planning agencies as well. Community activists
often provide alternative expert evidence at their own expense, even in areas covered by
explicitly “environmentally focused” development plans such as the Niagara Escarpment in
southern Ontario. Table 6 shows the range of public commentary or objection for each
category of decision, based on the Environmental Registry data.
Decision
Approved
Withdrawn
Denied

Range of Numbers of
Comments Filed
0-1108
0-1563
0-441

Table 6: Comments and Objections filed by members of the public and/or government
agencies (local, provincial and federal)
While the Minister has discretion to grant an aggregate extraction license despite outstanding
public objections, in practice almost all cases in which the proponent does not “resolve” all
concerns, the adjudication is referred to the Ontario Municipal Board where the planning
process is transformed into a quasi-judicial adjudicative process. Table 7 below shows the
breakdown of decisions referred to the Board by decision makers. Seventeen percent of
applications are adjudicated, with 83 percent being dealt with directly by the Ministry.
However, it is important to note that Ministry approval does not necessarily imply that
objections have been resolved from the perspective of the more-than-owner parties. As
described below, while the applicant has two years to attempt to resolve concerns, once they
notify the Ministry, parties have only 20 days in which to affirm their objection, or it is
deemed withdrawn. Technical expertise, capacity, and financial resources may be as
important in determining whether a party will maintain an objection as their substantive
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concerns, particularly in light of the near certainty that the application will be referred to the
Board. Hearings for contentious applications can be quite lengthy and expensive, particularly
if an individual or group obtains legal advice. For example, the Duntroon quarry extension
hearing lasted 169 hearing days.20 One interview participant observed the limitations of
poorly funded local groups directly, having worked in environmental departments of
government for many years, noting how success was linked to financial resources rather than
substantive issues:
Obviously many of them had very legitimate issues but unfortunately they were …
driven by bake sale funds, could not afford the scientific studies … that were
needed, so it became very difficult for them to argue their cases.21
Interview participants almost uniformly viewed success before the Board to be unlikely.

Decision Maker

Approvals
Denials
#
%
#
%
MNR
178
82
1
<1
OMB
28
13
3
1
Joint Board
2
<1
2
<1
Total
208
96
6
2
Table 7: Outcomes for approved and denied applications by decision maker for
decisions on Class A Licence Applications under the Ontario Aggregate Resources Act
2001-2014 as reported on the provincial Environmental Registry
The discussion below considers the finding that legal outcomes are skewed towards
applicants, in this case aggregate extraction companies, from a relational perspective. I first
examine the types of claims about what was at stake in the disputes and then explore how the
legal and policy frameworks governing the application process structures the people-place
relationships involved.
Structuring Legal Relations
While aggregate decisions engage a complex network of law and policy, the ARA and its
regulations and Ministerial policies, the Planning Act and the guiding planning policy, the
PPS, largely determine the structure of relations. The discussion examines the work that law
does to structure people-place relations in the context of aggregate extraction. First, morethan-owner perspectives on the people-place relations at the heart of the disputes studied are
examined to demonstrate that amidst the messy complexity of the place-claims involved,

20
21

More-than-owner party, Interview, September 9, 2014.
More-than-owner party, Interview, April 23, 2014).
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assertions of alternative relationships with the more-than-human world emerge and have the
potential to disrupt legal property relations. It then details three ways in which the peopleplace relations of aggregate extraction are shaped through legal texts and processes to uphold
the legal property relations of private ownership: (1) the relative positions of the potential
parties during the application and adjudication stages; (2) the presumptive right to
development and approval; and, (3) mitigation-based rather than a precautionary approach to
ecological impact.
Connection, Responsibility, Dependence: The Messy Story of Places at Stake
Participants in the study expressed complex and sometimes contradictory relationships with
the places identified for extraction in the disputes studied for this project. As noted above, the
interests asserted by these more-than-owner parties are neither uniformly environmentally
motivated nor are they merely instrumental NIMBYism. They are messy – all at once
instrumental and affective, conservative and transformative, exclusionary and reciprocal.
Here I am focused on such openings to consider whether the places at stake in aggregate
disputes can serve as the “literal common ground” for essential conversations and
negotiations about how we want to live together as human communities embedded in the
social and ecological complexity of particular material places (Haluza-Delay et al. 2013;
Scully 2012). Environmental concerns were not the only concerns expressed by the
participants in this study and few of them identified primarily, or at all, as environmentalists;
however environmental concerns were consistently raised as a central issue in both interviews
and the texts examined.22 In this paper, I have focused on these concerns because of the
challenge they present to the enduring legal primacy of the landowner in land use planning
decision-making, often arising in unexpected places. It is not meant to romanticize a
particular community or way of life or to simplify the messy and contradictory nature of the
disputes. Rather my aim is to unsettle the notion that such disputes can ever be neatly
For example, see the “Resident Comments, Questions and Responses by Key Topic” from the Nelson Quarry
Joint Agency Review Team Report, available online:
http://www.halton.ca/planning_sustainability/planning_applications/applications_under_review/nelson_aggregat
e_quarry/. Halton Region, in which the Nelson Quarry was proposed, has a unique Joint Agency Review Team
(JART) process that brings local and regional planning authorities together to review proposals. The JART
Reports attempt to provide an accessible summary of key elements of the proposal and reviews of the technical
information to the public. The Nelson JART Report also breaks down public comments. In this case 70
comments were received and organized into the following categories: Natural Environment (22), Water (18),
Noise and Air Quality (16), Blasting (22), Traffic (22), Existing Quarry (8), Rehabilitation (8), UNESCO
Biosphere Reserve (10), JART Process (3), and, Other (24). While no thematic organized summary is available,
the author’s assessment of the public comments of the 2012 legislative review reflects a similar mix of issues,
although several additional concerns were raised in the province-wide hearings, such as First Nations
jurisdiction and the constitutional Duty to Consult Indigenous communities.
22
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categorized as either NIMBY or environmental in order to better engage with the “complex
relations of attachment, belonging, exclusion and otherness that permeate such conflicts”
(Woods et al. 2012:568).
Some participants explained their motivations or their role in the process through
concepts of advocacy, stewardship or responsibility. One member of a local environmental
group involved in a licensing appeal pointed to both an interspecies and intergenerational
sense of obligation:
One of the problems you have is the Niagara Escarpment can’t stand up for itself;
it is mute. You and I and all of us have to stand up and defend and that is what we
are trying to do.”23
A sixth-generation farmer on land adjacent to a proposed mine site whose family rejected
repeated offers to buy-out his land reflected on his relationship to the surrounding lands and
waters:
…we realized when these guys came along, they could destroy all that stuff. We
didn’t realize what a great spot we have here. We didn’t want to see that done. It is
deeper than just the money part, eh. A lot deeper.”24
One submission on the Nelson Quarry stated, “we are so fortunate to be stewards of this
scenic, special land.” (Appendix C, JART Report, 2009, 14). Another noted, “[A]s humans
we bear an enormous responsibility. While we look for ways to improve our lives through
development, we must respect all that nature provides us and must use its resources
responsibly.” (Appendix C, JART Report, 2009, 24). A farming couple collectively pointed
to the need for a sustainable relationship with the soil:
Participant 1: The big thing is you can’t create soil to grow food in.
Participant 2: No, it is not a renewable resource but produces a renewable crop
every year and that is the difference. You can't take aggregate and produce a
new crop every year. …
Participant 1: Yes, look at the cod industry. You spoil it, it doesn't come back in
a few days.25

23

More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014.
More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014.
25
More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014.
24
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Human-environment interdependence was sometimes discussed in the context
of environmental health. One participant reflected that she was surprised that public
concern about the quarry proposal was quite limited until people were informed of the
environmental health issues:
We started off strong as a group on traffic impacts and property
devaluation …and it doesn’t seem to have much of an influence…even
with blasting…but you can’t breathe and your water is contaminated,
people start to listen.26
This type of framing was seen by other participants as narrowing the ecological perspective
to centre human concerns. One participant lamented that the “average person” was more
concerned about their own water and real estate values than the rare bats, butterflies, and
orchids found on the site, “they are creatures succumbing to the destruction of the
environment.”27 Another viewed the ecological impact as more of a “case-facing” issue than
a “community-facing” concern such as traffic.28 For others, the connection between human
wellbeing and ecological integrity became important to the shift beyond a site-specific
campaign to engagement with broader debates about land use. One group shifted their focus
from the particular site to advocating for a regional environmental plan that would recognize
“the whole region [as] a system of environmental features and functions that work
together.”29 A leading member of another group talked about rejecting the site-specific
approach for the “common denominator” of food and water: “Our water is not for sale, our
water is sacred and not to be polluted, and our foodlands are there for the betterment of this
province.”30 He reflected on successfully shifting the local fight to support a more broadly
focused campaign, “It is one of those issues in life that is just the right thing to do.” 31
Interview participants simultaneously emphasized their own knowledge of the places
involved and a sense of humility about how much they had learned about the complexity of
ecological systems and connectivity through involvement in the disputes. For several
participants the relationship to the place at stake in the dispute changed or deepened through
engagement with the planning process. One farmer reflected on his new understanding of the
role of the complex groundwater and hydrogeological features in the area:
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I never knew about the reach of water. I never knew that changing cold water
fisheries by a couple degrees in temperature could be an issue. I never knew that
fish that spawned in the Nottawasaga sturgeon became game fish in Lake
Michigan. We were just farming there doing our stuff. We just don't understand
the reach of impact things can have. We learned. We talked.32
One participant talked about the proposed mine site beside her long-time family home, and
having only recently learned about species of rare butterfly that depends on this unique alvar
habitat:33 “This is a beautiful little alvar that should be saved, part of a disappearing globally
rare habitat. You would find at least as many alvar indicators to save it [as another protected
area]…but nobody is looking. The rare species are there but nobody is looking.”34 In several
cases this learning was, at least partially, the result of engaging with highly technical
proponent data personally, and often through experts, and finding it lacking. One participant
described the process of learning about the complex hydrogeology of the site:
As we were looking it just became more and more gripping because of the fact that
we found these species, that it was designated provincially significant…how
precious and vulnerable this aquifer was…The fragility of the system became
more and more apparent as we learned more.35
For many participants this complexity was not reflected in the complex modelling provided
by proponent experts, abstracted from the day-to-day experience of a particular place. One
member of an environmental group familiar with the detailed and time-consuming processes
of ecological science noted that the ability to contest the expert reports was limited by little or
no opportunity to collect alternative data about the physical and biological environment on
the proponent’s property:
They won’t let you walk around in your rubber boots and eat some sandwiches
and try to figure out what is going on … You are in there for three hours and then
you get the hell out.36
Connection to place was also evident in participants’ descriptions of the impact of aggregate
mining as fundamentally transformative, in marked contrast with its legal construction as an
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“interim use” in the PPS. The sense that a particular material place would be lost was evoked
through the image of the “hole” or “crater” that would be left behind:
…[Y]ou are taking a natural feature which is an escarpment and you are creating
a gigantic hole which later becomes a deep lake which is not natural on the
escarpment. There [are] no lakes on top. You are destroying wetlands, you are
destroying creeks, you are destroying woodlands, habitats…and farmland.37
The loss of something was linked to the particularity of specific places through the rejection
of highly technical adaptive management plans and environmental compensation mechanisms
increasingly incorporated into licensing conditions in Ontario. Ambitious plans for the
rehabilitation of a quarry site to agricultural production were rejected based on experience
with the particular ecosystems involved: “My experience is it can’t happen….Once it is
disturbed it is never as good.” 38 Another participant distinguished between the “synergistic”
relationship between the current agricultural use on the site and its “ecologically pristine
features” and spread of ecological degradation that results from the “wasteland” or
“moonscape” created by the “dry, barren, dust” landscape of the aggregate mine.39 The legal
emphasis on the interim nature of the use, and on the requirements for rehabilitation, was
seen by many as obscuring the material impact of extraction as a loss not simply to a right to
a particular use or activity, but of a complex and relational place (Graham 2010). This legal
move reinforces the primacy of property-ownership at the expense of the range of more-thanownership relations that might otherwise make such decisions even more complex.

Owners as Planners and Participation as Objection
There is no other sector that has the … same type of preferential treatment as the
aggregate sector.40
Legally the process of siting an aggregate mineral mine begins with the Aggregate Resources
Act. However, the process of land assembly preparation likely begins many years before an
application is filed. One participant described this pre-planning phase:
I am confident that the quarry owners were planning this quarry years before
knowledge of the application surfaced. Whether it is in acquiring the land or
preparing the plans - the profit is such that the investment is very long term on the
part of the industry. So they are light years ahead in their planning and their
37
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understanding of the citizens before the citizens become aware there is going to be
a quarry in their back yard. 41
The application is premised on the selection of a site by the project proponent, who also
usually owns the land in question. Unlike other siting disputes, such as landfills, where
alternative locations are considered through a public environmental assessment process,
aggregate mine locations are generally fixed by virtue of private ownership. In the words of
one planner, “the aggregate is where it is; and also, it is private sector owners [who] don't
really have the opportunity to look at alternatives. 42

The Act positions the private landowner as the primary actor who initiates the process at a
time of their choosing through an application to the Ministry.43 The process is proponentdriven and as the Provincial Standards and Manual sets out, the Applicant has control of the
knowledge base upon which the technical, legal and factual decisions are made. The licensing
process is informed and driven by the information and expertise provided by the proponent,
with the express purpose of having the application approved. Any subsequent litigation is
based on this same data, subject only to any independent technical or legal expertise and
documentation that may be provided by Indigenous governments, municipal actors or
planning authorities, and third party groups or individuals, likely at their own expense.
However, independent expert evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both
logistically and financially onerous, particularly for Indigenous communities, small local
governments and community groups. It is also risky, given that they may or may not be
accepted by the Board at a hearing and that access to the proponent’s land may not be granted
for direct investigation and data review.44 At least one participant noted difficulty retaining
technical consultants due to expert firms’ relationships with the proponent companies. 45

The result is that the story about what is at stake and which relationships matter is effectively
determined in advance of any adjudicative process. Once the proponent has established the
narrative – politically, economically, and technically – it is very difficult and onerous to
change. In at least two of the six denied applications, the more-than-owner parties linked their
41
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success to having intervened at the early stages of the application by developing positive
relationships with local planners and representatives and providing them with independent
technical information and reviews of proponent data directly. In some cases they had
provided expert reports before the proponent had even submitted data. Participants described
this as “driving the agenda” and providing local decision makers with a “counter
viewpoint.”46 In contrast, one participant in an approved quarry hearing noted that their
community group was “considered hostile by everybody at [Township].” She noted that the
company, who already had an existing quarry adjacent to the new site, had successfully
positioned themselves as ‘local’ and ‘good citizens’: “[They] had all of their ducks in order.
They invite the community to barbecues, they are the good people, they do things for the
community centre.”47

However, these parties also identified their success as related to a very specific framing and
presentation that specifically excluded the affective dimensions of their relations with the
places at stake. As one more-than-owner party noted, “We have to be as professional, frankly,
if not more so than the proponent and that has to be our front in everything we do…” 48 This
was described by other participants as focusing on the “facts” or the “science.”49 One
participant with past government experience linked a lack of success amongst communitybased groups on environmental issues to a failure to adopt this frame: “Many of them spoke
simply by emotion and not enough by fact and substance.”50
More-than-owner parties are characterized in Ministerial policy as “objectors” with no formal
relationship with the land.51 Their relationship in the proponent-led process is with the private
Applicant – the owner and holder of the rights related to the land. Despite the protection of
aggregate resources as a matter of “provincial interest” for the benefit of the public, the
consultations about aggregate application are conducted and controlled by the proponent. The
Ministry has no role in addressing objections made by citizens and can therefore issue a
license without formally addressing concerns expressed through either the ARA or the
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Environmental Registry process. 52 There is no public assistance to interpret and assess the
application information and little time to do so is provided, with a 45-day window for
commentary.53 While the Provincial Standards require the proponent to host one public
presentation in the local area during the notice period, neither the technical experts retained
by the proponent nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist
the public in interpreting the reports or to ensure compliance. In fact, the Policy Manual
directs Ministry staff not to attend meetings unless there are “special circumstances.”54 One
participant described the proponent-led process this way: “Aggregate has had its way forever
and a day. They are firmly entrenched and implanted. They can do the things they do because
they own the process.”55

Multiple participants expressed frustration with the lack of access to Ministry experts and
decision makers. Despite the designation of aggregate mineral extraction as a matter of
provincial interest in 1982 (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing & Ontario
Ministry of Natural Resources 1982), government agencies routinely decline to participate in
hearings and in at least one case have refused to provide parties with relevant information
about the application and assessment.56 A participant in that case characterized the Ministry
as “in effect a facilitator for mining for quarry in Ontario. We don't have enough agency
resources to police the quarry companies.”57 One planner described the lack of transparency
in the planning policy process, particularly the role of various provincial and local decision
makers:
[T]hey are making those trade-offs in the back rooms and not necessarily in an
open forum. The thing is now that we have this one window planning act process
that we have had for quite a while now, it doesn't enable you to identify which
ministry said what to government. So you don't really know how these trade-offs
were made.58
He expressed concerns that community groups were filling the gaps left by under-resourced
or conflicted local governments: “Why is the municipality not protecting their own citizens?
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Why do they [citizens] have to spend thousands of dollars to bring their own consultants in?”
He also noted the imbalance given that aggregate companies can “afford to get the kind of
expertise they want.”

The proponent continues to set the terms and pace after the initial comment period. Within
two years, they must “attempt to resolve” objections and submit a list of unresolved
objections and documentation of attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for
resolutions to the Ministry and to remaining objectors. 59 A 20-day notice period is then
triggered during which remaining objectors, including government agencies, must submit
further “recommendations” or they are deemed to no longer object.60 While it is difficult to
measure, it is possible that without the time, political support, and financial resources to
obtain legal representation and technical expertise, parties with ongoing concerns may allow
their objections to be deemed withdrawn. Conversely, one professional conservationist in an
area of high aggregate development noted that once a proponent has triggered the process
they have a great deal at stake and become much less likely to withdraw despite the need for
ongoing consultation: “Once they start they start the licensing process then they become very
attached to it and they have invested a lot of money, a lot of money.” 61

Where they do go forward, parties tend to focus on narrow grounds that have received some
legal recognition in the past, limiting their ability to articulate what is really at stake. This
could include for example focusing on a specific endangered species habitat rather than a
responsibility to respect the physical limits of particular ecological systems and obligations to
future generations. Tribunal members routinely thank more-than-owner parties for sharing
their “concerns” and for participating, while overwhelmingly accepting the “facts” provided
by the proponent’s privately hired consultants and rarely challenging unsupported assertions
about social and economic benefits.62 In the words of one planner, “[T]he boards tend to
kind of fudge on the side of the proponent a lot of the time.”63
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Presumptive Development, Approvals, and Saying No
“[T]he issue was never about gravel or limestone, the issue was always about
planning.”64

Technically, in the context of aggregate extraction, if the land for which a quarry is proposed
is not currently designated as a “mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable
municipal Official Plan, the proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate
amendments under the Planning Act.65 However, the local planning requirements are
constrained by provincial policy. The Policy Statement serves as the guiding document for all
land use decisions in the province and the Planning Act stipulates that all policy and
decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the Ontario Municipal
Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent with the Policy Statement
(Planning Act, s. 3). Since the first version was approved in the 1990s, the Policy Statement
has consistently prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and development. This
prioritization has been maintained through to the recently revised 2014 policy. In 2005, the
Policy Statement was revised to explicitly exclude consideration of the need for the resource
to be extracted (PPS, S. 2.5).66 The Board itself has noted the exceptional nature of this
presumption: “[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging Policy Statement
where need is not required” (Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County), 2010). Planning and
urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of specific discursive
frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano and Sandberg
specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the aggregate industry
to appeal to decision makers (Patano & Sandberg 2005).

The effect is to limit the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and
operation, including the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into
the assessment of applications, and to protect features not deemed provincially “significant”
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(Bull & Estrela 2012). One participant described the surprise when community members
learned about the lack of jurisdiction at the local level: “Whose jurisdiction is it? Why can't
our local council have a say in a potential industrial development that would totally change
this community that has been built for five generations? How come we don't have a say? This
is not okay. What can you do about it to make it okay? Nothing.” 67 One planner also
expressed a concern that the Board often adopts lower ARA standards as compared to the
more rigorous official plan requirements.68
More-than-owner parties have found that there is no meaningful opportunity to say “no”
within the licensing process. In the words of an individual involved in one highly contested
dispute:
The industry often argues that companies need efficiency, transparency and
certainty. What about efficiency, transparency and certainty for communities…?
Surely when all agencies and stakeholders are saying no, the process should be
able to come to a “no” outcome. To us, it unfortunately seems that the philosophy
of presumptive development and entitlement prevents this company from
accepting a no position.69
Presumptive rights to transform and destroy the land at stake are embedded in the guiding
policy, severing the “resource” from both human and other ecological communities. The
Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term use,
including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits,
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude or hinder”
extraction.70 This protection extends even to operations that have ceased, despite the repeated
and ongoing assertion by a range of parties that land containing aggregate deposits is of value
for agricultural uses, subject to ongoing Indigenous claims and rights, and ecologically
critical habitat. Indeed, some participants expressed frustration at the lack of recognition that
the rock to be extracted was an integral part of the ecological system on which the
agricultural and/or conservation values depend.71 The narratives of exclusivity and the
inevitability of growth discipline the messy complexity of competing and overlapping claims
to land and ecological relations.
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A specific place with complex networks of relations is transformed into an abstract space to
be ‘temporarily’ disappeared and then rehabilitated to some other form of ‘use’ when its
extractive value has been exhausted. The aggregate regulatory regime specifically provides
for greater exemptions from rehabilitation requirements where quarries are developed in
ecologically or agriculturally valuable land, based on concerns about efficiency and technical
feasibility. For example, 2013 amendments to the Endangered Species Act specifically
exempt aggregate licenses from the permitting regime. 72 The sense that approval is presumed
leads to a feeling that the process was not getting to the ‘right’ decisions because the relations
considered were so narrow. There is no space for an articulation of a loss of place, something
different and more profound than the loss of an abstract right. The “public interest” protected
by the Ministry of Natural Resources, which oversees the licensing process, is explicitly
linked to economic growth.
One of our big themes when we talked to the government was the idea of
presumptive development. One of the things with Hamilton that we kept getting
scared about over, particularly a city who is trying to encourage industrialization
and get the corporate tax base up so that the tax pressure is off the resident, is all
this theme about business is good. We hear it in our politicians all the time. It
doesn't matter what it is, business is good.73
While the land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and
potentially as having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities for
food production, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the PPS. Participants
expressed a view of aggregate sites as places with eco-social relations. But for the purposes
of law, they are divided into different kinds of space - agricultural fields, ‘natural’ heritage,
such as forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as trails, and subsurface resources such as
mineral deposits and groundwater sources. The policy is currently constructed in such a way
that even where recognized, these other types of relationship to place are trumped by the
protection of the mineral resource value and economic relations.
Mitigation, Prevention and Self-Regulation
This whole business of adaptive management plan is rooted in the approach by the
aggregate industry that if I don't do all my assessment work ahead of time to get an
approval, then when I uncover a problem that I haven't anticipated, I will solve it
then. I don't know what it is. I didn't know how to approach it. But I will solve it.
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How ridiculous is that? That is what an adaptive management plan is about. It is a
non-plan.74
Finally, the recent trend towards approvals on the basis of proponent-designed ‘Adaptive
Management Plans’ also obscures the relationships of interconnection and dependence
between the human and more-than-human communities in particular places. While not
required by law or policy, proposals to mitigate rather than prevent potentially catastrophic
harm, such as the depletion of the water table, through Adaptive Management Plans have
been supported and even promoted by the Ministry and the Tribunal while they have largely
rejected a precautionary approach (Van Wagner 2013). As critics have argued, this type of
reactive approach to risk in extractive contexts waits until problems reveal themselves and
attempts to resolve them by trial and error (Randall 2012). Arguably, this voluntary and
industry-led approach compounds the proponent-driven nature of the licensing process.
While adaptive management plans have been incorporated into site plans and licensing
conditions as “an additional layer of oversight,” (Bull & Estrela 2012:29), their enforceability
has been questioned, as has the potentially improper delegation of the Board’s authority to
the Ministry (James Dick Construction Ltd. v. Caledon (Town), 2010) However, this concern
has also been dismissed by other decision makers (Jennison Construction, 2011).

The promotion of mitigation in place of precaution is further complicated by the almost
universally recognized inability of the Ministry to enforce regulatory requirements and
increasing reliance on self-monitoring (James Dick Construction and the dissenting opinion
in Walker), concerns which are routinely dismissed as beyond the scope of the legal decisionmaking process (majority in Walker). As noted above, 2013 amendments to the Ontario
Endangered Species Act exempt pits and quarries from the requirements to obtain a permit
for activities that would otherwise be prohibited, including damaging or destroying species
habitat, instead requiring only mitigation measures and registration of activities with the
Ministry and without independent monitoring requirements and enforcement capacity.
Aggregate extraction operations are also exempt from other environmental legislation,
including any regulations of a local conservation authority under the Conservation
Authorities Act. Such agencies are empowered to regulate development impacts on wetlands,
shorelines and watercourses; however, in the context of aggregate they play only an optional
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advisory role to municipalities on issues related to natural heritage and water.75 One
participant recalled that potential lawyers they interviewed focused on mitigation rather than
opposition by asking questions such as: “What did we want as our compensation? What did
we want for a framework document for how the operation would operate?”76 However, to
many of the participants the stakes were too high to settle for mitigation despite the risks and
the costs.
Conclusion
As the above analysis makes clear, the current land use regime in Ontario structures peopleplace relations to uphold the primacy of the landowner as planner in the context of aggregate
extraction. In doing so, law obscures ‘more-than-ownership’ relations with the land. An
ecological-relational perspective reveals this structural orientation as excluding the complex
range of relationships in particular places from the decision-making process. This limits the
transformative potential of planning as alternative articulations of property relations are
managed in the interests of a narrowly defined public interest in economic growth. By
examining the use of planning tools and forums by more-than-owner parties in a specific
setting, I argue that the legal rights to speak, write, appeal and contest land use decisions are
not enough to reorient land use planning law away from abstract and anthropocentric
property rights without the creation of space for performances of reciprocal relations with
place.
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Chapter Eight – Law’s Rurality: Land Use Law and the Shaping of People-Place
Relations in Rural Ontario1
1. Introduction
Land use law in Ontario constructs the rural as residual – a boundary space between the urban
and the natural, between the industrial extractive and protected ecological zones. The
working landscapes of rural places serve as a buffer to legally protected environmental
landscapes, but are also offered up as a potential sacrifice zone where resource demands can
be satisfied. As the space between industrial and environmental zones, rural places serve as
the spaces in which the ‘balance’ between environmental values and economic growth can be
established through the promotion of appropriate development and good planning. This
residuality reinforces the value of rural places as either preserved amenity spaces or sites of
industrial and extractive development rather than the inhabited sites of ongoing negotiated
relations between human communities and with ecological systems. Further, it forecloses
opportunities for the articulation and performance of transformative ecological relations that
might otherwise emerge as parties negotiate the people-place relations of living with the
‘more-than-human’ world in rural places.

Decisions about land use are sites of political and legal contestation about social and
environmental justice in both rural and urban contexts. This paper specifically considers the
rural context by examining aggregate mineral mining in the Niagara Escarpment region of
Ontario, Canada, a rural and peri-urban region that borders the Greater Toronto Area.2
Aggregate extraction provides a strategic context in which to explore rurality as a dimension
of environmental justice because of both the transformative material impacts of extraction
and the spatially fixed nature of mineral resources. In this sense, mining can be distinguished
from many of the other types of siting and locally unwanted land use issues traditionally
considered by environmental justice scholars. Mining necessarily occurs in particular
locations where resources are found (Keeling and Sandlos, 2009). As well, extraction is

Originally published as (2016) Law’s Rurality: Land use law and the shaping of rural people-place relations in
rural Ontario. Rural Studies 47, 311-325.
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Section 1 of the Aggregate Resources Act (RSO 1990, c. A.8), defines “aggregate” as, “gravel, sand, clay,
earth, shale, stone, limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, granite, rock or other prescribed material”.
Depending on the specific material, a mine is classified as either a “pit” or a “quarry” in Ontario. Mines are
further classified according to private or Crown lands, tonnage of extracted material, and extraction above or
below the water table.
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transformative – a particular place is lost and another is created. While large-scale industrial
aggregate mining in Ontario takes place largely on private land at the initiative of private land
owners, the impact of extraction extends to a much wider range of human and more-thanhuman communities with relationships to the particular places at stake. In this paper, I
specifically examine interests asserted by parties without ownership interests in the land
involved. These ‘more-than-ownership’ interests complicate legal and cultural constructions
of property as the defining relationship between people and places. Disputes about aggregate
mining provide one example of the how land use planning law attempts to balance such
interests with the protection of private property ownership in Anglo-Canadian law.

In the context of Ontario, the fixed location of aggregate mineral resources overlaps with
networks of conflicting relationships with land: environmental preservation and ecological
integrity; agricultural and recreational land uses; local and regional infrastructure and
economic development; and, Indigenous rights and legal orders with respect to land and
resources. Such relationships are produced through complex and interdependent people-place
relations that are always being contested and negotiated through political, social, and material
interactions within and between human and more-than-human communities. The specific
hydrogeological features of valuable mineral deposits create the conditions for high quality
agricultural land, historically inhabited and used by Indigenous communities displaced from
their land through the establishment of settler farming communities and now characterized by
a growing population of amenity-seeking exurbanites and second home owners. Elsewhere
the rare species habitat of an alvar landscape, protected by an Indigenous legal order for its
cultural and spiritual significance and subject to ongoing land claims, may be popular as a
recreational destination, valuable as pastureland leased to local ranchers, and simultaneously
privately owned by aggregate developers with plans to extract the uniquely accessible
mineral resources. This paper examines the role of legal constructions of rurality in
determining the ordering of these relations. In particular, the legal privileging of an extractive
model of property over people-place relations that fall outside the boundaries of private
property ownership is critically examined in the context of rural Ontario. The work that law
does in structuring relationships with land shapes and constrains the range of ‘more-thanownership’ relations that are articulated and recognized in planning processes. In doing so, it
plays an important role in shaping opportunities for just and equitable environmental relations
in particular places.
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2. Methods3
This paper presents a case study on the unique environmentally-focused Niagara Escarpment
planning regime that is part of a larger research project examining the law and policy
governing disputes about aggregate extraction in Ontario between 2001 and 2014.4 An initial
review of the Provincial Environmental Registry identified 242 decisions on large-scale
industrial aggregate mines, including approvals, withdrawals, and denials.5 A database of
the decisions was constructed, including chronologies, location, depth of extraction, volume
of extraction, objections filed, key issues identified, and, decision makers.

Detailed documentary analysis of legal texts was undertaken, including formal laws and
regulations, policy and regulatory guidance documents, public submissions, and legislative
review documents. Specific cases for detailed documentary analysis and in-depth interviews
were selected through a review of key documents to identify the level of participation by
members of the public and governmental and non-governmental organizations in the
regulatory process and the types of issues and concerns about the impact of extraction raised
by such parties. Cases with high levels of participation or those that presented particularly
significant concerns, such as unprecedented size, experimental or untested extraction
methods, or high levels of social and environmental impact were considered for interviewbased qualitative case studies. In selecting specific cases, I focused on applications resulting
in, or likely to result in, a hearing before the provincial land use tribunal.

Based on the documentary analysis, 18 unstructured in-person interviews were conducted
with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes. All the disputes were in places
deemed ‘rural’ by local or regional plans with the exception of one case study in Northern
Ontario. For the purposes of this paper, rurality is defined in relation to the legal
classification of the place involved rather than personal identification as rural or as
belonging to a rural community. Participants were largely activists in local or regionally3

This section summarizes portions of Chapter Three, from pages 119-128. Repeated text is italicized.
In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1 st session, 40th Parliament,
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection,
including conservation and recycling.
5
The Environmental Registry is a public online database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993,
SO 199s, c 28), where Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly
posted,
4
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based organizations formed to respond to a specific application or pre-existing organizations
who chose to become involved with a particular quarry application based on a particular set
of environmental or social concerns. Participants included farmers, residents of communities
close to proposed mine sites, non-resident home owners in communities close to proposed
mine sites, and members of local environmental and conservation groups. 6 In addition, two
lawyers, one scientific consultant, one policy analyst, one professional naturalist, and two
planners were also interviewed. All but one of the participants were white, 15 were men and
10 were women.

Interviews took place in both one-on-one and small group settings. Where possible,
interviews took place in the area that was the subject of the conflict. Subsequent site visits
were made by the author in order to achieve a place-based understanding of the participants’
perspectives. In two cases, participants provided an extensive guided tour of the proposed
site following the interview. In other interviews participants provided or referred to maps and
pictures of the location. In two cases the author is personally familiar with the area.

The data was analyzed through an eco-relational analysis developed by the author to bring
together the relational analysis of law proposed by Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky
with the relational-place approach proposed by Pierce et al. Based on this hybrid framework,
the data was analyzed to identify “the place-frames central to the conflict” (Pierce et al.,
2011), the place-based relationships and values “at stake” (Nedelsky, 2012) and law’s role
in shaping and defining the people-place relationships in particular places. .

As explored here, rurality was one of several themes that emerged across these analytical
categories. This paper specifically considers the legal structuring of rural people-place
relations in the Niagara Escarpment. As a particular and material place in which

6

At the time of writing, the larger project includes the development of a conceptual framework and an ongoing
process of relationship building aimed at working with an Indigenous community facing quarry development
proposals in Ontario, including in the Niagara Escarpment Development Plan Area where enduring Indigenous
relationships to the land and place-based legal systems are critically components of realizing just sustainability.
The goal of this work is to engage with Indigenous experiences, perspectives, and legal principles for land use
governance in the larger project, which requires distinct legal and methodological considerations for the author
as a white, settler, legal academic. This aspect of the project was not complete at the time of publication and is
therefore not included in this paper. The discussion below does consider questions and implications related to
Indigenous land and legal orders as a critical part of a broader discussion about rurality and environmental
justice in Ontario and Canada and an essential element of ongoing and future research. However, it is not
reflected in the empirical data discussed below.
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interdependent human and ‘more-than-human’ interests are engaged by extraction, the
Escarpment provides a useful case study in which to analyze how law structures people-place
relations as well as defines and contextualizes what is at stake in land use conflicts. While it
draws on the larger project’s analysis of generally applicable legal texts and on the themes
identified in the interviews as a whole, the case study is grounded in the specific legal,
political, social, and ecological context of the Escarpment through its focus on the Niagara
Escarpment planning framework.
3. Placing Law: Preserving and Extracting the Niagara Escarpment
Ontario’s Niagara Escarpment and its distinctive planning framework provide a particularly
interesting example of law’s construction of rurality. The region is both ecologically
significant and legally unique. Indeed, the development of the province’s first environmental
planning regime under the Niagara Escarpment Development Planning and Development Act
[“The Niagara Escarpment Act”] (RSO 1990, c N.2) was specifically motivated by the impact
of the aggregate mining industry on the landscape of this peri-urban and rural region of the
province (Chambers and Anders Sandberg, 2007; Whitelaw et al., 2008). Rurality is one of
the defining land use categories through which competing claims to land are negotiated
through the Niagara Escarpment Act and the policies that flow from it. There is however a
lack of consistent or explicit definition of the ‘rural’ in planning law and policy. General
definitions of rurality outside of the planning context tend to construct rurality as a residual
category – the territory “outside” or “that remains” outside urban or population centres
(“Rural area (RA) - Census Dictionary”).7 Here I consider how rurality is constructed as a
residual category in legal decision-making about land use. I consider whether it is
conceptualized in relation to the ecological relations of particular places; or conversely,
whether rurality serves to obscure or dismiss ecological relations in contentious land use
disputes about rural places.
A. Seeing Law’s Relational Work in Place
Building on relational approaches to place (Amin, 2004; Massey, 2005, 2004; Pierce et al.,
2011) and relational legal analysis (Nedelsky, 2012), the analysis below examines the role of
the legal system in Ontario, including formal laws and regulations as well as the daily
operation of regulatory planning processes. These processes structure the relationships that

One of the few contexts in which rurality is defined in Ontario is health care planning, where an “index of
rurality” focused on population and distance has been developed (Kralj, 2000).
7
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constitute rural places and uphold particular values about the more-than-human-world. In
particular, I build on the relational theory of Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky to
foreground the specific ways in which land use law operates to constitute our relationships
with the ecological networks of particular places and sustain particular values in relation to
the more-than-human world. In order to extend Nedelsky’s analysis to more-than-human
relations, I adopt the language of ‘place’ and ‘people-place relations’ to understand the
overlapping and nested relationships within the ecology of specific landscapes inhabited by
human communities alongside complex and layered networks of materials and entities
(Amin, 2004; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013; Massey, 2005, 2004; Pierce et al., 2011). In doing
so, I apply an eco-relational analysis of land use law to foreground the complex
interdependence of relations between human and more-than-human interests at stake, as well
as the embodied experience of living in particular places.

When we better understand what kind of decisions about our relationships with our
environment are being made through planning and land law, we are better prepared to
critically intervene to shape them differently. Through this eco-relational analysis, I aim to
make visible the values upheld by current legal relationships to place, predominantly defined
through private-property ownership. In the context of this paper, the eco-relational approach
also supports moves to shift environmental justice from its anthropocentric roots towards the
more-than-human elements of places at stake in land use conflicts (Agyeman and Evans,
2004; Agyeman et al., 2003; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013). As Neimanis et al. argue, the
capacity of an ecosystem to self-regulate its ability to support all forms of life is essential to
the realization of social and environmental justice (Neimanis et al., 2012). The integration of
ecological integrity and environmental justice avoids shifting between anthropocentric and
ecocentric hierarchies, instead acknowledging more-than-human interests while drawing
attention to the relational interdependence of human life and ecological systems.
Drawing attention to law’s role in the hierarchical privileging of particular types of
relationships with land within settler-colonial societies is also an essential part of
understanding when and how place-connection claims and place-protective behaviours serve
to reinforce colonial patterns of land use and contribute to social exclusion and patterns of
environmental inequality (Foster, 2010). Exposing the ways in which legal constructions of
rurality shape the types of claims asserted and recognized in land use conflicts is central to
identifying the “way that power works through places to limit the possibilities for human and
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non-human others” (Gruenewald, 2003, p. 315; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013). Where law
obscures embodied experiences and excludes relations of ecological interdependence to
reinforce hierarchical and exclusionary constructions of place, it operates to limit the
potential to realize environmentally just people-place relations (Graham, 2010).

The romanticization of farm life and agricultural practices, erasure of Indigenous histories
and legal orders in rural places, glorification of the rural landscape as an amenity space for
urban recreation, and the preservation of the rural as an empty or untouched wilderness, all
impose a problematic binary, colonial, and anthropocentric worldview in which particular
human bodies exist as separate and apart from ecological relations. Not only does this
foreclose opportunities to account for the interests and relationships of and with the ‘morethan-human’ world (Gilbert et al., 2009a; Sandberg et al., 2013; Whatmore, 2002), it also
upholds the colonial and Eurocentric property relations that justify the dispossession of
Indigenous lands and the exclusion of Indigenous legal orders, one of the key sites of ongoing
social and environmental injustice in Ontario and Canada (Agyeman et al., 2010; Alfred,
2009; Borrows, 1997; Chien, 2010; Porter, 2012; Scott, 2013). While I adopt the view in this
paper that mining is a uniquely transformative land use in which a relational place is removed
from the social and ecological networks in which it was once embedded, I neither presume
nor reject the possibility that other land uses, such as agriculture, residential development, or
recreational uses are (potentially) appropriate and just in particular places. Rather, my aim is
to examine the ways in which rurality is invoked in law and interpreted through legal
processes in the specific context of aggregate mining. In doing so, I hope to consider
opportunities for the articulation and practice of alternative and just ecological relations with,
and within, rural places. Further, I seek to identify strategic opportunities to heed HaluzaDelay et al.’s call to learn how to “live well together in the land” (2013). In my view,
critically examining the complex and often contradictory nature of relationships with place is
crucial to engaging in meaningful debate about how we live together as human communities
embedded in rich and complex networks of relation in particular material places. Here I argue
that rurality is one way in which law structures people-place relations that must be considered
if we are to work towards “a compassionate sense of place as well as a politicized sense of
justice” (Haluza-Delay et al., 2003, 235).
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B. Environmental Justice
The context of competing claims for particular rural places presents a unique opportunity to
consider whether and how rurality emerges as dimension of environmental justice. My focus
on parties without legally recognized property interests in the land at stake complicates the
reductive labeling of rural land use conflicts as NIMBY-ism (Burningham, 2000; Hubbard,
2006; Mcclymont and O’Hare, 2008; Wolsink, 2006) and avoids the binary of development
versus preservation towards critical engagement with the “complex relations of attachment,
belonging, exclusion and otherness that permeate such conflicts” (Woods, 2012, 568).
Without suggesting a fixed definition of environmental justice, I interpret it as including both
procedural and substantive dimensions and as attending to positive entitlements to ecological
integrity alongside concerns about the distribution of environmental harms (Agyeman and
Evans, 2004; Agyeman et al., 2003; Draper and Mitchell, 2001). From an eco-relational
perspective, human dimensions of environmental justice are embedded in just relations with
the ‘more-than-human’ world. A number of scholars have argued persuasively that
environmental justice scholarship must broaden its scope – in particular the need to move
beyond race and class as the central analytical categories and sites of injustice. Canadian
environmental justice scholarship has called for the broadening of voices, worldviews, and
methodological approaches (Agyeman et al., 2010), as well as the need to shift away from
anthropocentric notions of justice (Neimanis et al., 2012) to integrate environmental and
social dimensions of justice and sustainability (Agyeman et al., 2010, 2003; Haluza-DeLay et
al., 2013). Here, I consider how rurality as a dimension of environmental justice contributes
to such a broadening in the Canadian context as people in rural places inhabit, negotiate, and
contest their relationships with land and the more-than-human world.

In debates about regional planning, opposition by farmers to development controls on rural
land has been characterized as “rooted in the ‘traditional producers’ discourse of
individualism and property rights” (Bartel et al., 2013; Pond, 2009). Environmental concerns
expressed by urbanites and rural homeowners have also been characterized as self-interested
claims to amenity and property values by both proponents and decision makers (Gilbert et al.,
2009b; Sandberg et al., 2013), while dominant environmental narratives have been shown to
perform the “work of social exclusion and xenophobia” and reinforce colonial narratives of
land use and landscape (Foster, 2010). These are all valid concerns about the political nature
of planning and crucial demonstrations of the operation of power through land use decisions.
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Exclusionary politics of property rights and narrowly framed arguments for environmental
preservation do emerge as part of land use disputes in Ontario and they do serve to obstruct
discussion of environmental justice and ecological integrity and even perform or reinforce
social exclusion and colonialism (Foster, 2010). At the same time, disputes about aggregate
mineral extraction in rural Ontario reveal the complexity of relationships between agricultural
land users, property owners, other rural land users, and rural places themselves. As parties
invoke relationships with the ecological in their opposition to extractive development and
form unlikely alliances across ideological, territorial, and political boundaries, strategic
opportunities to contest dominant people-place relations and generate legal change emerge
(Gilbert et al., 2009b; Sandberg et al., 2013). Careful and critical attention to the range of
environmental and place-based interests asserted in the context of land use conflicts may also
provide opportunities for more effective and successful dialogue about progressive
environmental planning (Bartel et al., 2013; Foster, 2009; Sandercock, 2000). While parties
can, and often do, express competing and contradictory claims in the context of contentious
land use conflicts, I argue that nuanced and critical examination of expressions of respect for
Indigenous histories and legal orders, assertions of place-attachment and place-based
experiential knowledge, and acknowledgment of shared ties to particular places reveal
strategic openings for a restructuring of rural people-place relations through law (Bartel et al.,
2013; Foster, 2009; Sandercock, 2000). In this sense, I argue that it is possible to remain
attuned to the danger of depoliticization and parochialism of place, while simultaneously
exploring opportunities to build relations of reciprocity with the land (Graham, 2011, 2010)
and foster progressive planning (Foster, 2010, 2009) as we “learn to live well together in the
land”(Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013, p. 236).
4. Locating Law: Aggregate Extraction and Environmental Planning in
Ontario8
These are the landscapes of a special place. There is a special legislation
to protect this area and it means a lot to them and they don't want it treated
lightly. (Planner 2, Interview, September 3, 2014)

In 1962, blasting from the Dufferin Aggregates Milton Quarry accidentally blew a hole in the
Niagara Escarpment, one of Southern Ontario’s most prominent landscapes. The Escarpment
is a major limestone outcrop running through a large part of Southern Ontario from Niagara

8

This section summarizes portions of Chapter Three, from pages 210-213. Repeated text is italicized
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Falls to the Bruce Peninsula. It is simultaneously a site with unique ecological systems
(Jalava et al., 1996; Kelly and Larson, 2007), prime agricultural lands, high scenic and
amenity value, proximity to urban centres, and valuable aggregate mineral deposits, as well
as being the traditional territory of Indigenous communities with particular legal, spiritual
and historic significance (Borrows, 2001, 1997; CONE, 1998). The visibility of the
transformed landscape was a catalyst for the development of a fledgling environmental
movement in the province and the public construction of the Escarpment as a specific and
valuable landscape (Whitelaw et al., 2008). Growing public awareness of the unique
ecological and aesthetic features of the area and the impact of aggregate mineral
development led to a 1968 government-commissioned expert report that mapped and
documented the entire Niagara Escarpment area (Niagara Escarpment Study Group, 1968).
In 1973, the resulting landmark Niagara Escarpment Act was approved, bringing about the
first regional and, “at least symbolically” environmentally focused land use protection plan
in Canada (Cullingworth, 1987, 230). In 1990, the area was designated as a UNESCO World
biosphere reserve.9
The Niagara Escarpment Act passed into law with the express purpose of maintaining
the Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing only for
“compatible” development (s.2). The Act was significant in that planning decisions that had
previously been made at the local level were now regionally determined (Whitelaw et al.,
2008).10 The Niagara Escarpment Plan [“the Plan”], drafted under the Niagara Escarpment
Act sets out the specific policies related to the management of land and water resources,
location of industry and commerce, identification of major land use areas, provision of major
parks and open space, control of pollution and the natural environment, and ensuring
compatibility of private sector development (s.9). The sense of loss of place following the
Milton Quarry accident informed the Plan’s unique attention to the preservation of the visual
landscape alongside the natural and cultural features of the area.

9

See details at the UNESCO website: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecologicalsciences/biosphere-reserves/europe-north-america/canada/niagara-escarpment/
10
The Act created the 18-member Niagara Escarpment Commission [the “Commission”), made up of the
appointment of a chair, 8 members from escarpment municipalities and 8 members of the public, which is
responsible for the creation of a land use plan and is now responsible for its implementation, at ss. 5. There are
no appointments designated for Indigenous governments and representatives. One member of the NEC is a
representative of the aggregate industry. The current 2005 Niagara Escarpment Plan is available online:
http://www.escarpment.org/_files/file.php?fileid=fileuRdJDqEnAp&filename=file_NEP_Intro.pdf
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While the process through which the original Plan was developed was neither collaborative
nor participatory, environmental groups, community organizations, and aggregate and other
industry groups were involved in the “adversarial” hearings on the proposed land use plan
from 1980 to 1983. Critics of the new planning regime, including the aggregate industry,
private land owners and residential developers, were successful in limiting the scope of the
plan by over 60% and influencing the planning rules to allow for extractive development
within the Plan area (Whitelaw et al., 2008).11 As will be discussed below, the legal
construction of “rural” places within the Niagara Escarpment Plan Area [the “Plan Area”]
is crucial to the ongoing role of extraction in shaping the Niagara Escarpment, both within
the boundaries of the Plan Area and outside. Aggregate mining has been, and continues to
be, one of the most contentious land uses in Ontario, and particularly on the Escarpment.

5. The Legal Creation of Rural Spaces of Extraction: Defining Rurality
Residuality
In 2001 a Statistics Canada Rural and Small Town Canada Analysis Bulletin noted,
“[A]lmost every social, economic and environmental policy issue has a rural dimension” (du
Plessis et al., 2001). Yet there is little treatment of the concept of rurality in Canadian legal
scholarship and the role it may play in the legal treatment of land use issues. In part, this is
reflective of a broader neglect of land use planning in legal scholarship in Canada; however,
even within the limited legal and socio-legal scholarship in this area, the focus is decidedly
urban (Blais, 2011; Blomley, 2004; Valverde, 2012, 2005).12

As will be explored in detail below, the legal and policy framework regulating land use
simultaneously presents the rural as a space of resource extraction, economic growth, and as a
source of essential ecological services. The ‘balancing’ exercise between these potentially
contradictory roles and values is performed through the legal processes of land use planning

11

The NEPDA requires the government to review the Plan regularly and now requires that it be reviewed at the
same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the Greenbelt Act (2005). In 2015 the government undertook a
coordinated review of these and other Provincial Plans, including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan
and the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan. More information about the coordinated review can be found
on the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing website: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page10882.aspx.
See the guiding document for public consultation, (Our Region, Our Community, Our Home, 2014).
12
For a discussion of the urban-centric focus of legal geography, see (Pruitt, 2013). Canadian socio-legal
scholar Deborah Curran recently noted the “paucity of academic interest in land use in Canada” in a blog post
noting Blais and Valverde as important exceptions:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/destined-to-be-classic-land-use-books-from-canada.html.
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as parties shape and contest the nature of rurality and rural land. The project of defining
rurality is fraught and contentious, and its extensive debates are beyond the scope of this
paper (Halfacree, 1993; Phillips, 1998; Woods, 2012). Rather than engaging in a definitional
exercise, I adopt the position that rurality is not a fixed category or territorial space, but rather
a site of contestation and complex interconnection between the social, the temporal, and the
material more-than-human world. My aim here is to consider the specific role that law plays
in creating and upholding “structural obstacles to developing mutually enhancing land
relationships” by upholding particular relationships with place and excluding others
(Plumwood, 2002). In other words, how does the legal construction of ‘rurality’ in Ontario’s
land-use planning process shape and constrain the ongoing and contested ordering of the
social and ecological interests of people-place relations in rural spaces?

i. The Provincial Policy Statement
The provincially governed and policy-led regime of land use planning in Ontario relies on
overlapping and sometimes conflicting constructions of the rural to shape and contain the
complex relationship between people and places - the rural, urban, northern, and increasingly,
suburban and peri-urban places, made up of the social, ecological, and political networks of
human and more-than-human life. Constitutionally, planning falls within provincial
jurisdiction over municipal institutions and property and civil rights in Canada (The
Constitution Act, 1867). Though the day to day operation of land use planning falls to local
and regional governments, the Province provides broad guidance and maintains considerable
power to constrain local government action through both the Ontario Planning Act (The
Planning Act, 1990) and the Provincial Policy Statement [the Policy Statement], a policy
document that “sets the policy foundation for regulating the development and use of land”
(Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2014).13
The Policy does not define “rural” or “rurality” in the text or in the extensive definitions
appendix. However, it does define rural areas as “a system of lands within municipalities
that may include rural settlement areas, rural lands, prime agricultural areas, natural
heritage features and areas, and resource areas.” ‘Rural lands’ are also defined as “lands

13

The PPS is available online: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx. In April 2014 the Ministry of
Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took effect on April 30, 2014.
However, the cases considered here are governed by the earlier PPS from 2005, which can be found here:
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page1485.aspx.
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which are located outside settlement areas and which are outside prime agricultural areas.”
Of the 42 references to ‘rural,’ in the PPS, half are to rural lands or rural areas. However,
the remaining references are to undefined terms, including “character” or “characteristics”,
“amenities”, “assets”, “land uses”, and “landscape.” This leaves significant scope for
contestation and interpretation about rurality and land use.
Section 1, ‘Building Strong and Healthy Communities,’ permits and encourages resourcerelated uses on rural lands. In fact, it explicitly protects resource-based use and uses requiring
separation from other uses, invoking the key land use logics of separation and incompatibility
to secure rural lands for industrial, infrastructure, and extractive developments (ss. 1.1.5.6,
1.1.5.7, 1.1.6.1). While development “compatible with the rural landscape” is promoted, the
“rural landscape” is not defined in the Policy (s.1.1.5.4) and read in conjunction with the
above sections, it appears to include typical infrastructure, locally unwanted, and resourcebased uses. The Policy goes on to link rural communities with the “quality of life” and
“economic success” of the Province (s. 1.1.4) and to associate the development of a
“sustainable economy” to leveraging rural assets and amenities and protecting the
environment as a foundation for a sustainable economy. Under Section 2, separate
subsections deal with Agriculture (2.3), Natural Heritage (2.1), Cultural Heritage and
Archeology (2.6), Water (2.2), Minerals and Petroleum (2.4), and Aggregate Mineral
Resources (2.5).

ii. The Niagara Escarpment Framework14
The Niagara Escarpment Act and the Plan also play a central role in conceptualizing rurality
through the creation and maintenance of seven land use designations: Escarpment Natural,
Escarpment Protection, Escarpment Rural, Escarpment Recreation, Minor Urban, Urban
and Mineral Resource Extraction. These designations govern the types of uses and activities
individuals or corporations can engage in as of right, those which require specific
permission, and those which are prohibited. Each designation is described in detail in the
Plan, including the “Objectives,” “Criterion for Designation,” and “Permitted Uses”
associated with such a designation (Niagara Escarpment Plan, 2005, ss. 1.3-19). Through
these designations, the Plan mediates and controls extraction and industrial land uses based

14

This section repeats portions of Chapter Four, in particular pages 193-201. Repeated text is indicated is
italicized.
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on a particular construction of rurality. Escarpment Natural and Escarpment Protection
designations prohibit any mineral resource extraction. For Escarpment Rural lands, an
amendment to the Plan is required for extraction over 20,000 tonnes. Such lands are
described as “essential” yet also peripheral, with their key role being to provide a “buffer to
the more ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment” (s. 1.5). While not an as of right
land use, extraction is specifically contemplated for Escarpment Rural lands. In this way,
particular places – complex networks of eco-social relation designated by the plan as ‘rural’
–become the central objects of political and legal decision-making about extraction.

The Plan designates Escarpment Rural areas as an “essential component of the Escarpment
corridor,” serving this buffer role for protected environmental spaces. It sets out five
Objectives for Escarpment Rural areas (s 1.5):
1) To maintain scenic values of lands in the vicinity of the Escarpment corridor;
2) To maintain the open landscape character by encouraging the conservation of the
traditional cultural landscape and cultural heritage features;
3) To encourage agriculture and forestry and to provide for compatible rural land uses;
4) To provide a buffer for more ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment;
5) To provide for the designation of new Mineral Resource Extraction Areas which can be
accommodated by an amendment to the Niagara Escarpment Plan.
Therefore, while the Plan does explicitly contemplate extraction, it requires an amendment to
be approved. As noted above, extraction is not an as of right land use in Escarpment Rural
areas and section 8 of the Niagara Escarpment Act sets out seven “objectives” that are “to
be sought in the consideration of amendments to the Plan”:
a.) to protect unique ecologic and historic areas;
b.) to maintain and enhance the quality and character of natural streams and water
supplies;
c.) to provide adequate opportunities for outdoor recreation;
d.) to maintain and enhance the open landscape character of the Niagara Escarpment
in so far as possible, by such means as compatible farming or forestry and by
preserving the natural scenery;
e.) to ensure that all new development is compatible with the purpose of this Act as
expressed in section 2;
f.) to provide for adequate public access to the Niagara Escarpment; and
g.) to support municipalities within the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area in their
exercise of the planning functions conferred upon them by the Planning Act.
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Amendments must be consistent with these objectives and the purpose of the Act –
maintaining the Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing
only for “compatible” development – and the Plan. Amendments must also be justified by the
Applicant (ss. 6.1(2.1) and 10(6), NEP, s 1.2.2). Further, an applicant must demonstrate the
purpose and objectives of the Niagara Escarpment Act will not be adversely affected (NEP, s
1.2.2).

The Niagara Escarpment Planning Area has been designated by regulation (O Reg 826) as a
‘development control area’ and specific developments must be approved under a permit or
exempted by regulation.15 The Plan sets out both general and specific Development Criteria
in Part 2, which must be considered in the permit application process; however, not all
criteria are applicable to all situations.16 Section 2.11 specifically considers mineral
resources, with the objective of minimizing the impact of new mineral extraction and
accessory uses. The Plan requires that operations shall not conflict with the following
criteria:
a.) The protection of sensitive ecological, geological, historic and archaeological sites or
areas.
b.) The protection of surface and groundwater resources.
c.) The maintenance of agricultural areas, in accordance with the Agricultural Policies of
the Provincial Policy Statement (PPS).
d.) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on
existing agricultural or residential development.
e.) The preservation of the natural and cultural landscapes as much as possible during
extraction and after rehabilitation.
f.) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on
parks, open space and the existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail.17

15

Lands licensed continuously since 1975 under the Pits and Quarries Control Act, 1971, are exempted from
requirements for a development permit by regulation, which remains significant since aggregate licenses do not
expire (O Reg 828/90, s 19).
16
This was also emphasized by the majority of the Board in Walker.
17
The Section also includes requirements for setbacks from the brow of the Escarpment, screening, progressive
rehabilitation, the use of off-site material for rehabilitation, accessory uses, and restrictions on new adjacent
development. The following specific criteria outlined in the Plan may also be applicable to an aggregate
application: 2.5 New Development Affecting Steep Slopes and Ravines; 2.6 New Development Affecting Water
Resources; 2.7 New Development Within Wooded Areas; 2.8 Wildlife Habitat; 2.9 Forest Management; 2.10
Agriculture; 2.12 Heritage; 2.13 Recreation; 2.14 Areas of Natural and Scientific Interest (ANSIs); 2.15
Transportation and Utilities; 2.16 The Bruce Trail.
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“Protection” is defined in the Plan as “ensuring that human activities are not allowed to
occur which will result in the unacceptable degradation of the quality of an environment
(Appendix 2, at 127). This protective stance differs from proponent-driven approach in the
Aggregate Resources Act and the presumptive development approach to mineral extraction in
the Policy Statement.
6. Structuring Rural Relations for Extraction: The Aggregate Resources
Act18
“Agriculture, forestry, mining and manufacturing sectors contribute greatly to the quality of
life in Rural Ontario.”
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Website

The Aggregate Resources Act [ARA] governs aggregate extraction in the majority of the
province, including pits and quarries in the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area (1990). The
ARA came into force in 1990 replacing the former, and highly criticized, Pits and Quarries
Act 1971. As with the Niagara Escarpment planning protections, the aggregate industry
lobbied against the passage of the ARA (Baker et al., 2001). Notably, while the ARA received
first reading in 1979, it was not proclaimed until 1990. During this period the extraction rate
in the province rose from 131 million tonnes to 197 million tonnes, resulting in “heightened
awareness of the overall costs of the industry and weaknesses in the policy framework”
(Aggregate Resources Program: Statistical Update Aggregate Resources Section, 1990;
Baker et al., 2001). The new 1990 Act did respond to some of the concerns raised by the
public and municipal governments and brought in a more detailed set of requirements for site
planning and rehabilitation of quarries and pits. However, amendments to the Act in 1997
raised further concerns about the regulation of aggregate mining in Ontario (Aggregate and
Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996). The amendments aimed to increase
industry accountability through the introduction of requirements for public notice and
circulation of applications and mandatory public consultation. Yet, a central objective of the
Bill was also to reduce the government’s role in the regulation of aggregate licensing and
operations by shifting towards a self-monitoring system and the creation of an industry-led
Aggregate Resources Trust that would be responsible for the rehabilitation of abandoned pits
and quarries, research activity and fee collection and distribution (ss. 4, 12, 36). This

18

This section summarizes material included in Chapter Four, pages 134-142, 162-192. Repetitive text is
italicized.
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proponent-driven approach has persisted, and arguably increased, to the present-day. While
the Act governs extraction licensing, conflicts are largely focused on the planning approvals
and amendments required prior to a license being granted. Therefore, the focus on most
conflicts is on the Provincial Policy Statement.
A. The Provincial Policy Statement
While the Policy Statement is to be read as a whole to balance social, economic, and
environmental values, it has consistently prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and
development since the first version was approved in the 1990s. The balancing of social and
environmental impacts of extraction in the Policy Statement must be considered in light of its
protection of mineral aggregate resources and operations from “incompatible” development.
Section 2.5.2.5 requires municipalities to protect known deposits, areas adjacent to known
deposits, strictly limiting development that would “preclude or hinder” access and
extraction. Mineral aggregate operations, even those operations that “cease to exist”, must
be protected from incompatible development (s. 2.5.4.2.) while earlier versions of the Policy
Statement maintained that “mineral resource needs” should be considered in the licensing
process. In 2005, the Policy Statement was revised not only to remove consideration of need,
but to explicitly exclude it: “Demonstration of need … including any type of supply/demand
analysis shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability, designation or licensing for
extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or elsewhere.” Formerly, opposing parties
and governments used the needs analysis to argue that the material to be extracted was not
currently required and therefore the site in particular cases should not be approved (Bull and
Estrela, 2012). After the amendments, those arguments are no longer available.

This presumptive need analysis remains controversial and the NEC along with the provincial
Environmental Commissioner, amongst other commentators, argued that supply/demand
analysis should be reintroduced during the most recent five-year-review of the Policy
Statemen tand the legislative review of the ARA in 2012.19 While the Board has concluded
that a needs analysis is not required under 2005 (and now 2014 PPS) language, it has

19

For example, Niagara Escarpment Commission. 2010. Re: Five Year Review of the Provincial Policy
Statement. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario; 111 of 166 comments on the Provincial Policy Statement
Review can be accessed on the Environmental Registry, Registry Number 011-7070; (Ontario, Legislative
Assembly, Standing Commitee on General Government and Standing Committee on General Government,
2012); Statements on file with Author, transcripts of the legislative review hearings can be accessed online.
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nonetheless been a live issue in several cases.20 As noted by the Board in a recent decision to
turn down an application, “[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging Policy
Statement where need is not required.”21

In contrast, a close examination reveals that protection of natural and social-cultural
features in the Policy Statement is largely limited to features formally deemed “significant”
by provincial policy and is subject to important exemptions (s 2.5.0). While it provides for
absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies and existing operations, social and
environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than avoided (s.2.5.2.2). This despite
s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected for the long term”,
s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve or restore the quality and
quantity of water,” and s.2.6.1, which states that significant built heritage resources and
significant cultural heritage landscapes shall be conserved.22 In 2013, the Ontario
Endangered Species Act was amended to specifically exempt pits and quarries from the
requirements to obtain a permit for activities that would otherwise be prohibited, including
damaging or destroying species habitat. Instead it would only require mitigation measures
and registration of activities with the Ministry and without independent monitoring
requirements and enforcement capacity.23 Exemptions for aggregate extraction, such as those
newly introduced under the ESA, have been the subject of strong criticism from the provincial
Environmental Commissioner.24
The Policy Statement attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between the protection of
natural features and cultural heritage by classifying aggregate extraction as an “interim”
activity and requiring rehabilitation to “accommodate subsequent land use” (s 2.5.3.1). The
2014 Policy Statement now encourages “comprehensive rehabilitation” in areas with a
concentration of mineral aggregate operations. However, the standards for rehabilitation are

20

OMB Case No: PL101197 decision issued 16 December 2011, 2011 Carswell Ont 14192, at para 117-118
[“Jennison Construction”], but see also James Dick supra note 13, and the dissenting opinion in Walker supra
note.
21
Capital Paving at para 16, supra note 13.
22
The 2014 PPS now draws attention to and explicitly distinguishes between “positive directives” such as shall
and “limitations or prohibitions” such as shall not which do not allow for discretion and “enabling or supportive
language” such as should, promote, encourage which, they state, allows for “some discretion,” making the
close-examination of such language essential to decision-making at the application and adjudicative stages.
23

, 2007, S.O. 2007, c.6 [ESA]. O. Reg. 242/08, s. 23.14 (1).
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 2013. “Laying Siege to the Last Line of Defence: A Review of
Ontario’s Weakened Protections for Species at Risk”: http://www.eco.on.ca/index.php/en_US/pubs/specialreports/2013-special-report.
24
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limited to the promotion of “land use compatibility” obscuring the specific and unique
relationships that adjacent ecological and human communities may have with the land and
its current use.

This emphasis on one feature of the land, disconnected from its wider ecological and social
networks, as is compounded by the requirement that “as much of the mineral aggregate
resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as close to markets as possible”
(s.2.5.2.1.). The majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area and the
surrounding Greater Golden Horseshoe region. As will be discussed below, the resulting
concentration in surrounding regions and the cumulative effects of extraction are
exacerbated both by the Plan’s focus on designated rural places to accommodate extraction
and the vulnerability of those places left outside of the contested boundaries of the Plan itself.
The close to market requirement is subject to the “realistically possible” limitation and the
Ministry has taken the position that this should be considered on a case-by-case basis and
include consideration of other Policy Statement policies and “other considerations.” There
has been limited analysis of the section by the Board; however, one case did point to social
and environmental impacts as part of the “realistically possible test,” finding that the
proposal was, “not realistic given that the possible environmental impacts have not been
minimized.”25 Bull and Estrela point out that this is consistent with the purposes of the Act to
minimize adverse impacts. However, they note that the close to market analysis also suggests
that some impacts are acceptable (Bull and Estrela, 2012). The focus on mitigation rather
than avoidance is reflected in the legal analysis, which has been focused on deciding on
which impacts are acceptable and at what threshold rather than examining the assumptions
behind claims of economic benefit or considering the ecological and social costs of
development.26

7. Finding Balance in Rural Places

In 2011, the first denial of an Aggregate Resource Act license in the Plan Area was hailed as
a historic victory for PERL (Protecting Escarpment Rural Lands), a group of current and

25
26

Capital Paving, at para 30.
See Capital Paving, and Jennison Construction.
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former residents and environmentalists, as well as the local governments and planning
authorities who had opposed the application, including the Niagara Escarpment Commission
[“the Commission”]. 27 Nelson Aggregates had proposed the large, below the water table
quarry near Mount Nemo in the Burlington area outside of Toronto, Ontario.28 PERL
opposed the mine based on the ecological, agricultural, and cultural significance of the site
and provided substantial evidence to decision makers through their own expert reports,
resulting in the designation of an endangered species habitat for the Jefferson salamander and
recognition of a watershed complex, and ultimately rejection by the Board. 29 However, on the
heels of the victory in Nelson, the Niagara Escarpment Commission and a locally organized
group of residents, environmentalists, and second home-owners, suffered an equally
significant defeat when the Walker Aggregates large-scale quarry extension was approved
within the Escarpment Plan Area. 30

When the Commission and a coalition of community members and organizations formally
opposed Walker’s proposal for a large quarry adjacent to a quarry grandfathered under the
ARA in Duntroon, the vulnerability of rural escarpment lands in the Plan Area was exposed.
At one of the highest points of the escarpment, the site is hydrogeologically significant, is
home to habitat for endangered species, and is adjacent to recreational use areas. After the
Commission denied the Plan amendment and development permit applications, the proponent

27

Nelson Aggregate Co., Re, 2012 CLB 29642, [Nelson]. See (Van Wagner, 2013) for a detailed discussion of
the Nelson decision.
28
The Application materials and reviews by the Joint Agency Review Team (JART), a unique collaborative
review model in Halton Region, are available on the Halton region planning website:
http://www.halton.ca/planning_sustainability/planning_applications/applications_under_review/nelson_aggregat
e_quarry/. JART Report lists the following PERL Consultant submissions as having been considered: PERL
Consultant submissions: Natural Resources Solutions Wetland Evaluation; Letter from Wilf Ruland (P.Geo.) to
PERL dated April 23,2005, Re: review of October 2004 report titled “Hydrogeological and Water Resources
Assessment of the Proposed Nelson Quarry Co. Extension; Letter from Wilf Ruland (P.Geo.) to JART dated
December 23, 2006 Re: further review of the May 2006 submission from Golder Associates titled “Additional
Work Programs, Proposed Nelson Aggregate Co. Extension, Burlington, Ontario”; Blackport Hydrogeology
Inc., prepared by Ray Blackport, P. Geo. for PERL, Re: Review of Hydrogeology and Water Related Issues
Proposed Nelson Quarry Expansion (December 17, 2007); Ray Blackport powerpoint presentation to JART on
water hydrogeological issues.
29
PERL maintains a website and Facebook group: < http://www.perlofburlington.org/>. A Toronto-based
environmental group Lake Ontario Waterkeeper who formally objected to the Nelson proposal maintained a
blog with links to the reports and notes from the hearings: < http://www.waterkeeper.ca/wordpress-importblog/19261?rq=Aggregate>
30
Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012 CLB 16274 [Walker], aff’d Niagara Escarpment Commission v
Ontario (Joint Board), 2013 ONSC 2496, 12 MPLR (5th) 51 [Walker Appeal], 4, 18.
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land owner appealed.31 A two member majority of the three-person Joint-Board in Walker
rejected the “environmentally-focused” approach set out in the Plan. They interpreted the role
of the Niagara Escarpment Act and the Plan as “balancing” or “resolving” the conflict
between “the protection and development of aggregate resources” and the “protection of the
Niagara Escarpment.” Based on the lack of “definitive guidance” and definition in the Plan,
the majority chose to apply the Policy Statement standard of “no negative impact” to
environmental impacts rather than the “protection” of “unique ecological areas” required by
the Plan. While provincial plans like the Niagara Escarpment Plan prevail in the event of a
conflict with the broadly applicable Policy Statement, the majority characterized their
decision as a preference for the Policy Statement test rather than finding it conflictual,
thereby bypassing the higher standard.

This finding, and the result, was upheld on appeal to the Ontario Divisional Court despite a
lengthy and detailed dissent by the sole ERT member at the hearing (Van Wagner, 2013).
While decisions at the tribunal level do not bind the Ontario Municipal Board, Environmental
Review Tribunal and the combined Joint Board as administrative decision makers, the
findings of the judicial review in Walker do set a precedent for future cases. By upholding the
majority decision in Walker, the Divisional Court has signaled a move away from a
precautionary and environmentally-focused approach to planning adopted in some notable
recent decisions, 32 and has placed a substantial burden on those seeking to establish the nonextractive value of rural places and work towards a just sustainability in people-place
relations (Van Wagner, 2013). Walker demonstrates how the residuality of rural areas in the
Plan area creates an opening for the lower standard that reinforces the primacy of both private

31

Review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) and the
Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT), ostensibly dividing “land use” from “environmental” decisions despite
the environmentally-focused nature of many objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al., 2013; Van
Wagner, 2013). Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies have recently been formally linked as part
of the Environment and Land Tribunals cluster but it is too early to determine any substantive outcomes of the
restructuring, See, (Sossin and Baxter, 2012). However, in the context of the NEPA, appeals related to aggregate
development are heard by a Joint-Board made up of three members from the two appellate bodies, Consolidated
Hearings Act, RSO 1990. c C.29. As administrative ‘expert’ decision makers, the Joint Board, the OMB and the
ERT are all given considerable deference by reviewing courts and it is very difficult to overturn their findings as
appeal is granted only on errors of law.
32
Nelson, supra note 27; James Dick Construction Ltd. V. Caledon (Town), [2010] OMBD No. 905 [James Dick
Construction]; Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County), 2010 Carswell, Ont 697, OMB Case No: PL080489,
January 19, 2010, [Capital Paving].
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ownership and extractive land uses in the interests of finding ‘balance’ between the
environment and economic growth.

The places at stake in aggregate disputes are embedded in and constituted by complex
networks of eco-social relations, but for the purposes of Ontario’s guiding planning policy,
they are divided into different kinds of space - agricultural fields, the natural heritage zones
of forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as hiking trails, and subsurface resources such
as mineral deposits and groundwater. While the land may be recognized as having natural,
social and cultural features, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the Policy
Statement. The structure of the Policy Statement provides basic recognition of ecological and
social relationships with places. However, the hierarchical protection of the mineral resource
value and economic relations to land lead to a presumption of development which ultimately
undermines people-place relations. In the Walker decision, the Board’s ‘balancing’ exercise
was enabled by the adoption of the Policy Statement rather than the more protective and
precautionary environmentally-focused Plan framework. The resulting reductionist account
of the complex eco-social places of Escarpment Rural lands fails to account for the embodied
people-place relations of particular places. By narrowly defining the story about what is stake
in disputes about places, the structure of relations upheld by the legal process limits the
nature of people-place relations that can be realized through land use planning. The research
examined below explores alternative articulations of the place-relations engaged by aggregate
extraction disputes from the perspective of parties with more-than-ownership interests in the
land. By critically examining these alternative accounts of what is at stake, I consider the
strategic potential for a shift towards an environmentally just construction of rural peopleplace relations.
8. Discussion and Results
A. Extraction, Compensation and the Transformation of Place

Relational legal analysis aims to expose what is really at stake in a particular dispute in order
to determine whether law can, and should, structure relationships differently (Nedelsky,
2012). Interview participants in aggregate extraction conflicts consistently expressed concern
about the environmental harms resulting from the transformative nature of extractive land
use. This is consistent with submissions to ARA licensing processes and to the legislative
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review process by a range of parties. The sense that a particular, material place would be lost
was repeatedly captured by the image of the ‘hole’ left behind by extraction: “… [T]he loss
of natural habitat which is caused by the new Quarry [Duntroon] is an absolute loss and the
lake provides no significant replacement except as visual compensation instead of a great
hole in the earth” (BMWTF, 2011), One participant characterized the impact of a proposed
quarry on the Escarpment as “unavoidable destruction of the landscape”:
[S]o you are taking a natural feature which is an escarpment and you are
creating a hole which later becomes a lake which is not natural on the
escarpment. It is up on the top. There [are] no lakes on top. You are
destroying wetlands, you are destroying creeks, you are destroying
woodlands, habitats. And farmland (Interview, May 7, 2014).
For some participants environmental concerns were linked with a sense of connection with,
obligation to, or dependence on, the land. One farming couple collectively pointed to the
need for stewardship of the soil to ensure on ongoing and sustainable relationship:
Participant 1: No, it is not a renewable resource but produces a renewable crop
every year and that is the difference. You can't take aggregate and produce a
new crop every year. …
Participant 2: Yes, look at the cod industry. You spoil it, it doesn't come back in
a few days. (Interview, August 8, 2014)
A member of an environmental group involved in opposing a licence application expressed a
sense of intergenerational and interspecies obligation:
“The Niagara Escarpment to me is a thing that I meant to protect for my
kids. One of the problems you have is the Niagara Escarpment can’t stand
up for itself; it is mute. You and I and all of us have to stand up and
defend and that is what we are trying to do” (Interview, August 8, 2014,
Collingwood).
Connection with the land was sometimes linked to experiential knowledge and living or
working with the land, particularly for farmer participants (Interview, August 8, 2014;
Interview July 18, 2014). However, it was also described by many participants as the result of
the rich learning about the ecological, historical, or cultural features of a particular place
through their engagement in the decision-making process. In particular, several participants
described learning about the connectivity and interdependence of the social and ecological
systems within and between places. One farmer reflected on his new understanding of the
role of the complex groundwater and hydrogeological features in the area:
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I never knew about the reach of water. I never knew about changing cold
water fisheries by a couple degrees in temperature could be an issue. I
never knew that fish that spawned in the Nottawasaga sturgeon became
game fish in Lake Michigan. We were just farming there doing our stuff.
We just don't understand the reach of impact things can have. We learned.
We talked. (Interview, March 12, 2014)
One participant pointed to the alvar ecosystem in the proposed site beside her long-time
family home, and having only recently learned about species of rare butterfly and bat that
depend on this unique habitat (Interview, August 28, 2014). Another participant whose
childhood home was impacted by a proposed mine described gaining a renewed appreciation
for the place she grew up through her involvement with a local residents group:
It [the proposed site] become more of a presence to me the more I learned
about it, and before they put the “no trespassing signs on it, the more I
walked around it and thought more about it…It’s just beautiful and I had a
distinct memory of coming home when this just started to unfold and
seeing it, and going, ‘that’s as good as it gets’. (Interview, August 11,
2014)
One submission to the 2012 legislative review stated: “The soil can’t be separated from the
substrate or from the atmosphere or from the water or anything else. This is something we
understand” (ARA Submission, June 2012, on file with author). In some cases, participants
also linked learning about Indigenous history, worldviews, and relationships with the land at
stake with a deepened connection to place (Interview, August 11, 2014; Interview, August 8,
2014; Interview August 28, 2014). These participants reflected on the need to learn from
Indigenous approaches to environmental issues and cited the importance of working with
Indigenous communities based on their experiences in opposing aggregate applications. One
participant went on to actively support Indigenous opposition to other types of development
based on her experience opposing a local aggregate mine (Interview, August 11, 2014).
Participants also strongly refuted the idea that extraction could be a “temporary” land use, as
it is characterized by the Policy Statement. One naturalist characterized the impact as “a
transformation of the landscape” (Interview July 18, 2014), while another participant
reflected that something “precious and vulnerable” would be lost (Interview, August 11,
2014). The sense of loss was linked to the idea of compensation for negative impacts on
ecological features, which was rejected by those participants who discussed it. As one
planner noted, in the context of the Niagara Escarpment:
We don’t use net gain: ‘sorry, I took that away but I am giving you
this.’…Ours is maintain and enhance, not take away and compensate. But
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with the quarry, there is not much you can do other than compensate
because you are obviously losing what was there.” (Interview, September
3, 2014, NEC)
A key concern about the Walker decision is that it opens the door to the net gain
compensation approach, even in the context of the environmentally focused Plan. This raises
serious concerns about the capacity for the legal process to account for the specificity of
ecological systems and the materiality of particular places and to appreciate the
transformative impact of mining. Viewed in the context of the prioritization of aggregate
under the Policy Statement, the significance of the Walker decision extends beyond the loss
of the socio-ecological place at stake to concerns about the integrity of the Plan itself. As
noted by the NEC staff report to the Commission:
The concern and issue is not with respect to the Majority preferring the
evidence and opinions of the witnesses of the Applicant, but rather that in
staff’s opinion, the Majority appears to disregard key terms and objectives
of the NEP related to the protection of natural features and areas on the
basis that they are not defined (or not clearly defined), and defer to the
Provincial Policy Statement in making their findings (Staff Information
Report Re: Joint Board Decision Office of Consolidated Hearings Case
No.: 08-094 ̶.Walker Aggregates Inc., 2012, p.1).
Concerns about this shift away from the unique environmental focus of the Plan reflect
broader concerns about the integrity of the proponent-driven decision-making process.

In the shadow of the loss in Walker, the 2015 statutory review of the Plan and the other
Provincial Plans began with a series of conversations at the Commission on key issues. In
September 2014, the Commission considered a staff report on whether, 30 years later, the
aggregate mineral policies had realized the goals and intentions of the Act, or whether
changes were required to achieve protection of the Escarpment (Niagara Escarpment
Commission, 2014). Many of the groups who participated in this research also made
submissions on the aggregate policies, calling for an end to, or moratorium on, aggregate
extraction in the Plan Area. Despite the modest recommendation by planning staff to “review
and improve existing policies and development criteria”, the Commission voted 7 to 5 to end
aggregate extraction in the Plan Area. Commissioners characterized the staff recommended
options as “business as usual” and concluded, “[I]t is time to get back to first principles.
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There has been a long period of accommodating aggregate extraction. It is time to transition
and phase this use out of the NEP.”33
B. Trust, Power, and Knowledge: Ownership and Control
An overall lack of lack of trust in both the decision-making system and the proponents
themselves was evident throughout the interviews. Participants identified concerns related to
site selection and alteration as well as a lack of trust in the knowledge base on which
decisions were made. In Ontario, aggregate planning is largely determined by private land
ownership, such that the siting of aggregate mines is driven by the acquisition of the land
rather than an assessment of the relative suitability of alternative sites. Some participants
expressed concerns that corporate landowners had acquired lands without being “honest” or
“transparent” about the intended land use (Interview, March 12, 2014; Interview, August 8,
2014). Others noted that a change of ownership allowed the new owners and operators to
evade the commitments made to neighbours or local governments by previous owners with
respect to expansions (Interview, May 7, 2014; August 11, 2014) or the establishment of an
asphalt plant (Interview, August 28, 2014). Rather than contesting the appropriateness of
private ownership of the land, participants’ concerns indicated a sense of unease about the
extent of the proponents’ rights and powers flowing through ownership.

This was particularly evident where interview participants had observed or had knowledge of
proponents damaging or altering their land to remove ecological or cultural features that
could impact the approval of the licence, such as habitat for endangered species. Participants
simultaneously understood this as being legal based on the proponents’ ownership of the
land, but nonetheless wrong, as it had the effect of shifting the baseline for assessment of the
impact of extraction. An experienced NEC planner observed that there is a suspicion of
inevitability by members of the public (Planner, Interview, September 3, 2014). In their
submission to the legislative review, Friends of Rural Communities and the Environment
(FORCE), which had organized against the Flamborough quarry proposal, questioned
whether proponents would accept a ‘no’ in the process (on file with author). Another
participant described the perception that it was an approval process rather than a decisionmaking process:
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Personal correspondence, October 7, 2014. NEC discussion papers and Minutes NEC policy meeting are
available online: http://www.escarpment.org/planreview/NECDiscussionPapers/index.php. See the September
17 minutes for the decision referenced here.
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They had done the political legwork and under the Aggregate Resources
Act knew they could muscle this thing through. Couldn't care less what the
community wanted. This was strictly a play on money because they
wanted to be in, get the licence, sell the whole thing and have tremendous
shareholder return (Interview, March 12, 2014).
Exploratory excavation and testing are exempted from permitting requirements in the Plan
Area, allowing landowners to undertake preliminary studies before making any applications
(s.5). In the case of aggregate mineral extraction, such preliminary studies can lead to
significant expenditures of money and time and compound a proponent’s sense of entitlement
to approval, characterized by one participant as “because we want it, we get it done”
(Interview, March 12, 2014).

Experiential knowledge of particular places was contrasted with that of proponents’ technical
experts, which was widely mistrusted by participants as biased or unreliable. In several cases,
interview participants had produced or procured alternative knowledge and expert data to
counter the factual record established by the application materials for planning authorities and
litigation. Notably, in two cases where this third party data was provided to decision makers
and planners in advance of legal proceedings, participants saw it as determinative to the
ultimate findings that the land was ecologically significant and the risks of the proposal
outweighed the benefits (Interview, May 7, 2014; Interview, April 23, 2014). However, the
barriers to accessing such expertise are significant and raise important concerns about which
communities can, and do, succeed in contesting the proponent’s narrative about the place at
stake in aggregate conflicts. In addition to the financial barriers, participants pointed to
problems retaining the same types of experts that work with proponents (Interview, March
12, 2014). One environmental group participating in a hearing reported being unable to hire a
hydrologist who was concerned that it would limit future work opportunities with proponents.
Further, they expressed concern that evidence provided by the naturalist they hired was given
less weight because he was “just a biologist that has spent 100 years walking through the
bushes, a field guy” and not a “scientist” with a PhD (Interview, August 8, 2014).
Additionally, as the private land owner, proponents can and do exclude other parties from the
site and therefore limit their access to data and ability to review and produce independent
data. This is particularly significant where ecological features may be temporally or
seasonally variable:
They won’t let you walk around in your rubber boots and eat some
sandwiches and try to figure out what is going on. They don’t let you do that.
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You are in for three hours and then you get the hell out. When you are going
to do environmental surveys, in my experience anyway, there is timing on
this. There [are] times you go in and see stuff and there [are] times you don’t
see diddly squat. (Interview, August 8, 2014)
The role of this alternative data can be significant in the outcome of particular cases, as it was
in the rejection of the Nelson quarry. However, as one planner pointed out, this demonstrates
the failure of the licensing process when the burden of effective assessment falls to private
individuals and groups (Interview, March 7, 2014). This burden is of particular concern in the
context of a fixed resource and the concentration of extractive development.
9. We’ve Done Our Share: Concentration and Cumulative Impacts
The fixed nature of aggregate resources raises particular concerns about concentration and
cumulative impacts on specific ecological and spatial communities. Mining occurs where the
resource is – “it does not discriminate in terms of place” (Anders Sandberg and Wallace,
2013, 68). When the restrictions on Escarpment Protected and Escarpment Natural lands are
layered onto the fixed location of the resource, extractive developments proposals within the
NEP are necessarily concentrated in areas designated as Rural. In Walker and other decisions
within the Plan Area, proponents and decision makers have used existing extractive uses and
prior environmental damage on adjacent land to establish the compatibility of new, or
significantly expanded, extractive land uses. One naturalist who has observed the aggregate
industry for many years noted the “creeping motion” of aggregate licensing:
Somebody comes in for an application … for a very small site which is
relatively easy. And then they come back five or ten years later and say it
is already there, the service is already there, let's make it bigger, make it
below the water table now. Or in the world of limestone, ‘we are only
taking off ten feet or something like that... Inevitably when they have done
that, they come back and say the service is already there, they have
already taken away the environmental features [on] the top. Let's make it a
regular quarry,” (Interview, July 2014).
In this sense, the buffer function of rural lands actually creates an opening for further
extraction once it is established on adjacent lands. The same participant went on to observe
that the issue is exacerbated by the unwillingness of decision makers to contemplate future
land use in the legal process: “Even though you may suspect and believe in your soul that is
what they are doing, you can't prove it. You can't prove intent,” (Interview, July 2014). While
this narrowing of focus on the current proposals may be legally correct, it is notable that
decision makers do rely on prospective planning by proponents in Adaptive Management and
Rehabilitation Plans put forward in the application process. In the face of scientific
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uncertainty both are at least somewhat speculative by definition. Neither of these preclude
current or future owners from applying for extensions or permission to use the site for other
controversial uses, such as a landfill or sewage site, and yet they may substantially influence
approval in a particular case where mitigation is determined to resolve environmental or
social impacts.34

Despite the imposition of a development control system, Patano and Sandberg found that the
NEC approves the overwhelming majority of overall development applications (2005). In the
case of large-scale aggregate extraction, while the NEC has turned down a handful of high
profile applications in recent years, only the decision in Nelson has survived appeal. When
Walker was being argued, the Ontario Municipal Board was approving another down the
road, just outside the Plan boundaries.35 Several interview participants pointed to the ‘closeto-market’ requirement as a major factor in the concentration of extraction in particular areas.
This implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource protection and development on a
specific geographic area within the province, including rural areas in the Plan Area. An
Ontario Bar Association presentation by a leading proponent council summarized the
justification for the policy as follows:
Transporting aggregates longer distances increases the cost to the user and
the cost of the final products that use aggregate as inputs, such as public
infrastructure projects and housing. Therefore, there is a public interest in
ensuring that aggregate resources are extracted as close to market as
possible in order to support the Provincial economy (Bull and Estrela,
2012).
The aggregate industry has also emphasized the environmental benefits of this
requirement in reducing production-related emissions and contribution to climate
change (Sandberg and Wallace, 2013; Bull and Estrela, 2012). However, several
interview participants were critical of industry’s environmental claims and connected
climate change and environmental crisis with the presumption of perpetual growth

34

At the time of writing an appeal of a decision to allow industrial sewage dumping in a lake created in an old
quarry site by Oxford County and a residents’ group, Oxford People Against the Landfill (OPAL) was rejected
by the Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal: “Appeal by County and OPAL Rejected”, 104.7 HeartFM
News, 29 October 2015, <http://www.1047.ca/news/local-news/appeal-by-county-and-opal-rejected/>
35
The MAQ quarry was approved by the Ontario Municipal Board in 2013: MAQ Aggregates Inc., v Grey
Matters, OMB Case No. MMO90038.
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and development and ongoing demand for aggregate resources (Interview, July 5;
Interview July 17, 2014; Interview August 8, 2017).

While some concentration of extraction is inevitable with a fixed resource like aggregate, the
clustering of this type of transformative land use makes a cumulative impact assessment
relevant, particularly where exacerbated by policy requirements (Interview, May 9, 2014). 36
One community group representative summed up the sentiment in areas with multiple large
aggregate developments: “We are doing our share” (Interview, May 23, 2014). Neither the
process under the Act, the PPS, nor the municipal amendment processes, require a cumulative
impacts analysis. The Provincial Environmental Commissioner has expressed concern about
the lack of cumulative impact analysis in aggregate applications (Environmental
Commissioner of Ontario, 2012).

Cumulative impacts are of particular importance for communities in Rural Escarpment areas.
However, they are also increasingly significant for those that fall outside of special planning
regimes like the Plan, the Greenbelt or the Oak Ridges Moraine regimes as proponents
attempt to bypass the costly and prohibitive regulatory requirements of Plan areas. For
example, the Carden Plain area and parts of Dufferin, Grey, and Bruce Counties adjacent to
but excluded from the politically negotiated boundaries of the Plan Area, and First Nations
territories in parts of Southern Ontario and Manitoulin Island are all facing increasing
pressure from aggregate extraction proposals. Opponents to the now abandoned Melancthon
mega quarry proposal, which fell just outside of the Greenbelt and the Plan Area, obtained an
internal memo to investors by the American hedge fund land owner stating that they had
specifically chosen the site based on the lack of regulatory oversight. Notably the memo also
cited the small population, leading some observers to conclude that the proponents did not
expect the organized opposition they eventually faced (Interview, March 12, 2014). Just as
the rural parts of the Plan Area serve as a kind of sacrifice zone in the search for balance
between competing land uses in the Niagara Escarpment, areas outside of the politically
negotiated boundaries of provincial planning regimes uphold the protection of the legally

See also, Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 2009. “The Swiss Cheese Syndrome: Pits and Quarries
Come In Clusters”:
http://www.ecoissues.ca/index.php/The_Swiss_Cheese_Syndrome:_Pits_and_Quarries_Come_in_Clusters
[ECO, “Swiss Cheese”].
36
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protected lands within them. The political nature of these legally enforceable boundaries has
significant implications for the relationship between rurality and environmental justice.
Further, the desire to protect Plan Area land can result in a desire to shift impacts elsewhere
without regard to the consequences for human and more-than-human communities elsewhere.
While some aggregate development is likely inevitable in Ontario’s future, determining the
‘right’ place for extraction and its impacts must be part of an inclusive and progressive
planning process in which a wide range of rural people-place relations are recognized,
challenged, and reconfigured. If place-protective behaviours in rural land use activism serve
to compound existing environmental burdens and colonial land use patterns, they will
undermine environmental justice and the potential for transformative alliances for just
sustainability.

A. Put It Up There: Layers of Rurality and the Colonial Potential of Place

Given the likelihood of ongoing demand for aggregate, some participants indicated that they
were not opposed to aggregate extraction, instead commenting that it was an appropriate land
use elsewhere (Interview, March 12, 2013; May 23, 2014). Some pointed to other proposals
that were preferable to their own without reflecting on the consequences for other ecologies
and human communities in that place (Interview, August 8, 2014). The potential for this
impact shifting has clear implications for places outside the boundaries of the Plan,
particularly Indigenous communities and those with less financial resources and political
power. From an environmental justice perspective, the potential for particular communities to
bear the burden of extraction as a result of reduced regulatory oversight is significant. This is
compounded by the relative power of some communities to mobilize opposition and reinforce
regulatory boundaries while others are presumed to be willing hosts, or in the case of
Indigenous communities, are continuing to fight for recognition of their jurisdiction in
relation to lands and resources.

Some participants specifically emphasized a distinction between the role of rural Southern
Ontario as agricultural land and the North as the appropriate place for extraction. The drive to
protect farmland and agricultural communities in southern Ontario was simultaneously
connected to both instrumental interests and to the sense of interdependence and reliance on
the land. The desire to shift extraction elsewhere was coupled with a sense that extractive
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activity was more “appropriate” on land outside of agricultural areas and the implication that
the impacts on people-place relations in such places would be less significant. This desire to
shift extractive development ‘somewhere else’ exposes the uneasy relationship between rural
agricultural areas and ‘the North’ in Ontario. There are important legal, political, economic,
geographical, and cultural reasons to see the southern and northern parts of the province as
distinct (Stark et al., 2014). However, unless opposition to aggregate disputes in Southern
Ontario includes a rejection of the construction of the North as the “appropriate” site of
extractive activity, it will compound the social and environmental injustices faced by
Indigenous communities (Agyeman et al., 2010; Stark et al., 2014).

Detailed analysis of the complex issues surrounding extractive industries in Indigenous lands
and the role of mining in Northern Ontario are outside the scope of this paper; however, it is
essential to note that the Rural-Northern relationship is an important dimension of any
consideration of rurality and environmental justice in Canada. The following brief discussion
of the legal construction of this relationship points to the need for further research,
particularly on the role of Indigenous perspectives and legal jurisdiction in Ontario’s land use
planning framework. The Far North Act, 2010 (SO, 2010, c. 18) now imposes a distinct land
use-planning regime for the Far North, which purports to balance the rights of Indigenous
communities with environmental conservation and mining interests. In fact it reinforces
provincial authority, providing a “public interest” veto for development and resource
decisions, and upholds the hierarchical privileging of extractive rights (Gardner et al., 2012;
Pardy and Stoehr, 2012; Wilkinson and Schulz, 2012). The construction of the North as the
appropriate space for resource development is also upheld in the 2014 Policy Statement
which simultaneously presents an inclusive rurality while distinguishing the working
agricultural landscapes of the South from the natural North in section 1.1.4: “Across rural
Ontario, local circumstances vary by region. For example, Northern Ontario’s natural
environment and vast geography offer different opportunities than the predominately
agricultural areas of southern regions of the Province.” This resource-based distinction is also
emphasized by the Government’s departmental structure – for example, the division between
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs, and the Ministry of Northern
Development and Mines. While the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing is responsible
for the Planning Act and planning related issues generally and the Ministry of Aboriginal
Affairs guides provincial relationships with Indigenous communities, the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Forestry deals with community based land use planning for First Nations.
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The Aggregate Resources Act itself applies only to very limited and specific parts of the
province outside Southern Ontario (O. Reg 244/97). While there may be legitimate concerns
that a regime developed for the context of extraction in the South may not serve the needs of
the diverse communities and ecosystems of the North, the exclusion of the majority of land in
Northern Ontario from regulation under the Aggregate Resources Act licensing process
means that municipal Planning Act approvals are the only mechanism for review in large
parts of the province where Indigenous lands and rights may be impacted.37 In Ontario, the
exclusion of the North from the Aggregate Resources Act regime has been compounded by
the silence in the Planning Act and until 2014, the Policy Statement, on the duty to consult
and accommodate Indigenous Peoples. At the time of writing it remains unclear what the
implications of the 2014 Policy Statement’s recognition of the duty to consult and
accommodate Indigenous communities are for municipal decision-making in Ontario.38
Given the powerful role of the Policy Statement in decision-making by both municipal
governments and the Ontario Municipal Board, this explicit provincial delegation of the duty
to consult and accommodate to municipalities is significant. However, the failure of the
Aggregate Resources Act and associated policies to clarify how the duty to consult should be
fulfilled, and by whom, leaves First Nations, municipalities and proponents with many
questions about how to proceed with the complex steps of aggregate planning. With the
exception of a lawyer working with Indigenous communities, the professional interviewees
all declined to comment on the duty to consult as outside their expertise. Pressing concerns
about financial support for First Nations to participate in consultations and resources for
municipalities to understand and carry out their obligations are evident within the Plan Area.
The communities of the Saugeen Ojibway Nation report facing complex and sometimes
multiple consultations and have pointed to the need for financial support for staffing and
technical expertise for consultation (Ritchie, 2013, pp. 427–428). This remains a significant

37

Notably the limited application in Northern Ontario is the direct result of one highly controversial proposal for
a large aggregate mine in Michipicoten Bay on the Lake Superior Coast. See the Ontario Municipal Board
decision in Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Wawa and Superior Aggregates Company, PL040025,
November 30, 2009.
38
The duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous Peoples in Canadian law is beyond the scope of this paper,
see for example: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, at para. 168 [Delgamuukw]; Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] SCR 511 [Haida], at para. 35; Taku
River Tlingit First Nations v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550
[Taku River]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388, 2005
SCC 69 (Canlii), 259 DLR (4th) 610, [2006] 1 CNLR 78 [Mikisew]; Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario
(Natural Resources) 2014 SCC 48.
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challenge facing First Nations involved with the aggregate licensing processes. Similar to
other types of mining, it involves the review and interpretation of complex technical reports
including planning, natural heritage, hydrology, geology, hydrogeology, archeology and
cultural heritage and often air quality, as well as requiring independent expertise to provide
advice and expert evidence in any legal proceedings.

The consistent privileging of extractive land uses in the Policy and the Far North Act could
align Indigenous and non-Indigenous rural interests in efforts to realize a place-based
approach to land use planning. However, such opportunities cannot be realized if even the
most active and informed opponents of aggregate development elsewhere in the province
frame extraction “up there” or “up North” as appropriate or preemptively acceptable
(Interview, September 9, 2014). While the 2011 proposal for a mega quarry in the
agricultural community of Melancthon Township in Southern Ontario met with international
criticism and solidarity from urbanites and First Nations, the massive recent expansion of the
Lafarge Meldrum quarry beside Sheshegwaning First Nation on Manitoulin Island was
approved with little outcry. The aforementioned quarry will now be the largest in Canada and
was approved despite minimal engagement with the First Nation who have a constitutional
right to be consulted and accommodated with respect to development on their territory during
the licensing process (Interview, September 5, 2014). A just and sustainable dialogue about
the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ places for aggregate mines must not only respect the constitutional
rights of Indigenous Peoples with respect to land and resources in the context of land use
planning, it must go much further to take enduring Indigenous legal orders as a starting point
for a transformative politics of place and relationswith land.
10. Conclusions: Towards a Just Politics of Rural Places
The way law structures rurality and rural places has important material consequences for the
human and more-than-human inhabitants of particular places. Disputes over aggregate
extraction in Ontario’s Niagara Escarpment demonstrate the way law shapes and constrains
our relationships with place. I have argued elsewhere that the structural privileging of
ownership in the operation of land use law undermines the progressive potential of planning
(Van Wagner, 2013). Here, I have demonstrated how the legal construction of the rural as a
residual space produces rural places as sacrifice zones between spaces of environmental
protection and economic growth. Engagement with the embodied experiences of rural peopleplace relations demonstrates that they are complex and sometimes contradictory, at once
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instrumental and affective, exclusionary and reciprocal (Foster, 2009). In my view, this
engagement in those places that are socially and legally constructed as rural can contribute to
a broadened conception of environmental justice focused on the mutual interdependence of
living in the land. If this broadened notion of environmental justice requires us to learn and
practice new ways of living in, working with, and caring for the land as we pursue social
inclusion and decolonization, the perspectives explored here serve as a tentative starting point
for difficult, unsettling and necessary dialogue about the future of Ontario’s rural places.

While land use planning conflicts can, and do, result in narrow and exclusionary politics of
the ‘local’, it is cautiously argued that they may also serve as strategic openings for the
articulation of alternative social and ecological relationships. As a starting point, participants
in rural land use conflicts must strengthen and deepen the transformative potential of their
movements through meaningful engagement with the theories and practices of environmental
justice. In Ontario, this is particularly relevant to hopes for building relationships of
solidarity, respect, and reconciliation between rural land users, environmental movements,
and Indigenous communities. Rural land use activism plays a role in redefining rural peopleplace relations through meaningful engagement with enduring, place-based Indigenous legal
orders and a progressive politics of environmental health and social inclusion. However, this
requires careful and critical attention to both the structural obstacles and the cultural
assumptions underlying narratives of property ownership, appropriate development, and
hierarchies of land use, as well as a rejection of colonial and exclusionary place-protective
politics. As Alexa Scully argues, places can serve as the “literal common ground” necessary
for the kind of “rich dialogue and understanding across perspectives” required for
decolonization (Scully, 2012). Ongoing relationships with First Nations that were developed
durng the Melancthon mega quarry campaign are hopeful developments that should be
sustained (Interview, August 8, 2015). As well, the Coalition on the Niagara’s Escarpment’s
policy on working with First Nations, which includes commitments to self-education about
Indigenous rights and perspectives and a prioritization of relationships with First Nations was
notably developed in collaboration with Indigenous environmental and legal experts Henry
Lickers and law Professor John Borrows. 39

39

Aboriginal Policy for CONE:
<http://www.niagaraescarpment.org/images/docs/cone_aboriginal_policy_final.pdf> and on file with the author.
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Opposition to aggregate extraction in Ontario is often characterized as site- and issuespecific, and this is sometimes the case. However, there are also important examples of
parties shifting their focus to broader campaigns about regional land use planning and
environmental decision-making. For example, the province-wide Food and Water First
campaign evolved from the opposition to the Melancthon mega quarry and continues active
engagement in law and policy reform and electoral politics. One organizer described the
evolution as follows, noting the opportunity for solidarity and transformative politics:
The way this conversation changed from a potential […] quarry application to
engaging tens of thousands of people on the common denominator that our water
is not for sale, our water is sacred and not to be polluted, and our food lands are
there for the betterment of this province, this food and water first in our thinking
tore away all other lines of difference. It is to me the sleeping giant in elections
from here on forward, federally or provincially, the protection of water and food
lands is raising up what people are willing to take action on (Interview, March 12,
2014).
Organizing the Nelson quarry opposition included efforts to bring the regional communities
together to articulate a proactive and long term “community vision” for the region. That
grassroots exercise became the basis for local government efforts to develop a regional rural
vision:
That had enough influence on the city that they came after a couple years later
and had council create what they call the rural vision. They did the same process
as we had done and workshops and all that and had people design how the rural
area would look in the future vision. This work is to form part of the municipal
Official Plan, thus formally identifying the value of preserving rural agricultural
and natural areas (Interview, May 7, 2014).

These campaigns serve as strategic opportunities to link rural land use activism with
environmental justice goals in order to negotiate and articulate alternative conceptions of
rurality. The 2015 Plan review serves as another key moment for intervention to remove
structural obstacles and foreground relationships with place. At the time of writing, the
review is ongoing and ultimately the Province will determine the revisions to the Plan
regardless of the Commission’s recommendations. Nonetheless, the Commission’s strong
affirmation of an environment-first and values-led interpretation of the Act should be seen as
an opening for the assertion of alternative and transformative relations with rural places. In
particular, it creates conceptual space in which a critical politics of rural place could shift the
way law structures rural people-place relations. This requires rejection of exclusionary and
individualistic site-specific opposition to development in particular places. Instead, it must be
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replaced with an active, humble, and critical engagement with a wide range of the human and
more-than-human actors inhabiting, or seeking to inhabit, the conceptual and literal common
ground of rural places.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion – An Eco-Relational Approach to Land Use Law

1. A Summary of Research Findings: Placing Private Property in Ontario’s
Land Use Law
This final chapter weaves the findings and arguments in the preceding chapters together to set
out an eco-relational approach to land use law, built on my study of Ontario’s quarry
conflicts. This dissertation has examined aggregate mineral extraction in order to understand
how we might transform the way we resolve disputes about how we use, and live with, the
more-than-human world. Here I summarize the findings of the study by returning to my
ecological adaptation of Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis introduced in Chapter
Five as a framework to think through how we might start to “live well together in the land.”1
Informed by critical ecological property theorists, particularly Nicole Graham, and legal
geographers, such as Nicholas Blomley and Sarah Whatmore, I apply my eco-relational
analysis to foreground the people-place relations at stake in aggregate extraction conflicts.
Informed by the articulations and assertions of alternative people-place relations uncovered
through this research, I consider the potential for an eco-relational approach to land use
disputes to bring about transformative change in Ontario’s land use law.

First this section summarizes the existing legal relations of aggregate mineral extraction in
Ontario. Based on the documentary and interview data collected in this project, I then
consider the place-based values at stake for the more-than-owner parties involved in
aggregate conflicts and discuss how the people-place relationships uncovered in this research
uphold these values. Finally, in considering the “institutional and rhetorical means of
expressing, contesting, and implementing” that could uphold these place-based values and
relations, I propose specific changes to the legal and policy framework, and argue
transformative changes are required to the way we make land use decisions in Ontario. 2 This
research demonstrates that participatory rights are not enough to realize environmental justice
and just sustainability. Without meaningful opportunities to negotiate, contest, and shape the

Randolph Haluza-Delay, Michael J DeMoor & Christopher Peet, “That We May Live Well Together in the
Land...: Place Pluralism and Just Sustainability in Canadian and Environmental Studies” (2013) 47 J Can Stud
Détudes Can 3 226.
2
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 236.
1
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values and assumptions at the heart of property and planning law, the process remains closed
to the full range of people-place relations at stake in aggregate mineral extraction conflicts.
Rather, we require a fundamental reorientation of property relations in which ownership is
not only decentred but also reconceived as one of a broader range of people-place relations
with private land. Finally, I observe that future research about the role of Indigenous
jurisdiction over land use decisions, as well as substantive engagement with Indigenous legal
concepts in land use law, are a necessary part of re-shaping Ontario’s people-place relations
towards just sustainability.

A. Enacting the Ownership Model: Understanding the Legal Relations of
Ontario’s Aggregate Minerals
This dissertation has examined the relationship between private property and public land use
planning. I have demonstrated how, despite participatory opportunities for a range of parties
in the planning process, private ownership remains a powerful and central force in shaping
Ontario’s land use law. The chapters above examine why and how the ownership model of
property-relations is achieved and sustained in the province.

As demonstrated in Chapter Four and discussed in Chapters Five through Eight, the structure
of Ontario’s land use law and policy gives priority to particular forms of use and
development. Chapter Four provides a detailed description of how aggregate mineral
extraction is constructed as one such privileged land use. It demonstrates how aggregate
minerals are produced as resources, severed from and valued above all other physical,
ecological, social, and cultural features of a particular place. Chapter Six demonstrates how
the people-place relations of ownership are enrolled to uphold a utilitarian vision of the
public good as development and economic growth while the much broader range of morethan-owner relations with the land at stake are severed, and therefore excluded, for the
purposes of legal decision-making. This structure of legal relations has consequences that
extend beyond the boundaries of a particular site-specific dispute, and even beyond the
particular case of aggregate mineral regulation, as the messy socio-materiality of peopleplace relations is “placed outside the frame” of land use law.3 The dominant ownership model
Nicholas Blomley, “Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing” (2014) 10 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 1 133
at 136.
3
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of property is upheld and successfully performed despite the ongoing and creative assertion
of alternative people-place relations.4

An emphasis on the exclusivity and alienability of private property underpins the narrow
view of the state evidenced in the proponent-driven land use regime governing aggregate
extraction and the increasing reliance on self-compliance and monitoring. As demonstrated in
Chapter Six, in addition to the temporal privilege to initiate the events in the application
process, the owner has the spatio-temporal power to shape the site prior to extraction and
determine what more-than-human entities and material relations will or will not exist for the
purposes of the legal process. The severability of land from its wider relations is reinforced
by the primary role of the legal land owner in the consultation process through which the
more-than-ownership relations engaged by the proposed development are asserted and shaped
for the purposes of the subsequent litigation. As demonstrated in Chapters Seven and Eight,
the material and social consequences of transformative extraction are trivialized or even
deemed irrelevant to decisions about how private land should be used. The documentary
analysis and interviews set out in Chapters Six through Eight expose a significant
discontinuity between the more-than-ownership people-place relations at stake and the legal
regulation of the places produced as sites for aggregate development.5

As I contended in Chapter Four, the work of hierarchically ordering land uses is done through
the guiding planning policy in the Provincial Policy Statement and by the inversion of the
broader municipal planning inquiry and the provincial licensing approvals regime. Chapter
Six described how this inversion shifts the primary analysis from a broad planning inquiry
into whether a particular development should proceed to a managerial aggregate licensing
inquiry and about how it should proceed. The mandatory protection of the resource and
aggregate operations from other land uses in the Policy Statement is compounded by the
explicit exclusion of analysis about whether and where the resource is needed, the close-tomarket requirement, and the treatment of extraction as interim use regardless of the impacts
and the form of rehabilitation. By hierarchically ordering both the physical features and uses
of a particular place, the Act and the Policy Statement produce aggregate extraction sites as
alienable commodities and attempts to sever more-than-owner and non-instrumental peopleNicholas Blomley, “Performing Property, Making the World” (2013) 26 Can J Law Jurisprud 24 23.
Deborah Martin, Alexander Scherr & Christopher City, “Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the
Production of Space” (2010) 34 Progress in Human Geography 2 175.
4
5
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place relations for the purposes of land use decision-making. As Chapter Seven argued, the
exclusion of these relations upholds a dualistic view of nature and culture that precludes
responsibility and interdependence. Further, as Chapter Eight demonstrated, it produces and
upholds the legal construction of rural places as residual – the potential sacrifice zones
between the urban and the natural. As commodities to be used for the benefit of those
exercising the dominium of ownership are enrolled in a vision of the provincial interest
privileging extraction, places can be harmed and even destroyed with only minimal
requirements for mitigation or reactive ‘adaptive management’ to address the significant and
even irreversible transformation or loss of a place and its relations.
B. Listening to the Heart: Creating Space for More-Than-Owner Values and
Relations in Ontario’s Land Use Planning System
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight provide insight into the values at stake for the more-thanowner parties and the relations that can uphold these values. As I note in Chapter Seven, the
values and relationships asserted by more-than-owner parties are messy – all at once
instrumental and affective, conservative and transformative, exclusionary and reciprocal. As
on more-than-owner party reflected: “The water, the land, the air, the alvar, those are
important. I don't know which is more important. It depends on whether it is your land.” Few
raised concerns about property values directly; however, several did note concerns about
traffic and noise or vibration impacts on their property or raised such concerns in the
planning process. One planner noted that she often hears concerns related to the “loss of
enjoyment of their property” or damage from blasting; however, she simultaneously observed
that people engage in Niagara Escarpment planning processes because they “really value that
it is a special place.” In this study, all participants raised concerns about ecological impacts
during the interviews and in the consultation or litigation materials, both in terms of human
dependence on ecological systems and the importance of relations within the more-thanhuman world. In uncovering what was at stake for the more-than-owner parties who
participated in this research, two strong themes emerged which disrupt the dominant legal
structure of people-place relations set out above: responsibility and humility.

While these were not the only values and relations articulated, I have emphasized their
potential to disrupt dominant property relations and perform alternative people-place relations
through land use law. It is necessary, in my view, to foreground these assertions and reject
simplistic characterizations of rural land use conflicts while remaining attuned to, and
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critically addressing, the exclusionary potential of ‘local’ politics of place in rural land use
conflicts. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter Eight, we must do both in order to reshape rural
people-place relations towards a practice of environmental justice with ecological integrity at
its core.

Responsibility emerged in the context of both intergenerational and interspecies relations.
This was linked to a sense of emergent and dynamic sense of belonging to places in relation
to other beings, both human and more-than-human.6 A more-than-owner party involved in
litigation over a site on the shore of one of the Great Lakes noted his lifelong passion for the
lake.7 Another lamented the potential industrialization of the “longest stretch of wilderness
shore line on any of the Great Lakes.” One more-than-owner party described the
interconnected ecological systems and species on her childhood home, adjacent to a proposed
extraction site, which include fields and a woodlot, as well as complex hydrogeological
systems:
Mostly it's an upland deciduous forest, lots of maple, beech, there's some pine and
definitely there are some evergreens. It is the top mountainy ledge above, so it's a
recharge zone so there's no water coming from anywhere. It's the high ground and it's
an outlier on the top of the escarpment so it relies entirely on snow and rain for its
water supply, and yet there are all these springs that are poking out at the top of this
plateau. The hydrogeology up there is really impossible to model because of the
limestone karst, which is rock that has been worn down for 400 hundred million years
and has all these channels and fissures, and caves. [It] is known for its caves. There are
springs and there are sinkholes. It's really cool. There are big depressions in the forest
floor.8
She recalled searching for frogs and snakes as a child and went on to describe the intersection
of her family property with the proposed extraction site: “…[W]here all the properties meet at
the back there it's paradise-like, it really is.” Reflecting on arriving home after learning of the
proposal: “I had a distinct memory of coming home and when this was just starting to unfold
and seeing it going, ‘that's as good as it gets.’ That's world-class beauty and nature.”9

Several more-than-owner participants talked about particular species, such as the Jefferson
salamander, the bobolink, the butternut tree or Hart’s tongue fern, or specific ecological

Davina Cooper, “Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the Productive Life of
Property” (2007) 32 Law Soc Inq 3 625 at 329.
7
Interview, August 23, 2014.
8
Interview, August 11, 2014.
9
Ibid.
6
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systems, such as forests, alvars, wetlands, and geological formations. One professional
naturalist described how cattle grazing by local farmers maintained boblink habitat because
they require short grasses, and had observed that aggregate companies would strategically
end grazing arrangements on their land in advance of applications to erase potential obstacles
to approval. Another more-than-owner party expressed a sense of awe about the bat habitat
created by the fissures in the karst rock system and the pristine alvar environment on the
proposed site. That alvar is home to an endemic silver butterfly species and several rare plant
species, such as the ram’s head lady slipper, which grow in very few other places in the
world. Others emphasized the importance of connectivity between various parts of wetland
complexes within or adjacent to the proposed extraction sites, for example one more-thanowner party noted: “The property in total is a very rich ecological myriad of wetlands and
rich with species of critters, flora and fauna.” Another lamented how two simultaneous
quarry applications on nearby lands failed to consider the interconnected wetlands running
through and between each site. As one more-than-owner party put it when describing the
wetlands and forests adjacent to the proposed extraction site, as well as the species that rely
on them, , “[i]t is an ecosystem. You have to look at it as an ecosystem.” Farmers who
participated in the study emphasized the relationship between the high quality soil in the area
and the hydrogeological functions of the limestone underneath which creates the conditions
for crops to survive in both wet and dry weather. To understand this unique soil, one farmer
noted, “you have to get out and feel it and smell it.”10 In his view, few proponents or decision
makers ever did so.

As noted in Chapter Eight, at times social responsibility was also linked to solidarity with
other communities built through alliances as urban and rural or Indigenous and settler parties
came together. These alliances were often new and unexpected, as a specific place became
“the common ground” for an alternative story of what was at stake in the dispute. 11 In my
view, these have the potential to serve as key starting points for conversations and
negotiations we need to have about how we want to live together as human communities
embedded in the social and ecological complexity of particular material places. 12 As Graham
notes, it is the landscapes themselves, so long deemed invisible and irrelevant to law, we
10
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must look to in order to remind ourselves of our interdependence and our limitations as we
negotiate the complex socio-materiality of place.13 A southern Ontario farm may
simultaneously reveal the grid of the colonial survey and Crown land grants, ongoing
contestation about the jurisdiction of an Indigenous legal order over land use decisions, and
the licenced extraction area for a future quarry that will one day become a lake on top of the
Niagara Escarpment. When we see the materiality of legal relations as continually produced,
and contested, through places we are better positioned to shape and reshape law to reflect
relations of care, connection, and interdependence with the more-than-human world.

In my view, relations of guardianship or stewardship have the potential to decentre ownership
within people-place relations and to uphold articulations of responsibility towards places,
even those constituted by private land. While the specific content of these concepts must be
developed and contested in relation to place, by emphasizing interdependence and connection
with the more-than-human world these relations could foster the necessary humility to
account for a much wider range of relations, both human and more-than-human. In my view,
humility is required both with respect to our ability to know and change the more-than-human
world, and therefore to manage it; but, also to develop a much richer conception of need that
accounts for the embeddedness of a particular resource in ecological and physical systems. In
this way, the needs of owners, as well as those of more than owners and more than humans,
are understood as part of an interdependent network of relations, but are not given
presumptive primacy by virtue of legal ownership. As with Arnold’s web of interests, the
point is not to erase human activity from the landscape nor prohibit use of the more-thanhuman world, but to make visible the material consequences of particular people-place
relations, and make possible a contextual place-based assessment of sustainability.
Ownership, therefore, would emphasize particular responsibility to attend to the people-place
relations, rather than the unilateral power to shape them.

A shift towards having relationships with places rather than to others in relation to place, or
even to the land itself, has the potential to centre foreground relations of responsibility and
reciprocity. This requires us to contemplate what the legal relations of land use planning
would look like if, in James Penner’s words, we were “condemned to having to deal” with

13
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“things.” What if, in contrast to Penner, we understood the things as having much to say
about their relations, and us as having the responsibility to take this into account? 14 Notably
this research revealed that the process of engaging in a planning conflict changed, and often
deepened participants’ instrumental relations with the places at stake. In the context of the
potential or actual loss of place, people described a renewed sense of wonder and humility as
they learned about the complexity and connectivity of ecological systems and came to
appreciate the social and material limits of the places at stake. At the same time, they
emphasized the value of experiential knowledge developed slowly over time through
interaction with the land, contrasting this with the technical expertise procured by the
proponent through ‘people from away’ and sophisticated modeling programs. This research
revealed not only a sense of responsibility to deal with the more-than-human world, but the
possibility that key sources of knowledge and experience were left unrecognized and
unheard. Concerns about the neglect of experiential knowledge were linked to new or
increased concerns about sustainability and the ecological integrity of specific places. Indeed,
descriptions of the impact of aggregate mining as irreversible loss were in marked contrast
with its legal construction as an “interim use” as if the unique and complex place-based
features and values could be removed and replaced without the integrity of ecological
systems and people-place relations being transformed.
C. Finding our Place: The Institutional and Rhetorical Means of Expressing,
Contesting, and Implementing People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Land Use
Law
I have taken a critical view of the existing structure of land use law in Ontario in this project.
Nonetheless, I maintain land use planning decisions can be strategic sites for the assertion of
more-than-owner relations with place. Concepts such as the precautionary principle,
stewardship, and place-based analysis of the impacts of land use have emerged to play key
roles in recent quarry cases, demonstrating the potential to identify and exploit strategic
openings and disrupt dominant people-place relations. However, to face the challenges of the
contemporary environmental crisis in just and sustainable ways, we must seek more
transformative change of our decision-making structures. An eco-relational approach to land
use planning requires both a reorientation of land use decision-making away from the
primacy of private ownership and a redefined conception of ownership. This would create
space to conceptualize and implement new patterns of relationship with the more-than-human

14
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world, including relations based on humility, interconnection, and reciprocity. Thinking this
through is a humbling and possibly never-ending, task. In my view, it requires a range of
responses from changes to the existing regulatory structure to a fundamental rethinking of
ownership in Anglo-Canadian property law.

In the aggregate context, this would start with a very practical shift towards meaningful
participation in decisions by making consultation a public process rather than a private duty.
This would entail a publically-driven, prospective planning process that explicitly includes
place-based analysis of needs and limitations and removes ownership from the site selection
analysis. Instead, as called for by commentators,15 aggregate planning would occur through a
publically-driven, open, strategic planning process informed by both independent experts and
experiential place-based knowledge. Aggregate mineral resources are deemed required in the
provincial interest and should therefore be subject to a site-selection process in which
alternatives are formally considered in light of the benefits and impacts and any
environmental justice considerations about the distribution of harms and benefits. Without
endorsing current “willing-host” and environmental assessment processes, which also exhibit
problematic elements of the proponent-driven approach, aggregate extraction siting should
include the formal and public consideration of alternatives like other controversial land uses.

Consultation and participation in both the broader aggregate planning process and site
specific applications should be the responsibility of provincial and municipal governments
rather than the proponent. While proponents should be required to respond to concerns,
objections, and critiques brought forward by interested parties, meaningful consultation
requires engagement with the decision makers themselves. This would necessarily also
include a meaningful opportunity to say “no” to a specific proposal, regardless of the scale or
timeline of investment for a proponent. In other words, the process must be a process of
decision-making, rather than mere approval. By shifting the work of contestation from a
private burden to a public obligation we can also better safeguard against communities with
fewer resources shouldering a greater burden of resource production and protection; and,
ensure no communities are filling the gaps for under-resourced state actors and enforcement
mechanisms. In particular, knowledge production and procurement of expertise must be
15
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publically driven and independent from the outset, both throughout the process and the life of
a mine site, such that the narrative about the relationships and values at stake are not
predetermined. In addition, funding for participation by a range of parties would guard
against artificial narrowing of more-than-owner intervention by reducing barriers to gaining
legal and technical expertise and making full party status accessible to all before the Board.

In many ways the nature of the task itself reinforces the role of a precautionary approach
because to be humble and responsible we need to slow down and learn, both technically, but
also ethically. In this sense requiring a precautionary approach to aggregate decision-making
is an appropriate legal means of upholding relations of interdependence and connection. This
is relevant in both the scientific sense that fosters respect for ecological integrity and the
complexity and limits of the material world, but also in a broader sense that calls for the
humility to learn from and with places and each other, even where there is uncertainty and
discomfort. Statutorily requiring a needs-based analysis and the application of the
precautionary principle to all aggregate licensing proposals would be a critical starting point.
In addition, requirements for cumulative effects analysis for all extractive development
should be incorporated into the aggregate minerals framework and into planning decisions
more broadly.

Beyond these specific suggestions for regulatory changes, an essential component of the
centering of responsibility and fostering humility in land use law is a much greater role for
Indigenous legal orders. This is both a central part of meaningful commitment to the ongoing
project of reconciliation in the Canadian context, but also a practical approach to shifting
towards place-based relations with land. Respect for enduring legal principles and tools
shaped by relations in particular places can be realized not only through direct jurisdiction
over land use decisions but also through collaboration and partnership based on solidarity,
intergenerational responsibility and place-based alliances. The recent recognition of the Duty
to Consult and Accommodate in the Provincial Policy Statement is a starting point for this
work at the day-to-day operational level of land use governance in Ontario. However, this
also requires much more transformative work with respect to foundational concepts in
Canadian law, including the creative rethinking of property relations and ownership in
particular. It must go beyond consultation and participatory inclusivity to affirm and respect
jurisdiction over a range of land use decisions, and to create space for a sophisticated
engagement with substantive concepts, principles, and processes from Indigenous legal
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orders – even, and perhaps especially, when they challenge the dominant settler-colonial
property relations.

At the same time, an eco-relational re-structuring of people-place relations in AngloCanadian land use law requires us to directly confront the conceptual baggage of ownership
in Anglo-Canadian law. It requires a shift to view private ownership of land as including
limited contextual rights of private use and benefit. These rights would be part of a broader
set of more-than-ownership relations, including duties and obligations with the land itself, as
well as with others (both human and other beings) who may also have rights and obligations
in relation to the land. In this construction of property relations, there is no full bundle of
rights because property could never be understood as simply a private relation. It is always in
relation with, and responsible to, place. There could be no presumptive rights to fundamental
transformation, substantial harm, or destruction of the land automatically flowing from legal
title. Rather, as discussed in Chapter Four, the onus would be on owners to demonstrate how
extractive activity would have no negative impact; or, where negative impacts cannot be
avoided, how they are demonstrably outweighed by benefits to the place as a whole, not
simply presumptive flow-on effects of economic activity such as employment and local
taxation income.

Private ownership would not presumptively include rights to exclude others from the shared
and interconnected material and ecological aspects of private land, requiring ongoing
negotiation and debate about the limits of land uses in particular places. Rather, more-thanownership relations of guardianship or stewardship could serve to balance rights of access,
use, and benefit by centering responsibility and reinforcing ecological integrity as a core
element of people-place relations. In this sense, our autonomy would be enhanced by our
ability to construct reciprocal and sustainable people-place relations rather than our power to
exclude human or more-than-human others from the sphere of our control. Property
ownership would constitute a form of negotiated belonging in the more-than-human world –
a living together well in the land.

This is necessarily a work in progress. The articulation and identification of values and
relationships that matter must be place-based – informed by the complex and negotiated
socio-materiality that constitutes a particular place. Reorienting ownership will require
transformative change – social and political, as well as legal change, and this will often feel
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out of reach. Yet, the messy complexity of disputes over the seemingly mundane extraction
of gravel from Ontario’s rural places demonstrates that while the primacy of private property
in environmental decision-making endures, it is also actively and creatively contested in
unsuspecting places. As Carol Rose reminds us, moments of cultural and political recognition
of alternative property relations can be transformative.16 The decisions examined in Chapter
Four expose these conflicts as strategic openings through which to engage in the difficult and
challenging work of telling new stories about our place in the world. The values and
relationships uncovered in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight demonstrate how rural people-place
relations can challenge the dominant ownership model of property in surprising and
unexpected ways. What I have argued here leaves us with much more work to be done. It will
be difficult, uncomfortable and confronting, involving as much unlearning as learning,
particularly for those of us who are settlers in the lands that make up Ontario. However, in
my view, doing this work provides us with a vital opportunity to tell new stories about
ourselves and about who we are as more-than-owners living well, together, with the places
we inhabit.

2. Coda: Possibility Lives in Places
A relational reorientation of ownership is an essential part of my eco-relational framework
for land use law. However, I also acknowledge there may be contexts in which even this
reconstituted ownership will not reflect the people-place relations of a particular place.
During the final years of this project I have been privileged to live in Aotearoa New Zealand
where I have learned a great deal about the potential for legal creativity, and the importance
of negotiation and contestation in the context of land use law and Indigenous-settler relations.
I have had the honour of teaching natural resource and planning law while the Whanganui
River became recognised as a legal person in law,17 and as a number of creative comanagement arrangements with Māori communities unfold under Treaty of Waitangi
settlements.18 During the final days of my dissertation, the Te Urewera Board released the
draft Te Kawa o Te Urewera,19 the plan created to implement the landmark Te Urewera Act
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enacted as part of the Tūhoe Treaty of Waitangi settlement.20 Under the Act, the lands cease
to be a national park and Te Urewera is vested in itself as its own legal identity, owning itself
in perpetuity.21 The Board, which will eventually be made up of majority Tūhoe members, is
empowered to speak as the voice of Te Urewera and act in the interests of the land. At the
outset of Te Kawa the Chair, Tāmati Kruger, explains the role of the plan as “about the
management of people for the benefit of the land – it is not about land management.” The
plan goes on to explain,
Te Kawa is not intended to operate in the same way as a usual management
plan which focuses on rules. Rather, Te Kawa records principles as law, and
traditions and beliefs as the sense of a better future. As in life, virtues shape
our responsibilities and choices guiding Te Urewera Board decisions on
appropriate and responsible activities in Te Urewera.22
Te Kawa explains the application of Te Urewera’s legal personality as follows:
The Act does not establish the Te Urewera identity rather it liberates it from
human speculation in order that nature and the natural world return to its
primal role, revered and served by those of her children she has given life to.
The use of property rights by the western legal system has hidden from view
the concept of nature; rendered her parts as natural resources now capable of
rival priorities competing with other household choices. These human granted
rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku with ownership now
serving individual advantage. These motives suppress the vision of Te
Urewera as distinct life. Yet, property rights do not give life nor do they
encourage the connectedness of all living things for life. In this altered
relationship people struggle to unify to perceive the whole which is nature
collectively. Needlessly our fracturing of nature has sponsored our own
fragmentation. The use of property rights to regulate human disputes arising
from human society is no longer permissible in and of Te Urewera. Te
Urewera may never again be owned by people.23
Kawa is a contested term within Maoridom; however, it generally means the customary
protocol or procedures to be followed on a particular marae, which is the gathering place for
a Maori community – a “place for the feet to stand” in connection with the ancestors and the
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land, introduced above.24 In this sense, Te Kawa is the product of a specific material, social,
and historical context. It reflects the unique eco-social personality of Te Urewera, the violent
and troubled history of Crown-Tūhoe relations, and Tūhoe tikanga, the ethical framework,
customary practices, and legal order developed over generations. 25 As such, I do not present
it as a model or blueprint for Ontario or other jurisdictions to adopt. We must all do our own
hard work of re-shaping our people-place relations with the more-than-human world in which
we are embedded. Rather, it serves as an example of both the recognition of Indigenous legal
jurisdiction with an existing and enduring place-based system for land use decision-making,
and, of a sophisticated and creative engagement with Indigenous legal concepts offering ways
to break with destructive structural legal relations. In particular, the assertion of connection
and responsibility in place of the severability of resources from their context and of
individual owners from the collective points to the possibility of a structure of legal relations
that transcends the dualism of anthropocentrism or ecocentrism to centre reciprocal peopleplace relations. What possibilities might we uncover if we look to our own places with the
humility and creativity required to reshape our people-place relations?

Hirini Moko Mead & Sidney M Mead, Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Auckland: Huia Publishers,
2003) at 71, 110.
25
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APPENDIX A
Interview Guide – More-than-owner parties
1. How did you first learn about the proposal for the quarry?
a. Please describe where you found the information.
b. Please describe your initial reactions.
c. Please describe where you went for help/guidance or to get more
information.
2. Please describe why it was important to you to be involved in this process.
a. How would you describe what was at stake in this decision?
b. Please describe the land where the quarry was proposed.
3.

Please describe how you become involved in opposing the quarry.
a. Who did you work with?
b. Who did you/do you see as the decision maker in the licensing process for
the quarry?

4. How familiar were you with the aggregate decision making process prior to your
involvement, if at all?
a. Please describe your impressions of the decision-making process when
you first become involved.
b. Has your view of the process changed? In what ways?
5. Please describe what your involvement in the process looked like.
a. What avenues of participation/objection/assertion did you use?
i. Why did you choose these particular forms of involvement?
ii. How effective would you consider these forms of involvement?
b. What was the role of legal counsel?
c. Please describe how you approached different forums or audiences.
6. What, if any, aspects of the process did you find most challenging?
a. Were there particular stages or parts of the process that you felt you could
or could not assert your interests as you would have liked?
7. What, if any, aspects of the process did you find most rewarding/satisfying?
a. Were there particular stages or parts of the process that you felt your
concerns and interests were particularly well understood and responded to?
8. Please describe whether you think your involvement in the process had any impact
on the decision. In what ways?
a. Please describe whether other factors and influences impacted the decision
in your view.
9. What values or priorities do you think the decision reflected?
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10. Please describe whether your involvement has had any impact on the way you
think about the quarry land.
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APPENDIX B
Expert Interview Guide
1. Please describe your understanding of the key environmental issues raised by
aggregate extraction in Ontario.
a. Why are these decisions so contentious in your view?
b. What is at stake for the communities involved?
c. How would you characterize the groups and/or individuals who get involved
in aggregate disputes?
2. Please describe your view of the opportunities for participation in the aggregate
extraction licensing process.
a. What is the role of the EBR and the ER?
b. What, if any, are the challenges that third parties face in participating?
c. What do you consider the most successful participation strategies?
3. How do you think the recent Legislative Review and Government Response dealt
with the concerns of third parties?
a. Do you think the Review’s report and the government response dealt with the
concerns you raised in the submissions?
i. If not, what was missed?
4. What has changed for aggregate planning with the new Policy Statement 2014?
a. Endangered species habitat (ESA reforms)
b. Agricultural land
c. Duty to Consult – First Nations
5. What are the key reforms that could be made to the governance structure?
a. Legal & Policy?
i. PPS
1. Interim?
2. Close to market?
3. Needs assessment?
4. Agricultural land?
ii. Broad provincial strategy?
b. Oversight?
i. Role of MNR and resources?
c. Participatory?
i. Standing and appeal rights?
ii. Funding and access to expertise
d. Screening-out mechanism?
6. Why are so few applications turned down?
a. Role of OMB?
b. Role of MNR?
c. Role of Municipalities?
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7. Recently a few key applications have been turned down by government or the
OMB/Joint-Board, what do you think influenced these decisions?
a. ERT members?
b. Public objection?
c. Participation of third parties?
d. Municipal involvement?
8. What, if anything, do you think the impact of the St. Mary’s settlement and/or the
NAFTA claim will have on the regulation of aggregate in Ontario?
a. On the use of MZOs?
b. On role of community groups?
9. Should the JART-model be the standard for applications?
a. What is the relationship between JARTs and community groups? i.e. invitation
to POWER
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APPENDIX C
Coding Guide
1. The decision making process
a. Relationships with decision makers;
b. Organizing/Activism;
c. Law and legal practices;
i. Jurisdiction
d. Planning policy and practice;
i. Balance
e. Experts and the role of science;
i. Knowledge
f. Enforcement;
i. Adaptive management
ii. Rehabilitation
2. Place
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Descriptions of place
Characterizing participants
Land ownership
Land use
Knowledge about place
Framing
Rurality;
i. Definition
ii. Law
iii. Planning
iv. Rural-urban relationship
v. Agriculture, economy
h. Temporality
i. Indigenous knowledge, jurisdiction, and land use

3. What was at stake: values, rights, relationships
a. Environmental;
i. Water
ii. Land use
b. Economic;
i. Jobs
ii. Development
iii. Property values
c. Social;
i. Health
ii. Relationships/community
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